Private versus public heroes : politics of commemoration by Lebel, Udi
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Private versus public heroes : politics of commemoration
Lebel, Udi
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
Department of Mediterranean Studies 
King's College 
University of London 
Private versus Public Heroes: 
The Politics of Commemoration in Israel, 1949-1963 
Dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 





The research was carried out under the supervision of Prof. Efraim Karsh. 
Abstract 
This study deals with the period 1949-1963, the years that frame early nation building 
in Israel and what scholars term the era of Labor Movement political dorninance. In 
the pre-State period, Mapai, the leading party in the Movement, had attempted to 
attain hegemony as well as dominance over Zionist politics. In doing so, the party had 
engaged in incessant delegitimation of its political rival - the Revisionist Movement 
(Etzel and Lehi), what was to become the Herut Movement after independence. From 
the period of the State's infancy on, Herut would try to counter the negative image 
produced by Mapai's delegitimation of its policies and activities. 
The main arena of collective memory from which Mapai attempted to exclude 
the contributions of Etzel and Lehi was bereavement and commemoration. 
The fundamental research question pertains to the relationship between 
memory in general and bereavement in particular in the context of political 
dominance. That is, I focus on the politics of cultural construction not only among a 
country's living citizens but also among its deceased. Death, it appears, can be 
recruited to political needs. 
The study is divided into five chapters. The first provides the theoretical and 
contextual framework of the study. It deals with the relationship between political 
dominance and the construction of collective memory. Four chapters follow, 
representing the empirical portion of the study. Each focuses on one dimension of 
what Noret calls lieux de memoire, spaces for the realization of political processes and 
strategies: political, physical -geographic, semantic-symbolic and historiographical. 
The conclusion indicates why Mapai's political dominance did not survive for 
long after the period studied. As cracks in its ability to preserve its hegemony 
widened, excluded groups were able to penetrate Israel's collective memory. Political 
dominance, it is shown, weakens when control over collective memory declines. 
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Preface 
Private versus Public Heroes 
Several years ago, upon arriving in Beer Sheva just before starting to teach at the 
Department of Politics and Government, the University of Beer Sheva, I rented an 
apartment in one of the last neighborhoods to be constructed in the city, probably 
during the 1980s. Although it hadn't caught my attention at first, I soon noticed that 
all the streets in the vicinity of my new home had been named after leaders of "the 
Revisionist camp, " Israel's political right. It came as quite a surprise to rne: Streets in 
the rest of the city all bore the names of leaders associated with the "Labor camp, " 
Israel's political left. Wherever you turned you would be confronted by mention of the 
forefathers of Israel's Labor Movement, on streets, roundabouts and major 
intersections, built and named by the State. Suddenly, I found myself wondering 
whether to turn at Kashani Street or Dresner Street, both named after two among the 
Oley HaGardom, the Etzel members caught and hanged by the British during the Z-- 
period of the Mandate in Palestine. 
My observation was not coincidental, the outcome of local taste. Beer Sheva, 
like most of Israel's cities, had been controlled for decades by the Labor Movement 
and its component par-ties, especially Mapai. The pattern was repeated in Tel Aviv, 
Haifa, and Jerusalem. Only those neighborhoods, like mine, which had been 
constructed from the early 1980s, the period when the right - "the nationalist camp" 
- held the reins of government, gradually displayed references to this historic 
movement. 
g 
My curiosity was aroused, and I became aware of another, similar tendency. I 
noticed that in their history classes, my nephews were studying about heroes and 
organizations that had fought for Israel's independence, such as the Aharonson family 
and Nili, the underground organization it helped found, which were absent from the 
texts that I had used. 
These two phenomena - street names and history class subjects - reflect the 
same, wider trend. As of the early 1980s, the Israeli public has been steadily exposed 
to more and more information previously concealed from its awareness. In addition to 
the requisite attention given to defense, the economy and social welfare, the rightist 
regime that had come to power for the first time had begun to flood Israel's collective 
memory with what were for the majority new programs, historical events, periods, and 
heroes. The social engineering performed by its predecessor, the Labor Movement, 
had made it clear to the Israeli public - but especially to its new citizens, the 
generations born after 1948 and the waves of immigrants who had not participated in 
the independence project - that its political parties, ideology, leadership and policy 
bore exclusive responsibility for the national rebirth of the Jewish people. 
Numerous studies delving into the historiography of nations and their wars 
have already taught us that history is always shaped and written by the victors. In the 
present case, however, we are not dealing with a dominant Jewish narrative that 
excluded the alternative Arab narrative. Rather, the case before us is that of a 
dominant party's narrative that excluded the alternative narrative associated with its 
assumed partner in a common enterprise. Both belonged to the Zionist camp and both 
strove to achieve an optimistic vision: the establishment of a Jew i sh -democratic state 
in the Middle East. 
h 
This study examines the political dynamics of the construction of Israel's 
collective memory; more explicitly, official commemoration of the nation's martyrs, 
members of the Jewish fighting forces killed in the pre-State era and immediately 
afterwards. The study covers the years 1949-1963, a period labeled by scholars of 
political parties and regimes as the period of Labor Movement political dominance. 
The era depicted displays two prominent characteristics: First, the totality of politics. 
The entire public sphere as well as most areas of civil life were structured according 
to decisions made in the political arena. Second, the boundless control exercised by 
Mapai and its head, David Ben Gurion. As a political movement, Mapai's power was 
such that no parliamentary coalition could be formed without it as the controlling 
faction. In reality, the "party" dictated more than health, economic or defense policy 
- subjects touching upon the affairs of the living - it also determined 
commemoration policy and historiography, matters concerning the dead. In the period 
in question, politics had entered the cemetery. 
This study could not have been concluded without the friendship, support and 
assistance of many. It is impossible to list them all. I would like to single out those 
whose direct help made it possible for me to complete the writing of this dissertation: 
Maury Kantor of the Labor Party Archives, Amira Stem of the Jabotinsky Institute 
Archives, Doron Aviad of the IDF Archives. In their company and with their 
assistance, I spent days and nights burrowing through documents, files, and 
containers, opened for the first time at my request. They tirelessly and graciously, 
with the utmost professionalism, disclosed the wealth of correspondence, documents, 
and registries that represent the study's empirical foundations. I would also like the 
thank the dozens of bereaved families who let me peruse through private letters., 
documents and personal Journals whose contents are made public here for the first 
time. Collection of the material could never have been properly completed without the 
generous assistance of Moshe Primer of the Ve'Yikra (N'7/717) bookshop in Tel Aviv, 
who helped me locate rare books and cornmemorative literature published during the 
period covered. My sincere thanks are also extended to members of the acadernic 
community: my supervisors, Prof. Efraim Karsh, Head of the Department of 
Mediterranean Studies, King's College, University of London, and Dr. Rory Miller, 
also of the Department of Mediterranean Studies, for their unfailing encouragement; 
Prof. Gideon Doron for his comments on the research methodology; Dr. Yuval Yonai, 
Dr. Maoz Azaryahu and Dr. Avishai Erlich for their readiness to work through various 
issues with me during the course of the research. I likewise wish to thank Mr. Yehiel 
Kadishai, Cabinet Secretary during the Begin Administration, who dedicated 
numerous hours to guaranteeing the accuracy of the events described herein. Special 
thanks are also due to the Jabotinsky Institute and the Yad Tabenkin Research and 
Documentation Center for their financial support. Finally, I would like to thank Nina 




On 14 May 1948 (5 
-1yar), 
David Ben Gurion officially declared establishment of the 
State of Israel. Together with construction of the regime's institutions and 
administrative agencies, significant efforts and resources were dedicated to the 
production of a civil culture, its symbols, myths and rituals. ] This civil culture was 
required to provide interpretations and meanings, a dominant version of the events 
that had taken place during the War of Independence and the pre-State goals the War 
was meant to achieve. For the scholar, this date therefore marks a crucial stage in the 
development of collective memory and the state rituals that maintain that memory as a 
vital factor in the game of Israeli national politics. 
The Period of the Study 
The present study thus deals with the period 1949-1963, the years that frame 
early nation-building, when Israel's state rituals and collective memory were in 
process of formation. During its infancy, crucial choices are made with respect to the 
objects that will embody a nation's symbolic, historical, and ritualistic meanings; 2 
especially important, as Mircea Eliade states, is the selection of those symbols that 
structure perceptions of the collective past. This period is, therefore, the most charged 
lAzarvahu, M., 1995, State Rituals, Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion Universitv of the Negev and Sde Boker: 
Ben Gurion Archives. (flebrekv) 
2 Ibid., p. 12. 
2 
with those meanings that will accompany political structuration and actively influence 
evolving political processes and culture. 3 The year 1949, the peak of the process of 
national rebirth, an historical watershed for the Jewish people, the transition from 
diffusion and exile to deliverance, opens this period. 4 The year 1963, with the 
resignation from the government of David Ben Gurion, the founding father and master 
builder of Israel's collective memory, closes it. 
Scholars of political parties and regimes label the period 1949-1963 the era of 
Labor Movement political dominance. 5 For the sake of clarity, the Labor Movement 
was an ideological framework covering several organized factions; Mapai, a political 
party, functioned as its parliamentary arm first in the pre-State (referred to as the 
Yishuv) forums and then in Israel's Knesset. With Mapai's increasing strength, 
political dominance shifted from the Movement to the party; the two would become 
synonymous in the public mind and in the practice of politics. The preceding period, 
from 1919 to the initiation of the Jewish community's active struggle for 
independence in 1947, is identified with the Movement's efforts to attain dominance. 
In the pre-State period, Mapai attempted to attain dominance over Zionist politics and 
hegemony over its political system. Statehood marked the seeming conclusion of what 
came to be called the 1948 Generation's mission, that of national self-determination. 
Its efforts to do so are detailed in Yaakov Goldstein's The Road to Hegemony, which 
6 describes Mapai's behavior during the years 1930-1936 , when the aims and strategy 
that were to characterize the party for generations were crystallized. It could be 
anticipated that Mapai's leaders would want to reproduce their pre-State 
3 Eliade, M., trans. W. Trask, 1963. Myth and Reality, New York: Harper & Row. 
4 Azaryahu, 1995, p. 2. 
'Goldberg, G. 1992, Israel's Political Pat-ties. Front Mass Parties to Electoral Parties, Tel Aviv: 
Ramot. (Hebrew) 
"Goldstein, Y., 1980, The Road to Hege117017y, Alapai - Policy Formation, 1930-1936, Tel Aviv: Am 
Oved. (Hebrew) 
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organizational framework and political power in the new era. We will thus deal with a 
period when the political, legal, and procedural rules of the democratic game as it is 
played in Israel came into existence. Actors and entrepreneurs active in the political 
arena would utilize these new tools for the preservation of their political might while 
attempting to acquire the status of a dominant party. 
The Herut Movement, the party peopled in the main by Mapai's pre-State 
political opponents, represented this same opposition after independence. Just as they 
had in the pre-State period, Herut's members would try to counter their negative 
image, the product of Mapai's delegitimation of their policies and activities, so as to 
amass power and effectively threaten the Labor regime. 
The political conflict between Mapai and Herut would be played out against 
the background of the struggle for independence and the organizations that played 
significant roles in that struggle. Thus, 24 hours after the State was declared, tý Z-1 
Menachem Begin, the charismatic commander of Etzel (the National Military 
Organization, a major pre-State underground movement), announced the 
organization's dismantling as a military force active within Israel's borders (excluding 
the Jerusalem region, whose status was still uncertain, and overseas operations). 
Herut, the political body that would work toward fulfillment of Etzel's values and 
agenda, was subsequently founded; it invested the bulk of its resources in preparation 
for the 1949 elections. New members were recruited, branches opened, a list of 
candidates for election was compiled, and a party-affiliated newspaper began 
publication. 
Herut's ideological platform, like its organizational structure, reflected that of 
Etzel. It stated that the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict involved the use of force, 
just as Etzel had used force against the British. The Movement likewise stressed that 
4 
Etzel was the sole body responsible for laying the foundations of the Jewish nation as 
an independent state. It justified this contention by claiming that only as a result of its 
anned struggle were the British driven out of Palestine, an event that freed the area for 
the confrontation with the Arabs and the eventual establishment of the State. 
As to other areas of communal life, Herut was, according to Yonathan 
Shapiro, essentially a populist party: It advocated direct democracy, a constitution and 
bill of rights, decision making on national issues by means of referendums and special 
election of the nation's president. Herut strove to cancel the emergency measures 
introduced by the British during the Mandate that, in its view, had transformed Israel 
into a police state. Herut also acted to promote social policies and to improve the 
living conditions of the lower classes, and supported revocation of Histadrut (the 
Federation of Labor in Israel) and Kupat Holim (the National Sick Fund) monopolies. 
Thus, for example, Begin argued in 1949 that if people were hungry - the State t: l 
should appropriate of bourgeois capital and property. 7 Like Shapiro, Peter Meding 
interprets these statements as expressions of Herut's socio-economic populism, 8 meant 
to weaken Mapai's institutional power. This power was rooted in the Yishuv's so- 
called "national" though non-govern mental organizations, the local structures that 
exerted control over the economy, health services, and what then existed of the public 
administration. 
In the intra-organizational arena, again parallel to the situation in Etzel, Begin 
led Herut as its sole effective leader and decision-maker. He was the Movement; and 
the Movement was identified almost solely with his stewardship. 9 
7 Bader, Y., personal interview cited in Meding. P. - 
1992. The Hcrut Delegitimation Theory - Political 
and Academic Myth or Reality? State, Regime and Intei-national Relations 36,57-85. (Hebrew) 
8 Meding, P. 1992, p. 60. 
9Shapiro, Y., 1989, Chosen to Coinrnand, 'Fel-Aviv: Am Oved. (Hebrew) 
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Two parties were therefore created, each identified with a single individual 
who would wield absolute authority and require unequivocal support from his 
subordinates: Mapai under David Ben Gurion, and Herut under Menachem Begin. 
The period of Mapai and Labor Movement political dominance continued until 
1963, all the while under Ben Gurion's sway. 10 During this period, Mapai was able to 
hold the reins of government and to formulate a public policy that approached 
absolute control in its penetration of every walk of life. Public space was co-opted, 
adjusted and manipulated to suit Ben Gurion's political agenda. ' Two main strategies 
directed the practices Mapai applied to maintain its political control: 
a. Political positionin . In order to garner the majority of electoral votes, the 
party directed its efforts toward placing itself at the center of the nation's political 
map. On that map, the dominant party was located at the nucleus of the, national 
movement that had achieved independence. 12 This process was realized in various 
forms, such as the broadcasting at every opportunity the slogan coined by Ben Gurion 
- "From a class to a nation" (mi maamad le am) - referring to the nation-building 
enterprise. The implicit message identifying Mapai as the deliverer of national and 
historical fulfillment was addressed to all segments of the population, not only the 
working class. This trend was repeated in Mapai positions regarding security and 
foreign policy, which were carefully placed at the ideological center of Israeli public 
opinion. 13 For example, Mapai was never to include extreme parties within the 
10 Goldberg, 1992. 
1 'Lebel, U., 2002, Cracks in the Mirror of Military Hegemony: The Courts and the Media as Agents of 
Civil Societv in Israel, in D. Korn (ed. ), Public Policy and Administration in Israel, New York and 
Baltimore: Lexington. 
12 Almond, G. A., 1960, Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics" in G. A. Almond 
and J. S. Coleman (eds. ), The Politics of DetWopment Ireas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 
40-42. 
"Doron, G., 1986, To Decide and to Implemeni, Rehovot: Kivunim, p. 100. (Hebre\v) 
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coalition governments it formed; it always preferred to align itself with moderate 
parties. This strategy narrowed the boundaries of the political arena and sustained 
Mapai's dominance and centrality. 14 
b. Delegitimation of political rivals. With statehood and the institution of a 
democratic regime, the Revisionist camp, formerly denounced as terrorists (see 
below) was formally transformed into a legitimate party (i. e., Herut). 15 Yet, attempts 
to delegitimate the Revisionists continued if not intensified, with the aim of removing 
Herut from the circle of influence. Mapai's goal was to engrave an image in the public 
mind of a group unworthy of participating in governance and incapable of threatening 
its hold on the government. Herut remained excluded from every public and political 
site under Mapai control, from the Jewish Agency, the junior and senior levels of the 
public administration, and the military. In contrast, Mapai presented itself as the 
nation's sole legitimate party, as wholly and uniquely responsible for the State's 
rebirth, as well nigh equivalent with the State. 
The delegitimation program began directly with the 1949 electoral campaign. 
After the elections, Ben Gurion convened the parties that had obtained seats in the 
Knesset (Israel's parliament) in order to form a coalition government. These parties, 
from Maparn to the General Zionists were identified by Ben Gurion as "allied to some 
,, 16 degree with constructive forces. ... As to Herut, he characterized the Movement as 
"unworthy of taking part in the government or its branches.... t, 17 
14 Meding, 1992. 
15 Despite this change in the institutional environment, there were still "remnants" of the pre-State 
undemocratic rules of the game. Friedman (Yellin-Mor) and Shmuelevitch, members of Lehi, one of 
the underground organizations, remained incarcerated in a military prison even after establishment of 
the State. Their arrest in Haifa, rationalized by the emergency measure ordinances still in effect, was 
greeted by new Foreign Minister Moses Shartock (Moshe Sharet) (Mapai) : "The snake's head has 
been chopped, " to which he added: "'['his is wondertul news. " See Iferut, 3 October 1948. (1 lebre), v) 
16 Ben Gurion, D., 1967, The Reborn Slate of1srael, 'I'el Aviv: Am Oved, p. 371. (Hebrew) 
17 Goldberg, 1992, p. 34. 
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Yet, a third strategy, explored in this dissertation, was also adopted. It entailed 
the attempt made by Mapai as wel I as Herut to structure voters'perceptions of Israel's 
collective pa. vt. This strategy's direct audience was the nation's youth and the masses 
of new immigrants who flooded into the country after independence. Neither group 
had first-hand experience of the struggle for independence, nor did they hold any firm 
views about the contributions made by the respective organizations toward the 
achievement of statehood. Memory, Shapiro argues, is the battlefield of identity: Who 
contributes more in the endeavor to achieve society's transcendent goals? With whom 
does historical justice lie? Who is injured and who injures? Who is righteous and who 
is wicked? In this contest, forgetfulness is as important as recollection: recall only 
what is convenient, forget the rest. Historiography becornes a major weapon in this 
campaign, a campaign that is also political at its core. 18 As this study will show, 
Mapai did its utmost to expunge any trace of Herut's - and its underground 
antecedents - contribution to statehood from the collective memory of the War by 
denying them entry into the arenas of official commemoration practices and 
historiography. This meant that the State refused to recognize the underground's dead 
and disabled as eligible for its recognition and support. It also meant that the battles in 
which they had participated and the period of their activity were excluded from the 
lieux de memoire (memory sites, see Chapter 1) recalling the War, produced by Mapai 
for mass consumption, which dotted the landscape, cultural endeavors and library 
shelves. 
Against Mapai's image as the expeditor of the Zionist dream, these memory 
sites presented Herut as a non-partic i pant, an irrelevance; they thereby rationalized the 
latter's exclusion from the locus of political influence. Arguments that Ben Gurion 
18Shapira, A., 1997, New Jews, OldJews, Tel Aý iv: Am Oved, p. 16. (Ilebrew) 
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had used to delegitimate the Revisionists (Herut's forefathers) during the Yishuv were 
touted as still relevant, despite statehood and the passage of years: 
Herut's political army dissolved under the threat of force, although I am not 
convinced that the tendencles guiding Etzel have been cleansed from Herut's 
leadership ... This party is, therefore, undeserving of entry into a national 
coalition constructed on the basis of mutual trust or loyalty to the State, and 
only to the State. 19 
Ben Gurion barred every bid to rehabilitate Etzel and Lehi, the organizations that 
operated parallel to the Hagana (associated with the Labor Movement) during the 
struggle for independence. The construction of collective memory, as a strategy, was 
thus used to recruit the past to the political needs of the present. 20 Moreover, while it 
selectively excluded the living from positions of power, this process likewise 
selectively excluded the dead from official state bereavement. 
The Totalitv of Politics - To the Death 
I begin with the facts. The Hagana was the most militarily meaningful and 
effective contingent in the armed effort to realize the seemingly utopian vision of 
(re)establishing a Jewish state in the heart of the Middle East. Official data, later 
collected by the IDFs History Branch, reveal that during the War of Independence, 
"about 1,300 incidents took place, not including the about 100 incidents in which 
Etzel and Lehi participated, of which about 500 involved the Palmach ... There were 
6,000 dead, including 1,500 civilians, and about 3,500 members of fighting units, not 
including Etzel (about 200 dead) and Lehi (about 50 dead), and about 650 in 
19 Ben Gurion, D., 7 January 1959, Proposal to theAgenda, The Knesset Protocols. ýHebrew) 
10 Medin& 1972, p. 74. 
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subsidiary and support units. 112l It should be noted that this division of the war's dead 
(martyrs in the national lexicon) among the separate organizations does not always 
correspond due to the circumstances in which they fell: Some operations were 
coordinated by the various organizations within what carne to be called "the 
underground movement" - to be distinguished from the "underground. " The title is 
itself political in character: The three major armed organizations that had fought to 
oust the British from Palestine were all, technically speaking, undergrounds. 
However, the Hagana was treated as a "semi-underground" by the British authorities, 
given the Labor Movement's policy of cooperation with the Mandate in the face of the 
pending Arab threat. The other two organizations, Etzel and Lehi, were variously 
called "terrorists" and "thugs" as well as "the underground, " depending on one's 
political affiliation and attitude toward their methods. The dissertation retains tile 
more general, popular term applied to Etzel and Lehi: the "underground. " 
During the period in question, Israeli democracy did not quite meet the criteria 
set by the liberal model given that the public sphere in addition to numerous areas of 
private life were structured by political decisions. "The Party" (i. e., Mapai) not only 
dictated policy in the areas of health, security and the economy, it also determined 
policy pertaining to bereavement and with it the policy determining commemoration 
and historiography, areas that influence the nation's perception of its dead. In response 
to this program, Herut learned to employ the same instruments, based on its 
comprehension that social legitimation of its entry into the circle of power would be 
awarded only if its contributions to the War of Independence were made plain. This 
goal was the mainstay of its activities as an opposition party. Coupled with its 
21 IDF, History Branch, undated, apparently from 195 1, internal document, the IDF Archives \75 - 427 
922. (Hebrew) 
10 
criticism of government policy regarding the budget, economic and security, Herut's 
objective was to modify the collective memories about the War produced under Ben 
Gurion's direction. In the apt words of the nation's foremost critical journal at the 
firrie, HaOlam HaZeh: "Today, the Party takes care of everything. Mapai gathered the 
War of Independence under Ben Gurion's wings. Achdut HaAvoda [a party identified 
with the Labor Movement] incorporated memories of the Palmach, whereas Herut 
transformed the underground's fighters into an instruments to be used for its own 
benefit. , 22 
Conceptual Approach and Methodolou 
General 
The study delves into the production and formation of myths as components in 
collective memory. On the one hand, the dominant Party, Mapai, attempted to 
generate a valid narrative out of some fragments of reality while excluding others; on 
the other, the opposition party, Herut, tried to integrate those excluded fragments into 
the national meta-narrative. According to I. M. Lewis, a "myth tells a major truth by 
means of major Iles. , 23 The significant efforts invested in the formation of national 
myths indicate the extent of their political repercussions. Dynasties have always 
created myths to provide them with the legitimation necessary to maintain their rule. 
It appears that in the modern age, history has replaced divine inspiration as the main 
source of legitimacy. 24 Historical facts have undergone careful screening and 
accumulation, guided by the political-mythic function they were designed to fulfill. 
ý '2 HaOlam HaZeh, 16 April 1958. (Hebre,. NF) 
23 Lewis, 1. M., 1974, Social Anthropology in Perspective, New York and Middlesex: Harmondsworth, 
p. 12 1. 
24 Azaryahu. 1995, p. 5 
The approach directing this study claims that social objects and practices are 
not produced randomly. Few scholars are privy to the machinations consummated in 
decisions to embed selected myths within a society's memory sites, whether these be 
street names, the contents of public school history textbooks or the inscriptions 
engraved on national monuments. For this reason, it is incumbent upon the researcher 
to apply rational analytic tools, divorced from the ideological and normative 
perspectives that guided the myth's producers. In general, an individual's behavior is 
considered rational to the degree to which that behavior is directed toward achieving 
the goals set. If that behavior is haphazard and unrelated to those goals, it is 
25 considered irrational. The same assumptions can be readily applied in the sphere of 
politics. 
Application of the term rational requires clear differentiation between the 
rationality of means and the rationality of ends. Whereas the first dwells on the 
effective achievement of goals, the second examines whether the goals themselves are 
normatively acceptable. Research in political science focuses on the means, leaving 
goals to philosophy. 26 With respect to goals, I accept the assumption made by 
Anthony Downs, elaborated in his book An Economic Theory of' Democracy. 27 
According to Downs, the goal of politics is power, its acquisition and application. It 
follows that political rationality must guide the making of decisions that enable 
individuals or groups to grasp the maximum power possible. Any decision that does 
not promote this goal is considered irrational. This assumption enables studying the 
effectiveness with which goals are achieved and, in this case, the cumulative 
effectiveness of political power. Steven Brams has argued that political rationality 
'5DAL R. and Lindblom, C., 1953, Politics, Economics and Welfare, New York: Harper, p. 38; Doron. 
G., 1988, Rational Politics in Israel, Tel Aviv: Rarnot, p. 21 (Hebrew). 
26 This argument relates to the critique of the behaviorist discourse over the question of whether we can 
at all examine political processes without taking a position with respect to their goals. 27 
' DoýN ns, A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row. 
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also involves estimation of costs and benefits; the resulting estimates influence the 
actions taken by a significant number of individuals as well as by government. 28 This 
approach directs research of political rationality to the decision making and policy 
formation activities associated with the actors' policy objectives. The actors' 
preference for good alternatives, meaning those that more effectively carry them 
closer to their destinations, permits the scholar to conclude that their behavior is 
indeed rational. 
The second major aspect of the rationality approach is the scholar's waiver of 
any normative stance toward the consensual goals reached by the actors investigated. 
Goals are categorized as rational only after thorough review of the behavioral 
effectiveness of the actors' attempts to achieve them. Goals may include prestige, 
status, power, income, influence on public opinion or, in effect, anything that the 
political actor believes will contribute to maximization of its relative share of power. 
This insight obliges the scholar to first hypothesize the actor's aspirations. Although 
inductive analyses begin with empirical descriptions of political behavior, they are 
unable to arrive at an explanation of why some rather than other choices were made, 
inasmuch as simple observation of the results of decision making per se cannot reveal 
the motivations governing political behavior. To identify those motivations, analysis 
of prior events is required. 
The rational approach enables systematic presentation of hypotheses 
constructed on the basis of a set of explicit assumptions. Given that optimal strategies 
are not necessarily self-evident, the deductive logic of rational decision making allows 
differentiation between good and bad, favorable and unfavorable strategies; it 
28 Brams, S. J., 1993, The Study of Political Rationality (Hebrew edition), in B. Zisser (ed. ). The 
Diversity of Political Science: A nalytic Schools and Approaches in the Study of Politics, Tel Aviv: The 
Open University, p. 347. (Hebrew) 
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supports-assessment of their appropriateness to the actors' goals - their rationality 
as determined by the researcher. 
The advantage of this approach thus lies in its ability to provide tools to 
ascertain the true goals of the actor observed and the materials reviewed. Researchers 
who have posited their subject's goals a priori have frequently discovered, subsequent 
to empirical observation of the respective actor's behavior, that the steps taken toward 
achievement of that goal were not rational. In retrospect, it is clear that the 
methodological error is rooted in the assumption that the goals identified a priori are 
necessarily the true goals. An instructive example of the benefits of the rational 
approach is the study conducted by M. Nash, 29 who showed that the goals of the 
tropical society studied by him were other than those identified by his predecessors. 
They had been convinced that the group's major value was accumulation of economic 
rewards; after they discerned the group's tendency not to maximize its economic 
potential, this behavior was labeled irrational. Nash, in contrast, decided not to apply 
western values in this non-western cultural setting. Upon close observation of his 
subjects, he was able to conclude that equality and the prevention of economic gaps 
were the society's true core values, a conclusion that led to his reassessment of their 
economic behavior. The society's choice to under-utilize its economic resources was 
consequently found to be rational. 
The assumption that an actor's behavior is appropriate for the achievement of 
its goals requires the researcher to empirically observe the decision-maker's behavior 
and identify its outcomes and meanings, irrespective of the subject's statements 
regarding those goals. Hence, the rational approach ignores the actor's expressions of I tý 
intent and concentrates on observed behavior. Due to the mode of its application, this 
29 Nash, M., 1967, The Social Context of Economic Choice in a Small Society in G. Dalton (ed. ), 
Ti-ibal and Peasant Economies (pp. 524-53 8), New York: Natural History Press. 
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method has been labeled the revealed preference method 30 because the researcher 
relies only on data revealed by direct observation. 31 
History 
The memory site at the focus of this study is that of commemoration and the 
associated historiography. Following Michel Foucault, who stated that politics 
32 
occupies a site on every level in every arena of social life , the study examines the 
behavior of Israel's political elite after the establishment of the State in all facets of its 
policy pertaining to the remembrance and commemoration of War of Independence 
dead. The study asks whether those memorialized in the State's commemoration 
project represent all the individuals who participated in the war effort. This question 
partially rests on the character of historical writing. The historian A. H. Carr states that 
03 historians are "selective . As Carr views it, facts speak only when invitation from 
the historian for it is the historian who decides which facts will be mentioned, in what 
order, and in what context. 34 Talcott Parsons called for a similar but broader approach. 
He claimed that science is a system for selectively studying the relationship between 
society and real Ity. 35 This approach is applied here regarding the fallen "resurrected" 
on the State-constructed stage of collective memory and awarded official recognition 
and commemoration. In order to comprehend and interpret the politics buried in the 
explored "social cell, " I have followed Carr's call to learn about the historian before 
30 Riker, W. and Ordeshook, P. C., 1973, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, p. 14. 
3 'This method is the opposite of the strategy termed processual rationality. In this case, the researcher 
assumes the studied actors' goals a priori, and then examines whether their behavior is consistent and 
effective for the promotion of their goals. This method is also entitled the assumed preferences method. 
See Riker and Ordeshook, ibid.; DOF011, G. 1986, P. 100. 
32 Foucault, M., 1984, Truth and Power, in Rabinow, P. (ed. ), The Foucault Reader, New York: 
Pantheon, pp. 5 1-57. 
33 Carr. AJ 1., 1986, What Is History? Tel Aviv: Modan, p. 25. (Hebrew) 
34 Ibid. 
35 Parsons, 1'. and Shils, E.. 1954, Toii'ards a General Theory of Action, 3 rd ed., Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 167. 
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36 
approaching the facts .I accordingly attempt to ascertain the political elite's 
interests 
in commemoration as a key to understanding the government's actions in the sphere of 
bereavement and collective memory. 
The Research Questions 
The study of the production of collective memory has flowered during the past 
two decades. Particularly significant are George Mosse's highly influential study 
examining the socio-cultural meanings transmitted by the monuments erected in 
Europe in the wake of World War 137 and that of Pierre Noret, who coined the concept 
lieu de memorie. 38 Numerous other studies have likewise shed light on the bias 
inherent in different aspects of public as well as national attitudes toward 
commemoration. This body of literature has shown that many areas of experience and 
group participation commonly perceived as "neutral" because they are presented as 
"official" or "national" are, in fact, biased. The purpose of this study is to reveal yet 
another facet of the formation of collective boundaries and the prevention of 
specific groups from penetration of those boundaries by means of political 
manipulation of bereavement and collective memory. 
Within the framework of the present thesis, the institution of bereavement is 
analyzed as a political site, constructed in the course of political competition and 
influenced by cultural processes; its outcomes are political. What will be remembered 
or forgotten, what will be stressed or muted are intimately related to political 
contingencies and the needs of the participants. Some of these needs are shown to be 
short-term while others are long-term, framed by the objective of preservation of 
36C 
- arr. 1986. p. 35. 
37 Naveh. E. 1994, JVorld Har I and Its Conseqziences: A Generation of Soldiers Searches for 
Redemption andAvenues ofArticulation. Tel Aviv: Sifri. (Hebrew) 
"ý Noret, P. 1993, Betveen Nlemorý and lfistorý - On the Problem of Place, Zmanim, 45,5-19 
(I lebrew edition) 
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political hegemony and social status. The present study reveals that the associated 
actions are calculated, rational and conscious. They culminate in the positioning of the 
excluded groups outside the national narrative. Practically speaking, in the Israeli 
case, bereaved families belonging to excluded groups were denied equal status and 
benefits, State support for commemoration of their sons as well as mention of their 
efforts within educational and historical texts. 
The relationships between the dead, their bereaved families and the Israeli 
elite are revealed to be indicators of bereavement's use in the production of a symbolic 
and legal infrastructure that endows legitimacy and preferred political status to 
members of the ruling regime. State recognition of the bereavement experienced by 
these groups, indicating their inclusion within the national narrative, is shown to be a 
major mechanism in the construction and reinforcement of socio-political hegemony. 
Alternatively, the exclusion of the bereavement felt by other groups, those whose 
contributions to Israel's independence project was denied, pushed to the periphery and 
excluded from the national narrative, is shown to be motivated by the political 
interests of the dominant party. 
Several studies have dealt with various aspects of Israel's nation-building 
project. These works focus on identical symbols - the fallen, heroes, and battles - 
that define the included group within the national narrative. This is the group around 
which national collective mernory was constructed. In complementing this literature, 
the present study will describe the construction of collective memory by revealing the 
associated dynamics of peripheral izati on of groups presenting themselves as rivals to 
the dominant party. It will also trace the evolution of each group's status: the temporal 
frarnework, interests, and cultural-political developments that supported changes in 
their status. The study reveals. for the first time, the programs, institutions and 
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organizations that, parallel to their official, elite-controlled counterparts, strove to 
commemorate and rehabilitate the fallen belonging to the two major underground 
movements, Etzel and Lehi. It also sheds light on the incessant bargaining conducted 
with official bodies, as well as the various strategies adopted to force recognition of 
the underground as partners in the nation-building enterprise. 
The majority of studies dealing with collective memory and political culture 
inadequately elaborate these concepts. Political culture is treated as a given, an 
independent variable that the scholar is to disclose, whose foundations and values are 
to be identified and understood. From this perspective, political culture represents a 
political text to be deciphered through the use of interpretative practices. The text's 
components are accepted meanings, expressed in a plethora of symbols and subtexts 
that members of the subject community internalize and distribute in the course of their 
daily lives. 39 
The literature offers a plethora of research strategies to help the scholar avoid 
introduction of bias so as to reveal the "true" cultural co-ordinates of the space 
researched, 40 the majority of which are inspired by phenomenology and symbolic 
interactionism 
.41 
These approaches have likewise been applied in numerous studies on 
42 Israeli society. The current study adopts a contradictory perspective in an attempt to 
39Geertz, C., 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books. 
40 See for example W. F. White, 1980, Development of the "Streetcorner Society Fund" Research in M. 
Shoked, E. Marx and S. Deshen (eds. ), Readings in Social Anthropology (pp. 257-267), Tel Aviv: 
Shocken. (Hebrew) 
41 Rogers, C. 1992, The Phenomenological Perspective in Personality Theory in L. A. Hjelle and D. J. 
Ziegler (eds. ), Personality Theory, New York: McGraw-Hill; Goffman, E., 1989, The Representation 
of Seýf in Everyday Life, Tel Aviv: Reshafim. (Hebrew edition). 
42 E\, an-Zohar, 1,1980, The Growth and Development of Indigenous Local Jewish Culture in Israel, 
1992-1948, Katedra, 16,206-216; Lomsky-Feder, E., 1998, As if the War Didn't Exist, Stories of the 
Lhýes of Israeli Men, Jerusalem: Magnes, The Hebrew University (Hebrew); Ohana, D. and Wistreich, 
R., 1997, The Myth of Memory. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz 
Harneuchad (Hehrew): Peri. Y.. 1983, Betii)een Baitles and Ballots: The Israeli Alilitaty in Politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Almog, 0.1993, The Zionists Myths of the Fighting Sabre 
Belonging to the 1948 Generation. . 
11aarachot, 333,40-47ý 50 (Hebrew); Almog, 0., 1996, The Sabre, 
Tel Aviv, Am Oved (Hebrew), Galnoor, Y., 1985, The Origins (? f Democracy in Israel, Tel Aviv: Am 
Oved (Hebrew). 
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contribute to our understanding of the strategies by which a political party acquires 
and sustains its own dominant status in society. In my survey of the literature on 
Israel's political system, especially that employing a comparative methodology, 43 1 
discovered that the majority of studies rest on the pioneering work of Maurice 
Duverger. 44 Among the conditions requisite for a party to be defined as dominant, 
Duverger lists the spirit of the time: A party seeking political dominance must express 
or correspond to the spirit of the time, a period's ambience. Without entering into 
excessive detail, Duverger's trenchant insight states that the spirit of the time is a real, 
independent, and fixed cultural product; political actors, treated as dependent and 
flexible variables, attempt to adapt themselves to a society's basket of values, symbols 
and meanings. This approach has been adopted by students of political 
communication who focus on political campaigns. These scholars tend to ask one 
main question: How can organizations, candidates and parties adapt themselves to the 
spirit of the time, grasp public opinion, discern nuances in attitudes and ascertain 
voter needs and demands in order to accommodate, integrate, and provide the 
appropriate electoral response? 45 
My main argument is that a diametrically opposed process can be observed in 
the public space. Political actors, already endowed with existing values, symbols and 
meanings, will attempt to manipulate conditions so as to create a spirit of the time that 
is suitable to their attainment of dominance. This is a long-term politically-motivated 
social process in the course of which, among other things, national memory and 
modes of bereavement are structured with the support of initiatives in the spheres of 
43 Huntington, S. P. 
1,1968, 
Political Or(icr in Changing Societies, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
44 Mlveraer. M. 1972, Political Parties. London: Mcthuen. 
45 With respect to political campaigns in Israel, see: Shahar, R., 2001, Leader By Invitation, Tel Aviv: 
Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew); Doron, G., 1996. Stt-ategý) of Electot-al Campaigns, Rehovot: Kivunirn 
(Hebrew); Fox, K and Bar Le\,, W., 1999, Ti-wh and Surveys, Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 
(Hebrew). 
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education, culture and social relations. I will reveal how these processes materialized 
in the context of Israeli politics in the period following the achievement of statehood. 
I will argue that Mapai -a political party - immediately set upon constructing the 
spirit of the time in order to secure political salience and party dominance. 
If we were to restate this argument in the language of marketing, we might say 
that the political producer is not interested in adapting its product to the market but in 
creating a market suitable for its product. This goal requires creation of a cultural 
monopoly by means of which producers - in this case, a political party - achieve 
dominance by erecting cultural barriers that prevent competing producers - 
opposition parties - from penetrating the market and capturing a significant market 
share. 46 
Such a project was undertaken by Mapai. As a homogenous party whose 
leadership was predominantly socialist and eastern European in origin, Mapai had to 
preserve its strength within a society that did not, in the main, share its values, a 
society of immigrants from countries throughout Europe, Asia and North Africa. To 
meet this task, Mapai set about forming, among other things, the society's nascent 
collective memory. Because memory is a major component of a nation's attitudes 
toward its past as well as its present, Mapai reinforced the historical contours of its 
status by stressing the contribution of that past to the present. It then translated the 
associated narrative into the substance of a political culture that imbued the spirit of 
the time with the party's values and symbols, all done to preserve its salience and 
status as the nation's natural, uncontested political leader. 
The main research question is, then: What is the relationship of memory in 
general, and bereavement in particular, to political dominance? To paraphrase: The 
46 An application of this approach in the context of American business can be found in Doron, G., 
1979, The Smoking Pat-adox, Cambridge, NIA: ABT. 
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purpose of the study is to focus on the politics of cultural production among a 
society's dead as well as its living in order to clarify how death can be recruited to 
political exigencies. 
By way of answering this question, the study traces public policy regarding the 
community of the bereaved, families whose sons had fallen in the battle for 
independence, but particularly the commemoration policy executed with respect to the 
dead of three underground movements: Etzel, Lehi and the Hagana. Etzel and Lehi 
represented the fighting forces of the right wing in Zionist politics, whereas the 
Hagana represented the left wing. Families associated with the first two were not 
awarded the symbolic and legal recognition given to families associated with the 
third; nor were they to enjoy official commemoration of their dead as did Hagana 
families during the period in question. The study pays special heed to the personality 
of David Ben Gurion, perhaps the key figure in the formation of Israeli culture with 
respect to its treatment of the bereaved father but particularly the bereaved mother. 
His deeds, writings, correspondence with bereaved families, initiatives and decisions 
relating to all the dilemmas connected with this issue powerfully stamped Israeli 
attitudes toward commemoration until this very day. State policy, it will be shown, 
was more a reflection of Ben Gurion's personal opinions than of the positions held by 
either Mapai or the elites. Ben Gurion's formal leadership and personal charisma 
were so dominant that years after he retreated from the political stage, every change in 
policy was influenced by his spirit and demanded his response. 
Ben Gurion coined the phrase rnanilachtiyut, his version of the exercise of 
sovereignty in the Israeli context. This term became the credo of Mapai and the public 
administration it constructed and led. As the organizing principle of Israel] policy, the 
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concept meant statism, an ethos or "state religion" embracing all segments of society 
- immigrants and veteran residents, Ashkenazim and Sephardim and, or so it 
implied, right and left - as equals under the umbrella of Israeli democracy. 
Sovereignty represented the melting pot that allowed everyone the opportunity for 
assimilation and access to jobs within the public administration. The study, guided by 
the methodology of procedural rationality, reveals that contrary to party declarations, 
mamiachtiyut was nothing but a mechanism of exclusion directed at potential political 
competitors. Furthermore, from the perspective of substantive rationality, events in 
the selected arenas reveal that sovereignty, as conceived by Ben Gurion, was not 
achieved, and that his policy in the area of bereavement and commemoration was 
inconsistent with its goal of sustained party dominance. That is, in this context, Ben 
Gurion's behavior was not rational. 
It was Frank Parkin who, following Max Weber, showed that political 
processes are in essence practices for the production of political barriers to be used by 
those who hold positions of power to hold competing groups at bay (exclusion). In his 
study, Parkin called for the study of exclusionary strategies in addition to the 
strategies employed by the excluded groups in direct response to their obstructed 
status. 47 The current study treads the path laid out by Parkin. It appears that in Israel, 
the two strategies operated in parallel, just as Parkin had observed in his own 
research. The "counter-culture" of symbolic and political mechanisms produced was 
similar to, yet independent of the "official" versions, and accompanied by relentless 
attempts to penetrate the elite, to become cultural, political and social "Insiders. " 
This process found expression in the sphere of Israeli bereavement and 
collective memory at the very inornent when rituals of remembrance and 
47 Parkin, F., 1979, Marxism and Class TheorY. .4 Bourgeois Critique, New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
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commemoration were constructed. These rituals had a dual function: Not only did 
they echo the central themes of the evolving political culture, they also determined 
that culture's disposition. The resultant institutions were long-lived, not the least due 
to their having developed in tandem with national consolidation. "Routine" politics, 
marked by uninterrupted power struggles, operated in a defined area, attuned to a 
static view of the past that either supported or eroded the legitimacy of the actors 
competing over positions of power. After consideration of the events, we can readily 
agree with Pierre Vidal-Naquet that the annihilation of memory 48 is simply a rational 
strategy for the exclusion of those political competitors that pose effective threats to 
the elite's power, access to which, as stated, is the instinctive goal of every political 
entrepreneur. 49 
48 Vidal-Naquet, R. trans. A. Eldor. 1991. jllenioiy's Murderers, Tel Aviv: Am Oved. ýIlebrew 
edition). 
49 Easton, D.. 1953. The Political System. 4n InqWq into the State qf Political Science, New York: 
Knopf. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter One presents the theoretical 
and conceptual framework applied throughout the study. The relationship between 
political dominance, collective memory and bereavement are analyzed from various 
perspectives. Evidence supporting the analysis and its conclusions was culled from 
numerous sources, including the political science and political sociology literature. 
The following four chapters represent the empirical portion of the study. Each 
chapter focuses on one of the dimensions comprising the lieux de memoire, to borrow 
Noret's phrase, the space where these political processes and strategies were enacted. 
Chapter Two focuses on the political dimension. It examines legislation as a 
vehicle for the overt expression of power. Legislation leaves little room for doubt or 
interpretation about its meanings or implicit impacts. The chapter reveals the attempts 
to exclude Etzel and Lehi dead from every arena implying formal, legal recognition of 
their relations as members of the official "family of the bereaved. " This was 
accomplished through obstructing their eligibility for a wealth of services elaborated 
in laws meant to institutionalize support and succor this exclusive community. The 
significance of these laws, other than their financial impacts, ties in their use for State 
recognition of the contributions made by the fallen. 
Chapter Three stresses the physical-geographic dimension. Immediately after 
the establishment of the State, Israel's landscape was transformed into the main arena 
for the practice of commemoration. Monuments, statues and military cemeteries soon 
became State instruments for placing commemoration of the dead high on the public 
agenda. In this area as well, strict exclusion of Etzel and Lehi supporters was 
practiced by the elite. 
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Chapter Four turns to the semantic-symbolic dimension of sovereignty. Civil 
rituals, particularly memorial day observances, were use to transmit images of heroes 
and other symbols, formulated according to elite interests along social communication 
networks. These, too, reveal political processes. 
Chapter Five turns to historiography. This is perhaps the central and most 
meaningful chapter, not the least because Ben Gurion, more than any of Israel's 
leaders, placed such great weight on the writing of history. In addition to the personal 
diaries he diligently kept, Ben Gurion initiated and participated in hundreds of 
historiography projects for the purpose of documenting and commemorating the 
forces active in the nation's rebirth. As will be shown, this sphere as well reveals the 
rationality of a leadership that understood the long-term political significance of 
official versions of history, to be taught for decades to the nation's younger generation 
and its immigrants. 
My conclusion can be viewed as an epilogue of sorts. Mapai's political 
dominance did not survive long after the period under discussion. Cracks in its ability 
to preserve its status soon appeared; as they widened, leaders of the excluded groups C, 
were able to penetrate, slowly, Israel's collective memory. The epilogue reviews 
several of these groups' successful attempts to penetrate the statist arena and 
reinforces the study's capacity to explain the relationship between the construction of 
collective memory and political dominance. Political dominance, it is shown, weakens 
when control over collective mernory declines. 
Sources and Methodology 
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The research strategy adopted in the study is historical-political. The material 
on which the study is based includes documents collected in public and private 
archives, the majority of which have yet to be publicized . 
50 In addition, many in-depth 
interviews were conducted with members of bereaved families, 51 decision-makers and 
representatives of the political movements active during the period studied. Moreover, 
newspapers items were carefully reviewed, especially those appearing in the 
contemporary daily press. Two newspapers were of crucial importance: Davar and 
HerUt. 52 Whereas the first was a vehicle for the transmission of Mapai's official 
position, the second was aligned with Herut. Extensive use was also made of the 
commemoration literature produced after the War of Independence. These can be 
found in public libraries, the homes of bereaved families and in public 
commemoration sites. 
The archives opened to me in the course of the study are: 
I Beit Hasofer Archives, Tel Aviv 
2. Beit Ya'ir Archives, Tel Aviv 
3. Ben Gurion Archives, Sde Boker 
4. Government Archives, The National Archives, 
Jerusalem 
5. Hagana Archives, Tel Aviv 
6. IDF and Ministry of Defense Archives, Givatayim 
7. Jabotinsky Institute Archives, Tel Aviv 
50For the scholars interested in exposing unknown facets about the interests and actions of Israel's 
governments during the period of the research, private archives are of exceptional importance. To be 
found there is the correspondence carried on between families and the government elite, documents 
that shed new light on the accepted image ofpublic policy within the area researched. 
"Requests for a personal interview were sent to all the families of Etzel and Lehi fallen as well as to 
dozens of families of Hagana fallen. As a reSUlt of the readiness of several to cooperate and disclose 
documents as well as be interviewed, scveral meetings were held with the researcher, the majoritý at 
the homes of the intervicwees. 
52, Fo differentiate between Herut the political movement/party and Herut the neý\spaper, the latter 
alway's appears in italics in the bodý of the rescarch. 
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8. Labor Party (Mapai) Archives, Beit Berel 
9. Theatre Archives, Tel Aviv 
10. Yad Tabenkin Archives, Ramat Efal 
Several studies that examined a number of aspects of Israel's nation-building 
project should be mentioned here; each touches upon the current study. Hannah 
Naveh's Imprisoned by Bereavement describes how bereavement is reflected in Israeli 
literary works; 53 Hannan Hever's A Sudden View of War reviews Hebrew poetry; 54 
Mordechai Bar On's Written in a Book surveys the crystallization of Israeli 
historiography on the War of Independence during the nation's first decade, - 55 and 
Histories, by Eyal Naveh and Esther Yogev, discusses the public controversies 
surrounding the teaching of history in Israel's schools. 56 Three pioneering studies 
deserve special mention: State Rituals, Maoz Azaryahu's study of Remembrance Day 
and Independence Day celebrations during 1948-1956; 57 Commemoration and 
Altemory, Ilana Shamir's examination of memorials and commemoration projects ; 58 
and The 1948 Generation, Emmanuel Sivan's analysis of the social profile of War of 
Independence fallen. 59 All these works, however, deal with institutional bereavement 
(what I would call dominant bereavement) as it is expressed by the included groups, 
and with the hegemonic ethos Ben Gurion constructed in the wake of the War of 
Independence. In contrast, the study presented here deals with how the government 
elites related to other groups, those excluded from collective memory and social 
53 Naveh, H, 1993, Imprisoned by Bereavement, Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Harneuchad. (Flebreýv) 
54, ]ever, H., 2002_4 Sudden Vieiv of ffar, Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Harneuchad. (Hebrew) 
5 5Bar On. M., 2001, Written in a Book, The Beginnings of Israeli Historiography of the 1948 PVur, Tel 
Aviv: Mam-ýichot, Ministrý, of Defense. Mehreýv) 
56Mý, eh. E. and Yogev, E., 2002, Historieý, Tel Aviv: Bavel. (Flebrew) 
57 Azarý'ahu, M., 1995. 
5'Shamir, 1., 1996, Commemoration and, 11emory, Tel Aviv: Am Oved. (Hebrew) 
59S ivan, E., 1990, The 1948 Generation, Tel Aviv: Maarachot. (Hebrew) 
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communication networks. The studies mentioned guided me in my rereading of the 
source materials upon which this study rests and in my attempt to present the events 
from a different perspective for the purpose of adding to our understanding of the 
issues in question. 
It should be noted that unless stated otherwise, all Hebrew texts and original 
documents have been translated by me. Furthermore, many individuals kindly 
entrusted me with letters and other documents, as noted in the footnotes. 
Chapter One 
Theoretical Framework 
The strategic interest of every party installed in the seat of power is to guarantee the 
survival of its regime and its continued reelection. These are the major political goals 
that determine the current behavior and future decisions of every party in power. We 
can likewise expect that all party activities and policies will be directed toward these 
aims. Adopting the terminology of theories of regimes and political party, we can 
claim that the aim of every party, once it has succeeded in gaining power, is to 
become the nation's dominant party. 
In the political science scholarship devoted to the study of political parties, 
attention has naturally turned to those parameters that appear to explain coalition 
formation within the context of democratic parliaments. Hence, definitions of the 
concept dominant party prevail in the terminology of coalition or party theory. 
Samuel Huntington has argued that a dominant party is one that cannot be replaced, a 
fact that guarantees its control. ' Asher Arian, subscribing to this view, states that such 
a situation is characterized by the absence of conditions conducive to creating an 
opposition or providing alternatives to the party in power. 2A somewhat less vague 
criterion is provided by Gabriel Almond, who contends that dominant parties are 
'Huntington. S. P., 1968, Political Ordei- in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
2 Arian, A., 1973, The Voting Public, Ramat-Gan: Masada, p. 50. (Hebrew) 
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3 found at the helm of national liberation movements. Almond provides indicators that 
elucidate the place occupied by dominant parties in the ideological-political arena - 
the center - as well as the historical moment that permitted access to this position: 
the drama of the struggle for the state's emergence and consolidation. 
Blondel, Sartori and Burger each contribute more precise definitions, 
including quantitative variables, of dominant parties. According to Blondel, who 
bases his conclusions on comparative studies of political systems operating in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and France as of 1958, the dominant party 
4 is the party that wins at least 45% of the vote . Sartori, who prefers the phrase "para- 
dominant party, " adds that such a party must win three consecutive elections. 5 Para- 
dominant parties that meet these criteria can be found in Uruguay, Japan, Turkey, 
India, Norway, and Sweden. In contrast, Burger, who based her research on India, 
6 
argues that a para-dominant party must obtain at least 56% of the seats in parliament. 
7 Giora Goldberg, in his pioneering study of Israel's political system, also ZD 
proposed quantitative variables for determining a ruling party's dominance (the 
specific question he explored was whether Mapai, the party in power throughout most 
of Israel's history, indeed conformed to these definitions). The three conditions (what 
he calls "contexts") or indicators of party dominance are: 
One. The inter-party context: The party that obtains at least 
10% more than the votes won by its opponents in three consecutive 
elections. 
3 G. A, Almond, 1960, Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, in G. A. Almond 
and J. S. Coleman (eds. ), The Politics of the Dei, eloping Areas, Princeton, NY: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 40-42. 
4 Blondel, J., 1969, Comparing Political Systems. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 98. 
5Sartori. G.. 1976, Parties andPartySystenz, Vol. L, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 125. 
6 Burger, A. S., 1969. Opposition in a Dominant-Parly System, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, p. 5. 
7 Goldberg, G., 1992, Israel's Political Parties. From 1fass Parties to Electoral Parties, Tel Aviv: 
Ramot. (Hebrew) 
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Two. The oppositional context: No party can replace the party 
in power as no one party holds at least two-thirds of the total number 
of mandates held by all opposition parties taken together. 
Three. The social context: The ruling party maintains 
ideological supremacy over an opposition that recognizes its power; in 
addition, the majority of the public identifies with the ruling party, 
which is perceived as expressing the spirit of the period in which 
critical events took place, such as the achievement of national 
independence. 
The majority of studies on this subject rest on the work of Maurice Duverger, 
one of the first scholars to investigate the phenomenon of party dominance. As we 
have seen, Goldberg, following Duverger, did not confine himself to estimates of 
parliamentary majorities as the necessary or even sufficient condition for 
consolidation of party dominance. 
Like other scholars, Duver-er maintains that party dominance is not confined 
to the parliamentary arena. In his view, a dominant party is considered as such even if 
it does not always obtain a clear electoral majority. To Duverger, the fundamental 
condition for attributing dominance is the party's sway over cultural rather than 
political phenomena, what he calls gestandt (spirit of the time), the ambience or, 
alternatively, the sociological factor. This variable represents the spiritual superiority 
held by the party and by those identified with it, a condition that allows the party to 
maintain its grasp over extended periods of time. Stated differently, the sociological 
factor provides cultural and psychological advantages in response to the way in which 
the general public perceives the party. Duverger argues that: "The party is dominant 
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when it is identified with an epoch, when we can say that its doctrines, ideas, and 
methods, its style so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch. " Thus, Duverger 
differentiates between party influence and party power (strength in his terms), two 
major concepts that, due to their similarity, continue to divide political scientists. 
Alternatively, because party dominance is "linked with belief, " 8 it is a consensual 
phenomenon: The entire public - not Just party leaders - accepts its preeminence. 
In essence, we are dealing with a case where perception and image meet: "A dominant 
party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant. Even the enemies of the 
dominant party, citizens who refuse to give it their votes, acknowledge its superior 
status and its influence; they deplore it but admit to it. "10 
Duverger's search for analytic instruments embodies an approach not often 
found in traditional models of coalitions, alliances, or political structuration, although 
it would appear to be of interest to parties intent on such a status. Duverger's 
perspective offers party leaders with a challenge that goes beyond parliamentary and 
coalition victories: establishment of the party's image as the embodiment of the spirit 
of the time, that is, creation of the sociological factor that facilitates maximization of 
the party's political power. This goal resembles the concept of hegemon . 
More than 
Zn Y 
political superiority, hegemony reflects the collective consciousness and cultural 
attitudes held by the socio-political elite together with those who are subject to their 
power irrespective of whether they support them or not. Hegemonic leaders are 
perceived as controlling the system's operational mechanisms - they are responsible 
for managing the public administration and its decision-making processes - but also 




as embodying the society's moral leadership, as symbols that represent society and 
identify its values. 11 
Viewed from the position of critical theory, the conventional image of ruling 
elites interested in establishing and reproducing their preferential political status 
implies the desire to attain and preserve political hegemony. It was Gramsci who 
coined the term in an attempt to describe the social control exerted through beliefs and 
ideas that become so common and uncontested that they appear to describe the 
"natural" order of things. 12 That is, hegemony refers to the conceptual foundations 
upon which the political leadership constructs its claims to an elevated social status. 
Belief in the political elite's worthiness and inherent qualifications for this position 
guarantees its continued hold. Significantly, the situation described is neither that of 
arbitrary coalition majorities or of random parliamentary victories; on the contrary, 
the group found at the apex of the political system is considered to be one of its 
enduring elements. To sustain this linage, dissension is avoided for dissension creates 
doubt, an attitude that undermines the taken-for-granted character of this situation. 
The "game" played by these societal actors represents, as Gitlin states, a cognitive 
process that entraps not only the ruled, but also the rulers, for both groups perceive the 
political elite as committed to the interests of both, as the society's genuine rulers. 
Hegemony represents, in effect, the reverse of what the functionalists, proponents of 
pluralism, call consensus, the normative agreement they view as necessary for 
society's survival. In contrast, for critical scholars, consensus, now dubbed hegemony, 
is the product of a system of control that serves narrow interests. ' 3 
Thus, according to Duverger and to Goldberg in his wake, dominance, like 
hegemony, relates to the formal dimensions of control but also to its informal, implicit 
1 'Bockok, R., 1986, Hegemony, London: Tavistock, p. 11. 
12 Gramsci, A., 1971, Selectionsfi-oin 1he Prison Volebooks, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
13 Thompson, K. 1986, Beliefs and ldcology. Chichester: Ellis Eforwood. 
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dimensions. Whereas study of overt forms of control reveals how the allocation of 
economic resources reflects acting coalitions, parliamentary behavior, and ruling 
group preferences, study of the latent dimensions of control unveils the subliminal 
aspects of cultural control and how the allocation of social values ensures the 
prolonged preferential status of selected groups. In constructing this picture of 
hegemony, critical theory reflects the view, prevalent among social scientists, that 
culture is the locus for the social production of meaning; that is, cultural processes 
produce and distribute social meanings. 14 
This approach has likewise been applied by scholars of political 
communication following the wave of dissent and subversive initiatives directed 
toward the incorporating reform within the public discourse. The prevailing view is 
that political initiatives are, by themselves, insufficient to stimulate public acceptance 
of new ideas. What is required is creation of an appropriate atmosphere, cultural 
conditions amenable to the acceptance of these ideas. 15 This ambience, operating as 
an independent variable, represents an interpretive package in the words of Gamson 
and Modigliani, a cultural derivative whose meanings and associations are ascribed to 
events and institutions by a society's members. Hence, competition among political 
actors is, to all effects, competition among different interpretive packages constructed 
from meanings produced within the public discourse. ' 
6 Moreover, political actors can 
themselves construct these interpretive packages, some of which gain dominance and 
provide the normative principles (or worldview) from which political behavior and 
stratification are derived. From the vantage of politics, culture breeds the political C, 
14(,, eert7. C. , trans: 
Yoash Mcisler. 1992. The 11, feaning of Culture, Jerusalem: Keter. (Hebrew) 
15 See for example Doron, G. and Lebel. U., 2000, An Institution On Trial: The Defense System 
Against Bereaved Parents, Plilim. 9,285-369. 
16 Gamson, A. and Modigliani, A., 1989. Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A 
Constructionist Approach, American Joarnal of Sociology, 95(l), 1-37. 
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institutions that structure reality and prescribe behaviors and knowledge that are later 
perceived independently of their political origins and are thus taken for granted. 
This cyclical process explains the impression that the actions of hegemonic 
elites, the groups that control the production of meaning and allocation of cultural 
values, represent "self-fulfilling prophecies. " It supports the rise to power of those 
elites most proficient in producing and then transmitting the social messages that 
reinforce their own political dominance. In general, to be effective, interpretive 
packages must endow actors, parties, and messages with acceptability, meaning and 
normative superiority; if successful, they can construct the links that bind institutions 
to social self-maintenance processes. As theories of decision making and social 
psychology teach us, any object or action perceived as furnishing advantages that 
ensure survivability - in sociological terms, group preservation - acquires 
preferential status in the hierarchy of social values. Objects and actions that ensure 
survival come to be perceived as inore meaningful vis-d-vis institutions that are 
associated with "secondary" values such as self-actualization or social well-being. In 
other words, objects, behaviors, personalities, and even provocative or engaging ideas 
can be incorporated into self-maintaining interpretive packages that link those 
phenomena to social survival. Hence, if the political demands motivated by these 
interests are impressed in the public mind, internalization of these demands as critical 
values will be hastened. Something similar occurs with respect to political parties: 
Parties that focus on security and are perceived as actively working to fulfill this 
function - that is, produce the requisite cultural packages - will attract greater 
attention and support than Nvill parties that deal with the other, more "mundane" 
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subjects found at the periphery of what Maslow conceives as the pyramid of human 
needs. 17 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of political parties attempting to achieve 
dominance and socio-cultural hegemony, the question remains open as to the method 
of incorporating the sociological factor into their identity. How will they adapt 
themselves to the spirit of the time, to the major ideas or themes preoccupying the 
voters? How, given their superior status, ideology, and institutions will they succeed 
in distributing effective interpretive packages that will tie the public to major national 
goals and communal survival? According to Duverger and his disciples, the 
interpretive packages producing the party's image come to represent this spirit, now 
functioning as an independent variable, objective, historical, and inevitable. Hence, 
each party gears itself to the challenge of adaptation. Moreover, this challenge is 
accepted by every political actor seeking hegemonic social control. ZD 
Despite the appeal of this argument, an alternative view is presented here: The 
spirit of the time is conceived as a dependent variable. Consequently, the ruling 
party's challenge is to create this spirit within a program of political action that 
includes the distribution of the supporting interpretive packages. Within this 
conceptual framework, the spirit of the time, as an entity, is a subjective, sociological 
factor produced by calculated, rational, political manipulation. Those of its constituent 
values or symbols that pertain to communal survival and security, as ingredients in an 
interpretive package, are none other than the products of political practices initiated 
by the dominant party to preserve its status. Thus, the allocation of values, in 
conjunction with the distribution of economic resources and exercises in coalition 
formation, enables the ruling group to manufacture the ambience that reinforces its z: l 
17SCe Shapira, B., 1988, There is Order to the Public 4gendu, MA thesis, Tel Aviv University. 
Department of Political Science. (Hehi e%ý) 
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integration within the socio-political structure and society's sanction of its rule, To 
summarize, I argue that this atmosphere, ideological climate, or spirit of the time is 
the product of rational political engineering. Such a project doubtless entails long- 
term investments, especially when compared with the short-term investment of assets 
and energy required for the bargaining associated with coalition formation, budgeting, 
and other undertakings that characterize day-to-day public policyrnaking. This 
extended time frame is warranted by the outcome of those investments - sustained 
dominance - the fundamental goal of any political or social movement. As will be 
demonstrated, this orientation toward the future adopted by the political actors in 
question enabled them to manipulate values and normative assets to the benefit of an 
interpretive package supporting their regime. 
The most appropriate location for construction of the spirit of the time is 
collective memory. Again, we must ask what interests might motivate political 
movements operating in the present to emphasize the past? It appears that the past, by 
means of the manner in which it is perceived, taught, understood and distributed, is 
the key site for the production of worldviews and expectations directed at the present 
and future. It follows, I argue, that a society's view of its past directly shapes the 
contemporary spirit of the time and perception of political actors as legitimate. 
Talmud and Yonai apply the term hegemonic regions to those cultural arenas, 
issues, and institutions that provide major hegemony-supporting assets. They argue 
that the entire society, the rulers and the ruled, sequester these arenas and position 
them beyond the reach of public debate, where competitive forces can come into play. 
These sites are therefore bounded by a consensus that crosses all sectoral boundaries 
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due to their status as intrinsic and thus unquestioned beliefs (the social ethos). 18 From 
the moment that it captures the reins of government, the political elite transforms 
collective memory into a hegenionic region. This act of appropriation awards the elite 
clear-cut political advantages over its rivals. From its position of power, the dominant 
party attempts to reconstruct the contents of crucial social networks -especially 
knowledge-transmitting institutions (particularly educational and research institutions) 
- into socialization agents supporting the ruling party's needs. We should note that 
the sooner formulation of a community's or society's collective memory begins, the 
greater the benefits to the group that spreads the requisite interpretive packages by 
means of that memory. More time is thereby freed for internalization of the 
interpreted collective past and its incorporation as part of the group's taken-for- 
granted cultural identity. 
Some scholars contend that collective memory is the most significant of the 
social assets available for construction of political communities. Emanuel Sivan, for 
example, argues that as part of its evolution, every community, but more so the 
nation-state, must first become a memory community. 
19 Memory is a fundamental 
condition; it binds individuals to the meanings and legitimacy underlying their 
internal sense of affiliation and external demands for recognition as members of a 
community. This process also has a "negative" side: Ernest Renan, ainong the first to 
deal with the issue of nationalism, notes that nationalism is not just what is 
remembered, it is also what is forgotten. As evidence for his claim, he cites the 
" Talmud, M.. 1986. Betiiý-een Politics and Economics: Public Agreement Versus Ideological 
Distinctions in Israel, MA thesis, Tel Aviv University, The Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology (Hebre%v); Yonai, Y., 1986, Is There Really No Choice', MA thesis, Tel Aviv 
University, The Department of Sociology and Anthropology (fiebrew). 
19 Sivan, E., 199 1, The 1948 Generation. Myth, Image and Memory, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, p. 191 
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omission from official texts of the Catholics' massacre of the Huguenots on St. 
Bartholomew's Eve as an attempt to establish national unity in France. 20 
Memory is thus a rnechanism for defining the individual's self-image as well 
as a tool for delineating the group's/state's boundaries, that is, for developing national 
consciousness. An elite wanting to achieve hegemony in an evolving society will 
attempt to impose uniformity on the mosaic of different memories found in its 
environs, and will initiate what Yoram Bronowski terms narratives of recollection or 
the history of forge tfulness. 21 In this context, the actors who frame memory fulfill a 
dual function: They reflect the society's evolving socio-political ethos at the same 
time that they determine the coordinates at which this political culture is fleshed out. 
In this way, a perpetuum mobile is initiated in which changing collective memory 
(expressed, for instance, in state commemoration practices) reflect the dialectic 
tensions at the heart of every society at the moment when recollection is 
constructed. 22 
The importance of collective memory as a unifying force is corroborated by 
the resources that infant nation-states devote to the formation of an exclusive set of 
symbols, myths and rites within national civic culture. These elements provide the 
interpretations and meanings that place the infant state on a new cultural-historical 
continuum. They spin the narrative describing the advent of national sovereignty and, 
most significantly, they determine the accepted components of political identity. In 
doing so, these cultural products award preferential status to those considered 
responsible for the national enterprise. In other words, by determining which 
individuals and groups will be recalled as the nation's founding fathers, collective 
20 Renan, E., 1882. OWest-ce qu'une nation? Paris: Calman-Levy, pp. 9-26. 
21 Bronowski, Y., I October 1993, Narratives of Recollection, or the History of Forgetfulness, llaaretý, 
p. 5B. (HcbreNý) 
22 Liebman, S. and Don Yehiya, E.. 1983. Civil Religion in Israel. - Traditional Judaism and Political 
Culture in the Jewish State, Berkeleý, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, p. 9. 
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memory awards those selected with the right to claim preferential political status in 
the future. 
Mircea Eliade notes that the period of national genesis is pivotal when viewed 
from the perspective of collective memory and its relationship to all the factors 
connected to the establishment of the modern state. As the period most charged, 
meaningfully and symbolically, for members of the community, it will accompany 
consolidation of the nation's political structures but only to the degree that two other 
elements are present: a broadly held ideologically or appropriate cultural ambience, 
and motivated actors who can actively influence the process of national 
consolidation. 23 
Contrary to Eliade, some scholars consider collective memory to be a 
methodological artifact, having no political salience when considered on the objective =1 
level. To counter this argument, obstacles to the observation of collective memory 
must be removed. This involves overcoming temporal limitations, locating public as 
well as private records, and gradually unearthing data with archaeological and 
archival methods. Viewed from this perspective, collective memory challenges the 
scholar to reveal the past, locate bits of information, and wipe society's spectacles 
clean on route to ascertaining what really happened. The events selectively 
experienced by numerous individuals and sub-groups are "relived" through the 
research, now under the heading of their shared history, political identity and fate. 
This assumes that for the subjects, memories are the main factor guiding construction 
of their collective identity and social consensus. For them, the past is an objective 
entity, real and immutable, begging to be raised from the depths and distributed far 
and wide. 
23 Eliade, M., 1963, Uyth and Realiq,, New York: Harper and Row. 
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Adherents of this approach describe the evolution of collective memory as a 
spontaneous and pluralistic process, the creation of a chain of memories retained by 
individuals and groups, with each independently adapting the contents of personal 
memory to a common framework. These memories are then synthesized into a new 
entity, one that converts individual members of society into a community having 
shared memories. 24 Nonetheless, Maurice Halbwacs, Durkheim's disciple, does not 
consider memory to be an evolving objective, historical fact. He views collective 
memory as a socio-political construct. In his paper on the phenomenon of social 
recollection, Halbwacs notes that memory, by necessity, is linked to a network of 
meanings and orientations that are impersonal and yet anything but arbitrary: These 
meanings and orientations are focused and channeled within the socio-political 
discourse. 25 
We can assume, then, that any leadership desirous of achieving and retaining 
political dominance as well as hegernonic control over a society's collective memory 
cannot be content with unmanageable historical or scholarly inputs, with 
unadulterated bits of information accumulated from the wellspring that represents the 
community's heritage. Such a leadership is well aware of the need for new versions of 
the recollected past, renditions supportive, first and foremost, of its capacity to unify 
the greatest possible number of community members about itself. In his study on the 
traditions associated with national movements, Eric Hobsbawm argued for the 
existence of just such a process. As he conceives it, elites "contrive" the required 
memories; they make political use of history to substantiate their legitimacy and the 
actions initiated by them to unite the coininunity about their desired agenda. Hence, 
24 I-lalbwacs, M. 1980. Collective Memmy, chicago. UniNersit) ot'Chicago Press ; Hartman, G., 1994, 
The Visible Darkness. 2000.107 68-9-3) (Hehrew). 
25 Halb,, vacs, 1980, pp. 167-169. 
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the history that supports a nation's, state's, or movement's store of knowledge and 
ideology does not encompass the breadth of factual memory but only what was 
chosen, portrayed, distributed and institutionalized by those assigned the task of doing 
26 SO. 
Collective memory, it follows, is not a spontaneous, grassroots phenomenon 
even if the individuals who produce it continue to believe in its pristine character. We 
are, in effect, speaking of a political construct, resting on manipulative foundations: It 
represents an instance of appropriation of the past for the sake of the present and 
future interests of the state and the elite. Pierre Noret suggests the concept lieu de 
memorie (memory site) to capture this phenomenon, directed from the top. These 
sites, established by the ruling elite that controls decision making in the political and 
national arenas, are used to penetrate the societal discourse that is stamped with 
contents (i. e., memories) favorable to it. 28 Noret is convinced that as a result of this 
29 
process, collective memory loses its ability to spontaneously "remember" the past. 
Noret further argues that a lieu de memorie houses meaningful qualities 
associated with a real or imagined entity, transformed into a symbol for a given 
community as a result of deliberate acts or subsequent to the passage of time. Memory 
sites, lieux de memorie, link the physical - geographically placed objects such as 
monuments, flags, or street names that commemorate leaders and heroes - with the 
temporal. A succinct example is Bastille Day, annually celebrated by the French 
public on 14 July. In Noret's view, any expressive vehicle for the penetration, 
dissemination and anchoring of memory within the public discourse is a memory site. Z: ' 
2611 obsba\vm. E., 1983 Invention of tradition: Introduction, in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds. ), The 
-, e 
University Press, pp. 12-13. Invenlion of Tradition. Cambridge: Camhriclp 
27[programming error-ul] 




He labels the community's aggregate of memory sites its symbolic repertoire. 
Collective memory thus constitutes all the signs and mechanisms that a group 
preserves temporally and spatially in order to remind its audience of past events. 
These events, however, are not random: Because they have been recruited to political 
ends, they "monopolize" memory. Noret himself describes lieux de memoire as empty 
shells deposited on the shore after the sea of memory has ebbed. 30 
Collective memory is constructed in three main stages: First comes the 
screening - the careful selection of what is worth remembering - of facts and 
events drawn from the past that conform to the desired image of the elite currently 
consolidating its position. In the process, the ruling group appoints agents to classify 
and select the preferred version froin among the historical facts available. Selection of tl 
what is remembered and what is forgotten, what is stressed and what is ignored, who 
are the heroes and who the villains, is conducted in accordance with ideological and 
moralistic directives. The second stage. interpretation - mediation of all past events 
or the placing of those events within the narrative - occurs prior to their presentation 
to the public. These interpretive packages are chosen from among competing 
meaning-assigning interpretive options. Stage three is distribution - the 
establishment of official memory sites to be marketed for the purpose of the public's 
internalization of their information and political meanings. To summarize, in Noret's 
view, internalized collective mernory is nothing other than the product of calculated 
political action, employed to facilitate unposition of hegemony over the public 
discourse. James Young writes in the introduction to his book The Texture of Memory 
that memory is not created in a vacuuni, liciice, its motives are never pure. 
" 
3 Olbid., p. 12. 
3 'Young, J. E.. 1993, The Texture ofAlemory. Holocaust Afemorials and Alleaning, New Haven and 
London: Princeton University Press, p. 2. 
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The key to understanding the concept collective memory is, therefore, its 
detachment from the personal memories of its individual bearers. Memory sites can be 
born and nurtured because mernoi-y is not spontaneous; archives must be established, 
anniversaries celebrated, rituals orpnized, eulogies delivered for memories require 
"tangible points of reference" by means of which society's members can relate to the 
event recalled. As Bar On argues, we are speaking of a social process, the result of Z: ' 
social dynamics and interpersonal cornmunication. This phenomenon is not dependent 
upon individuals despite the inward nature of the experience; it rests on the fact that 
individuals are members of the society that nurtured them, 32 Hence, study of a 
society's collective mernory necessitates a shift to the dominant political discourse. 
The relationship between the collective memories of the groups participating in as 
well as excluded from that discourse is \vliat interests the researcher. Comparisons 
will undoubtedly reveal significant variance in the perception and comprehension of 
events among different groups. In the present study, however, I focus on the groups 
that have established hegemony over the production of official memory sites, 
especially historiography and commemoration practices. 
Followers of Michel Foucault haý/e also called for a rereading of collective 
memory, historiography and, in effect, all human knowledge. Theirs is a political 
stance, requiring the identification of processes of construction and maintenance of 
collective memory within the context of the struggle for power. From the perspective 
of critical theory, the group possessing political and social power attempts to cast 
human knowledge in a form benefiting its continued hegemony. 33 This insight has ZD 
recently prodded contemporary academic scholars to uncover the histories of groups 
and other voices ornitted from the discoursc so as to offer them an opportunity, within 
32 Bar-On. M.. 2001,1 Uritlen ii7 a Book, I he Bel, iwmigs qf Israeli Historiography qf the 1948 War, Tel 
Aviv: klaarachot, Ministrý Of Dclc"Sc. P. 15. (flebrew) 
33 Foucault, M. 1973., The Order ol I-hingý , 1; 7.4rcheology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage. 
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public space, to tell the story ofthe marginal and the weak whose contributions have Z71 
been expunged from the official narrative. A basic tenet guiding this school is Marx's 
allegation that the bourgeoisie refuses to study itself critically or to relinquish its 
unilateral view of its own history. 34 
Hence, in the approach adopted, history, although not necessarily official 
. political sphere. 
Here, "the whole truth" is not history is redefined as a subjective. 
only alien, it is inadmissible. Selectivity is necessary because the writing of history 
must survive political barriers, struggles, and interventions. We can conclude that 
history is but one additional inernory site used by the powerful to foster an 
atmosphere amenable to them. For instance, consider Bar On's comments on myth, 
another major memory site: "The degree of truth hidden in one or another myth is n 
unimportant. Memory does not confront itself with what occurred in the past but with 
the degree of its compliance Nvith identified factors found in the present ... Collective 
memory is closer to myth than to documented history. What characterizes myths is the 
irrelevance of the any link the story rnigght have to recorded history. Collective 
memory's link to historical events also plays little part, irrespective of any connection 
that once existed among some of its components. " 35 
For illustrative purposes, consider historical myths. An historical myth is an 
interpretive mechanism that saiictifies aii historical event by labeling it a universal 
collective experience; as such, the inyth is subject to society's ongoing interpretation 
of its past. The social relevance of a myth is expressed by how it is incorporated into 
the network of private and corninurial rituals. More than retelling the past, a myth 
embodies a cultural code that exalts a distinctive set of moral values and behavioral 
34 Marx, K., 1973, Grundrisse, London: I kmllondý, -)rth, Pf). 105-106. 
35 Bar On. 200 1, Written in a Book, The 8c,; mmngý ol Israeli Historiography of the 1948 War. Tel 
Aviv: Maarachot, Ministry of Defense. (I lehrc\\) 
p. 29. (Hebrew) 
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norms. The myth's inculcation (or institutionalization) represents a mechanism for 
reproducing that code. Hence, a myth is, by definition, enlisled: The group that 
produces the memory site quickly creates a rnyth that rebuffs the memories supporting 
its competitors. In the case to be explored, Zionist symbolism and commemoration 
practices, I will show that, not surprisuiglý,, the plethora of memory sites and myths 
dealing with agricultural settlement helped to engender a spirit of the time suitable to 
the Labor Movement agenda. These will be compared to other, competitive myths 
expressing other values, which were either rejected or failed to survive as official 
memory sites. 
This analysis rests on the characterization of myth as more than historical 
narrative, nostalgic in temper. Myths are treated here as political assets; they represent 
models of political behavior approved by the ruling elites. More than minor 
components of socio-political reality, myths are powerful instruments for the 
disposition of groups in socio-political space as well as sources for that disposition's 
legitimation. This is possible because the political order is more than a hierarchical 
collection of positions and governance processes. A political order's effectiveness (as 
a measure of its hegemonic control) is reflccted in the degree to which the population 
internalizes the myths that "tell" the story of society's creation and thereby rationalize 
the present social structure. 36 Mythrnakin-g is thus an effective practice for ordering 
"facts, " causal links, and interpretive inferences into one piece exhibiting internal 
logic and persuasive power, all for the sake of political goals. 37 
Specifically, a myth is a story: it relates momentous events that, in the act of 
retelling, acquire an aura of sanctity. A myth is a tale, not an objective account of 
historical fact; its "truth" does not rest on objective verification of its details. Instead, 
36 Liebman and Don Yehi) a, 1983. p. 40. 
37 Azaryahu. M., 1995. Slate Rilitals. Reer She\ a: I ic" Gurion University of the Negev and Sde Boker: 
Ben Gurion Archives. p. 4. (Hebiew) 
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we are speaking of subjective truth, available for marketing to the myth's consumers. 
These consumers reside in the general community, beyond the bounded estates of 
power and influence. " This description parallels the observation made by British 
anthropologist 1. M. Lewis: Myths "tell a bi-, truth by means of big lies. " 39 Occupants 
of key positions in society are conscious of the historical and symbolic manipulation 
they and their competitors perpetrate through myths. Their competitors are, however, 
uninterested in sustaining a universalistic vision; 40 instead, they are intent on 
introducing alternative myths into the socio-political space. As a result, only extrinsic 
actors, strangers to the society in question, can discover the objective truth hidden 
from the masses by means of myth. Moreover, the myths that enter official memory 
sites as authorized versions of historical truth are always associated with the current 
political order. As implied, inyths decline not in response to public enlightenment but 
through replacement by alternative myths, the outcome of power struggles or contests 
over political hegemony. Hence, we can state that, as a rule, every narrative form of 
political consensus or hegemonic vision is the outcome of conflict and competition. 
Since the dawn of history, elites and governing dynasties have been aware of 
the indispensability of myths for the preservation of their status. They thus produced 
primal myths that told of their rise to power and legitimated their rule. In prehistory 
and antiquity, this legitimacy was based on the threads woven between the ruling 
group's origins and divinity or divine intervention. In modernity, myths are secular: 
The gods have been replaced by "history. " With respect to the nation-state, scholars 
have related primal myths to actions perfOrmed by political elites and intellectuals. 
The strength of these myths rests on the fact that after establishment of the regime, 
these myths -were integrated into the popular patriotic folklore - their contents came 
3 'Ibid. 
31)1ýe iSý 1. M., 
_NV 1974, SocialAnthropoloql in Perspcctive. New York: Harmondsworth, p. 121. 40 Ibid.. p. 16. 
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to appear natural, taken for granted. Iii either setting, primal myths evolved into Zý 
hegemonic concepts, controlling a society's perception of its history and its experience 
of statehood. 
It follows that iminediatek' Upon its accession to power, a political elite will 
initiate production of myths, usina elements culled from what will be official memory 
sites. The memory sites will be chosen according to the myth-related roles they are 
meant to fulfill. These two cultural artifacts (the myths and the memory sites) will be 
constructed as the exclusive representatives of the elite's version of the national ethos, 
to be transmitted to for the future generations. It should be stressed, again, that zn 
selection is a premeditated and rational process, involving the calculated adjustment 
and adaptation, reproduction and recycling of materials. Yet, to repeat, the fabrication, 
obfuscation and plain disregard of fact does little to reduce a myth's power to arouse 
emotions and identification among its target population. Therein lies its strength. 
As mentioned, competition over pmver provides the context for the production 
of myths. Rivalry over prestige and position is expressed here in the contest for 
control over the production, content., and proprietorship of national myths. During this 
battle, groups attempt to reinforce those rn\ ths that support their claims to preferential 
status at the same time that theýi atteinpt to undermine the myths supporting 
alternative claims. 41 
Viewed from the perspective of the ruling group, the preceding analysis 
suggests a paradoxical attitude toward the dimension of time. On one level, it is seems 
obvious that a group successful in its attempts to attain power should focus on the 
present by implementino a strate(-)v meant to solve urgent problems and formulate a ZD 
public policy suitable for the present. 'Elie same applies to the future, whether for 
41 Ohana, D. and Wistreich, R. S.. 1997, Mýth in ludaiSin, Zionism and Israeliness, in Ohana, D. and 
Wistreich, R. S., 1997, The Alvih oflkinorv. Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem institute and Hakibbutz 
Hamcuchad. (Hebrew) 
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reasons of the public interest (e. g., responsible elites make long-term investments) or 
for private interests (e. g., the distribution of patronage). These two time frames direct 
attention to a profusion of means, resources, and issues. Therefore, why look to the 
past? Going deeper, however., reveals that involvement with the past does not 
contradict the other approaches. PreoccuI)ation with the past and its reproduction 
represent but one additional mechanism available for producing the spirit of the time, 
the sociological factor that sets the stage I-or ruling parties to substantiate their claims 
for reelection, for example. 
Although such efforts do not exhaust the available historiographical materials, 
surprisingly, it impels the ruling elite to add commemoration of the dead to its roster 
of political mechanisms. This raises a further conundrum: Why should the elite turn to 
the dead at all? What do the dead offer that the living (and yet unborn) do not? 
Intuitively, all relations carried on with the dead are intimate, extra-political; they 
revolve around mourning, bereavement, commemoration and other means for coping 
that are activated on the level of the family or, in extreme circumstances, the group. 
The objective of this dissertation is to resolve this conundrum. In the following, I will 
show that the dead provide significant advantages to elites preoccupied with the 
maintenance of their political dorninance and cultural hegemony. In terms of the 
analytic perspective adopted here, bereaveiiient represents a political arena, one where 
the state duplicates its behavior regarding history and official memory sites. Whether 
intentionally or not, individuals who sacrificed their lives on the alter of national 
(re)birth - soldiers and their families. civilians participating in underground 
movements - become players in the valtie-al location game manipulated by the ruling 
elites for their own narrow interests. During the course of this game, the dead are 
appropriated by the state and denied their identities as members of the private sphere. 
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Addressing the past offers tactical as well as strategic advantages. Dates are 
crucial factors because they help segregate the chosen few from the others. The 
nation-building enterprise was not compIcted by a ruling elite acting alone; other 
actors, including competing groups, participated in the events, each in its own way, 
supported by different ideas and attitudes. Some were involved in diplomatic efforts, 
others in waging war. We can therefore assume that the group that gained prominence 
with national independence was either stronger or more resilient, or perhaps its 
activities on the eve of declaration of autonomy were perceived as more 
consequential. This dominance, I will show, was the outcome, among other things, of 
the group's control of mechanisms formally identified with the national effort - such 
as leading positions in governing institutions and recognition by other major actors as C, 
the exclusive and worthy representative of the entire population. 
Proceeding chronologically, upon conclusion of the nation-building enterprise, 
the dominant elite, once in government, is required to construct a new "national" 
collective memory. This means setting the date when the nation's history supposedly 
"began" and determining who contributed to its unfolding. If their contributions are 
recognized and extolled in collective memory and memory sites, their inspiring acts 
43 
and fallen heroes will become standards for the coming generation S. Z, 
Establishing the national narrative's temporal framework is therefore an 
effective ploy for purging national myths of those actors and efforts identified with 
competing political factions for its creates a seemingly objective criterion for their 
symbolic exclusion from the enterprise. We can therefore conclude that what is 
generally considered to be the onset of history and its objective details - the crucial 
moments of the national enterprise - are essentially subjective. They reflect political 




decisions, and are "inauthentic. " Michael Young has written that any year can be 
considered the inaugural year of national history. It simply requires placing some 
events within a specific time frarne and transforming them into "ours. " For this 
process to be successful, an opening date suffused with meaning must be selected. 44 
Dates are likewise crucial for national bereavement and commemoration, the 
subjects of this dissertation. Decisions as to who will be counted among the fallen in 
service to the state and, it follows, which groups sacrificed their sons and daughters to 
the national effort are political at their core. To return to Young, this group embraces 
those who fell so that the nation-state could be (re)born. Casualties of the wars waged 
prior to the politically determined base year will be excluded from the burgeoning 
mythology; they will not be considered national martyrs. The groups associated with 
"pre-history" will be denied political as well as extra-political (i. e., cultural and 
economic) rewards. More to the point, recognition of their contribution to the national 
effort, especially in the form of the children they sacrificed, will be ignored if not 
purged from national consciousness. 
The literature on the strateoies employed by ruling elites to impose their mark 
during the early years of national independence is very broad in its reach. Education, 
health, citizenship, the establishment of democratic institutions and the public 
administration, and certainly creation of national security forces are major examples 
of such projects. However, bereavement and commemoration have been neglected for 
45 46 the most part, even by students of the rebirth of the Jewish state . 
44 Young, M., 1988, The Metronomic Society - Natural Rhythms and Human Timetables, London: 
Thames and Hudson. 
15See for example Ciellner, E., 1994., Natiom andNationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 
46 Shapiro, Y., 1984, An Elite Without Succcssors, Generations Qf Political Leaders In Israel, Tel Aviv: 
Sifriat Hapoalim, (Hebrew); Shapiro, Y.. 1989, Chosen to Command, Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hebrew); 
Shapiro, Y. 1996, A Society, Held Capow by Its Polaicions, Tel A\ iv: Sifriat Hapoalim (Hebrew). 
Lissak, M. and Horowitz, D., 1977. Political Recruitment and the Construction of Yishuv Institutions 
During the British Mandate, in NI. Lissak and Horo%\ itz. D. (eds. ). Israel's Political System, Jerusalem: 
Am Oved. (Hebrew) 
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Bereavement is a major component of collective memory; the available 
literature has focused primarily on its cultural rather than political implications. From 
the perspective of this study, however, bereavernent is a political asset, rationally 
constructed by political actors. This approach requires a shift in analytic focus from 
the individual response to commemoration, the mode in which an individual response 
is converted into a collective, nation-level response. 
Since the advent of modern psychology, the preoccupation with bereavement 
has intensified. This discipline has decpened our understanding of how the response to 
loss influences people throughout their lives. The plethora of research on bereavement 
produced by the behavioral and social sciences can be summarized in three points: 
a. Bereavement is a private event. Bereavement is an intimate experience, 
belonging to the private, familial or community realm. Numerous studies have 
observed and analyzed the methods by which individuals cope with tragedy on the 
rehabilitative, functional, and behavioral levels. Study of the subject began with Freud 
who, in his pioneering work, originally conducted with Breuer in the mid 1890s, 
described Anna O's symptoms in response to her father's fatal illness. 48 The 
characteristics of mourning described by Freud in Hourning and Melancholy (1917), 
such as the preoccupation with the deceased and the imaginative reliving of the death 
itself continue to serve as the foundations of the research literature. 49 Hence, the 
majority of studies dealing with bereavement have continued to focus on the 
individual or the deceased's family; it has only touched upon the surrounding social 
and cultural support systems and ignored the nation. 50 Zý 
4sBreuer, J. and Freud, S. 1895, Sludien uber Hyslerie. London: Gesaminelte Wekre, Imago. 
41) Freud, S.. 1917, Trauei- und Melancholic, London: Gesammelte Wekre, Imago. 
50 See tor example Caplan, G., 1974-Pluchmew and Loss, ý"ol. 3: Loss. New York: Basic Books. 
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b. Bereavement is a temporary phenomenon. Psychological mechanisms 
permit the individual to perceive his or her response to the trauma of bereavement as a 
short-lived although powerful experience. New habits are expected to emerge that 
exclude the deceased. This attitudc has inspired models indicating a gradual decline in 
the force of the response. 51 Behavioral models for working through bereavement tend 
to rest on short-lived experiences, temporally bound and organized in progressive 
stages. At their termination, the situation is redefined or restructured as if the 
mourning period has come to its natural and obvious conclusion. 
C. Bereavement arouses emotional and irrational reactions. The majority 
of approaches to bereavement have focus on affective responses to loss: anger, 
depression, anxiety, shame, and guilt. 52 Research has centered on the dynamics 
between thought and feeling, based on the distinction between functional cognitive 
thought patterns and dysfunctional bereavement- induced patterns. A further 
distinction was made between grief and mourning: Grief is an individual, emotional 
response to loss from death '53 whereas mourning is a socio-cultural activity, 
constructed by society to mark the tragic event, a means to reintegrate survivors into 
the existing web of social relations. 54 
This being so, the shift in level to political behavior and the nation-state bids the 
scholar to perceive bereavement as an asset whose properties go beyond the confines 
set by the traditional approaches just reviewed. A rational-political approach to the 
phenomenon depicts bereavement as free of temporal constraints: Memories of the 
dead and their families' subsequent behavior become available for appropriation by 
the state, to be used for the benefit of its long-term political goals. This process is far 
5 'Parkes, C. M. and Weiss, R.. 1983. Rccover , yfirom 
Bereavement, New York: Basic Books. 
52See for example Raphacl, B., 1983, lhe. Owtomy qj Bercuivinew, New York: Basic Books. 
ý3 Averill, J. R., 1968ý Grief: Its Naturc arid SiLmil`icance., ýmerican Sociological Review, 29,358-347. 
54 Rosenblatt, P. C.. Walsh. R. P., and Jackson. D. A., 1976, Grief and Mourning in a Cross-Cultural 
Per, ýpeclive, Washington, D. C.: Human 1ýclations Area F'iles Press. 
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from spontaneous: As will be shown, bereavement, as it appears on the roster of the 
nation-state's instruments, represents a premeditated, calculated policy, planned and 
motivated by political considerations and competition between social groups whose 
leaders comprehend its inordinate long-term political value. We are definitely not Z-1 
discussing an intimate, familial, extra-political phenomenon but a public event 
requiring scrutiny from a purely rat] onal -political perspective. 
In its confrontation with bereavement, the nation-state has been rather 
innovative. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for the first time in modern 
history, a state-initiated organizational framework came to see itself as responsible for 
the burial of war casualties and their official commemoration. Up until the end of the 
nineteenth century, war dead were left to rot in the field, a situation that changed with 
the transformation of fighting forces from a collection of paid mercenaries to national 
armies. From then on, state agencies have seen to the burial of the war dead in 
military cemeteries. A humane gesture at first sight, its benefits were one-sided in the 
main. The state's treatment of its war dead effectively shifts the deceased out the 
private and into the public sphere. State burial represents appropriation of the war's 
victims by the community, their availability for use as public symbols, to be 
intensively used within the sphere of social communications. In the following, 
cemeteries are conceptualized as arenas for the play of politics and techniques of 
political communication. 
Cemeteries, it will be shown.. are also sites where memory is restructured by the 
transmission of patently political messages. Althou,, h most of these messages are 
implicit, they fulfill two major functions. The first relates to intensive penetration of 
the dead as a major constituent of collective consciousness. A precedent for this 
function can be found in Europe following World War 1, with its millions of Z. ý 
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casualties. During the 1920s, England, France and Germany became absorbed in 
commemoration of the War's human toll by means of memorial days, rituals, and the 
statues erected in major cities as well as remote villages. The spirit of the War's dead 
became an integral part of Europe's public and political existence. 55 
The second function is epistemological: delineation of the community's 
boundaries. Once the dead enter the sphere of the collective consciousness and 
become available as carriers of political messages, military cemeteries perpetuate their 
memory. This occurs not the least because those who died are labeled as members 
(i. e., as signifiers) of the groups credited with completing the mission of national birth 
or, as in the Israeli case, of rebirth. But not all the dead receive identical treatment: 
Official acts of commemoration are products of screening processes in which all the 
related events, including those taking place immediately after independence, are Z, 
selected according to their contribution to the myths that support the political and 
military leadership. Such screening is the logical outcome of the socio-political 
function of military cemeteries. As memory sites, they chosen not the least for their 
ability to motivate the young to join the army forces, the institution that, more than 
any other does, expresses collective values of sacrifice and deference to the state. 
Victims of events that ended in tragedy, failure, or defeat, incidents potentially 
embarrassing to the political and military elites, may be interred in military cemeteries 
but excluded from mention in national myths and other mernory sites. Their 
resurrection as national heroes, if it occurs, results from local, private initiatives, 
"from the bottom up, " bereft of official "top down" encouragement, and often in the 
face of official resistance. 56 
55M osse, G. L., 1975, The Nationali--alion of ihe A, lasses, New York: publisherý Mosse, G. L.. 198 1, The 
Martyred Soldier Ritual: National Ceinetcries and the Renascence of Nationalism, Zmanin, 6, (Hebrew) 
"'Doron and Lebel, 2000. 
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The link established between the individual, intimate and extra-political level, 
where efforts are directed toward rehabilitating the victim's family, and the exterior 
political level, where state intervention in bereavement is motivated by interests of 
power and governance, can be categorized as one of exchange . 
5' Elevation of the dead 
to the status of national heroes is a mechanism contrived to compensate the victims' 
families for their sacrifice. Incorporation of the dead into the socio-political discourse 
grants the victims everlasting life on the symbolic level while it acknowledges the 
nation's debt to their families. The attachment of meaning to their loss and the 
recognition of the depth of their sacrifice, especially when the event is depicted as an 
ultimate act of heroism dedicated to national (re)birth, are crucial resources in the 
state's rehabilitate of the families. 
In exchange for this gift, the victims' families accept the clear strictures on 
their political behavior exacted by the state. On the one hand, the families' passivity, 
resulting from trauma, effectively guarantees that the terms of the exchange will be 
kept. Alternatively, this arrangement can convert bereaved parents of victims of 
national insurrections and wars of independence into political activists, ready to 
legitimate the state's social and political undertakings. As state-designated members 
of the leadership's unofficial retinue, they are invited to take their place on the 
grandstand at public rituals and gatherings. 58 From this position, they dispense their 
children's legacy in a version prepared by agents authorized to draft that legacy as an 
entreaty to share in the prescribed political conduct. On the national level, bereaved 
parents may thus encourage young men and women to join the army in the name of 
the very goals for which their own children died; on the political level, they set 
examples regarding continued public support for and trust in the leaders who had sent Z: I 
57 Doron and Lebel, 2000, op. cit., Lebel. 1998. The Political Behavior of Bereavement, MA thesis, Tel 
Aviv University, Department of Political Science. 
58Lebel, U. 1998. 
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their children to their graves. Both levels illustrate the calculated use of 
commemoration to secure the desired public response to the nation's challenges as 
conceived by the political elite. To illustrate this process, consider a statement made 
by one Israeli Chief of the General Staff at the inauguration of a memorial park 
dedicated to War of Independence dead: "They gave us independence, their 




is our readiness to sacrifice everything for the sake of Israel's 
independence. 09 
In their construction of collective memory and memory sites, political elites 
recruit a group's dead as they recruit its history. The preoccupation with bereavement, 
bereaved families, commemoration and the incidents during which lives were lost has 
an important place in the network of rational political behavior we are discussing. 
ImportantIv, this preoccupation is also the result of a decision. The respective 
activities represent the realization of a crucial decision impinging upon the public's 
perception of the evolving nation-state's political structure. The choice of victims and 
events included in the repertoire of coin mern oration activities is meant to establish a 
clear equivalence between those individuals and events and the elites presented as 
responsible for the independence project. 
Contrary to Azrayahu, who argues that commemoration rituals treat "all those 
who fell in battle, " meaning that the decision of who is remembered is made from 
below, I suggest that the decision is made from above. The outcome of this selection 
is state control of a major syrnbolic asset: official designation of an individual's 
and hence his community's - inclusion in a revered group, that responsible for the 
nation's birth. This asset endows political legitimacy to those groups who, interested 
59Gen. Yigael Yadin, Israel's Chief of the General Staff ,3 April 1951, speech made at the unveiling of 
the Nvar memorial located at the Gan Ana% im Military Cemetery, commemorating the casualties of the 
Har-El Brigade, IDF Archives, UMIUMbered file. 
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in achieving that status and access to its (political) resources, base their claims on 
their sacrifices to this sacred cause. Hence, bereavement can become a mechanism for 
defining the collective's inclusive boundaries, delineated in the national narrative, and 
justifying the political hegemoný wielded by its elites. Alternatively, those groups 
whose bereavement is driven to the periphery of public consciousness, whose grief is 
excluded from the national narrative and commemoration, receive no such 
recognition; their personal but mainly historical contribution to the national enterprise 
is denigrated. State denial of the other's bereavement is thus political in character: It 
channels access to the political and social resources sequestered by the hegemonic 
elite. 
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Commemoration of Bereavement - The Stratepy of SyMbolic Manipulation 
How is the political use of bereavement realized and how is the linkage between 
bereavement and collective memory constructed? The study of collective memory 
focuses on identification of political messages and their content as determined by the 
producers of those messages and memories. However, we should not ignore another 
important aspect of the phenomenon: the practices that make memory possible. 60 1 
refer to those mechanisms - many more of which, in number and effectiveness, are 
available to ruling as opposed to other groups - by means of which ideas and myths 
penetrate social channels of communication and become accepted as normative, that 
is, institutionalized. A political elite interested in preserving its status cannot be 
content with producing a "sociological factor" favorable to it; it must actively 
distribute this factor throughout society. 
Based on their awareness of the key contribution made by memory sites to 
regime continuity, scholars intent on studying the political bargaining conducted over 
the boundaries of the state must also focus on the bargaining that accompanies control 
over memory sites: national rituals, stamps, street names, customs, holidays, memorial 
days, and textbooks. We would therefore expect to find a heated political debate 
conducted between the groups controlling access to those sites and its contents (i. e., ZD Z' 
those holding the reins of power) and those groups denied access to those sites. We 
can also assume that the heat of such debates bears witness to the political stakes 
involved. 
In the literature on national inemory, the concept commemoration is applied to 
the mechanism that, through channels of social communication, integrates fragments 
of the historical past by stressing their salience to the experience of the present and 
60C onnerton, P., 1990, HowSocietics Remember, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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future. Commemoration can be described as the cuiriulative product of disparate 
strands from the past, woven into a uniform narrative. This narrative supports the 
story of national genesis distributed by the political elite at the same time that it 
provides fertile territory for the reproduction of the social and political order. 
Consider the term military heritage, one of the standard mechanisms used by the 
nation-state to invoke national unity. According to Mordechai Bar On, a former IDF 
Chief Education Officer and one of the first to apply the terrn in the context of Israeli 
nation-bui I ding, this phrase was never intended to refer to the lessons learned from 
particular battles or assessments made of specific campaigns. Instead, the term relates 
to "narratives of battles used as didactic stories focusing on values ... morale ... pride in 
one's unit and loyalty to the army ... sacrifice, solidarity. " Thus, according to Bar On, 
construction of a military heritage entails "selective memory. " Such a process 
demands, in his view, "rigorous selection of those same 'memories' that support the 
desired message. " He also argues that this process involves more than memory and 
recall; it also requires forgetting and generatingforgqfulness: "Memories will always 
be found that support and construct meaning; however, memories also exist that 
undermine these memories and offer to replace them with alternative or contradictory 
meanings. t16l 
The study of commemoration has been nurtured by the work of Emil 
Durkheirn who wrote that commemoration preserves and exalts traditional beliefs and 
attitudes, reinforces their existence, and reproduces the status of the social agents that 
distribute them. As the perceived validity of these beliefs increases, the probability 
that they will forfeit their place in society's collective memory decreases; as a result, 
basic values and their foundations are strengthened. According to Durkheim, the cult 
("Bar On, 2001, p. 37. 
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of commemoration, like any religion, kneels not before the Almighty but before 
society. Society is fortified in the process. 62 
Thus, from the functionalist point of view, commemoration, in all its facets, 
represents assets that support the public's confrontation with trauma and loss, provides 
the glue of social consolidation, and produces a unique national identity. Such a 
process was recognized in the collective commernoration rites conducted in Britain 
following World War 1. It began in the schools, the colleges and military units, and 
was accompanied by public pressure to observe Armistice Day as the nation's official 
memorial day. At the sarne time, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was erected. This 
memorial soon became a hallowed site for communion with the dead, visited by the 
entire public, not just bereaved families. 63 In Israel as well the demand to build 
,, 64 memorials began from the "bottorn. Based on this observation, Azaryahu maintains 
that national commemoration is democratic in nature, a collectiveact in which all 
members of society participate. However, by persisting in this line of argument, 
Azaryahu continues to ignore the simultaneous exclusion of certain groups from 
participation in those commemorative practices. 
On a superficial level, national rituals are universally used to impart a sense of 
communal authenticity, of collective or national unity. Creating authenticity is thus a 
major objective for producers of national communities. The specific forms these 
rituals take are derived from the images and attitudes found within the operative ZD 
cultural space. Nevertheless, although it tends to be a product of defined (though 
potentially variable) political interests, the unity represented by these rituals functions 
as a cornerstone for all competing national ideologies. The latter continue to be 
62 Durlcheim, E.. 1912, The Elemenfary 1, orms of Religious Lýfi-, Nc%% York: Free Press. 
63 Malkinson, R. and Witztom, E. 1993. Berea%ement and commemoration: Fhc dual sides of the 
national myth, in R. Malkinson. R. RLIbin, and E. Witztom (eds. ). Loss and Berem, enzent in Israeli 
Society, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense. 
64 Azaryahu, 1995. 
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perceived as fundamental, taken-for-granted, objective facts. Hence, national unity 
sustains the political demands made in the name of society. In parallel, the founding 
fathers are aware, if only implicitly, that such unity Must be molded, safeguarded, and 
more than anything else, expressed on the symbolic level. 
National rituals are, therefore, outstanding, examples of the processes at the ZD 
core of nation-building projects. They do not burst forth spontaneously as inventions 
born of a national spirit or collective identity. Rituals are products of complex 
political processes. According to Azaryahu, two stages are involved: first, definition 
of the needs to be fulfilled and choice of the ritual's subject; second, 
institutionalization and choice of agents. Regarding the first stage, this represents a 
self-conscious choice among options competing for priority within the cultural space. 
The choice is therefore political, motivated by the needs of those responsible for 
determining national identity and, accordingly, the meanings they wish to attach to 
that national identity. With respect to the second stage, the specific course 
institutionalization takes is determined by the social communication channels and 
agents available and/or acceptable to the public at large. 
National rituals therefore potently illustrate tile intricacy of commemoration. 
To repeat, commernoration is not only a means for transforming collective memory 
into political culture, it is also a mechanism for translating memory into political 
attitudes. Commemoration is an instrument, available to the authors of a nation's 
political culture for the presentation of desired attitudes as natural, matter of fact, and 
65 real. As Nachman Ben Yehuda writes: "[tlhe word 'remember' has a dual meaning: 
65 Berger, P. L. and Luckmann. T., 1972, The Social Constraction of Reality, New York: Penguin; 
Dahrendorf, R., 1966, Class and Class Coqflict in 1"dustrial Sociely. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
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the first, to recollect; the second, to commemorate. , 66 William Baumol argues in turn 
that the two meanings are permanently and cyclically interrelated: The way in which a 
memory or event is recalled determines the manner in which it is commemorated, the 
elements emphasized and those effaced and therefore forgotten. It follows that 
producers of commemoration rituals revive images taken from collective memory, an 
act that influences the way the original event will be recalled in the future. As Shamir 
writes: "The [war] memorials' initiators were asked ... to include the fallen among the 
remembered, a group immersed in the past, having participated in building the 
homeland. , 67 Those who participated in building the nation can legitimately, we may 
assume, expect to participate in managing it. 
Intensive observation of commemoration reveals yet another story. Even if the 
demand to erect a commemorative monument came from below, the state appropriates 
the activity for the benefit of the ruling elite despite the fact that we are dealing with a 
consensual project. In cases where a memorial's fundamental message is problematic 
for the ruling elite - because the elite would prefer to erase the event or hero from 
the collective memory - the government will make every attempt to either prevent its 
construction or to limit its access to social channels of communication. Using the 
public's need for symbolic rituals, a pattern is contrived for nationalization of 
memories of the dead in favor of the current regime. 
From the point of the political elite - the very same groups responsible for 
drafting the official interpretive package - this process enlarges its political capital 
thusly: The fallen identified with favored groups receive preferential treatment in the 
form of official commemoration while those belonging to peripheral or competitive 
""Ben-Yehuda, N., 1995, Hie Alusada lljthý C011eClilT AleHIOI) (117d Mythmaking in Isi-ael, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press. p. 272. 
67 Shamir, 1., 1989, The Elernal Flame. Xleniorials to the Vartyrs of Israel's lVars, Tel Aviv: 
Maarachot, Ministry of Defense. p. 34. (Hebrew) 
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groups receive fleeting if any mention. This increases the elite's standing among the 
groups honored and thus its implicit control over those same groups. Schwartz and 
Vagner-Pacifici, in their study of Vietnam War memorials, discuss this process in 
terms of the ambivalence and political trials associated with commemoration of events 
that undermine the political hegemony of the governing elite but which cannot be 
ignored due to their scope and attendant trauma. 68 
In general, state commernoration reflects the political elite's attitude toward 
the period and figures commemorated. Hence, changes in government inaugurate 
changes in the spirit behind commemoration projects: The needs of different elite 
groups must now be met. Schwartz describes how the meanings of historical events 
changed in the wake of modifications in prevailing social attitudes and how these 
transformations influenced the construction of the memorials built on Capitol Hill in 
Washington, DC 
. 
69 In a similar light, Mayo categorizes US war memorials according 
to whether they commemorate what are considered just or unjust wars, victories or 
defeats. As he views it, both types can exist side-by-side as part of what he terms "the 
conflict over memory. " Conceptions of what type of memorial to erect, dedicated to 
which event, and within what framework vary over time because the "truth" in whose 
70 narne the memorial was built construction changes with time . It follows that 
attempts to obliterate any mention of rival groups from memorials and other memory 
sites carry the seeds of those groups' re-entry into the discourse at some later date. Z, 
68 Schwartz, B. and Vagner-Pacifici, R., 1989, The Vietnam Memorials, American Image, 44,315-320. 
In their study of Vietnam War memorials, the authors discuss this process in terms of the ambivalence 
and political trials associated with commemoration of events that undermine the political hegemony of 
the governing elite. The quandary arises when these events. though threatening, cannot be ignored due 
to their scope and attendant trauma 
69S ch%vartz, B., 1975, Social Charges and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George 
Washington, American Sociological Rei, ieijý. 
70MaN,, o, J. 1988, WarXfemorials as Political Landscapes, Ne%% York: Praeger. 
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Memorials and flags, national cemeteries and commemorative rites, street 
names and stamps are political symbols strategically positioned to invent an 
"imagined community" in Anderson's term S. 71 These symbols refer to those of the 
community's former mcnibers who have no bodily substance, that is, the dead. This 
community links the past with the present and the future by specifying who 
contributed and who, through martyrdom, purchased controlling shares in the nation- 
building project (the past); who can and who cannot legitimately hold the reins of 
power (the present); and finally, which party will achieve dominance on the basis of 
the first two factors (the future). 
Among the symbolic mechanisms available, we have selected the following on 
the basis of their proximity to the political processes described. 
National Heroes 
The creation of national heroes is a highly effective political strategy. These heroes 
the nation's forefathers and brave fighters who fell in the struggle to achieve 
independence - are all identified either at the tirne of their courageous acts or as a 
result of events following their deaths with ruling political ideologies and movements. 
Lipset, in his article on the rise of civil religion, cites two basic scenarios. In the US, a 
uniform homogeneous culture arose that incorporated reverence for the "founding 
fathers" such as Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt and the values they 
represented. In contrast to this case, which displays a political culture where leaders of 
every political persuasion express respect for the same set of founding fathers, Lipset 
71 Anderson, B., 199 1, Imagined Communities. London: Verso, imprint of New Left Books. pp. 16-17. 
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suggests the case of Europe, where right and left distribute distinctive symbols: 
heroes, dates, historical truths, and myths. 72 
Determination of who authored the political order's narrative is an act of 
exegesis, a practice meant to "enlighten" future generations. The process responds to a 
vital question associated with construction of collective identity and memory sites, 
specifically: What heroes and values spearheaded establishment of the state? Public 
responses to these heroes and values will be akin to those celebrating the Greek polis, 
where rites for the veneration of the founding fathers were transformed into rituals 
celebrating the city as a political entity. Modern examples are the cults of personality 
surrounding Lenin, George Washington, and William Tell. These figures' 
monopolization (i. e., cultural hegemony) of the contents of texts, stamps, and street 
names induces acceptance of the self-serving thesis, put forth by the parties in power, 
that their "historical" association with these icons and "national values" legitimates 
the existing political order and their exclusive control of the state. 
Commemorative Monuments 
Construction of commemorative monuments is a common practice throughout the 
world. Because of their physical longevity, monuments provide lasting testimony to 
how events and casualties are etched in each period's collective memory. To 
guarantee that these complex projects indeed operate as sites for mass pilgrimage, 
these complex projects require intricate and careful planning, licenses obtained from 
nurnerous government agencies, often huge budgets and long-term investment in their 
maintenance. Inevitably, only governments or ruling elites are capable of such 
undertakings. This is especially true when the subject of the monument is nationalistic 
721ý ipset, S., cited in Ofiana, D. and Wistreich, R. S., 1997ý The Alyllz ofAlemorv, Jerusalem: Van Leer 
Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Harneuchad, pp. 1 1-41. (Ilebrew) 
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in nature and fixed on the public agenda, whether in the area of education, tourism, 
official rituals, and the protocol of state visits. For instance, following World War 1, 
an unprecedented number of monuments - 38,000 in all - initiated by local 
governments and veterans associations throughout the France, carry the names of the 
dead and are infused with the republican spirit of sacrifice. 73 The penetration of 
monuments into the fabric of public life may be what motivated Annette Becker to 
place them into the category of "official art. t, 74 Hobsbawm, who studied monuments 
constructed in Europe during the period 1870-1914, maintains that this is a process 
producing tradition . 
75 He argued that socio-political transformations necessitated the 
creation of new tools by the elite to reinforce their control and to guarantee loyalty. 
One substitute for the unifying glue formerly provided by the church and the crown 
was found in the mechanism of commemoration, with monuments functioning as the 
durable pegs for its expression. 
Military Cemeteries 
The earliest military cemeteries combined the sublime values of the French 
Enlightenment with the practical considerations of sanitation. The French 
Revolution's leaders encouraged arranging graves in rows because the ideal of 
equality was to be maintained in the cemetery as it was in the City. 76 France's other 
commemorative projects followed this principle to some degree: Its Armistice Day is 
celebrated as its memorial day-, Independence Plaza at Verdun and the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier attract countless pilgrims of every rank. Yet, prior to World War 1, 
73S ivan, E. 199 1, The Generaton of 1948. Alyth, Image and Ifemory, Tel Aviv: Maarchot, Ministry of 
Det'ense. (Hebrew) 
74 Becker, A., 1987, Les 41onitinenis aux Afort, Paris: Errance. 
75 Hohsbmvm, E.. 1983, Nfass Production of''l-radition: Europc 1870-1914, in E. Hobsbamn and T. 
Ranger (eds. ), The Invenlion of Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 263-307. 
76 Mosse, 1981, The Martyrs Ritual: National Cemeteries and the Renascence of Nationalism, Zmanim, 
20.3-14. (Hebrew) 
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soldiers were buried in common graves at the place of their demise. Only the graves 
of their commanders were awarded special attention. In 1915, civilian cemeteries 
were differentiated from military cemeteries for the first time. 
But military cemeteries are nonetheless special: They are official sites for 
rituals, visited by the masses - schoolchildren, soldiers and their families, bereaved 
parents and siblings - but also politicians, military and civilian leaders, on national 
memorial days in particular. Speeches are made and homage is paid to the dead. The 
dead are extolled as the nation's benefactors, worthy of mention in the nation's history 
books. However, there are those who, for one reason or another, but especially if they 
died prior to the nation's official anniversary, are denied burial in military cemeteries 
by the nation's leaders. Excluded from this official site, the outcasts are bereft of ally 
possibility to enjoy the status extended to their rivals in the collective's imagined 
community. 
Memorial Day Rituals 
Memorial day rituals are among the most effective channels available for transmission 
of political and normative messages by the state. It is obvious that the state pours 
considerable effort into planning and mounting these events. Official rituals are 
funded by the state; its senior officlials, especially representatives of the ministries of 
defense, education and culture, address the audience in well-staged appearances; the 
logistics involved with transportation guarantee that huge crowds will attend and 
imbibe in the messages to be distributed. Memorial day rituals are, in short, optimal 
platforms for the distribution of the new state's version of national history. 
The audience's anonymity does not preclude the effectiveness of these events 
as a means of communication. An individual's identity is far less important than the 
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act of participation in a social communications network: Anyone can make the 
pilgrimage to the founding fathers' graves, view the monuments and experience the 
force of the messages conveyed. Participation can be immediate by physically visiting 
the site, or vicariously, through the media. 
It deserves to be stressed that contrary to the time frame indicated by their 
title, the crucial political significance of memorial days is their relationship to the 
present, "real time" as Yerushalmi refers to it. The story commemorated - its heroes, 
order of events, motives and outcomes - is routinely repeated every year. This 
consistency creates, in effect., a convention for the transmission of political 
77 messages . Yerushalmi therefore concludes that memorial day rituals are among the 
most potent vehicles available for the reinforcement of collective memory. 78 
Official Commemorative (Yizkor) Literature 
As early as the Middle Ages, Jewish communities throughout the world introduced 
several practices for the construction and maintenance of collective memory, two of 
which are especially relevant to our subject. The first practice, developed within the 
framework of spiritual-] iterary texts, involved preparation of volumes of prayers and 
hymns; these responded to the need to preserve and distribute Jewish religious 
memory. The second practice, preparation of commemorative volumes - termed 
Yizkor after the liturgical prayer for the dead - was particularly popular among 
Ashkenazi (European) communities. These volumes documented the history of local 
persecution and pogroms; they were read to worshippers from synagogue pulpits and 
79 preserved in Jewish archives . 
77 Yerushalmi, 1988, p. 28. 
78 lbid. ý p. 33. 71) Ibid., pp. 60-73. 
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A distinctive feature of commemoration after the rise of the modem nation- 
state is the appearance of commemorative volumes in their civic context. These 
volumes are produced either privately, by the victim's family, friends, or military unit, 
or publicly, by state aguencies. When published by the latter, these volumes are 
generalized, dedicated to all the war dead having some connection to the particular 
institution. The different types of commemorative volumes may somewhat overlap. 
But one aspect links all the entries in the various categories of official literature: They 
omit the names of those not buried in official sites. The significance of this exclusion 
lies in the fact that these authorized memory sites - school textbooks and especially 
as documents found in the national libraries - are treated as sacred texts, recalling 
those who died for the sake of other citizens. Hence, exclusion from these texts 
ensures exclusion from the nation's collective memory. 
The imagined community of the dead therefore endures by means of repetitive 
mechanisms that enable living members of the community to experience them on 
symbolic and affective levels. Among these mechanisms we can list the agents that 
facilitate, for the living, attempts to overcome discontinuities in space and barriers of 
time so as to establish direct contact between the two communities. The device 
employed by social a,, ents to bridge these gaps are the channels of social 
communication that allow community members to be concurrently present in all the 
time frames chosen by the respective social agent. As an "editor, " the agent 
determines what is relevant and thus what can be excluded from the content and 
experience of collective memory. 
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Establishin2 Legitimacy: The Function of Memory Sites 
This survey of selected memory sites raises some basic questions pertaining to the 
political manipulation of culture: Why use memory? What outcomes does national 
bereavement, as a sociological factor, generate? Why is it so necessary an instrument ZD 
for an elite wishing to maintain its rule following establishment of the nation-state? 
As Weber wrote that, the foundations of government rest on the legitimacy 
awarded its rulers. Collective memory, but especially bereavement, casts the 
foundations of that legitimacy. This legitimacy rests on the past, not on the present. 
Stated differently, the quality of a regime and its decisions are not gauged by the 
effectiveness of its economic, infrastructure, or defense policy but by its sacrifice and 
loyalty to the nation's past, to the historical "controlling share" that rationalizes 
dominance in the present. Hence, legitimacy need not be awarded to the present 
government through the vote. Crises of legitimacy arise when none of the groups 
80 competing for power have access to the political system in the interim. In the case 
where the current government is a continuation of the regime operating during the 
pre-state period, opposition parties are denied access to the system and experience a 
crisis of this sort. They remain, as before, outside the centers of power and influence. 
We are in effect referring to an attempt to sustain these competitors exclusion 
frorn the centers of power by labeling thein as illegitimate. This campaign is waged by 
manipulatively diverting the public's attention away from the array of solutions to 
current problems offered by the cornpeting groups and shifting that attention towards 
the regime's self-serving interpretation of its rivals' past decisions and conduct. 
Assume that the coiAest for political power in the present is an open game, the 
object of the public's attentive review of arguments, decisions and programs. In such 
8OLipset cited in Ohana, D. and Wistreich, R., 1997, Myths in Judaism, Zionism and Israeliness, in: D. 
Ohana and R. Wistreich (eds. ). The Alyth ofAlemoty, Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and 
Hakibbutz Hameuchad., p. 170. (Ilebre\\) 
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circumstances, failed government moves immediately trigger alternative proposals by 
the opposing player, again to be assessed by the public. In the type of political context 
studied here, the past is not a game played according to the rules of free competition; 
it is open to inainpulatioii by the party iii power. The ruling party can determine the 
dominant images, play up or play down events, and purchase - with the assets it 
controls by virtue of its current location in the system - an image as the sole 
sacrificial larnb placed on the collective alter of national independence. 
As to the actions taken during the nation's infancy, the dominant party is, by 
necessity, the only party open to criticism of its management of the state by the fact of 
its position and the responsibility exercised. The role of opposition parties is to 
criticize, identify failures, and point out defective policies from their position outside 
the governing structure as parties free of any direct responsibility for governing. 
Given that, the ruling party's investment in the past will cushion it from the effects of 
the often justifiable criticisms made in the present because the narrative of past 
accomplishments and sacrifices implanted in collective memory dwarfs the current 
censure. 
It is within this context that state delegitimation of opponents proceeds. Put 
briefly, delegitimation is a political instrument available to the elite for the 4: 1 
preservation of its hegeniony. The strategy accompanying its use is marked by the 
attempt of political actors to vitiate their rivals' symbolic assets. To the degree that 
they succeed, their rivals' arguments and claims will be assessed not by their 
substance but by the image thrust upon them as unworthy of obtaining power. 
As a policy, delegimation proceeds by elite manipulation of the rival party's 
social definition. This requires initiation of a campaign of labeling and stigmatization 
of the target groups. Stich canipaigns resemble those waged by the authorities against ZD 
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underground movements. 81 Occasionally, this state of affairs represents an outgrowth 
of the network of political relations established prior to independence, when the ruling 
and opposition parties had either shared authority or been members of the same 
underground movement. Once the shared goal of statehood is achieved, the dormant 
competition is free to erupt. In most cases, therefore, delegitimation programs tend to 
be aimed at groups and parties frorn the present that are perceived as threatening the 
dominant party's political hegemony in the future. 
A related, interesting issue is the reversal in strategies adopted by each party 
immediately upon achievement of their national goals. During the struggle for 
independence, opposition groups or parties are preoccupied by attempts to present 
alternatives (i. e., delegitirnate the commonly accepted agenda) for the purpose of 
differentiating one from the other. Following independence, the leading group, now 
the dominant party, initiates a program of delegitimation to protect its position of 
power. At the same time, their rivals seek the legitimation necessary for entry into the 
main camp in order to integrate themselves among the elites. Z' 
The purpose of delegitimation following statehood is not to eliminate the rival 
parties but to control thern, to direct and influence them. Paradoxically, delegitimation 
(or effective stigmatization) intensifies the dominant party's demands for voter 
legitimation. 82 The outcome is what Schor terms a "stigma contest, 03 a competition 
over negative images. Success is achieved when the rivals are perceived as deviant in 
the sociological sense of the word. After all, deviance is an outcome of the 
reciprocities maintained between social groups and an individual or subgroup defined 
8'Schor, cited in Resnick. 1988, (. ýnderground 11orcments in Segmented Societies. .4 Sociological 
Portrait ofLehi. unpublished NIA thesis, Rarnat Gan: Rar-flan University, Department of Sociology, p. 
57. (Flebrew) 
82 Marx, G. T., 1976, Thoughts on a Ne lected Category of Social Movement Participation: The Agent 9 
Provocateur and the Informants.. Imerican Journal qfSociology, 80(2). 503-440. 
83C ited in Resnick, 1988. 
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by that group as violating its laws or strongly held norms. We should remember that 
this process is subjective, not objective. The deviant, Illegitimate groups do not 
necessarily challenge authority or society, yet, the label sticks. 84 Goffman's 
observations confirm that the contests over legitimacy and stigmatization conducted 
between political rivals are Nvaged on symbolic levels, a process described by Gusfield Z: 1 
as a "symbolic crusade. " 85 
Within this environment, the dominant party retains superiority over the others 
because it commands the channels of social communication. It has more effective 
access to the press, theatre, film and, especially, state commemoration and the 
production of collective memory by legislative means. In effect, this is a struggle over 
the right to manipulate information and knowledge. 86 
The concept of legitimation is particularly salient to any analysis of the 
relations between parties and groups in democracies. Weber argued that the state is Z: ' 
the only entity with the capacity to claim exclusivity over the legitimate use of force. 
His discussion of the concept control is essentially an exploration of legitimacy. A 
regime, in his view, cannot base itself solely on coercion or obedience to orders; the 
continuity of control (or rule) rests on agreed-upon claims to legitimacy. A regime 
that fails to abide by the conditions of these claims will either collapse or face 
difficulties when functioning. Legitimacy is thus rooted in the means of violence and 
policies over use, the control over both of wThich are exclusively reserved to those 
groups who have already proved their loyalty and their trustworthiness when using 
violence in the struggle for independence and their defense of the state. 
84 Goffman, A., 1980, The Prescniation oj', ýcll 1 j17 1,, vc/-vC1q 
.I 
Lift, Tel Aviv: Dvir (Hebrew edition); see 
also Goffman, A., 1983ý Stigma. 1-cl Avk: Reshal-im. (I Icbrc\\ edition) 
85 Gusfield, J. R., 1966,, V-nzbo/ic Crusacie. Urbana: t ýni\ ersity of Illinois Press. 
86, Furk. A. T., 1982. Political Criminahiv. San Die,, o: Saue. 
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Weber does enlarge upon the use of collective myths and images in the 
acquisition of legitimacy, although not in those words. He distinguishes between 
justification and legitimacy. Whereas Justification represents the claims rulers make, 
legitimacy is the subjects' ýN, illiiigness to accept those claims. Stated differently, 
justification flows top doNvii while legitimacy flows bottom up. We are thus referring 
to communication, a process composed of two main elemeflts: transmission of a 
message and its reception. The effectiveness of the message, from the standpoint of 
the transmitting agent is, obviously, gauged by the proximity and fit of its reception 
by the recipient. The message's effectiveness declines in direct proportion to the 
distance between the two. The content of the respective messages delegitimates the 
rival groups by claiming that any part they played in the glorious independence 
project was marginal and far from heroic. From the perspective of the regime, 
manipulation of the spirit of the time - the explicit identification of the dominant 
party, its leading figures and soldiers with that spirit, together with control over 
historiography and the other symbolic processes referred to previously - if properly 
managed, awards political legitimacy to the regime while it denies legitimacy to its 
rivals. 
In the period reviewed in this dissertation, when the foundations of Israel's 
political system were was laid, the efforts expended in labeling - for the purpose of 
legitimating and delegitiniating - came to exert their influence for decades. During 
this period, the nation's institutions were constructed. Subsequent to its conclusion, 
individual actors and political parties distilled the traumas of the War of 
Independence, a war was to become a heroic chapter in the nation-building opus. The 
party that could securely associated itself ýýJtli the events - that identified itself with 
the spirit of the timc - \\as bound to gain political aseendance especially if it was 
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able to expunge rival parties from that same opus. The decisions and attitudes 
emerging with statehood and the public administration - during the phase of 
organizational charisma, according to Weber - would accompany the progressive 
institutionalization and inculcation of the attendant organizational and political 
culture. The impacts of the normative and political influence exerted by those would 
become an indelible part of Israel's socio-political landscape. 
Construction of Collective Boundaries 
The construction of commemorative rituals, as described above, had long-term effects 
on Israel as a nation-state. What were these impacts? How did they influence the 
political culture and political reality of the uation during the institutionalization phase 
of its governance structure, subsequent to the phase of organizational charisma? These 
questions return us to Lipset's statement that a major test of legitimacy is the 
appearance of a secular political culture, what others have termed the civil religion of 
the state, involving the creation and management of state rituals and holidays. 
Continuing this line of thought, collective commemoration represents acts that 
produce political legitimacy for its authors., the dominant party. 
Don Handelman ar, ,,:, ues that state rituals are none other than official, written 
versions of the cornniunilý's social and moi-al order. As such, they represent important 
elements in the determination of the society's cultural space and its boundaries. 87 
Erickson defines society as a community with protected boundaries. 88 These 
boundaries, he argues, are symbolic; they define the collective's identity. Yet 
boundaries are dynamic, open to change, theý are constantly being redrawn as a result 
87 Handelman, D. and Shanigar-Handelinan, L., 1997ý The Presence of Absence: The Memorialism of 
National Death in Israel. in 1- Ren-Ari and Y. 13ilu (cds. ), Grasping Land Spaces and Places in 
Contemporary Israel, Albany: Sl IINYý pp. 
85-128. 
88 Erickson, K. T., 1964. Notcs on the Socjologý of'Deviance in H. Becker (ed. )., The 01herSide, New 
York: The Free Press, pp. 9-2 1. 
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of bargaining between social control agents and non-con form i sts, between guardians 
of the status quo and those intent on changing it. A community's boundaries thus Zýl 
simultaneously express and symbolize its values. With respect to death and 
bereavement, the conflict surrounding their Substance and representation in 
commemoration indicate their centrality to the cornmunity's sense of being, to its 
identity - otherwise, there would be no conflict. Two other examples elucidate the 
meaning of this concept: The rate of property crimes indicates the importance of 
property to the community; conflicts over authority and compliance indicate the 
centrality of authority and compliance. 
Applying Handelman's and Erickson's concepts, we can redefine the nation- 
building enterprise is an attempt to draw the boundaries and collective identity of a 
community whose boundaries are still amorphous. Societies found at this stage are 
characterized by conflicts between groups and perspectives waged over the Z:, 
community's boundaries, conflicts that invite labeling groups as deviant, 
stigmatization, and political delegitimation. 89 
Returning to Weber, he views social closure as the process initiated by social 
groups to reinforce their advaiitages. Social closure entails the restriction of access to 
assets and opportunities to a circumscribed circle of those eligible (i. e., those 
considered deserving of such access). This is a carefully thought-out process, during 
which social attributes are compared and weighed with respect to how they support 
the political exclusion of other groups. Weber continues: Any subgroup trait- race, 
language, social or religious affiliation - can serve as a vehicle for the management 
of access to opportunities and assets. 9'-) In the case explored here, the respective assets 
89 Resnick, 1988, p. 62. 
9"Weber, M., cited in Aron, R.. 1965, Max Wcher, in R. Aron (cd. ), 1965, Main Currents in 
Sociological Thought, New York. Býtsic Books. 
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were primarily land, exclusive information, and weapons, 91 regulations governing 
health services and employment as well as the concentration of wealth (state 
monopolies and oligopolies). However., the insight at the heart of the study is that zD 
even in the area of bereavement and official memory, a similar dynamic operates: 
bereavement and death can likewise be treated as political assets and manipulated. 
I suggest that politicizatlon of this sort applies to every aspect of the 
metaphors produced during the elaboratioii of collective memory; in the process, it 
assigns attributes to groups along the dimension of participation or non-participation 
in the national independence project. This process resembles Weber's observations 
regarding exclusion or, as he terms it, delegitmation: It portrays the political 
competition that culminates in denying access to social and economic opportunities to 
rival groups and their political representatlý, eS. 92 Thus, social closure shapes society's 
distribution system (inclusion and exclusion) and certainly its power relations and 
political culture. 
Frank Parkin, who extended Weber's analysis of the politics as exclusion and 
the construction of socio-political closure. argues that this analysis should not be 
limited to the dominant group, that which erects the exclusionary barriers. At least as 
93 fascinating are the behaviors and strategies adopted by those excluded . 
This is Parkin's challenge to the scliolar: To examine the responses of those 
excluded to the experience of exclusion. This involves an analysis of the construction 
and use of the symbolic instruments discussed, all of which were initiated by the 
ruling elite to preserve its political dominance. Weber, too, states that we can 







anticipate initiation of' reciprocal responses to exclusionary acts. 94 As Neuwirth 
indicates, Weber elaborates this concept in his discussion of the behavior to be 
anticipated by those suffering from exclusion, the group that Neuwirth calls the 
underprivileged, 95 those directly affected by the exclusionary strategies applied. 
According to Parkin, the feature that distinguishes exclusionary closure from 
social closure is subordination, a political process that inevitably leads to the creation 
of social categories marking their occupants as "ineligible, " "excluded, " or "barred" 
from some social act or asset. Parkin stresses that exclusionary closure involves acts 
of downwardly directed power, that is, political strategies initiated by the ruling party 
that produces, by necessity, a group, status, or layer of people who are defined 
through legislation as discriminated aggainst or inferior. The latter, by the very 
imposition of this status, are forced to adopt strategies derived from this definition and 
to initiate, in Parkin's words, acts Of upwardly directed power in order to gain access 
to a larger portion of assets. By doing so, they invariably threaten the preferred status 
of those who define themselves as "superior. " 
We are speaking of a veritable cliallenge to the recounIzed system of social 
distribution, as well as to the normative justifications of that system. Application of 
this analytic perspective discloses a pheiionicrion that I terin the J)olitics of symbols, 
the persistent competition waged arnon- rational political actors. This concept 
describes a situation where the dorninant party attempts to preserve its political status 
by exploiting the advantages of dominance, that is, access to the symbolic materials 
that sustain dominance: collective men-iorv. bereavement and sacrifice among those 
identifying themselves with the dominant party. and the dele-itimation of political 
rivals. These will be manipulated according to the party's chan()ing needs. If this 
94 Ibid. 
95 Cited in Parkin, 1979. 
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process is realized, the ruling party's rivals will be erased from the official narrative of 
statehood and blocked from re-enterm, -. At the same time, opposition parties, 
excluded from active participation in niainstrearn politics, will remain preoccupied 
with legitimating themselves, with attempts to Iiiii-odLice its heroes into the national 
opus, and with threatening the long-term interests of the ruling elite. 
The Politics of Symbols 
Gusfield and his colleagues differentiate between class politics, which include the 
formal political arena, the framework in which groups tend to their constituents' 
economic interests (e. g., budgeting, patronage, regulation), and status politics, the 
mechanisms by which the symbolic conflict over prestige and image is waged within 
the public discourse. It appears that class politics represents the everyday practice of 
politics, the concrete mechanisms by which the dorninant party's regime is preserved 
in the short run. In the vocabulary of political science, we are referring to practices of 
coalition formation. In contrast, status politics involves the play of symbols, whose 
fruits will be reaped only in the long run. Both types of politics are geared toward the 
same goals but function in different time trarries. 
There is little doubt that during the infanc\ of the nation-state, as opposed to 
situations where the dominant party is loi-i- established, the ruling elite is preoccupied 
with simultaneously controlling both political dimensions, that of class and that of 
status, that of practice and that of symbol. The ability to do so is based on the new 
political structure's monopolistic access to two mechanisms, the one distributing 
economic, administrative, and political i-ewards, the other producing collective 
symbols, historiography and memory sites. Opposition parties, due to their location 
far from crucial positions of power and lience bereft of any access to distribution 
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systems for concrete goods, are almost totally preoccupied with status politics, with 
symbolic justification of their position. They will continue to struggle for the prestige 
they believe was groundlessly denied them by the dominant party. 96 
Contrary to class politics, which are open to pragmatism and compromise, 
status politics are conducted as a zero-suin game. Allocation of prestige to one group 
automatically denies prestige to anotlier. Acknowledgement of the efforts and 
sacrifices of the opposition party in the iiidependence project undermines the added 
value of those acts for the ruling party's reelection. Hence, this type of political 
contest stimulates hyperbole in the content as well as style of the engagement. The 
debate over national myths and political symbols sheds its pragmatic character. 
Instead of concrete answers to concrete questions, instead of bureaucratic politics 
conducted in parliamentary committees and behind-the-scenes bargaining, political 
leaders become engrossed in symbols. Competition is fierce and sensational, with the 
public square converted into the preferred scene for dramatic campaigning. 
In these settings, politicians gifted with rhetorical flare create what Sperber 
terms a symbolic discourse, whose content revolves around glorification of the myths 
pertaining to the speaker's party and denioration of the myths related to its rivals. 97 A ID 
symbolic discourse rejects moderation. 'Elie contenders' attributes are dichotomized: 
Politics becomes a struggle waged betwcen good and evil., saints and sinners, patriots 
and traitors, categories typifying debates held in the inass media for the purpose of 
enlisting public opinion in conflict resoltition. 
Summary 
116 Gusfield, 1966. 
Q7 Sperbcr, D., 1975, Rethinkingýý, mbolist, Camhii, i, -, c: Cambridge 
Uni%ersitv Press, p. 6. 
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According to the self-interest approach to politics, public policy serves group 
interests, by definition. Policy issues are resolved only when they further 
particularistic self-interests. This contrasts with the public interest approach, which 
claims that public policy serves the general public. 98 
It appears that every society, especially in its infancy, experiences a period in 
which an active civil society and the separation of power characteristic of the western 
liberal tradition are absent or inchoate. Its politicians hold this society captive. Israeli 
society, according to Yonathan Shapiro, fits this description. 99 These conditions 
likewise fulfill the requirements for Miat Alessandro Pizzomo calls absolutist 
politics. 100 This type of political regime dictates the rules of behavior in every major 
arena of civil life, imposes normative standards throughout, and defines a single 
version of the truth. Absolutist politics also contains a transcendental element, marked 
by a significant dose of sacrality. 101 In order to identify the dominant actors on the 
stage of absolutist politics, scholars mList set their gaze toward center stage. As 
Yonathan Shapiro noted in the introduction to his study of Israel following 
independence, his guiding assumption NNas that political parties are the major 
organizations operating in a democratic country; in order to grasp a nation's structure 
of control, we must lirst understand the structure and functioning of its parties. 102 
This dissertation extends the theoretical framework described to the sphere of 
bereavement, an experience assumed to be intimate, authentic, and individual, located 
far from the public space. I will show that the policy of bereavement, as expressed in 
commemoration, is likewise a captive of Israel's politicians, and that this policy serves 
98 Doron, G., 1979b, The Smoking Paradox, Canihiridge, MA: ABT. 
99 Shapiro, Y. 1996. A. Socicl-V Held Captive bIv Politici(m. s. 'Fel Aviv: Sifiriat I lapoalim. (Hebrew) 
100 Pizzomo, A., 1987. politics t'nhound. in -). Nlaier (ed. ). Jhe Chatýgmg Boundaries of the 
Political, London: Cambridge Unk crsity Press. pp, 27-63. 
'O'Ibid. 
102 Shapiro, Y.. 1989. 
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and sustains the interests of its most sigilificant actors, the political parties. Among 
these interests we find those having broad collective significance, designed to produce 
a society based on broad, shared ideational and symbolic foundations as well as a 
common identity. Alternatively, we will also find narrow interests, embodied in a 
symbolic consensus that was scrupulously formed to impose a hegemonic worldview 
and to further the particularistic interests ol'the dominant party. 
The political history of commemoration in Israel, as described and analyzed in 
the following pages, can therefore add to our understanding of how parties maintain 
their dominance in new, democratic societies. 
Chapter Two 
The Political Sphere 
Review of the parliamentary legislation leaves little room for interpretation or broad 
discussion about its meanings and implications. A parliament is one of the few sites in 
which we can observe power openly and grasp its immediate intent. Legislation is the 
stage at which public policy is formulated into compulsory mandates addressed to the 
administrative arena and regulatory agencies, to those who implement decisions. As 
such, legislation is the process through which major coordinates of the socio-political 
structure of the budding nation are melded. Contrary to the intellectual exercises 
required to unravel the motivations underlying many of the events to be analyzed in 
the following chapters, legislation is immediately open to diagnosis of the political 
interests that motivate the process. 
After the new State of Israel was established, the political leadership faced a 
new challenge. This involved reproduction of the political and organizational patterns Zýl 
and processes developed in response to the power relations and control structure 
characterizing the period of the Yishuv, and endowment of those patterns and 
processes with a validity appropriate to the evolving democratic political culture. At 
first glance, issues touching upon the distribution of power and interest group access Z-- Zn 
to the sites of policy formation were reopened to competition, now according to the 
rules of the dernocratic parliamentary game. These were the means by which Mapai, 
the he0enionic party during the period of YishLiv, hoped to reproduce its former status 
and to attain dominance over Israel's parliamentary process as well as its ideological 
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and political existence. The numerous legislative initiatives required to fulfill these 
objectives placed weighty subjective demands on the public with respect to the new 
reality, but especially regarding their perception of the War of Independence, the 
pivotal event in the life of the young nation. The laws not only reflected these 
conditions; significantly, helped to create them. Insights obtained from the direct as 
well as indirect reading of the laws were translated and internalized as social values, a 
process influencing subsequent political behavior. Ben Gurion's dual aspirations - 
construction of his self-professed image as the War's exclusive leader and establishing 
Mapai's status as the sole organization supporting him throughout the period - would 
find expression in massive legislation. The impact of that legislation, beyond its short- 
terin effect on government structure and process, was the public's acceptance of Ben ZD 
Gurion's claims that he and his movernent were the lone institutions responsible for 
Israel's statehood. 
The second challenge awaiting the new regime was the mission, again defined 
by Ben Gurion, of erasing all mention of the contributions to national independence 
made by what he called the "rebellious" underground organizations, Etzel and Lehi, 
from collective mernory. This challenge was, in effect, the direct sequel of his policy 
during the Yishuv, when he would publicly label the underground as illegitimate. His 
policy, was based on the fact that the very existence of these organizations threatened 
Mapai's exclusive authority throughout the civil arena and in everything related to the 
monopoly Mapai demanded over the means of violence. Establishment of the State 
did little to swerve Ben Gurion from this political agenda: the exclusion of Etzel and 
Lehi veterans (as mernbers of the largest dissident underground organizations) from 
an-v access to positions in the state achninistration. After 1948, lie was able to do so by 
appropriating, the War, its course and its human costs to the benefit of Mapai's 
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sustained hegernony. His goal was accomplished by inculcating a message stating that 
the underground had contributed nothing to the rruracle of national resurrection. 
Such statements found their way into the laws that institutionalized public 
perceptions of the Israel's War of Independence. That is, these laws identified the 
community that bore the brunt of the War, who could be categorized among the war 
dead, where and when public memory sites could be established, and in what form, 
they also identified who would be excluded from enjoying the associated rights and 
privileges. The overt aspects of those laws - for instance, the eligibility criteria for 
the State compensation and economic assistance awarded to disabled veterans and tile 
dead's survivors, state support for commemorative projects, tax benefits and legal 
protection of ernployee status in the workplace - were rather marginal in their 
absolute effect. All told, only a few hundred individuals and/or families were affected. 
However, it was the covert aspects of these laws - that is, the interests behind the 
legislation - that had the more far-reaching impact. Ben Gurion quickly grasped that 
legislation was an ideal mechanism to promote long-term political interests and 
maintain political dominance, to maintain the momentum of the statist project. He 
understood that the success of his statist project would not be affected by the status or 
image of any sitting Knesset members, budgetary allocations, or items on the public 
agenda, but rather by its continued implementation in legislation. Laws were key 
instruments for the sustained identification of the dominant party with the crucial 
event of nation-building - national independence - and for the exclusion of 
competing groups. ThrOUoh this device, collective memory Could be constructed by 
those having exclusive access to the sites of its formation. Legislation was, then, a 
highly effective instrument for the production of "historical truth. " zn - 
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In the following, I trace this process as it was expressed in a selected number 
of memory sites: the culture of commemorative volumes, the impact of history texts 
in the area of education, practices in the area of national symbols and ceremonies, and 
the fallen who had paid the highest price for the nation-building project's success. All 
these sites were supported by legislation. 
Delineatintj the War's Time Frame 
Michael Young has argued that "Fvery year can be considered the inaugural Z: 1 
year ... The crucial step involves 
framing several events within a specific time and 
transforming that period into 'our' time - an opening date having special meaning 
must be linked [to the events] for this purpose. "] It appears that Young's argurnent 
was rigorously implemented in Knesset decisions regarding the dates of the War of 
Independence. Although, historically, the date marking the outbreak of the War is still 
under contention, the political arena was called to mark the temporal boundaries of 
the War in order to recognize its dead and wounded as war dead or disabled veterans 
deserving of state support. The War's dates therefore define a preferential community 
supportive of the hegemonic elite. Ben Gurion, desirous of implementing his political 
goals through public administrative means, decided that such temporal bounds would 
assist him in denving the underground access to that same status and those same 
rewards. Hence, it was decided that the War's duration would cover the period 
between 29 November 1947 and 30 May 1948. These dates enabled recognition of 
those who did battle as soldiers enlisted in the IDF. In the laws stipulating the criteria 
for elioibilitv as state-recoonized dead, a clause was added that endowed the Prime C, L- 
Minister the discretion necessary to include flagana yet ignore Etzel and Lehi dead 
I Young, Nl- 19M I'lic I'lell-ononlic Socier) --- Natural Rhyihms and Human Timelables. London: 
Tharnes and fludson. 
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who had fell not only during the years preceding the War but also during its course. 
Specifically, the clause states: 
Military service and service - interpretation: During the period between 30 
November 1947 until 30 May 1948 - every service that the Minister of 
Defense declares to be so, as published in the Reshumot [the government law 
bulletin], is military service for this purpose. 
It was Nathan Yellm-Mor (MK, HaLocharnim) who demanded that the 
Knesset expand the scope of the dates so that the State could recognize those who had 
fallen earlier. His proposal declared that the State would also express its economic 
and symbolic obligation to the families who had lost their children "from the date of 
publication of the While Pal? er [the British government's policy paper limiting 
immigration to Israel], 17 May 1939, until 14 May 1948, including all operations 
planned against the British Mandate in the Land of Israel. " He justified his proposal 
by declaring that: 
by means of this proposal I place before the Knesset the rights of dozens of 
individuals, fighters who had died in battle in the pre-State period ... 
The State 
at whose head stands Mr. David Ben-Gurion cannot escape its obligations to 
the families of these fiOhters who volunteered and died during the War ... 
Is it 
at all imaginable that such feelings of vengeance and resentment should be felt 
toward brothers'! [I believe that Such a] responsibility should rest upon the 
shoulders of every citizen, every patriot. 2 
The Minister of Defense thought differently. "By the authority vested in ine, " 
Ben Gurion stated oil 2 AugLISt 1950: 
according to Article I of the Law: Families of Soldiers Who Died in the War 
(Compensation anel Rehab ilitation. ), 1950,1 declare that a tour of duty in the 
Hagana and tours of duty in all planned operations against the Arab bands and 
2yeI lin-tvior, N. 5 Julý 1950. Session No. 172 of the First Knessct, Knesset ProlocoLy. (Ilebre\\ ) 
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invading armies during the period 30 November 1947 until 31 December 1948 
- is to be considered military duty for the purposes of the stated law. " 
On 16 August of that same year, his notification was entered as a binding 
clause in the Yalkut HaPh-suinim, 3 in these words: "... a tour of duty in the Hagana 
and tours of duty served in all planned operations against the Arab bands and invading 
armies as military service. ,4 
These politically motivated statements accompanied decisions implemented by 
administrative bodies. The Head of the History Branch, the Ministry of Defense, 
wrote that the War of National Sovereignty was defined as continuing during the Z-1 zn 
period of warfare extending from 29 November 1947 (the date of the UN declaration 
on the partition of Palestine) until 20 June 1949 (the date of the signing of the cease 
fire agreement with Syria, the last of the cease fire agreements signed). 
5 Furthermore, 
every phase of the care given to the families of the fallen and of disabled soldiers was Z' 
under the control of the Commemoration Unit and its official policy. The Unit set 
strict parameters regarding the definition of IDF fallen, hence, the criteria for 
recognition and support, too. From the point of view of the Unit, the War's dead, like 
its wounded casualties were all those who had fallen betýveen the cited dates, as Beii 
Gurion (in his role as Minister of Defense) had made clear to Shaul Avigur during one 
of their meetings on the subjeCt. 6 Avigur was a perfect audience for such a comment: 
Avigur was head of the Hagana's Intelligence unit (known as Shai), organized the 
persecution of Etzel (the period knowii as the &, ason), served as Ben Gurion's 
3 Government notices of all varieties are published in the Yalkut HaPirsumiln. 
4 Notification according to Families qf Soldiei-s ITho Died in the Har (Conlj)ensation and 
Rehabilitation), 1950.10 AIJ2USt 1950. Rcs/nanot. No. 104. p. 1363. (Hebrew) 
'Lorech, Lt. Col. N.. I'lead. the liistorý Branch. Office ol'the Assistant Chief'of Staff-I 20 March 1953. 
IDF Archi% es, 580\55 - 14. (I'lehrew') 
6 Avigur. S. II October 1949. letter to Dekel, Y., the Commemoration Unit, the IDF ArchiN es. , 56 - 59 
5 80. (H ebrc \ý ) 
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personal advisor after the establishment of the State and was actively though 
informally involved in determining policy for the Coin in ein oration U, I it. 7 
On the face of it, the stipulated date should have been an impediment for 
Hagana veterans given that they, like Etzel and Lehi veterans, had fought prior to 29 
November. In effect, as will be made clear, veterans of the three organizations were 
not treated as equal by the bureaucracy. Procedures were devised or later "discovered" 
in order to nullify the ternporal constraints that might deny Hagana veterans access to 
state recognition and the basket of veterans' rights although this same policy was not 
applied to members of the other two groups. Mordechai Olmert (NIK, Herut) 
addressed these inconsistencies in response to Yaakov Govrin's (Hagana veteran and 
MK, Mapam) argument that the I-lagana, like Etzel and Leln, were in the same Z: I 
category concerning their rights as soldiers: 
[I wish to comment] about the rights of the families of Hagana soldiers who 
were wounded before 30 Novernbcr 1947. He [Govrin] has stated that no 
discrimination exists between Hagana and Etzel members in this area because 
Hagana members are also denied [physical] rehabilitation. Perhaps this is true 
legally although the practical reality is quite the opposite. Hagana members 
arc rehabilitated and cared for by what were then called 'national' 
institutions ... whereas the families of Eizel and Lehi members who were 
wounded prior to that date receive no assistance whatsoever. Discrimination 
does in fact exist. 8 
Who was the Enemy? 
The second message that Mapai was eager to transmit concerned the identification of 
the War of Independence as a struggle solely against the Arabs. Recall of the fight 
against the British would have demanded recognition of Etzel and Lehi, organizations Z: I ZD 
7 For a recent biography of A\ ipur see Boaz. A., 200 1, Unsccn Ycl . 
4/ways Presciv, Fel A% i% 
Maarachot. Nlinistrý of Defense, (Hebre\ý) 
801mert. M., 12 N4a) 1952, Knessel Prolocols. (Ilcbi-e%N, ) 
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formed for the purpose of driving the British out of Palestine. Contrary to the battle 
against the Arab forces, the campaign azgalnst the Bri I itish found no expression in any 
area of legislation. On paper, then, the only armed conflict conducted on the road to 
independence was that waged against the Arabs. This policy of evasion was 
manifested in the law defining "military service" as it appeared in the Reshumot in 
February 1951: "Service in the Hagana or in any other planned operation against the 
Arab bands or invading [Arab] armies as of 30 November 1947 until 31 December 
1948. " 9 
The pattern was repeated with respect to the Law- Compensation and 
Rehabilitation LaTi) (1950). A commotion erupted in the Knesset when the opposition 
learnt that the law did not recognize Etzel and Lehi veterans as soldiers. Although the 
Hagana's disabled veterans also gained no benefits directly from the original law, they 
were eventually covered by it, based on a cited clause delegating to the Minister of 
Defense the authority to extend eligibility. In the wake of the parliamentary pressure 
exerted by Herut, a correction to the law was published in Yalkut HaPirsumini 
(another law bulletin). This meant that eligibility for compensation would be extended 
to families of the dead "who had participated in operations against the Arab bands and 
invading armies. " Removal of the respective dates allowed agencies to assist some 
Etzel and Lehi disabled veterans under the condition that they were wounded during 
operations against the Arabs alone, that is, the State continued to disavow the victims 
of the campaign against the British forces. 
"Can you imagine what would we look like today, " asserted Chaun Landau 
(MK, Herut) toward the Mapai benches "had it not been for that stru gle, for which 9,4 
no one seeks any reNvard ... You would be 
drinking tea with MacMichael [the British 
1) Reshumol. 8 Februarý 195 1. 
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High Commissioner for Palestine] somewhere in Jerusalem - without it, you would 
be subject to the British High Commissioner's decisions and you would be imploring 
him for 300 certificates [immigration permits].... " But Landau's words were of no 
avail: Mapai continued to refuse to recognize the contest against the British. Hence, 
the families of those who died or were wounded during this struggle but did not 
belong to the Hagana were deprived of all forms of state assistance. "We have not yet 
been able to convince this house [i. e., the Knesset] to set aside the party bickering that 
guides the government and the majority of [Knesset] members in their actions 
regarding that same segment of the Yishuv that took upon itself the entire burden of 
the War of Independence-, " lamented Yehoshua Lankin (MK, Herut). "To date, they 
[i. e., Mapai] are still attempting to dispossess these Jewish Youths, to deny thern their 
rights, to transform them into non-citizens and lacking in any economic and moral 
foundations. " 10 
On I April 195 1, the budget for the fiscal year 1952-1953 was passed. During 
the debate over the bill, Esther Raziel-Naor (MK, Herut) proposed to enlarge the 
amount allocated for compensation and rehabilitation of veterans and their families. 
Her objective was to benefit the entire community of veterans who had survived the 
War. "Under this item we propose allocating the SLIM of ILE 150,000 to [care for] the 
disabled from the war to free Israel from British rule during the years 1939-1948. " 
She also noted that "the War of Independence ... 
did not begin on 14 May 1948. " From ZD 
her perspective, it "began, in effect, with Etzel's war against the British, which began 
in 1939. " The position she advocated stated that "this is the war that eventually 
captivated the nation's youth, the entire country, and [inspired] them to ... struggle 
for 
Z: 12D 
freedorn ... and to oust the British.... " At this sitting she also raised the 
issue of the 
IoLankin. Y.. 8 September 1949, dcbatc rcgarding the Laij 1171WIld; (Pen. yions an(I Rehabilitation) 
Amendment (1949). Session 79. the First Knesset. knessei Protocol,;. 
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needs of veterans and casualties' families who had not been granted any state support. 
The State, she claimed, "denies the rights of those who participated in operations 
against the British. " 
Her words were translated into Ministry of Defense policy. Lt. Colonel 
Amnon Zair was assigned the task of classifying the Etzel fallen whose names Z-1 
Shelach the acronym for Freedom Fighters'Scrvice Association) forwarded to 
the Ministry. The first list was sent by Shelach's Center for Fighters and Soldiers on 6 
December 1948. Lt. Colonel Kis, working with Zair, listed the narnes according to the 
battles in which they participated. Soldiers who had fallen in Etzel actions against the 
British were categorized as "unconditionally ineligible" (emphasis in the original). 
Nevertheless, Kis reports, other narnes were accepted. Among those were "the fallen 
from the Rosh Ha'ayin, Yehudia, Wilhelma, Tulkarern, Ayii Razel operations" against 
the Arabs. '' The dead were deferred if they had been involved in actions against the 
British, even those undertaken within the framework of the short-lived cornmon 
underground movement (Thuat HaMeri, late 1945 to June 1946). with the blessings of 
Yishuv institutions and in cooperation with the Hagana: 
Approved were almost all the Jerusalem dead ... all the dead and inissing-m- 
action from Rosh Ha'ayin ... Unapproved were the dead from the underground 
movement, approved were the Mishniar Hayarden dead, 41 Out of 51 dead and 
missing-in-action from Ramle, all the dead from the defense of Tel Aviv and 
the capture of Jaffa ... all the dead from Yehudia.... 
12 
It was with reference to these events that some years later, Uri Avneri would 
write the following in HaOlam HaZeh: ZD 
II Zair, A., 23 Februarý 1949, letter to the Chief of'the General Staff', Y. Dori. IDF Archk es, ý149 - 212 
73-33 5. (Hehrc\ý 
12 Ibid. 
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No state law exists that guarantees compensation to members of the 
underground who had fallen in the war against the British Mandate. The 
government has abstained from legislating such a law lest it indicate that Etzel 
and Lehi actions had benefited the Jewish people in some form ... 
It is difficult 
to fathom the obscure party interests that motivate Israeli legislation ... 
A wide 
political gap separated the Hagana from Etzel and Lehl. To this very day, they 
continue to argue over their various routes. However, one detail cannot be 
argued: Men-ibers from both sides died in the belief that they were serving 
their people, not one party or another, and no fleeting government coalition. 13 
Authority 
Spread throughout the legislative coordinates was the message that the only partners 
to the war effort, as soldiers and as casualties, were those who had fought under the 
orders and with the approval of the political (the so-called "national") institutions that 
managed the Yishuv. After the boundaries of the community of dead had been set by 
inearis of state rituals enacted on politically meaningful dates, another restriction was 
set. It involved determination of whether the military activities in which the dead had 
participated entailed any subversion of (or contempt for) the authority of the Yishuv's 
leadership, headed by Mapai, and the authority of the Hagana as the sole official 
anried force. It was Yosef Dekel who requested that Israel's President or Prune 
Minister declare that all those who fell in the war against the eneiny "in any operation 
that did not accord with the policies of the authorized institutions as of I December 
1947, would not be considered servicemen. " 14 Despite Ben Gurion's position that 
there was no sense in formally setting down such a limitation, the Ministry of Defense 
informed Herut that "the rights of the individuals who served in the unofficial 
A ýIjcji. U. 19 June 1952. HaOlam HaZeh. (Hebrew) 
14 Bcn Gurion, D., 29 N, la% 1949, letter to Avigur, S. Private correspondence. (I lebre\%) 
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organizations would not be recognized. " 15 Alternatively, the rights of Flagana veterans 
were acknowledged even if their service ended prior to independence. 
The political debates over these issues were surprisingly similar to the disputes 
wa0ed during the period of the Yishuv. "All those who did not comply with state 
discipline [i. e., orders] did not serve the nation" declared Reuven Sari (MK, Mapai) 
during Knesset deliberations on the law. Rather, Sari continues: 
Whoever compiled with the Jewish Agency's orders in the pre-State period 
must be covered by the law beginning with the early days of the State, together 
with the Hagana. The law delegates this authority to the Minister of 
Defense ... The [proposed] 
law legislatively supports the State's prerogatives 
and obligations. A state that bows to anyone who denies his obligations, or 
even to rebels, and then awards him a prize, undermines its authority among 
the citizenrv and thereby threatens its own foundations. Israel will not consent 
to being such a nation. 
Thus, for instance, in the Law: Invalids (Pensions and Rehabilitation) 
Amendment (1954), the first clause, "Disabled veterans from the period of the 
Yishuv, " stipulates that among all those wounded prior to 30 November 1947, only 
those who had served "according to the appeal made by Israel's national institutions" 
would be efigible for the services covered. Z-1 
The right viewed the position manifested in the law as a COlItInLiation of the 
pre-Statc conflict. Then, as well, neither strategic nor operational issues had led the 
Hagana to object to the underground's actions, rather, it was the challenge to Mapal's 
authority that instigated their wrath. Herut viewed this policy as a "system based on Zn - 
disregard of the suffering experienced by the families of Etzel fallen and wounded I 
who had shed then- blood in operations denied official 'approval' by the 'organized' 
"Cited in Igerel LeAch, 4 Nissan 1949. (1-lebrew) 
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institutions. " 16 The attitudes that greeted demands to include individuals wounded in 
operations that had not been authorized by the Hagana among the lists of' eligible 
soldiers were similar to those held during the Yishuv. "Why such arrogance, why this 
self-satisfaction over their unwillingness to recognize the authority of the national 
institutions'? " railed Golda Meir (MK, Mapai) in response. She went on to explain that 
her objections were political in character, and aimed against the right as alternatives to 
the institutions in power: "In its [Herut's] own way, it attempted to subvert anything 
official ... 
The World Zionist Organization exists - it must be destroyed; independent 
national institutions exist - they must be assailed and their authority 
undermined ... 
The Yeshuv is faced with a bloody war against a foreign power - its 
forces must be divided. " 
In contrast to this position, Meir would delineate, on another occasion, what 
she believed the State should do for the benefit of Hagana veterans: During the first 
roll call vote on Amendment No. 3 of Laiv. - Invalidy (Pensions and Rehabilitation) 
Atnendmeni (1954), brought before the Knesset on 30 December 1952, Meir, from 
her position as Minister of Labor, argued that "when first discussing the Lait): lnvalidý 
(Pensions and Rehabilitation) Amendment in 1949 ... we were not in a position to 
expand the law nor to grant its benefits to other disabled veterans, even those whose 
rights we had always recognized. " She immediately specified which veterans she was 
referring to: "... the disabled veterans who served in the British Army and the Zn 
Hagana's armed unit. The proposed law is meant to arnplify the 1949 law, it expands 
the law's scope and incorporates those who enlisted in response to the appeals made 
by the national institutions and inducted into active units of the British Arrily as well 
as those who served in active units of the Hagana. According to the proposed law. Z:! 
'(Weria, 24 February 1954. (1 febrn% ) 
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these veterans will be guaranteed full eligibility for the sarne compensation and 
rehab iI itation benefits as those granted to IDF veterans. " 
On I October 1949, under the heading: "Treatment of Families of Etzel 
Nlartyrs, " the Rehabilitation Branch wrote the following to Moshe Tzadok, Head of 
the IDF's Personnel Division: 
At the time, it was decided to take care of families and soldiers in the event 
that the said soldiers had participated in an operation that had been 
coordinated with the Hagana or the IDF. Please inform me if it is possible, in 
principle, to deal with the above. If your answer is in the positive, I also 
request that the list be transmitted to the General Staff in order to notify us if 
the operations in which the said Etzel soldiers were involved were coordinated 
with the Hagana or with the IDF. 17 
Regardin- this same list. Tzadok requested on 30 October that the Operations 
Division of the General Staff "mark next to each name whether the individual had 
fallen during an Etzel operation that was coordinated with a Hagana or in an IDIF 
operation. " 18 Previously, on 28 October 1948, in a secret letter sent to the head of the 
Personnel Division of the IDF, Tzadok had written that every case of injury resulting 
from an operation coordinated with the IDF was to be dealt with. 19 The list received in 
response indicated the following, by operation: Jaffa - "no!! "; Ramle - 
"coordinated"; Jerusalem - "not in practice"; Yehudia, Wilhema and Rosh HaAyin 
yes. 
In the course of its correspondence with the Ministry of Defense, during which 
Shelach had tried to promote inclusion of the underground's bereaved families among 
those eligible for treatment by the Ministry, it transmitted the names of unrecognized 
l fnsi, -mcd. 30 October 
1948, letter to Tzadok, NI., IDF ArchiN es. 7335\49 - 212. (1-lebrew) 
I'zadok, M. 28 October 1948. to Herut, IDF ArchiN es, 7335\49 - 212. (Hebrew) 
Fzadok. NI 28 October 194 8. letter to head of the Personnel Di Ni si on, 11) Fý 73 3 51,49 - 212. (11 ebreN\ 
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military dead with the demand that they be added to the list of the recognized. The 
response, received in a letter from the Rehabilitation Branch of the Ministry of 
DelCiisc, stated that: "Care ... will be extended only to Etzel casualties and then, 
families and to the fainilies of Etzel dead who participated in authorized operations. " 
The Division requested that Shelach transmit to it a "list of casualties and the 
authorized operations during which they received their wounds" while explicitly 
stating that "the lists will be examined by Hagana veterans familiar with the events. 
The legislation regarding soldiers' rights, currently being finalized, will be in effect 
exclusively for fDF servicemen who enlisted according to the mobilization orders 
issued by the authorized national institutions in early December 1947. The rights of 
individuals serving in unauthorized organizations will not be recognized. , 20 Th is 
position was manifested in Ministry of Defense decision making. During a meeting 
held on 22 September with Moshe Tzadok, Shelach's representatives transmitted a list 
of the dead still awaiting approval. The Ministry official, for his part, transmitted the 
documents to the OF and requested that they "determine whether the said operations 
,21 were implemented in cooperation with the IDF.. .. 
Lel4itimation 
The translation of legitimation into legislative parameters was necessary to (Trant a 1 ZD 
normative imprimatur to the behavior of a political leadership that had persecuted 
"subversive" organizations, initiated acts of political and physical violence against 
them, and delegitimated then- operations and goals. Any recognition of the legitimacy 
of Herut's participation in the political discourse and practice threatened the total 
%Nclf-IIrc and Rchahilitation Branch. date, letter to Shelach, quoted in Hcria, 24 Fcbruarý 1949. 
c bre \%) 
, Hie Local Conimittce For Soldiers and Their Families, 23 September 1948. letter to the Head, 
Pcrsonnel Dkision. Subject: Treatment of Etzcl Mart\rs' Families. IDF Archkes, 7335\49 - 212. 
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fabric of negation woven in the pre-State period and exposed that policy as rooted in 
political interests devoid of the moral attributes claimed by Mapai. 
The first time that the issues of the rights and status of Etzel and Lehi disabled ZI 
veterans and casualties appeared on the public agenda was during the eighteenth 
session of the First Knesset. The Subject at hand was Law: Demobilization (Return to 
Place of Work) 1949, which ensured that demobilized soldiers were to be rehired by 
their former employers in the jobs they held prior to their mobilization. During the 
debate, Ben Gurion turned to Yaakov Meridor (MK, Herut), who had suggested that 
the law also apply to soldiers belonging to Etzel and Lehi before the War. " As 
Meridor refused to maintain the partition between the two organizations (Etzel and 
Lehi considered as one), Ben Gurion corrected him: "And I thoroughly object to [your 
proposal], and I hope that the Knesset reject all those amendments. " According to Ben 
Gurion, Meridor's proposal meant granting "equality to everyone. Equality is an 
exquisite word, just as "liberty" [herut in Hebrew] is an exquisite word. The question 
is: What content do we associate with these beautiful words? Equal rights and 
obligations for everyone - Yes! Equal treatment for all acts, good and evil alike - 
No! In the course of public aft-airs, in law and morality, there are acts to which we 
allot prizes and acts to which Nve allot punishment. We are not prepared to respond 
impartially to all the acts previously committed in this land. We distinguish quite 
carefully between acts. There are acts that we vetoed in the past and continue to do so 
in the present, just as there are acts that we approved in the past and continue to 
approve in the present. It appears odd to be asked, as the petitioner requests, that we 
react to evil acts in the same way that we react to beneficent acts. " 
Ben Gurion's fierce objection to providing support to the survivors of the 
underground's dead \ýas based on his -rasp of tile political and symbolic si, mificance 
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Of Such a move, shared with his Mapai colleagues. Eliyahu Golomb (MK, Mapai) 
would say as much: the underground's inclusion under the law would signify "public 
approval of then- methods of action" in the past, "they are not 
acceptable ... coordinated, integrated and authorized operations, cases such as these - 
will be acknowledged. And the Central Committee states that the remainder will be 
left to the discretion of the Minister of Defense. " Pinchas Lubmiker (MK, Mapai), the 
Chairman of the Knesset Labor Committee, also argued that the inclusion of Etzel and 
Lehi veterans among the eligible would retroactively sanction the underground's 
activities. 22 In his war diaries, Ben Gurion wrote that when "Herut voiced their 
demands, f told myself not to discuss the matter with Etzel - we should simply 
forget their crimes, that they should dare to request any reward for their 
machinations. " 23 
Etzell and Lehi: Mention in Legislation 
The motivation to exclude Etzel and Lehi from the official collective memory was 
likewise expressed in the determined effort to avoid any specific reference, by name, 
to their organizations. This included the area of legislation. With reference to the 
clause regarding "cases liable for consideration with respect to this law as military 
service prior to establishment of the State, " considered during the debate over 
amendment of the penal code, Yaakov Rifkin (MK, Mapai) argued that "there is no 
basis for such anonymity. The organization that preceded the Israel Defense Forces 
had a clearly assigned and recognized name, 'the Hagana. "' Rifkin suggested that 
instead of using the standard wording found in Israeli legislation until then - "service 
declared as rriilitarý service for the purposes of this clause" -a revised version 
-11auriv. 12 April 1949.1 lebre\ý) 
2"Ben GUrion, D. 195 1. Diaries, Sde Boker, Ben Gurion Archivcs, entry dated 29 December 1948. p. 
910. (Hebrew) 
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should be used that would clearly state its implicit meaning. The wording he 
suggested was "[service] in the regular forces of the Hagana in the State of Israel or in Z-1 
a unit active in the war against Nazism as well as any other service declared as 
military service for the purposes of this clause. " He believed that the candid inclusion 
of the flagana in state law would not alter the preferential status of the Hagana vls-ý- 
vis the underground organizations, that is, its meaning would rernam purely symbolic. 
By incorporating the phrase. the IDF would preserve "the grand historical continuity 
with the same forces that created it ... this organization [the Hagana] has a place in 
history., and should not be remembered as some mysterious 'military service. ' It has a 
name, and the Knesset is obligated to ensure the perpetuation of that name in 
accordance with the history of the flagana and the establishment of the IDF. , 24 
Rifkin's position was adopted, and the name "Hagana" entered the legislation. 
Herut gave Rikfin's request its full support. At the same tirne, it petitioned, as 
could be expected, that the naine of Etzel like that of Lehi be noted as well. It was 
Eliezer Shostak (MK, Herut) who proposed: 
... to clearly 
indicate the name [of the organization] and to say that a military 
tour of duty meant a tour of duty in a service declared as defense service in the 
regular forces of tile I lagana in Israel, of the National Military Organization, 
of the Fighters for the Liberation of Israel, and of any other service that will be 
considered as military service for the purposes of this clause. 25 
The symbolic and political significance of spelling out the names of the 
underground organizations is confirmed by the fact that the Minister of Defense could 
exercise his discretion in awarding survivors the basket of government support Zý 
24 Rifkill. Y.. 15 RHIC 1954. Session No. 439. the Second Knesset, debate regarding Amendment oj'the 
Penal Code (Crimes Againsl the State). Knessel Protocols. (I jebrew) 1 
2ý Shostak. F... 15 JLInC 1954, Session No. 439, the Second Knesset, debate regarding. 4mendment of the 
Penal Cocle (CrimesAgainst theSiale), Knesset Prolocols. (liebrew) 
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without specifically incritioning their organizational allegiance. It was the mention of 
only one of the three pre-State organizations - the Hagana - with the explicit 
c, xclusion of the other two that criflarned the argument. "We demand a clear statement 
in the law: [Military] scrvice in Israel witlun units of the Israel Defense Forces ... 
Etzel 
and ... 
Lehi - these boys have names, " proclaimed Esther Raziel-Naor (MK, Herut). 
Her position was supported by several Knesset members from the left. "I myself 
would suggest indicating the full names of the other two organizations" noted 
Avraham Stopf (MK, General Zionists). Yet, Ben Gurion was resolute in his 
insistence that words construct historical consciousness, and that "the historical fact" 
was that "frorn November 1947 to June 1948, the ME did not exist, and that the 
organization that fought [iii Palestine] was the Hagana. " Herz] Berger MK, Mapai) 
would use the same argument to counter Begin's remarks on this issue, with the 
addition that: "We do not wish the occasion of the ratification of the disabled veterans 
law to provide an opportunity to distort the history of the "alliance of thugs" [the 
appellation given a small right-wing group headed by Abba Ahimeirl. " 26 Surprisingly, zn 
Hagana veterans voiced few objections to Raziel-Naor's demands, whereas Mapai 
strongly objected to this step as it interpreted the act in concrete political rather than ZD 
historical terms. That is. this opposition reflected Ben Gurion's political rationality: 
his airn was to construct the past as an investment in the politics of the future. 
Herut's entreaties were met, for the most part, with silence. A number of Etzel 
and Lehi disabled veterans did -am Ben Gurion's permission to be counted arriong 
those eligible for cornpensation (based, inter alia, on their participation in the few 
coordinated actions against the Arabs), thanks to a very broad interpretation of the 
respective ckitiscs. Direct inention of the orgaiii7ations' names in the legislation Nvas 
26 Bei-ger. H. 6 April 1954, Session No. 411, debate i-cgarding. the Second Kticsset, Subject: Law. 
Invalids (Pensions anl Rchabilitation) . 4memimcni (, Iinended) 1954, Second and Third ReadinE. 
Knessel Protocols. (Ilebi-eM 
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nevertheless avoided throughout. As Eliezer Shostak (MK, Herut) noted: "The 
Minister of Defense has decided in the cases of these disabled veterans ... and they will 
be included among those eligible For compensation ... but it refuses to explicitly 
mention their names. 27 
Herut was very well aware of the political significance of the inclusion of the 
underground organizations' names in legislation, a significance that, as stated, went Zý 
well beyond the material government support to be distributed. In the debate on 
legislation ordering the benefits to be awarded upon demobilization, after being 
informed of the governi-nent's intentions to discard his proposal to add the refinement 
"a fighter who died while serving in one of the armed organizations, that is, the 
Hagana, Etzel and Lehi" within the law's text, Arieh Ben Ellezer (MK, Herut) charged 
that Mapai's "ma jority vote represents another retreat, similar to your retreat from the 
,, 28 War of Independence when you withdrew from the fighting [against the British] . 
The attempt to penetrate the normative consensus was a challenge whose lack of 
realization was considered a failure by the right even if partial gains with respect to ZD ZD 
eli, gnbifity for cornpeusatioii were achieved. After ratification of the Law: Invalids 
(Pensions and Rehahilitation) Amendment (4mended) 1954, which expanded 
eligibility, Ben-Zion Katzriellenbogen (Shelach) wrote the following to Esther Raziel- 
Naor: "We have not modified our position with respect to the substance of the law and 
to those of its stipulations that ignore the role of the armed underground while zn 
specifically mentioning the narric of the Hagana. It remains silent about Etzel and 
27 Shostak, F.. 17 June 1957ý debate regarding Invalids (Pensions and Rehab dilation) Alnendinew 
(Amended) (1954). (MSCCII(IlWous Ordcrs), Fir, ýt Reading, Kncsscl Protocols. (Hebre%N) 
"s, Ben-Eliezer. 1-- 25 April 1949. debate re2ardim-, Lmr DemobilLed Soldiers (draft for 
reconsideration). Kncssel Prolocols. (Ilebre\\) 
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Lehi. " 29 And so, none of the laws passed by Israel's Knesset expressly mention either 
Etzel or Lehi, excluding the law that declares Lehi a terrorist organization. 30 z: 1 
Attitudes toward Haaana Dead 
Compared to other underground veterans, Hagana veterans forged themselves into a t, n 
group displaying acute political consciousness together with easy access to official 
policy-making arenas. The families ofthe I-lagana fallen were aware that they, too, Zý ZD 
would pay the price of ineligibility for material support if their peers from Etzel and 
Lehi were excluded: To repeat, the dead of' all three organizations were killed in 
similar periods and sometimes during operations whose purposes were identical. 
However, the Hagana's representatives in the Knesset operated to bias legislation to 
their favor in direct proportion to the degree that they supported elimination of the 
underground from Israel's collective memory. 
The main goal set before this group was the prevention of any mention of 
Etzel or Lehi in the legislation institutionalizing the status of casualties and disabled 
veterans as well as the benefits to be awarded to their survivors and dependents. "I 
have sympathy for those who replaced the war of liberation [herul in Hebrew] with 
the war for I lerUt [the Party's name]" reinarked Israel Bar-Yehuda (MK, Maparn). " 
Although others than those who fought with the Hagana have suffered ... our subject z: 1 Z-- 
here is the War of Independence" he continued, while differentiating those who 
fought with the Hagana from Etzel and Lehi fighters. In response, Esther Raziel-Naor 
shouted: "And those [the right] didn't fight? "' 
Mapai's Labor Movement partner. Maparn, like Herut and HaLochamim, the 
last comprised primarily of former Lehi members, objected to the temporal limitations 
2Q Katziiellenbouen. R.. 1 Junc 1955. lettei to Razicl-Naor, F. (I lehrew) [sourcel 
30 I-a%N passedaftcr assassination ol'( ount Bernadotte. conlplctc (HebrcN%) 
Completc-0 lebl-CNO 
104 
that excluded the pre-29 November 1948 dead and wounded. Yet, the group targeted 
by Maparn was not that associated witli the underground, a point they scrupulously 
stressed. For instance, when Herz] Berger (MK. Maparn), Chairman of the Knesset 
Labor Subcommittee warned that the related legislation deprived "disabled veterans 
from the British Army's Jewish battalions [the 38"', 39"', and 40t" King's Fusillers] 
who fought in World War 1, " 32 Yaakov Rifkin, of Mapai, who supported the inclusion 
of these soldiers within the frarnework of the law, remarked that "the proposal had no 
relationship to the personal fate of members of the underground. 03 
The proposal that Rifkin personally promoted, which was eventually accepted 
by the Committee, was to empower the Minister of Defense to personally decide upon 
the eligibility of disabled veterans who did not fulfill the formal criteria stipulated by 
the law. Furthermore, he stressed, the pni-pose ol'the respective clause was to permit 
support for Hagana veterans and by no ineans was 'it meant to "equate the 
[underground] ... with those who had 
fought in the War of Independence. " Contrary to 
the support requested for Hagana veterans, which Rifkin dubbed as "humanitarian, " 
any possibility of extending eligibility to the right was described by hirn as the 
"political dividends and historical rehabilitation of Etzel and Lehi ... an endeavor 
meant to determine a new view of the history of our defense and the struggle for 
independence by introducing symmetry between the Hagana and what are called the 
'other defensive organ ization s, '" In conclusion, he voiced his hopes that "the Knesset 
will repudiate this outrageous attempt ... The point is that only the Hagana was 
32 Berger. H.. 6 April 1954. debate regarding-thc Law. Invalids (Pensions and Rehabilitation) 
Imendillent (4mcildc(l) 054. ýCcolld and Third Readinu. Se,;, ýion No. 411. the Second Knessct. 
Knessel PI-010co/s. (0111PIctc (flchl-c\\ ) 
'13 Ril'kin, Y., 6 April 1954, debate regardinL, the Laiv Inva1iA (Pensions and Rehabilitation) 
Amendincill (Amended) 1954. Second and Thial Reading. Session No. 411, the Second Knesset. 
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authorized to act by democratic institutions maintained by the Yishuv and the Zionist 
Movement. 34 
Arguments couched in similar terms Nvere raised with respect to all the laws 
that touched upon the rights ol'survivors and disabled veterans. During the debate on 
the Laiv. - Mililary Service ('1949) prior to its passage, Beret Reptor (MK, Mapam), in 
the name of his movement, proposed a revision that would replace the expression 
Flevery type of service that the Minister of Defense will proclaim" with a more explicit 
statement: "every type of service in a unit of the Hagana will be recognized as 
military service for the purposes of this sub-paragraph. " In elaborating his point he 
stated that: 
... our purpose 
in [proposing] this revision is to protect the rights of former 
Hagana members who freely volunteered and sacrificed themselves to the 
cause of Israel's defense, according to the appeal Issued by the Jewish Agency 
and the National Committee as the leading national institutions. We believe 
that all the operations undertaken by Hagana members throughout the years 
should be considered ... 
The 1-tagana filled tile role of a regular army long 
before 
... 
declaration of the State ... 
Why should we deprive those who served 
for years in the Hagana and in the Jcxvish Brigade. After all, the mernbers of Zý 
the Hagana were recruited by the Zionist institutions that represented the 
highest authorities in Our impending state. 35 
Such arguments convinced the government. As Pinchas Rosen, the Minister of 
Justice would explain: "If it is meant the period preceding Noverriber 1947... It is 
impossible to enter the revision in the proposed law... Nor is 'the flagana' noted within 
the law before us"; hwvever. he did agree that "to the extent that this issue touches 
upon widows and orphans, the goveninicnt is open to taking on the responsibility of 
34 
[bid. 
35 Reptor. B., 8 September 1949. Session No. 49, the First Kncssct, regarding Laii. Military Service 
(1949). Kncssel Protocols. comp I etc (II ebrc\\ ) 
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caring for them, irrespective of the period involved-The government is also 
ready ... to care 
for the survivors of other Hagana dead even If they are not covered by 
the law. 06 
Maparn enlisted in the campaign to (guarantee protection of the rights of the 
Hagana's disabled veterans and the dead's survivors within the evolving legislation. 
Thus, Hannah Lamdan (MK, Mapam) demanded inclusion of the following sentence: 
"Military service ... is also to reler to service 
in the Hagana. " She also suggested that 
eligibility for compensation and rehabilitation be extended to the families of soldiers 
who had served in the Jewish Brigade, the glietto uprisings in Europe, the partisans, 
and those foreign armies that had fought against Hitler during World War 11, that is, 
any form of armed engagement prior to 30 November 1948; membership in the armed 
underground was explicitly excluded. Additionally, in a letter (26 September 1949) 
written to the Minister of Defense bý, the interim national leadership of the Hagana 
Veterans Association, Ben Gurion was asked to publicize a statement indicating that 
"service in the Ha ana, beginning on 30 November 1947, would be considered as 9 
military service [in the IDFI. " Such a statement was indeed published. 
In this case, the interests of Hagana veterans meshed with Ben Gurion's 
political interests regarding the underground, its exclusion from seats of power and Z!, -1 
elimination from collective mernory. The absence of any mention of Etzel and Lehi 
from the compensation legislation was a clearcut expression of how those interests r, 
were realized. "It was with great satisfaction that we read your announcement in the ZD - 
press regarding the disabled veterans law, where you agreed to provide Hagana 
veterans ... with a status comparable to 
IDF disabled veterans, " wrote the Hagana 
Veterans Association. At the same time, it continued to press for incorporation of this 
;6 Rosen. P.. 6 Aprif 1954, debate regarding the Luij, InvalOs Wensions ancl Rehabilitation) 
Amendment (Amended) 1954. Second and Phird RcadinL,. Session No. 41L the Second Kncsset. 
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equivalence within other laws. According to this view, the Knesset had yet to 
adequately correct the "unjust discrimination" that still existed in tile law. 37 
Their efforts bore fruit. The clause delegating to the Minister of Defense the 
discretion to inake case-by-case Judgements regarding eligibility met with their 
-i Z-1 -- t, - 
satisfaction. "The Minister of Defense will determine these frameworks - who is 
considered to have been a participant in the planned operations and who is not, " wrote 
David Bar Rabi-Hai (MK, Mapai). He continued thusly: "The Minister of Defense is 
quite cognizant of where to draw the line and how to protect the dignity and rights of 
Hagana members. 08 Ben Gurion verily did so, in the Yalkul HaPirsumim: "Service in 
the Hagana and in all planned operations against the Arab bands and the invading 
armies will be considered military service. " 39 This directive was implemented 
throughout the Ministry of Defense. In a letter to the Chief of the General Staff, Yosef 
Dekel, Director of the Commemoration Unit, wrote that: "In accordance with custom, 
every individual who fell in the course of his service in the Hagana will be treated as a 
soldier in the IDF. " 40 This appears to have been adequate reason for Hannah Lamdan 
(MK, Maparn) to characterize the spate of legislation as "the niaxii-nurn measure of 
justice. " 41 
The result of the political discourse and the legislatioii passed in the Knesset 
was the clarification of Ben Gurion's position, supported as anticipated by flagana 
veterans: Etzel and Lehi veterans could definitely not be counted among the 
community responsible for the independence pro , ject. 
The statist ethos, rooted in the 
37 Laniclan, 11., 6 April 1954, debate rep , arding the 
Law, Invali(Is (Pensions and Rehabilitation) 
. Amendment 
(4inended) 1954. Second and Third Reading, Session No. 411, the Second Knesset. 
Knesset Protocols. (Flebrew) 
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dedication to collectivist values, had formerly been expressed in the obligation to 
sacrifice oneself in the defense of the Third Temple, the new State of Israel, it 
unquestionably excluded the underground, which did not abide by this ethos. 
The Underl4round's Efforts to Obtain Support 
Etzel and Lehi veterans, under the Herut umbrella, had little faith that a political and 
institutional structure capable of inaugurating the Season, the policy of Etzel ZD Z: I 
harassinent and persecution during the British Mandate, was likely to change its 
attitude. Nonetheless, they did hope for some correspondence in state support for the 
families of the disabled and killed. Despite their pessimism, they set about working 
toward this goal. Chaim Landau (MK, Herut) attempted to reawaken the 
compensation eligibility debate: "We are not discussing the writino of history - even Z-1 
if attempts to distort it occur daily. Where will the honorable Knesset members be., 
will their consciences remain unstirred by the fact that the Gruner, Kahani and Habib 
families have not been recognized as survivors of those killed in action'? , 42 Veterans ZD 
of the underground roused their audiences from every stage open to them. "We 
approached the IDF's Casualties Department, " veterans of the Mishmar HaYarden 
battle (in which the Syrians were repelled with the participation of Etzel forces) wrote 
to the Chiel'of the General Staff: 
and were asked a curious question - 'What organization did the fallen 
belong toT When we responded that they were members of Etzel ... the 
response was ... that the IDF could not 
be responsible for then- families ... These 
dear soldiers were abandoned twice, once before their deaths - we will tell 
11 Landau. C'.. 12 May 1952, kneýsel Prolocols. (1-lehreN\ ) 
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the story at a future date - and once after their deaths, after they had 
43 
sacrificed themselves for the homeland's defense . 
Knesset members belonging to the Revisionist canip made ceaseless attempts 
to include the families of disabled veterans and Etzel and Lehi dead arnong the groups 
eligible for State compensation and support. Just as ceaselessly they were met with 
what Eliezer Shostak (MK, Herut) described as: "Open denial by the State and the 
current government of the families and victims of the War of Independence.... " 
Shostak went so far as to number the potential recipients of that aid: "Two hundred 
and sixty Etzel soldiers fell in this war. Of these, 70 fell in the war against the British, 
and dozens from Lehi ... their survivors need 
help. 44 
Several of the underground's bereaved families, although accustomed to 
disdain and opposition, remonstrated against the institutional obtuseness to then- 
plight. "The Prime Minister and Minister of Defense must know that even if Etzel's 
activities were not to his liking, its members nevertheless bled just like those of the 
Hagana, , 45 wrote Yaakov Gelbgisser, father of the twins Shlorno and Menachem. 
Although both brothers had been killed during the War, only Menachem was 
officially recognized as a casualty because he had died subsequent to his transfer into Z: I 
the IDIF following incorporation of Etzel. After Gelbgisser was recognized as a I ZI 
bereaved father, he renounced this status. "I herewith return the announcement of my 
son Menachern's death, may he rest in peace. Despite the pain involved, I am ready to 
resign the honor, " as he wrote to Prune Minister David Ben Gurion. "Two trees have 
"Secretariat. the WedgcýNood agricultural settlement, cited in a letter from the Information and Public 
Relations Department. 16 March 1949, to Lt. Kis, Personnel Di% ision, the General Staff, IDF Archi% es, 
733 5\49 - 212. (1 lebrew) 
44, ýl oS k 1-- 13 AuLmv; l IWýOý Dehate on Ameminicia to Lm Invalids Wensions and Reh(ihi it( i I tý / I/ on) 
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been hewn from my home - they were equally dear to rne and they equally sacrificed 
themselves for their country. If the nation and the army want to commemorate the 
name of one and lorget the other because the burst of fire that killed one killed ail 
Etzel and not a Hagana soldier -I protest. , 
46 
Failure to ensure eligibility of Etzel and Lehi members within the welfare 
legislation caused the underground to turn to explicating the political dimensions of Z:, 
its opposition: 
For the first time, an authorized government institution openly admits that the 
State of Israel differentiates between the fallen according to their affiliation 
with pre-State organizations ... 
The question here is fundamental and 
important: Are we to officially approve the attempts made to describe the War 
of Independence as the product of the Hagana's endeavors on one day and 
deny its involvement the next, yet declare that the IDF is the continuation 
solely of the Hagana and not a universal fighting force that does not 
discriminate arriong its members. 47 
Herut took advantage of every forum open to them to advertise their exploits, 
whether against the British or the Arabs, in a campaign to persuade the public of their 
right to a place in the state arena as well as in collective memory. "During that period 
[of the War], important attacks were made not only by the IDF, then the Hagana, but 
also by Etzel and Lehi forces, " declared Yaakov Meridor (MK., Herut): 
Jaffa was liberated, as was Yehudia and settlements iii the Ephraim Hills, and 
Ramallah was attacked, all along, the coastal plane. In Jerusalem, Ramat t) 
Rachel was protected by Etzel forces, the liberation of Malcha was undertaken 
by Etzel ... Many operations imperative 
for the defense of the country were 
executed by those same forces whose rights the Minister of Defense is 
46Gelbissei-, Y., 5 Ma,, 1949,1 etter to Be n Gurion, D. pri\ ate corre spoil del ice. (I I chre\\) 
47 Gelbu issctý Y. 1949. cited in Iguerel LeAch, priN ate document. (I-Icbrc\\ 
unwilling to acknowledge ... 
In that period, soldiers fell side-by-side- yet, one 
is forgotten while the other is remembered. 48 
The restrictive leoislation was translated into an historical agenda conferred z: l 
upon future gcnerations. In IDF Casualties ofthe War ofIndependence. a report I 
prepared in March 1953 by the History Branch of the General Staff in cooperation 
with the Office of the Chief Adjutant and the Statistics Bureau of the Office of the 
Prime Minister, a clear definition of the concept "war dead" was presented, as were 
the definitive dates of the War of Independence. In the subchapter entitled 
"Definitions, " it was written: 
War dead are considered to be all individuals who were killed under all 
circumstances during the period in which they served as soldiers in the IDF or 
who died as a result of injuries suffered during active service in the IDF, even 
if they were not regular soldiers enlisted in the IDF at the time. The identitv' .1 ZD _Ing 
trait arriong all the above is that each received a military serial number. 
However, to those persons who fell during active service as members of the 
'Hagana' yet before establishment of the armed forces, a military serial number 
and rank were awarded posthumously. 49 
The right's claims for equality were implicitly addressed by Gotda Meir (MK, 
Mapai) when she summarized the attitude guiding formulation of' the respective 
legislation: "it would have been much more pleasant for me if I could say that 
everyone is equal. But that would be only an illusion. "'O 
Law Substance 
48 Nicridor. Y., 12 %laý 1952, Knesset Prolocols. (Hcbrc\\, ) 
41ý Lorech. Lt. N.. -70 March 19ý3ý IOF 
Fkac I from Ilic ffar ol'hick, pemictice, IDF Archi\cs. ý55ý540 - 14. 
(I lebre%\ ) 
10 Nleir. G., 30 Deceinher 1952, I)ehatc regarding Law. Disabled 1eterans Prior lo Pslabli. y1miew oj 
the Slate ('1952), First Rcadim, -- 
KI? CSS(! t 1)1-1)tfýCOIS. (liebl-C\\ ) 
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Discharged Soldiers (ReinslaIcnient and Guaranteed re-employment of soldiers at 
Enq)loynient) (1949) the place of work where they were 
employed at the time of their conscription 
Defense Service Ainendinew, Definition of military, service for the 
purpose of current legislation 
Ini, alidy (Pensions and Rehabilitation) Guaranteed state provision of 
Amendment compensation and rehabilitation services 
Penal Code Definition of military service for the 
purpose of current penal legislation 
Servicemen's Defense Counsel Provision of defense counsel to 
demobilized soldiers in court cases 
regarding eviction from apartments 
resulting frorn arrears in rental payment 
Order: Local Governinent Exemption from property tax payment for 
soldiers and war casualties 
Shelach 
The labyrinthine system of laws brought about a situation where the families of the 
underground's Nvounded and dead were left deprived of any and all state support, as 
they were in the pre-State period, rejected by the social services as well as denied 
government 1t on. 
In effect, until early 1949, Herut was the only body that -ecogni iI 
accepted exclusive responsibility to assist all the War's casualties and bereaved 
families corning directly from Etzel's ranks and indirectly from Lehi. The Public 
Council for the Care of the Soldier's Family - an administrative body established by 
the pre-State Provisional Council to undertake this task was composed of 15 
representatives. including those representing political interests: three representatives 
from the Ministry of Defense, three from women's organizations, and nine inernbers 
of the Provisional Council. Of the latter, t\\o , Nerc affiliated with Mapai, one with 
111) 
HaTzahar, one with Mapam, one with the General Zionists, one with HaPoel 
HaMizrachi [a Zionist religious party], one representing the Yemenite community and 
one the Sephardic community. The Council thus reflected the political constellation 
ruling the Provisional Council, meaning that politics had invaded the State's response 
to bereavement. 
In April 1949, Menachem Begin, as Etzel's former commander, decided to 
establish a special fund, Shelach - Shikum Lochamei Hofesh (Rehabilitation of 
Fighters for Liberation) - in response to the need for care. In mid April, the fund's 
creation was formally announced. 51 The organization was essentially a revised version 
of an association, founded by Herut, that had been functioning since October 1948. 
Shelach set up the "Office for the Soldier and the Fighter, " a public council having 15 
members that took upon itself "to rehabilitate and to assist in the rehabilitation of the 
underground's fighters, to support the families of fallen heroes, particularly those who 
receive no government aid, to provide medical care and to help those wounded during 
the underground's operations, and their families, especially those who receive no 
" 52 government aid, and to extend a helping hand to the underground's heroes. At the 
head of its Board of Directors stood Menachem Begin. 53 A series of committees were 
also established: the Commemoration Committee, the Organization Committee, the 
Fundraising Committee (Diaspora and Tourism), the Information Committee, the 
Finance Committee assigned to the Monuments Committee, and the Compensation 
and Rehabilitation Committee. 54 
5'Shelach, 1950, Summary Report, 15 April 1949 to 31 October 1950, the Jabotinsky Institute 
Archives, 1\12 - 10. (Hebrew) 52 Shelach, 1950, Summary Report, 15 April 1949 to 31 October 1950, p. 4, the Jabotinsky Institute 
Archives, 1\12 - 10. (Hebrew) 53 President: Menachern Begin, Chairman of the Board: Raphael Kotlowitz, Director General: Ben- 
Zion Katznellenbogen; Members: Yehuda Bilu, Shabtai Vardi, Reuben Yellin, Dr. Yaakov 
Litmanovsky, Dr. Israel Lifshitz (US), Dov Milman, Yaakov Meridor, Betzalel Arnitzur, Yehiel 
Kadishai, and Moshe Stein. 
54 The Jabotinsky Institute Archives, 1\2\1 - 10. (Hebrew) complete 
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Shelach's initiatives fired, as inight be anticipated, the expectations of the 
veterans from both underground organizations. Its demands were formulated in such a 
way as to force the State to adopt criteria that its public could meet. The battles, the 
temporal framework and the operations instigated against the British were events in 
which both Etzel and Lehi participated. This meant that although Shelach was directly 
affiliated with Etzel and meant to act in its interests, it promoted Lehi's interests, too, 
when the two were equivalent. 
Mifleget HaLochamim, the political party founded by Lehi veterans that was 
active in the First Knesset, furthered a rather small number of initiatives aimed at 
protecting the rights of its the dead and disabled. Apparently, these were marginal 
issues on its agenda. It did, however, actively support private groups of Lehi veterans 
in their attempts to corn mem orate their fallen and was in constant touch with the 
administration. However, the driving force behind the attempts to penetrate the 
underground into Israel's collective memory and commemoration project was 
Menachein Begin. This arribition, which he perceived as one of his primary political 
objectives, was not shared by the Knesset members of the sister party, HaLocharmill, 
-which managed to win very tew seats and did not survive the next elections. Contrarv 
to Herut, whose members were homogenous in their ideology and agenda, particularly I 
the will to present itself as the unequivocal alternative to Mapai, HaLocharnim 
represented an ideologically heterogeneous membership. Moreover, it was unable to 
devise a political objective sufficiently clear to rally support and penetrate the 
collective memory. 
In addition, revie,, v of the correspondence between its Knesset members and 
agency officials on the subject of eligibility t'Or compensation reveals that Lehl's 
appeals to the Minister of Delense for case-by-case recognition of eligibility, based on 
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the discretionary powers delegated to him, were frequently awarded with approval. 
We may venture that this success was based on Ben Gurion's continuing assessment 
that Lehi did not represent a political threat on a par with Herut. This conclusion is 
supported, inter alia, by the "Jerusalem Association of Former Lehi Members, " a 
private initiative founded by Lehi veterans, which included the "Committee for the 
Rehabilitation of Jerusalem's Fighters for Liberation. " This organization's purpose 
was to "tend, as much as possible, for every fighter for Jerusalem's liberation 
requiring care and to work for the commemoration of our fallen, may the Lord 
revenge them. " Nevertheless, the association informed the pertinent state institutions 
that it would be "joined only by the most prominent figures who took part in the war 
to liberate Jerusalem and were left penniless, including disabled veterans and the 
surviving members of the casualties' farnilies. " It closed its missive by stating: "The 
Association is apolitical in character. 05 
It was Nathan Yellin-Mor (MK, HaLochamim) who took upon himself the 
brunt of the effort to attend to the needs of the dead's survivors. With the creation of 
HaLochamim, parents of Lehi dead turned to its secretariat in order to express their 
surprise at the absence of their children's names from the official list of the dead and 
demanded that their representatives correct the situation. As the Association would 
write to one widow: 
Please be advised as to your predicament. Our people are not found on the list 
of military [IDF] casualties but on a separate listed devoted to Lehi. Therefore, 
you could not find your husband's name, may the Lord revenge him ... Mr. 
Yellin-Mor is dealing with the question of your husband to the same degree 
5 5Jerusalern Association of Former Lehi Members, undated? letter sent to each member personally. 
Mifleget HaLochamim Archives, Beit Yair, file nos. 37-38-39. (Hebrew) 
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that he is dealing with the other dead and the matter will be corrected as soon 
as the Knesset votes its approval. 56 
The party did indeed request of the Prime Minister that the state extend its 
services to their members. Ben Gurion responded that the State would care for each 
soldier and survivor "mentioned in the lists to the degree possible according to 
,, 57 Ministry of Well'are procedures involving similar cases. ... Yet, the attitudes toward 
the families of Lehi casualties were similar to those toward Etzel survivors. 58 For 
instance, the correspondence between the Director of the Social Services Division and 
HaLochamim regarding the non-transfer of funds to recipients in Tel Aviv: "You must 
accept the facts. To date, the Municipality of Tel Aviv has refused to deal with cases 
of individuals belonging to your party. , ý() Z, - 
Parallel to Shelach's activities, HaLochamirn collected the names of their 
wounded and killed, which they transmitted to the Committee for the Investigation of 
Claims and Conscription, the Ministry of Defense in order to further their retroactive 
and/or posthurnous conscription within the ranks of the IDF, an act that would 
guarantee their eligibility for support and commemoration. 60 However, beyond these 
particularistic requests for assistance, it appears that Hal-ochamirn, contrary to Herut, 
displayed little motivation to launch a frontal campaign on this and the related issue of 
56 Secretariat. Mifleget I lal-ocharnim, 13 JanUarýl 1950, Mifleget Hal-ocharnirn Archives, Beit Yair, file 
nos. 37-38-39. (1 lebre\N) 
57 Director. Social Services Department, Ministrý of' Defense, 19 June 1949. to the Welfare Bureau, 
Ministr\ of Welfare, Mifleget Hal-ocharrurn Archives, Beit Yair, file nos. 37-38-39. (IlebrcNv) 5S There were, however, exceptions. For instance, Yellin-Mor reported to the Casualties Department of 
the Ministry of Defense, Rehabilitation Division, the substance of a conversation between himself and 
the Prime Minister regarding "the bereaved father ofour comrade Naftali Lubinschik, who was arrested 
by the British in 1941, incarcerated under inhuman conditions, transferred to Nakar with other 
deportees. and died in Asmara on 1946. " Ben Gurion responded to Yellin-Mor's request and agreed that 
"vve should take care of'him. " See Ycllin-Nlor, N.. 2 March 1950., letter to the Casualties Department. 
N/litleget I IaLocharnini Archi\ cs. Beit Yair, file nos. 37-38-39. (lichrew) 
Directol, the "Social )Cl-\ iccs Dcpartineiaý 5 September 1949. letter to Nlillc, -ct lial-ochainim, 
N, Iifle,, ct HaLochamirn Archk es. Beit Yair. 1-ile nos. 37-3,8-39. ýl lehreýý ) 
"'Maaze. Gen. S- Ilcad. Personnel Division, Elid 1950, letter to Yellin-N/lor, N., Mitleget 
I laLocharnim Archiý es. Beit Yair, File nos. 37-38-39. (Hebre\% 
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Lehi's penetration into Israel's collective memory. It yielded the management of such 
a campaign to the parliamentary arena, and to Herut as its chief strategist and 
commander in the field. As Yltzchak Shamir was to note with respect to Israel's 
historiography: "[The gains were a] result of Herut's efforts, being that it was the 
larger movement and better represented [in the Knesset]; in any case, its activities in 
the name of Etzel dead were directed toward Lehi dead as well. , 
61 
Another possible explanation for the differences in level of commitment may 
have been the presence of Menachem Begin, former commander of the National 
Military Organization and current leader of the major opposition party on the Knesset 
floor, coupled with the absence of Lehi's commander, Yltzchak Shamir, from active 
politics. After independence, Shamir had joined the Mossad, one of Israel's 
intelligence-gathering agencies. 
As stated, the Ministry of Defense was given the legal mandate to deal with 
households that had lost a member in operations against the Arabs after 29 November 
1947. The boundaries of that mandate left Shelach to deal with the survivors of Etzel 
62 casualties. About 260 persons fell during National Liberation Organization 
operations. The majority left families without any source of support. According to the 
Lý I in government's 
decision. also transmitted by the Ministry of Defense to its delegation i I zn 
the United States, these larnilies were supposed to receive assistance similar to that 
t3 
provided to the survivors of Hagana fallen. ' In response to the de facto dearth of Z71 
6 
_'Shamir. 
Y.. date, pcrsonal inter% ie%%. Tcl A\ i\ - '-Shelach, 1950. Suminal- 
-, 
v Repoi-t, 15 . 
1pril 1949 to 31 Ocloheiý 1950, p. 11. the Jabotinsky Institute 
Archi%es, F, 12 -IW,. (I Icbi-c\%) 
6ý The OfTiCc of the Soldicr and the FiPhter. 'Nelfarc Department. the Herut Mo%ement, 21 Januarý 
1949, letter to Gordon, Y., Chairman, the Dkision for Servicemen's Return and Rehabilitation. 
Ministrý of'Defense. the Jabotinský Institute Archives, 8\22 - kn. (Hebrew) 
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support, Shelach provided legal counseling, advice regarding the rights of the 
disabled, and intervention when necessary. 
We summoned and urged... all the underground's disabled veterans who have 
been reco, nized by official aoencies to turn to the Ministry of Defense with 
their claims, we assisted them in solving many conscription problems for the 
underground's fallen and achieved recognition of the rights of their dependents 
- their bereaved parents. We should note the fact that many among the 
bereaved families and the disabled do not turn to the Ministry despite the fact 
that those cases have been promised assistance. 64 
The endless bargaining between Shelach and the Ministry of Defense over 
inclusion of Etzel and Lehi fallen among IDF dead was fruitless. Shelach adopted a 
moralist attitude and demanded "treatment equal to those awarded the I-IDF] 
casualties' families" in order to avoid "intensification of the discrimination and hunger 
among families whose breadwinners had sacrificed their lives to defend and liberate Zý 
the homeland. , 65 The institutional structure remained adamant. It was oblivious to the 
personal, moral element of their position and was conscious only of the broader 
implications of a change in its policy. In this NvaN, Ben Gurion's position - "we will 
not equate Etzel with the Hagana"(16 - materialized in practice. 
Thus, Shelach dealt Nvith, supported and accompanied "all those dozens of 
families whose sons fell ... 
[prior to and] during the War of Independence against the t, 
foreign tyrant. ...,, 
67 Another task, shared with HaLochamirn, was the treatment of 
those soldiers frorn the underground who were missing in action. Parents would claim 
64 Shelach. October 1956, The Associalion and [ts Activitics During 1956-1957ý p. 3ý the Jabotinsky 
Institute Archives. 1\12 - 10. (Iiebrew) 
65 Herut Movement, 6 December 1948, letter to 'Izadok, M., Head, Personnel Diývision, IDF, cited in 
f1crut- 24 Februarý 1949. (Ilebrew) 
ý"Ben Gurion, D.. 1951, Diarie, y. Sdc Bokci: 13cti Gurioii Archi\es. eiitrý dated 26 March 1950. 
(Hebre\\ ) 
67 Shelach, 1950. Summary Reporl, 15 April 1949 to 31 October 1950. p. 11, the Jabothisky histitute 
Archives. 1\12 - 16ý. (Hebre\\) 
119 
that the attitude toward the bodies of the sons, who were buried in Arab villages, was 
discriminatory when compared to the attitude toward IDI- soldiers missing in action. 
For example. consider the case of a family whose soii was executed after attempting 
to penetrate: 
... the 
headquarters of the [Arab] bands in Nablus in order to blow it up ... 
he 
was caught in the Arab village of Taibc and buried in Ktar Seer, in the 
proximity of Jenin. The family turned to all the relevant institutions about 
searching for the grave and returning the body for interment in Israel ... no 
response whatever has been received to date ... we are protesting to the 
Ministry of Defense in the name of the family, mernbers of Mifleget 
HaLocharmm. 68 
The bulk of the resources available to Shelach were dedicated to these 
humanitarian activities, which required it to recruit large sunis ot'i-nonev. Funds were 
collected in the United States and South Africa in order to send the wounded to the 
United States to undergo complex operations. " At the time the [Welfare] Department 
was set up, about 190 individuals required medical treatment as a result of their 
participation in Etzel operations. The majority of cases fully recovered after 
appropriate medical treatment in hospitals, convalescence centers and National Sick 
Fund clinics.... " 69 In addition: 
... the 
Department is striving to ClUarantee the rights of the underground's 
casualties at the Movement's community centers in Yad Ellyahu and Shikun 
HaVatikim in Kiryat Shalom. The Department has also arranged for the return 
of three Etzel prisoners from exile (two in Germany and one in the LJK) and 
for their rehabilitation after their return to Israel. The Department has likewise 
maintained contact with prisoners from the Old City [of Jerusalem] and frorn 
Misliniar HaYarden as well as ý, N ith their larrulies. 
6S Secretariat, Mifle2et lial-ocharnim. 17 April 1950. leacr to the Chicl' Nlilitar% Rabbi. Mifleact 
Flal-ocharnim Archives, Beit Yair, t-ile nos. 37-38-39. (flehreN%) 
69 Shelach. 1950. see I, tn. 67. 
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Shelach would follow up and procure medical treatment for Etzel veterans 
who, as a result of parliamentary activity following futile court cases, were eventually 
included among the community oJ'lDF disabled veterans. "The Department's approval 
provides the basis for compensation claims. Nmety-fivc percent of those presenting 
claims obtained a full settlement and authorization for compensation . 
70 With tirne, the 
number of cases handled by Shelach rose to 250. For those counted among the 
underground, Shelach provided the sole framework of support. Shelach was, then, 
"the only address to which they could turn in their hour of need. ,71 
Shelach organized branches (called "committees") throughout the world. The 
most important were to be found in the United States, Canada, Central and South 
Arnerica (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela), South Africa and Australia. 
These committees prepared shipments of food and clothing, as well as financed the Z, 
therapy for the disabled who managed to go abroad and. in a number of cases, the 
entire course of their rehabilitation. Herut Knesset members, especially Menachem 
Begin, 72 who headed the contingent to South Africa, 
73 and Chaim Landau journeyed 
to these countries to gather contributions. 
Shelach's activities abroad disturbed the Hagana's supporters. Despite the 
closure of the Israeli space to the underground's activities and to the transfer of public 
funds, Hagana veterans feared that the collection of contributions abroad would elude 
local barriers. After the Israeli elite had succeeded in abolishing "The American 
League for a Liberated Israel, " one of Shelach's branches, a worried Al HaMishmar, 
the Israeli daily identified with Maparn, would write: 
'Olbid. 
"S lie I ach, undated, placard. apparently sent to II crut Mo%ement members on the eNe of Remernbran cc 
Daý , 
1958.1 the Jabot iiiský I nstitute A rchives. 1 7\5 - 16`ý. (I I cbrew) 
,,, Welfare Department, Shelach. undated, internal document. (Hcbrc%\ ) 
73 Sliclach, October 1956. The Association and /Is Aclivilies Diii-ing 1956-195-1. p. 4, the Jabotiiiský 
I nstitute A rchives, 1\12 - 16ý. (Hehre\ý ) 
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Although the League has been officially disbanded, it continues to collect 
funds and distribute distorted propaganda ... 
Its [Shelach's] new fund raising 
campaign for the 'Rehabilitation Fund Im- Discharged and Injured Etzel 
Soldiers' is ignoring Ben Gurion's announcement that the Government of Israel 
will care for all the in jUrcd discharged soldiers, irrespective of their movement 
14 or party identification. 
The activities engaged in by Shelach and its committees prompted the elite to 
act to constrict Shelach's fundraising activities abroad. On 26 October 1948, a cable 
was sent frorn the Ministry of Defense to Israel's Consul in the United States after the 
Ministry had been informed of the scope of Shc1ach's fundraising activities. The cable 
clearly stated that: "The Government of Israel views itself as responsible for the 
provision of assistance to those of Etzel's members who were wounded prior to that 
organization's dissolution and to do so to the same level as that given to the Hagana's 
disabled. , 75 Israel's government was desirous of making it clear to the Jewish 
organizations abroad that there was no need for additional fundraising and that the 
activity launched by Shelach was superfluous. An internal Shelach document noted 
that: "These funds, which have not been authorized by the Jewish Agency or by the 
Board of Directors of the United Jewish Appeal, are the objects of fierce opposition 
and any, public figure openly supporting the project must confront pressure of the 
strongest kind ... 
Shelach 
... 
is not, in general, viewed in favor by the official 
institutions of the Israeli Government or of the Jewish Agency, " the latter two doing 
their utmost to constrain Shelach's activities abroad at the same time that they refuse 
to allocate it any funds, as stipulated in the law. "Shelach was not interested in 
operating, independent projects abroad and therefore turned to the United Jewish t, 
Appeal Nýith the appeal that it received its portion of the funds raised ... 
Our request 




left unanswered, we had no choice but to engage in independent projects and to 
establish Shelach branches in those same countries. , 70 In Australia as well Shelach's 
envoy was able to report establishing "branches in Sydney and Melbourne despite the 
07 
opposition of the official Jewish institutions there. ... 
Other, smaller projects were 
also initiated in order to recruit funds for the support of the dependent families. These 
included "a market was held at Metzudat Zeev, charity balls were held in Jerusalem 
,, 78 and Tel Aviv, [and] special film showings took place throughout the country. ... 
79 Furthermore, Herut Knesset members donated half their salaries to Shelach's coffers . 
Dov Gruner and Yaakov Wise left no surviving family. Shlorno Ben Yosefs 
family was killed in the Holocaust. Uri Avneri was to write: "The crucial factor was 
not econornic. Economic wounds heal. The wound's to a inan's soul can remain open, 
to fester until his final hours. " Following Avnerj, it should be stressed that from the 
perspective of the families, economic claims were not at the heart of the issue: The 
majority was able to make ends meet with the help of Shelach or other organizations. 
What they desired most throughout this period was official recognition by the State of I 
Israel. 
Summary - Only Ben Gurion 
The vitriolic confrontations over legislation exhibited an additional issue that hovered, 
it appears, above every aspect of Israel's public administration during the period 
covered by this research: Ben Gurion's exclusive control over policy. His sway was 
felt in the principles, values and policy objectives that emerged in Knesset activity. As 
tile supreme authority In the political sphere, his power ývas unshakable, to the point 
76 Shelach. 1950, Summary Report, 15 April 1949 lo 31 October 1950. p. 2. the Jabotinsky Institute 
- I\ 12 - l6t,. jlebrc\ý 2 '\rchi\ e, "Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
71) Kremerman, R.. II September 2001, personal intcrvie\N, the Jabotinsky Institute. 
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of smothering any spark of an idea that ran counter to his own viewpoints. His 
obstinate determination to view the Revisionists as "dissidents" or "rebels" and to 
exclude their survivors from the family of the bereaved was not shared by his 
colleagues in Mapai. On the tenth anniversary of Israel's independence, during the 
debate over the Invalids Wensions and Rehabilitation) Amendment (1954), Beba 
Idelson (MK, Mapai) stated that: 
the question regarding the widows and orphans of those who fought among the 
ranks of organizations such as Etzel and Lehi, represented an opportunity to 
remove the partition dividing widows and orphans. It would be to our honor, 
to the nation's honor, if we, at the tenth anniversary [of our independence] 
were wholeheartedly to do so, and to cease to discriminate between widows 
and between children ... 
I turn to you and ask that you find a way. 80 
Idelson's wish was for the Knesset to discontinue their politicization of 
bereavement: 
We are not about to enter into an historical argument over the justice of 
the ideological paths taken by the fallen ... such arguments can be conducted 
among the living, let us leave the dead in peace and tend to their families just 
as we tend to the families of those who fell in the War ... We are obligated to 
do so in memory of the victims. 81 
Nor did Mapai Knesset members consistently object to Herut and 
HaLochamirn demands. During the debate over the Lankin (MK, Herut) and Yellin- 
Mor (MK, HaLochanilm) proposal regarding Etzel and Lehi wounded during the 
entire period of the conflict with the British within legislation, many Mapai Knesset 
members preferred to abstain rather than vote against the amendment. 82 The directive 
regarding party discipline was imposed by Ben Gurion himself His reasons may have 
"'Idelson, B. 12 %Jaý 19521. knessci Prolocol. s. Olebrc\%) 
81 Ibid. 
, 921 bid. 
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been historical: To preserve the legitimacy of his decisions regarding the anti- 
underground "Hunting Season, " during which Etzel activists were persecuted and 
often handed over to the British. Or, they may have been calculated and rational: to 
prevent legitimation of a political rival. 
It appears that Mapai's undisputed head, who had been unwavering with 
respect to the imposition of his authority during the pre-State period, was to remain 
wedded to this position, ready to castigate any group that had dared to contradict him. 
"The law does not delegate to the Minister of Defense the implicit power to include 
Etzel and Lehi disabled veterans [within its framework], " wrote Uri Avneri with 
respect to the Invalids (Pensions and Rehab dilation) Amendment (1954) law. I le was 
referring to the clause delegating discretion over eligibility to the Minister of Defense. Z: 1 
This clause was interpreted as a statement recognizing Hagana veterans as having 
rights equal to those of IDF veterans: 
Other laws, such as the Lair. - Military Cemeteries, Lait,. - Veterans Disabled 
Prior to Establishment of the State, Laiv. - Families of Soldiers Who Fell in the 
War of In(Jepen(lence ... all incorporate the sarne wording: 
'... every service that 
the Minister of Defense declares to be so, as published in the Reshumot, as 
military service for this purpose. ' 
In every instance when rights were extended to Etzel and Lehi members who 
had been wounded after 330 November 1947, the day the United Nations declared 
establishment of the State of Israel, not one openly cited Etzel or Lehi by narne. This 
was all that was written: "I declare herein that participation in any planned activity 
against the Arab bands and invading armies will be recognized as military service for 
the purposes of the indicated law. " Thus, Etzel and Lehi dead who had been killed or 
NNotinded dnring the 'War of Independence, or foLi-lit a0ainst the Arabs. were awarded 
r1olits whereas those ý, vho had died or been wounded in the Linder-round's struagle 
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against British rule were not. Avneri continued: "The death of a son is a horrible blow :n 
dealt to every farrilly-the death of a son, with no guaranteed compensation to be 
awarded to the family to ensure its survival is doubly painful. However, that blow is a 
thousand times more painful when the nation repudiates the freshly dug grave by 
denouncing that son as a pariah, a traitor. " 83 
The uneasiness incited by the ongoing legislation's design was not the sole 
property of the press. In a published article, Rabbi M. Norick (MK, HaPoel 
IlaMizrachi) argued that "the religious front naturally objects to discrimination; after 
the proposal for the convening of a special committee [on the subject] was re 
, 
Jected, 
inembers of the front abstained from voting. " Norick continued that the events 
surrounding the decision resemble his: 
... experience as an elected representative abroad, when the government 
demanded that those members of parliament who were covert communists be 
tried and unseated. I was then the only Jew among all the members from the 
Commons that voted against the law. Hence, I did not always agree with the 
underground's actions, which sometimes caused spiritual damage and 
sometimes material darnage. But the undeniable fact is that the underground 
sacrificed themselves on the homeland's altcr, in rapturous love for their 
people and their country ... 
They climbed the scaffold singing HoTikvo [the 
national antherrij, with Shema Yisrael [a declaration of faith] oil their lips. We 
cannot desecrate the graves of Israel's sacred and pure heroes, Jewish patriots, 
who gave everything, everything. We do not have the right to disgrace their I 
bereaved mothers or ostracize their widows ... and orphans. 
We cannot ignore 
their disabled ... 
Thus, even though I am a member of the coalition and a 
veteran member of parliament, loyal to my party, as well as a friend and 
admirer of the Prime Minister ... 
I cannot deny rny conscience... My heart has 
been lightened 
... 
[for I can admit] that I have not shed blood nor discriminated 
a(, ainst others. " 84 
S; Ilaolain HuZch. 8 April 1958. (1-febrew) 
S4 Norick. ... ilanic. 
\Iaai-i\. 19 April 1949. (Ilebre\ý) 
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Subjectivity 
In general, legislation in the period following achievement of Israel's independence 
was devised so as to differentiate between the community that contributed to the 
independence project, those who had sacrificed themselves in its narne, and those who 
did not, on the basis of the accepted political criteria. Identification of the fallen and 
their bereaved parents, as well as the ordinary soldiers who paid the price for 
independence and sovereignty was integral to this activity. Formal, objective criteria 
for such differentiations are readily available. One dictionary defines those who died 
in the course of their military duty as: "deceased, murdered, dead, fallen, departed. " 85 
Another defines the concept thusly: "A soldier who died as a result of the inýjuries 
acquired on the battlefield or in a combat accident. " 86 However, the political 
legislation that was orchestrated under Ben Gurion's baton ignored such definitions. 
Ben Gurion exploited parliamentary legislative mechanisms as if they were primary 
assets, raw materials to be used in the construction of political barriers against 
opposition groups that inight wish to stake clairns in the historical events that 
endowed the dominant party and its leader with political legitimacy. Those events Zý 
were presented by Ben Gurion as a project completed exclusively by the IDF and the 
Hagana, to the astonishment of opposition members who declared that "the armed 
forces are not pawns in a garne played between the opposition and the regime or the 
government, the armed forces arc the property of the entire nation. "' 
ýýA\ incon. E.. 2000. ff'ord by [Ford, A Thesaurus of the Hebrew Language, Holon: Ita\. (Ilebrew) 
"'Boi-Shoshan. F.. 1969.11chreii-flebreit Dictionary. Jerusalem: Kirýat Scfer. (, E\cn- 
Shoshan based hi., i delmiLion on the Biblical \ei-,, c: -Nmý tile Philistines lbuý-, Ilt 1-("Iillst Isi-nCl. and tile 
iilciiofist-aelf'cl]ýlo\\iislLtiiiiiii-nount('jilboa"(Saiiiuel. 31: 1). 
81 Meridor. Y.. 16 Januai-N 1950. comments made in the debate regarding Luiv. -Ifilitary 
Service, 
Knessel Protocols. (I lcbre%ý) 
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In effect, after years of political delegitirnation based on their daring to deny 
the authority so central to Ben Gurion's being, Etzel and Lehi veterans expected no 
change in public attitudes toward thern. They were fully aware that just as in the 
period of the YisliLiv, contemporary legislation was motivated by politics: 
. 2ý 
... it is clear that the government will recognize only those Etzel wounded 
soldiers who participated in authorized operations; [it is also clear] that this list 
will undergo 'review. ' investigated and confirmed by Hagana veterans. The 
question of how we are to define 'authorized operation' also demands a 
response. The reasons for the government's refusal are political. Government 
acceptance of responsibility for the underground's wounded would 
acknowledge the war waged by Etzel against the oppressor - contrary to the I C, n 
will and against the decisions made by the national institutions. 
gnition of the 
dead and wounded of those violators of Ben But more: Recoa 
Gurion's authoritý would be interpreted as admission of the error of their past 
exclusion. 
Knesset members belonging to other factions also grasped the character of the 
interests driving legislation. "I do not think that we need place ourselves arnong those 
nations that rewrite their history every few years according to the era's politics, " 
argued Avraharn Stopf (MK, General Zlonists). 89 The Knesset did not, however, need 
to formulate hypotheses regarding Ben Gurion's airns: the State itself provided thein. 
When bereaved families from Etzel and Lehi turned to the Ministry of Defense with 
the request to recognize their sons and daughters as state dead despite their deaths 
prior to 29 November 1947, it was Ben Gurion, as the sitting Minister, who 
responded: 
88 Hcrut Movement, 6 NI-arch 1949. letter to Herut's representatives in Paris, the Jabotinsk% Institute 
, A, t-clii\es, 
8\12 - 1-,,. (Ilebre\%) 
, 9, ) Stopf. A. 16 Januarý 1950. Knessel Prowcols. (Ilebrew) 
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On what basis does Begin clairn the right for recognition of' zD 
Etzel ... Confirmation that a person served frorn I January to 30 May in an 
operation against the [Arab] bands will not lead me to recognize Etzel. I must 
prevent discrimination between the Hagana and others who were active during 
the sanic period and I-Or the saine purpose, although I will never accept Etzel 
as equivalcrit to the Hagana. 9) 
It appears, then, that irrespective of the objective-historical and/or rational- 
political justifications for excluding Etzel and the other underground organizations 
from Israel's collective memory, the genuine reasons for doing so were ultimately 
subjective. 




The Politics of Hegemony in Physical Space 
The activities described in this chapter represent another layer in the structure of 
practices initiated by Mapai, Israel's dominant party. The boundaries of these practices 
marked Mapai, its supporters, and the institutions it controlled as the main 
contributors to the independence pr ject. By delineating these boundaries, Mapai was 01 ZD 
able to exclude contributions made by Etzel and Lehi from the mernory sites 
monuments and state cemeteries - constructed in physical space. Thus, this chapter 
will show that Israel's landscape, like the other areas available for intervention, was 
not spared Mapai's appropriation. 
This chapter begins with an historical survey of Labor Movement attempts, 
begun prior to the establishment of the State, to structure a national commemoration 
pro 
, 
ject that reflected its ethos and desired narrative and thereby identify the nation's 
story with its own. Next, the chapter describes the institutions founded after 
independence for the purpose of sustaining the material dimension of collective 
memory. These institutions were of two orders, each reflecting a distinct political 
camp. The first was composed of state organizations mandated to implement state 
commemoration policy as formulated by Mapai's leadership. The second set of 
institutions, founded by the underground's veterans, strove to penetrate recognition of 
its dead and then- contributions into those same landscapes. The third part of the 
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chapter illustrates how this policy was executed, with an emphasis on the conflicts 
that ra ed between the or-anizations over the commemoration practiced at specific 9 ZD 
,,, 
the fourtli part discusses how the major state projects mernory sites. Following 
initiated in physical space - military cemeteries -- and burial policy reflected 
Mapai's exclusion of the underground from these sites as well. 
Bel4inninl4s of the Commemoration Project in Physical Space 
An authentic expression of Labor's conceptual hegemony can be found ill the 
monument dedicated to the defenders of Kibbutz Hulda. I The statue, entitled Work 
and Defense, erected under the auspices of the Jewish National Committee and the 
Histadrut, was planned and produced by the sculptress Batia Lishansky, the sister of 
Rachel Yanait (wife of the future president of Israel, Yitzhak Ben Zvi). Three figures 
appear on the statue., those of Efraiin Tchizik, who was killed during the Arab attack 
on Hulda during the 1918 riots; his sister, Sarah, who was killed at Tel Hai; and Z: 1 
another person. Although the monument was intended as a memory site dedicated to 
military operations, the statue places fig)ures representing those operations beside n 
symbols of agricultural labor and settlement activity. Beneath these figures, at the base 
of the statue, is a plaque displaying tools used to work fields of grain. Thus, in 
figurative content as well as in name, the statue expresses the Labor Movement's Z, 
ethos: the marriape of defense and agricultural settlernent. The Movement had 1. ý - 
attempted to create symbiosis bet\Ncen the pioneer who redeerns the nation's land with 
the sweat of his brow and the soldier who protects his people by the strength of his 
1 During the 1929 riots. hundi-cds ofArahs attacked the isolated agricultural training station situated in 
the midst ol'Arjh tcrritor\ .A -roup of 23 1 lagana 
fighters managed to t1mart the attack. durin(i \Oich 
their commander. Ffiraim Tchi/ik, mis killed. That cvening. the British troops and Arah police who 
arriN ed forced the dcl'endeis to \ acatc the týirm. DLII'iIIII the War of Independence. the farin was used as 
a base for the Flauana's defense of. 1crusalem. 
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IMpliC sword 'it in this symbolic presentation, as will be dernonstrated in the next 
chapter, is the myth Surrounding Yosef Trumpeldor, the "builder and warrior. " 
Trumpeldor presented an image of the hero that only wished to work the land but was 
forced to defend it, his one hand holding a rifle instead of the desired plowshare. 
Attending the Hulda monument dedication ceremonies on 26 August 1937 
were representatives of all the Yisliuv's national institutions, envoys from the 
Mandatory government, America's delegates to the Zionist Congress then visiting 
Israel, members of the Tchizik family, and the surviving Hulda defenders. In an article 
in the same day's issue of Davar, Rachel Yanait, a member of the committee convened 
to select the monument's design, referred to the statue: 
It is not simply a monument to an unknown soldier sent by leaders to the 
battlefield to die, but a monunient to living workers, individuals who, 
motivated by inner personal drive yet conscious of the general good, devoted 
themselves to construction and creation, through their labor they defended us 
a] 1.3 
Yitzhak Ben Zvi, Chairman of the Jewish National Fund, spoke at the 
ceremony in the name of the Executive Committee of the Histadrut, noting that: 
the incident at Hulda ... has become the moral property of the entire Yishuv, 
of the entire nation-its story will be repeated by the coming 
generations ... Hulda to the south and Tel 
Hai to the north are but two links in a 
4 
chain . 
Yanait and Ben Zvi thus expressed Labor's purpose behind the monument's 
erection - commemoration was meant to remind Lis that striking roots in Israel 
2 St I ýl pit- )ýy. 1984, Oilc. s WithowSuccessors. Generations (? f Israel's Political Leadership, Tcl Aý i\ 
Sifriat Halloalim. p. 110. (HcbrcNý). 




involved defending the land. 5 Com mem oration of Hulda was thLIS linked to the Zionist 
narrative, the story of Tel Hai. Thus, in Volume I of Sýfer Toldol Hahagana (Thstory 
of the 11agana), we find that "Tel Hai symbolized Hulda .... tile bravery of the Yishuv's 
,, 6 pioneers . 
The Hulda and Tel Hai monuments, both erected in the 1930s, represent 
institutional Zionism's first nicniory sites in physical space. Although commemorative 
monuments had been erected dUring the 1920s, these were initiated by a plethora of Zý 
private, voluntary groups, operating alongside the established, pre-State bodies - the Z' 
National Committee, the Zionist Federation, the Flistadrut, and the Jewish Agency' 
where commemoration policy was actually made. The Hulda and Tel Hai memory 
sites soon entered the channels of the social communication network, first and 
foremost through the coninicinorative rituals that became a permanent fixture of z- 
Yishuv life. This process Nvas supported by the financial and institutional control of 
the messages transmitted. Shamir's research indicates that: "The [Yishuv's] formal 
institutions viewed thernselves as responsible for the construction of collective 
memory during the formative days of Israel's national society. " In contrast, the 
voluntary initiatives, financed by donations and the fallen soldiers' families, were 
rather modest and, due to thcir private nature, incapable of penetrating national Z: ' 
consciousness as collective memory sites. 9 
Analýýsis of official comi nern oration initiatives cau help us identify the spirit of 
the time that the national institutions were desirous of constructing. Thus, for 
5 Shamir. 1., 1996. Commetnoration and Mcnior ' v. 
Tel A%, iN: Arn 0% ed, p. 25. (Flebrc,, N) 
6 DinUr. B.. 1959. Sefer Toldot Hahagana, Volunic 1. Part One, Tel A\li%: Maarachot. Ministry of 
Defense p. 378. (Hebre%N) 
/ Shamir. 1., 1992, The Farmers ofpre-Slate Israel, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Tel Aviv 
Unk crsitý , Departincia of'Political Scicnce, p. 
367. (1 lebi-c%%) 
S Ibid., p. 382. 
9 For exampIc. groups such as the Bnci Bim amin Associalion, Petach -l'ik%a. and the Sholmer 
(Protectors socictý )ý Bell Shemen. 
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example, although erected after independence, the Negba commemorative monument 
sculpted by Rappaport (1953) effectively expresses Labor Movement values and the 
rnaýjority of the political elite's ideological expectations. I () In effect, the Negba site 
transmits meanings similar to those represented by the Hulda monument, that is, a ZI - 
variant of the story of national rebirth: 
The soldier's uniform was like that of the kibbutzriik, except for his shirt, 
whose tails were snugly fitted in his belted trousers, and his laced shoes, worn 
in place of sandals. The similarities signify that both figures - the soldier and 
the kibbUtznik - were fashioned from the same stuff, members of the same 
farmly, the Labor family, workers, men of the soil, and that only when needed 
to protect the land would they gird their weapons. These two, who are really 
one, hold the plowshare with one hand and a sword with the other. '' 
This work repeats the image oftfie ideal soldier-hero: a young inan holding a 
rifle against a background of agricultural implements -a hoe - and symbols of the 
produce grown at Negba - sheaves of wheat., clusters of grapes, olive branches. z::, 
According to Levinger, those who solicited the work, like its creator, were intent on 
capturing the victorious ethos ofthe Labor Movement's pioneer ideology. As Gamzo 
states, the Labor's leadership was interested in transforming the conduct of the Negba 
defenders into an edifying example: "Such monuments display significant educational Z-- ZD 
as well as artistic values, embodied in their attempt to construct the image of a people, 
especially its youth. " 12 The site's brochure details this message: "Negba is a symbol of 
perseverance, a paean to all the nation's heroes who paid the price of our nation's 
10 Describe the Ncgc\ incidcnt 
11 Ganizo, C. 1957, Israeli Sculpllircý I el A\ i\: Nlichlol. unpaud: cited in I, c\ inger. A. 1993, 
Co"llnemor(Ilive 11011 unlews in Israe/. Te IA\ iN: II akibbutz Hameuch ad. p. 2 1. (Hebrew) 
12 Ibid.. p. 2 1. 
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independence. " 13 Negba did in fact become a popular site for organized visits by Z, 
groups of schoolchildren and members of the Gadna, the pre-military training units 
established in Israel's high schools. 
Contrary to Mapai's success in presenting, the War's victories as the products of ZD 
its leadership in the form of material objects placed in the visible landscape we find 
Etzel and Lehi failure to do likewise. They preferrcd a different historical epic, 
belonging to another tradition: that of loners, of an underground that went against the 
accepted policy of collaboration with the British invaders; they were involved in a 
rebellion meant to alter the course of the Zionist Movement and the nation's history. 
As viewed by their members, Etzel and Lehi were the progeny of a different 
movement - Nili, a group of "renegade" Jews who had co-operated with Allied 
intelligence during World War I in the hope of ensuring future Jewish settlement in 
Palestine. This group had also been expunged firom official memory by Labor yet 
appropriated by the underground as a model for emulation, The story of Nil] provided 
a source of strcngth and meaning for underground members faced with the political 
ostracism forced upon them. The believed that the day would soon come when N11i's y 
legacy would be recognized and accepted by the Israeli public. 
Nili's objective was to hasten liberation of Palestine froin the oppression of 
Ottoman rule-, it hoped to do so by joining tile Allied effort to weaken the Turkish 
hold over Palestine. Such a goal \vas considered inappropriate and potentially 
dangerous by the Yisliuv's leadership. Yishuv attitudes toward Nill during and after 
the period of its activity closclý reserribled Labor*s attitudes toward Etzel and Lehi. 
13 The V`oicc of Negba 11.9 NI a. \ 19-ý3. p. 6. (11 ebl-e\% ) 
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At the outbreak of World War 1, the Zionist leadership adopted a policy of 
neutrality though some of its factions sided with either Germany or the Allies. The 
Poalei Tziyyon party spoke in favor of Palestine's integration within the Ottoman 
political sphere. David Ben Gurion and Yitzhak Ben Zvi, then studying in 
Constantinople, imagined that they would one day represent Palestine as delegates to 
the Ottoman parliament. When the war broke out they exhorted the YishUv's residents 
to accept Ottoman sovereignty. Even the Shomer, a voluntary defensive association 
enjoying full elite backing, was pro-German: As early as 1913, Yisrael Shohat, its 
leader, suggested that a civilian militia be established within tile framework of the 
Turkish army. Few Yishuv residents or community leaders were willing to adopt a 
pro-British stance in view of Ottoman occupation of Palestine. Among the leaders 
outside Palestine who did take a pro-British position were Dr. Chaim Weitzman, who 
paved the way for Britain's Balfour Declaration, and Zeev Jabotinsky, who founded 
the Jewish Battalions that fought beside the British on the Eastern Front during tile 
First World War. 
Nili members stroncylv ob j ected to Ottoman rule. Sara Aaronsohn, one of its Z, -I 
founders, had personally witnessed the Turkish massacre of the Armenian comrnumtv 
in 1915 while on her ,,, Tay home to Zikroii 
Yaakov from Constantinople. The career of 
Yosef Lishansky., Nill's founder, was similar to that of Jabotinsky in that he, too, had 
been a member of Poalei Tziyyon. The departure of Lishansky's faction from the party 
incited public condemnation of Nill, rationalized by the its inernbers' rejection of 
Yishuv authority. Aaron Aaronsohn, Avshalom Feinberg, Sara Aharonson and Yosef 
Lishansky the group's leaders. were considered to be rash young people who dared to 
,, zn 
object to the Turkish presence in contradictioti of the Yisliuv policy of co-operation. 
Nili's actions were portraýed as endangering the entire cominunitV, and potentiallv 
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inviting a massacre similar to that experienced by the Armenians. Although the details 
of the group's dernise lie beyond the frarnework of this study, the treatment of its 
memory by the ruling elites is more than relevant for the pattern that it established. 
To illustrate, Lisliansky was persecuted for his views even after death. 
Apprehended on 19 October 1917, he was incarcerated in Damascus and sentenced to 
death by a military tribunal. In 1919, his body and that of Na'aman Belkind, who was 
also hanged in Damascus, were laid to rest in Rishon LeTziyyon. His grave was 
frequently desecrated and many attempted to prevent public mention of his 
activities. 14 
Avshalom Feinberg was killed in 1917 in the Gaza area under mysterious 
circumstances. A monument in his memory, erected south of Hadera four decades 
later by his family with the aid of the Hadera municipality and the local Farmers 
Association, received no government support. 1-5 Its dedication was organized by the 
city founders, which included the Feinberg family and members of the Association, oil 
the "fortieth anniversary of his death in the Sinai Desert. " 16 At its dedication on 20 
January 1957, a plaque was displayed with the inscription: "A testament to 
Avshalom... founder of the underground dedicated to liberation of the nation during 
World War I ... who 
fell in the Sinai Desert for the sake of Israel's independence.... " 
Until as late as 1930 the heirs of the Shomer and the Labor Movement saw to 
it that the story of the first Zionist underground (or "liberation movement" in current 
parlance) and the bravery displayed by its members was excised from collective 
mernory. After establishment of the State, the history of Nili continued to be viewed 
14 
Ibid. 
s Shamir, 1.1992, p. 23. 
16 Noted on the formal in\ itation to the event and included in the visit report written by the 
Commemoration t Init, cited bý Shamir, 1 992ý p. 23. 
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negatively and remained outside the established myths. No mention of the group could 
be found in the official historiography until after Herut came to power in 1977. One of 
the first authors to describe the events in a positive light, 1. Yaarj Poleskin, was forced 
to add a question mark to the title of his book: Spies or Nalional Iferoes" /7 Nih was 
also totally boycotted by the education systern and its textbooks. Mention of the group 
and its exploits was heard only in Beitar clubhouses. As part of the Revisionist 
counter-culture, Beitarists adopted their messages and symbols, which were still 
considered illicit, in solidarity with others who had also been denied entry into the 
collective memory project. Parallel to its absence frorn literary and symbolic space, 
Nili remained more or less absent from physical space as well. 
Orl! anizations 
National independence created a new context for the production of collective memory 
in physical space: the shared landscape. In these circumstances, use of space is no 
longer the prerogative of spontaneous iintiatives launched by one or another group; it 
is a public good whose development is determined by the public administration and 
legislation. Despite this change in tile essence of this space, numerous bodies 
continued practices they had become accustomed to in the pre-State era. So, these 
organizations would sporadically erect commemorative monuments while neglecting 
to co-ordinate their actions with the authorities. For instance, during the early 1950s, 
the Ministry of Defense decided to convene a special committee to help determine 
which monuments would be raised under its auspices. On 21 JLIIý, ' 1953, the Ministry 
of the Interior's Assistant Director for Planning authorized the creation of the Council Z-- 
for National Monuments and agreed to transfer responsibility for the maintenance of 
17 The Voice (ýf2\egbýi. undated. tio. 10. (Hchreýý ) 
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monuments to local councils. ' 8 Yet, centralization of authority was not implemented 
in practice. Two years later, in response to a legislative query, the Office of the 
Minister of Defense responded that many monuments had been erected without 
approval from the Commemoration Unit, and that any group Interested in doing so 
should see to obtaining approval. 19 The response indicates the elite's unwillingness to 
act in favor of projects it did not itself promote. Viewed differently, this comment 
indicates the freedom with which some organizational actors acted in the framework 
of commemoration. Thus, the political history of commernoration in Israel is also, to a 
significant degree, the political history of the organizations involved. 
Seventy-five percent (about 160) of all the statues erected by official agencies 
in memory of the War of Independence represent a patriotic landmark to the events 
that furthered the cause of national liberation. "Their location, the descriptions of the 
event as inscribed upon them, and the listing of the dead's names represent milestones 
in the nation's history. These were gradually perceived as historical evidence by those 
who erected them as well as by the public, with their place consolidated in collective 
memory. , 20 These monuments symbolized the grOUP to which the nation owed its very 
being: "On the monuments are engraved the dead's narries and sometimes their ages; 
often, the emblem of the Palmach, the I-lagana, the IDF or the unit to which they 
belonged appears as well.... " 21 Missing were the narnes of the underground groups, 
their fallen and the incidents during which they had lost their lives. Throughout the 2-1 
1950s, commemoration of Etzel and Lehi dead was excluded from the agenda of 
official commemoration projects with some exceptions, those 1 ndependently- funded 
's Mini strý of the I nterior. 15 September 1953, internal memorandum. IDFA rchi\ es, 49ý73-81. 
(1-tebl-c\\ ) 
QLlelý No. 21ý5.3 Ju Iý 1955ý I DF Avchi%cs 49\73-81. (H(-I)i-c%\) 
Ihid. 
Shamir. 1., 1996, pp. 389-390. 
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initiatives produced largely on the municipal level but which nonetheless agitated the 
Labor elite. 
Just how weighty were the political interests that determined these policies can ZD 
be learned from a letter written by a Ministry of Defense official, A. Gilad, in response 
to the announcement about a proposed "Anniversary of IDF Martyrs and the Tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier. " With respect to the construction of the Tomb, Gilad pithily 
noted that "the most important element affecting choice of the site is the political 
factor"; continuing, he wrote: "The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier must be located in 
the nation's capital. t, 22 In this case, however, the political considerations referred to 
were international in nature: In addition to its local purposes, the Tomb was meant to 
reinforce Jerusalem's position as Israel's capital. HoNvever, as we shall see, many 
internal and often narrow considerations played an important role in commemoration 
policy throughout Israel's history. 
To all intents and purposes, Israel's commemoration project began in 1948, 
with Ben Gurion's order to create an administrative department - the 
Commemoration Unit - to centralize policy regarding construction of monuments 
throuahout the nation's countryside. 23 A year after cessation of the fighting, the unit Z7, 
would be transferred to the Ministry of Defense and renamed "The Ministry of 
Defense Commemoration Unit. " As such, the Unit would function as the State's 
institutional framework for all commemorative activities. At its head would sit E. Z. 
Eshkoli, a military rabbi who had served in the Jewish Battalions. After his death, he 
was replaced in December 1948 by Yosef Dekel, a Hagana veteran who had 
previously held the position of Chairman of Semech, the Hagana department 
ý2 IDF Archi% cs, 155115 1-199. (1 iebre\\) 
23 Azarý ahu, 1995, Staie Ritzia[ý, Beer Slic\ a: Ben Gurion Uni\ ersit\ ofthe Nep-c\ . and 
Sde Bok-er: Ben 
Gurion Archi\ es, pp. 133-13 4. (1 lebrc\ý) 
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responsible for the fallen soldiers' families. The new unit was veritably a continuation 
of the Semech department, but now with respect to all IDF dead. The first task in its 
agenda was to establish military cemeteries and to gather all the bodies of the dead. 
24 
Previously, in October 1948, Eshkoli had signed a policy paper dictating 
establishment of a "Division for the Commemoration of Jewish Soldiers Who had 
Fought in the War of Independence. " In January 1949, Dekel signed the document that 
detailed the functions of the new unit: 
I. Establishment, administration and maintenance of military cemeteries. 
2. Treatment of the literary commemoration of the dead. 
3. Location of the bodies of soldiers missing In action. 
The question to be asked, however, is why should one organizational unit 
combine within its mandate ceremonial as well as what may be called practical issues, 
the first related to the content of collective memory sites per se, the second flowing 
from substantive military actions? A careful reading of the reports issued by the Unit's 
head as well as follow up after projects denied authorization indicates that the spur to 
creation of a central arm to deal with all aspects of commemoration was Ben Gurion's 
desire to nationalize commemoration and manage it in a manner that suited his 
purposes. For instance, consider the initiatives criticized by the Unit (and later the 
Public Council attached to it) and the subsequent reports sent to the Minister of 
Defense, one of which, is cited here: 
We occasionally discover that oroups of people, bereaved parents ... erect 
rnonurnents at sites where battles had raged. After the monument is erected, it I 
is discovered that other battles were also fought there and that others had ZD 
died ... The 
fact that the names of their loved ones have been omitted on the 
monument arouscs considerable sorrow amom, parents ... It appears to me that 
4 Dev(11- flashaviia (\%eckh supp lei nent), 16 April 1953, (11 cbrcý\ 
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within the framework of legislation, we should add a special item with respect 
to the raising of monuments and other commernorative activities ... and to 
establish a council with the participation [of parents] as well as representatives 
25 
of the military and experts to consider all requests to establish monuments. 
The Director General of the Ministry of Interior responded on 24 June 1953 
that such a proposal had indeed been adopted and implemented in February 1953. The 
original proposal had been based on a suggestion made to Ben Gurion in 1949 by the 
Director General of the Ministry of Defense: 
... in order to discuss these questions that are so crucial to the cornmernoration 
of IDF fallen and in order to obtain comments ... with respect to the actions 
taken by the Ministry of Defense, the executive staff of the Ministry of 
Defense has decided to establish a Public Council to operate alongside the 
Commemoration Unit. 
Members of the Council were to be chosen from among "representatives of 
each of the nation's regions and bereaved families. " The first meeting of the Council 
had been set for 3 May 1949 at the offices of the Ministry of Defense in Tel AvIv. 20 
In early January of that same year (1949), Ben Gurion dictated the initial 
composition of the Council, which was altered by the time of its first official meeting 
in Februarv 1949. The Council was ineant to include representatives of bereaved 
families and public figures frorn every part of the country. De facto, the Council was 2-1 1 
composed exclusively of bereaved families. Its mandate, formalized by Article 12 of 
the Military Cemeteries Law (1950) (to be discussed later), stipulated appointment of 
a public advisory council for the Commemoration Unit. , vhose members were to be 
I, I DI- Archi \ cs. 90", 72-156. (Hebrev, ') 
26 Peri. A. General Director of the Ministr) of Defense, 13 April 1949. letter to Ben Gurion. D., Minster 
of Defense and Dori. Y. Chief of the General Staff, IDF Archives, 580\56-375. (Hebrew) 
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appointed by the Minister of Defense. The Council's mission was to "advise and 
propose alternative programs for construction of a war memorial to commemorate the 
memories of our martyrs who had fallen during the War of Independence ... and the 
creation of military cerrieteri CS, , 27 the latter role delineated in the Regulations 
Regarding Military Cemeteries (Responsibilities of' the Public Council fi)r 
Commemoration) 1956. With respect to monuments, the Council was to offer its 
advice as to their raising and to co-ordinate sponsorship with the Commemoration 
Unit. 
Ostensibly, this initiative had the potential to appease parents who might take 
urnbrage at the "nationalization of bereavement, " a policy that removed from their 
hands the decision as to where their sons and daughters were to be buried and what 
was to be inscribed on their gravestones (organized opposition to this policy was to Z:, 
develop only in the 1990s. ) At the time these decisions were first made and translated 
into the Council's mandate, other trenchant criticisms could be heard. First, although 
the Council was staffed by bereaved parents and was meant to represent the entire 
"family of the bereaved, " the fact that they were not elected but personally appointed 
by the Minster of Defense created the impression that it was a rubber starnp for Ben 
Gurion's decisions regarding the proj ect. 28 Second. as the only candidates for seats on ZD ZD 
the council were parents legally recognized as the bereaved - that is, their children 
had died while serving in the IDF, the Palmach and the Hagana - parents of Etzel 
and Lehi dead were excluded. Discrimination was more or less total. 
-7 La% on. P., Minister ol Defense, 22 Fcbruarý 1955, request made to the Puhlic COLHICil'S 11C%v 
appointees. IDl' Archkes. 9W172-39. (Hebrew) 
28 Down, G. and I. cbel, E.. 20W An Institution On Trial: I lie Defense Lstablishment Versus Bereaved 
Parents. Plilim. 9.285-369. (1] lebre\0 
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The identities of the Council's initial members, announced by Ben Gurion on 2 
March 1951, are revealing. Among the 13 members we find Shaul Avigur, a flagana 
veteran and representative of the Ministry of Defense; Yitzhak Ben Zvi, a Hagana 
veteran, bereaved father, and soon to be tsrael's second President; Reuven Maas, 
lather of Danny Maas, a Palmach hero, Rivka Guber, whose two sons had fallen while 
serving in the Hagana and who had come to symbolize a generation of bereaved 
mothers; Avinoarn Grossman-Reuven, Ben Gurion's representative on the editorial 
staff of the Gvilei Esh (Parchments oj'Fire, part of the commemorative literature 
project); and Yosef Dekel, head of the Commemoration Unit. This roll call is 
prodigious in its organizational and political association with Ben Gurion and Mapai. 
It should corne as no surprise, then, that during one of its first meetings, the Council 
should turn to Ben Gurion with the demand that IDF dead be officially terined 
'Heroes of the War of Independence.. "' an appellation that would embrace Hagana dead 
on ly. 
29 
Another supposedly unofficial body to be established was the Yad Labanim, a 
non -govern mental association of bereaved parents. At its first meeting on 14 February 
1950. it was decided that: 
... the present cornmittee ... would 
be recognized by Ministry of Defense 
institutions, especially the Commemoration Unit, as an advisory forum on 
matters concerning commemoration of War of Independence dead-the 
Commemoration Unit will invite bereaved parents to cooperate in its 
coin mernorative activities as much as is feasible. 30 
,,, DekcI, Y. and Ben Zviý Y.. 21 February 195 1. letter to Ben Gurion, D. reporting on the c1ccisimi 
made during the 1-irst meeting ofthe Public Council lot- Commemoration. IDF Archk cs. (11chi-nN ) 
"0 Summarý of meeting held on 15 March 1950. IDF Archk es. 62-28\60. (Flebre%\) 
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As late as 1963, in the face of highly effective private efforts to commemorate 
Etzel and Lehi dead, Yad Labarum, together with the Hagana Veterans Association, 
"decided to 
_join efforts 
to erect, in Jerusalem, a public structure to be called The 
Hagana-Yad Labarurn House, ' a building to serve as a memorial to the fallen who had 
fought for liberation and as a meeting place for Hagana veterans and bereaved 
families. " Jerusalem's Municipality even allocated a plot for the project, located in 
Independence Park. 31 Yad Labamin would initiate many sirnilar projects in the areas 
of education and culture, public ceremonies and assemblies, scholarships, and other 
activities, but would continue to exclude underground veterans from its programs. 
Once again, despite the organization's outwardly public nature, parents of Etzel and 
Lehi dead were denied the opportunity to participate in this institutioii and based on 
the legal definition of a bereaved parent. C, 
As noted earlier, the underground's representative organization, Shelach, was 
formed in response to the political and organizational constraints encountered. Herut, 
like those Etzel veterans who had completed a full tour of duty within the frarnework 
of the IDF, and certainly their bereaved parents, wished to be included in the statist 
project intended to recognize the contribution of all the fallen and honor all the 
bereaved families. Even before the War of Independence had ended, bereaved families 
had been labeled according to their political affiliation, with only some SLIPPOrted by 
the political elite. This process involved transmission of the collective meaning of 
death on the battlefield and the State's obligation to the surviving families and 
children. Inclusion within the official definition of martyrdom ineant allocation of a 
31 INlaas, R.. 4 No\ ember 1963, letter to Ben Gurion, D., the Reuben Ivlaas Archives. (, Hebi-e\\) 
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mornent of collective memory to the dead. Incorporation among the list of "patriots" 
meant public recognition oftheir efforts and sacrifice. 
With elite monopolization of corninemoration, a good number of Palmach and Zý 
Hagana veterans came to head organizations that, with independence, were 
incorporated, as might be expected, into the official state apparatus that provided 
assistance to bereaved families and mounted commernorative prQjects. This process 
was echoed by Shelach, whose Herut founders argued that "the obligation to 
commemorate the underground's war ... was betrayed by our government. 
02 
Shelach's founders grasped the significance of their own coin in ern oration 
project in its broadest sense, including its temporal dimensions: "Shelach is an 
institution that ... battles against the 
distortion of history and against those who would 
conceal the truth. One of its objectives is to erect a memorial to those heroes so that 
their memories Nvill be eternally etched in the nation's history, " advertised a flyer 
written in 1958 on the eve of Israel's Remembrance [memorial] Day. The purpose of 
the flyer was to inform the public of Shelach's intention to till the gaps in the State's 
commemorative projects, to penetrate the nation's collective memory as well as its 
landscape in keeping with its agenda. 33 
Thus, two organizational networks filled the public landscape with 
commemorative monuments. The first, official and institutionalized, operated 
according to a lelal mandate and with Ministry of Defense blessing; it admitted 
participation in the project to selected groups of bereaved parents and leaders who had 
either lost children during the war or who were themselves Hagana or IDF veterans. Z: I 
AIIIILIUI I'C\ iCNý 01 "ilCladI'S lCti\ itics, presented to delegates of'I Icrut's Third National Com ention. 
A pri 1 1954. Jahmifisk% III Stitl-ItC Al'ClIk CS. I 9-5-In. (Hehi-c\v) 
,, F I\ cr ni'ailcd to members ofthe Herut Nlo% ement. Remembrance Da) E\ c, 1958. Jahotinský I nstitutc 
Archi\ es, 17,5-16,. (1 lcbrcý\ ) 
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The second appeared to be of no public significance and was poor in resources; yet, i Z: I it 
adamantly sustained its program. The points of contention between them were the 
absence of any mention of the underground's dead from monuments erected under 
State sponsorship, and opposition to Shelach's attempts to raise privately funded 
monuments as a rernedy. This split continued the pattern, formal and informal, 
established during the Yishuv when one set of defensive organizations operated with 
the sanction of the Labor-dominated institutions while another operated without )t. 
When trying to comprehend the meaning of this issue, we should mention a 
distinction Azaryahu makes in his study on commemoration in what was formerly 
East Germany. Azaryahu distinguishes between official and unofficial monuments 
that parallel the differentiation between the national and the municipal level. 34 Broadly 
speaking, monuments that contain official (i. e., national) symbols are the property of 
state agencies, as opposed to monuments that do not contain such symbols, which are 
usually erected according to local policies. Symbols such as the national flag., which 
appear on bank notes,., coins and stamps are designed and produced with state 
authorization. alternatively, street names tend to be determined locally. In totalitarian 
regimes, the differentiation between the national and local level is devoid of political 
significance because the political center controls all organizations - and all vehicles 2-1 
for the use of symbols - on every level of government. In pluralistic societies, 
however, the differentiation between national and local government projects may have 
meaning, especially when private symbols are concerned. 
\Vith respect to commemoration in physical space, the significance of these 
distinctions can be \%eighty. The meaning or implications of official monuments 
14 AzarN ahu. ( 1995). 
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erected by the state or with state approval are national in scope, whereas local 
monurnents constructed under municipal auspices are not. National monuments are 
incorporated into the compulsory national network of social communication through 
the related literature, addressed to tile corning generation, included in school texts and ZD 
other educational material prepared by the Ministry of Education. Such projects are 
also awarded with state financial support, guaranteed maintenance, and the public 
spotlight during the nurnerous rituals attended by government notables. The latter Z-- 
ensures media coverage of the events and intensified public exposure. Official 
monuments, therefore, not only convey political ideas falling within the social 
consensus, they display circularity: they create while they reproduce that consensus. 
Monuments reprcsentingy ideas outside the consensus remain, a priori, removed and 
excluded frorn the state-contro lied network of communication. This process likewise 
affects the strategy devised by a monument's initiators: Organizations within the ZD - 
consensus and interested in penetrating events or the war dead into the public's ZD I 
collective consciousness can turn to state agencies for funds and approval. Others, 
outside the consensus, in this case represented by Mapai's sovereignty narrative, will 
court municipal policy makers and seek admission into the local network of social 
communication. 
Just how acrimonious the conflict becarne over commemoration in physical 
space of the underground and its operations is demonstrated by Ben Gurion's 
treatment of the remnants of the Altalena. Seen from the perspective of history, the 
narrative of its removal is tragi-cornic, in direct proportion to the vessel's potential as 
the consummate memorial to Etzel and Lehi dead. Consider this scenario. Its scorched 
metal frame. betraying hLies of burnt Iron and rust. could have transmitted powerful 
messages bý the NN reek lying stranded ori the Tel Aviv shore. At each anniversary of 
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the ship's attack, a small group might have gathered at the site to recollect where their 
colleagues had stood on its deck or fallen wounded on the sand, and listened to a 
recording of radio transmissions from that eventful night. These gatherings could have 
become mass events, thick with meaning, especially if conducted in the midst of 
electoral campaigns. The beached hulk's image might have been movingly employed 
to differentiate "thern" frorn "us, " to remind the audience of the underground's vision 
and of its betrayal by Labor, of the injustices done. As the political reporter for Herut 
indeed wrote: "The Altalena's burnt skeleton rests on the Tel Aviv shore as a 
monument symbolizing the civil war fought by the Jews in all its ugliness, an eternal 
mark of Cain. 
05 
Such a scenario may intimate why, on 5 July 1949,13 months after the ship 
had been set ablaze in the course of the IDF's attack on the vessel, Ben Gurion, as 
Minister of Defense, ordered its removal and oversaw its dismantling. Ben Gurion's 
signing of the order Nvas based on the Mandate's Emerýgency Measures (1945) and 
Ordinance: Government and Due Process (1948): 
As Minister of Defense, I hereby order that the vessel known as the 
'Altaletia'... be confiscated by the Government of Israel due to its use as a site 
for criminal activities ... 
[it] will be hauled from the water and dismantled as 
directed by the Commander of the Israeli Navy. 36 
The removal was be2un, however. two weeks before the order was signed, as 
indicated by a message addressed to the Commander of the Navy: "Dismantle the 
remnants of the Altalena that has run aground in Tel Aviv. The operation is to be 
-NaWimon. 197S., 111alena. Tel A, \ k: Yediot Aharonot., p. 465 [completel. (Hebrew) 
Dckel, Y., Director, the Di% ision ofthe Na% Letterto the Assistant Minister of Defense. 23 October 
1949- 11)1ý Archk cs, 580\56-260. (I Ichre\\ ); see also Nakdirnon, 1978, p. 465. (Hebrew) 
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completed with dispatch. " It was even given a name: "Operation: The Altalena 
Razing. " 37 
Removing or, perhaps more appropriately from Labor's point of view, making 
the Altalena vanish proved to be a Sisyphean task. At first, Navy personnel tried to 
drag the ship from the shoals by means of'rollers.. floats, bulldozers, and cables. When 
these failed, they were assisted by navy vessels, which also proved ineffective. The 
Ministry then turned to a private company, Ogen, one of Solel Boneh's 38 daughter 
companies, again in vain. Still later, expert consultants from the US were invited to 
help complete the removal. The final report prepared by the Ministry of Defense notes 
that the operation was so unprecedented in its complexity that it provided the infant 
Navy with an "opportunity for intensive training in an important profession": 
salvaging. Instead, all these efforts led to the ship being sunk. 
The original plan had been quite different: It involved towing the vessel to the 
port of Haifa for dismantling. This plan was cancelled when it became apparent that 
the Altalena could not be towed. Holes were discovered in its bottom, and divers had 
to be sent to mend them. It then had to be emptied of water: Ogen secured heavy 
pumps scattered throughout the country, and the navy's workshops manufactured a 
special pump for that purpose. In addition, the heavy equipment in its hold had to be 
removed so that the ship could float. Added to these technical problems, the sea was 
rough and safety was minimal. In order to ease the burden of the work, the 
government decided to free the participating workman from the rationing regime then 
in force. The project was overseen by Avraham Holl, a private contractor who had 
promised to complete the pro. ject by September 1949. The contract signed with Hoh 
7 See% arious documents. 11) Archi\ cs. 5 80\56-2260. (Hebrew) 
Solel Boneh. a construction compam belonged to He\ rat O\ dirn, the Histadrut's industriat arm. 
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allowed him to use the ship's metal and equipment at his discretion so long as he 
"reduced [tile vessel] to pieces so as to leave no sign of any semblance of a ship. " In 
39 
order to complete the work, the Navy promised to lend Floll a barge, free of charge . 
In the end, at-ter the hull had been blasted apart, another obstacle arose: the 
remnants could not be sunk due to air pockets. Explosives had to be used once more. 
"It [was] impossible to comply ... with the order given ... 
because there [was] no force 
in Israel that [could] extricate the ship from its resting place on the shore. , 40 
Instead of the promised two months, the project took four months to complete. 
The cost was huge: about E27,000,70% of which was paid to Ogen to cover labor 
costs. Equipment worth millions was lost to the sea, as was the cost of purchase and 
insurance. 41 It would take 50 years before the Altalena's survivors could organize a 
cornmernoration service at tile site, even in the absence ot-a physical monument. 
The removal of the Altalena contains the embryo of Israel's statist 
commemoration project, a project that expressed the political elite's aversion to 
incorporation of the conflict against British and those who fought it within the zn :n 
boundaries of the nation's evolving collective inemory. Other, perhaps more poignant 
examples of this reluctance are the monuments dedicated to the fallen in other actions 
against the British, such as those near Kibbutz Givat Chaim and the "Night of the 
Bridges, " the latter to be discussed shortly. The monuments to these events, erected 
early in Israel's history, describe the dead as falling in action after Palestine had been 
closed to immigration (aliyah) in the years immediately following the Holocaust. No 
mention is made of the enemy: the British. It is therefore interesting to discover that 
11 q Proposed con u ac t I)ct\% cen the Israeli Na% ý and A. I lo li . attached to ýa letter 
From the Navý 's Ch ic f 
Repairs Office to its Ship Bodý Repairs Officer. 17 June 1949. IDF Archkcs. 2540\50-160. (Hebre%\) 
40 Nakdimon, 1978. p. 466. 
"' See \ arious documents. ID AFC11iVeS, 580\56-260. (Hebre\\) 
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prior to independence and the formation of an official commemoration policy, 
monuments commemorating the Yishuv's battle against the British can be found. zn 
In December 1946. the cornerstone for an eternal flame was laid in Emek 
Hefer in memory ofthe seven who fell there during the British blockade of tile Jordan 
42 
valley settlements . 
In 1947, Kibbutz Tel Yosef raised a commemorative obelisk in 
mernory of Chaim Harudi, who was shot by the British oil "Black Saturday" (29 June 
1946), 43 while in June 1947, a coin inernorative plaque was placed in memory of two 
individuals who had fallen during attempts to assist Kfar Giladi after this kibbutz, 
44 
situated in the northern Galilee, was blockaded by the British. Following 
independence, Ben Gurion made a calculated decision to remove the battle against the 
British from the map of Israel's collective rnernory. The question as to why he should 
want to do so will be answered in the discussion. Here I will limit myself to a 
description of the events as they found expression in the landscape. 
Commemoration of the Night of the Bridges is engrossing because it was an ZD 
operation undertaken within the framework of the combined underground movements 
(the "Resistance Movement, " late 1945 and June 1946). During this brief period the 
three camps - the Hagana, Etzel and Lehi -joined forces under a unified command 
to arrive at a common strate(jN,, auainst the British. The incident in question took place 
on 16 June 1946. Units frorn the three organizations were assigned to blow up bridges 
used by the British to transport supplies and troops throughout Palestine. During the ZD 
attempt to sabotage the Achziv bridge, 14 Palmach fighters were killed. 
4' 
. 
11 Hanwýhmar, 16 December 1940. (1 Ichre\\) 
41 Shamir. 1., 1989, The Eternal Flame lfcmoriaLý to the Parliv-s ot"Israel's lVars, Tel Aviv: MinistrN 
of Defensc Pub I icationsý P. 178. (11 cbre\\ 
44 
, 41 
Ilumishmar. 9 June 1947. (1 lcbrc\ý ) 
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On 5 December 1946, M the wake of the Achziv operation, Moshe Sneh, the 
commander of the underground, wrote as follows to the bereaved parents: 
These 14 martyrs ... join the 
list of national licroes and patriots that sacrIficed 
their lives in the war for Israel and its independence. In the name of the Jewish 
underground movement and its members, I NvIsh to express my deepest regret 
for the calamity that has befallen you ... The day will come when the nation and 
its people will be able to openly express its gratitude and fittingly 
commernorate their memories. 45 
After independence, families of the dead turned to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Moshe Sharett, as well as to the Commemoration Unit with the request to 
commemorate their loved ones. In accordance with the rigid policy stipulating that the 
State would recognize and commemorate only those dead who had fallen after the 
creation of the IDF (November 1947), the parents were denied their request and 
formally notified of that decision by the Council for National Monuments. 
The Council itself had no objection to complying with this request. However, 
as an instrumental body subject to the legislation and regulations formulated in the zn Z- 
political sphere, in this case by the Minister of Defense, there was little roorn for 
discretion. Nonetheless, although the law was binding with respect to the policy of the 
national commemorative bodies, a loophole did exist. As noted earlier, circumvention 
of the law was a prerogative of the Minister of Defense, stipulated in law. This 
loophole had been utilized to recognize the Ilagana's dead as national martyrs or war 
heroes. It appears that a similar strategy was eventually adopted in the current case as 
well. 
4ý Cited in Shmnii% 1989. p. 59. 
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Nor did this policy prevent the government from establishing a settlement, 
Kibbutz Yechiam, in name of the corninander of the Achzlv operation, Yechiarn 
Weitz. In response, a bereaved mother wrote to Ben Gurion and to Yigael Yadin, the 
Chief of the General Staff, expressing tier distress at the ne, (Ject of the others who had Z, In 
fallen together with Weitz. The specific appeal was directed toward the placeirient of a 
commemorative obelisk next to the bridge which "will serve as our final link to our 
lost sons ... and to change the name of the kibbutz to Kibbutz Gesher Haziv ... so that 
its name will recall all those who fell there.... " The parents' active involvement did 
not end there. On 29 January 195 1, a parent addressed a letter to a major newspaper, 
which was never published (a copy can be found in the Commemoration Unit) 
expressing his objections to a similar act: the naming ol-a forest, again after Yechiarn 
Weitz, while ignoring his felloNv soldiers: 
Flas not severe pain been caused to the other families when only one of the 14 
[martyrs] has been commemorated? ... 
A settlement has been established, 
called Yechiam. Doesn't the fact that a forest has also been named after 
Yechiam, without ineution of the other boys who fell, increase the hurt felt by 
the other parents ... 
? 46 
This letter came into the hands of Yechiani's father, Yosef Weitz, then 
Director of the Jewish National Fund's (Keren Kayemet LeYisrael) Settlement 
Department, another organization that played an important part in the commemoration 
project thanks to the forest and recreation areas it contributed to this effort. The elder 
Weitz attached himself to the parents' cause and, taking advantage of his unique 
46 
Ibid.. p. 61. 
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position within the state's institutional structure, expedited several commemorative 
proj eCtS. 
47 
Eventually, due to the parents' rebukes, Shaul Avigur, assistant to the Minister 
of Defense, ordered the head of the Coin in emoration Unit to respond to then- wishes. 
These included an additional demand, made later, to "bury our sons' remains under the 
monument next to the bridge. , 48 Thus, in 1955, a memorial was erected on the site of 
the incident. It was designed by Asher Hirem, the Unit's "house" architect, who 
carried out commissions fully financed by the Ministry of Defense exclusively for the 
Commemoration Unit. Before constrLiction began, the Council for National 
Monuments transmitted the plans to the parents for their approval. But only in 1963, 
17 years after their deaths, were the bodies of some of' the fallen transferred frorn 
temporary graves in Haifa and interred at the monurnent's site. On 13 June 1968, the 
remains of the others' were transferred to the monument from their oriv , inal common 
grave, also located in Haifa. 
On 17 June 1946, the morning following the Night of the Bridges, II Lehi ZD 
members were killed while trying to explode the warehouses used by the Haifa 
railroad. This operation, like that of the Night of the Bridges, ý, vas part of the 
coordinated campaign to disrupt British transport capabilities. 'The only governmental 
body to identify with the parents' grief was the Municipality of Haifa. In June 1949, 
the acting, chairman of Haifa's City Council sent a letter in which he noted that he 
wished "to express his condolences on the anniversary of the deaths of the II fighters 
who fell in the attack on the railroad Nvorkshops.... " 49 Yet, despite the "timely" 
47 See relevant correspondence cited in Shamir. 1989, p. 6 1. 
I'll, Dekel. Y- 18 Dccember 1949. letter to Dori, Y.. Chief'ofthe Gcncral Staff. IDF Archi\es. File No. 
60,, '20-62. cited in Shamir, p. 60. (1 lebrc\ý) 
19 Actinp Chairman ofthe Haifa Citý Council, 15 JUnC 1949. Lcttcr to the Lchi Partý, Beit Yair 
Archives, 1-iles 37 to 39. (1 lebre%\) 
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recognition of the event, a monument to the Lehi dead was erected in Kiryat Ata (a 
suburb of Haifa) only in 1970, on tile 24' h anniversary of their deaths, as will be 
described in Chapter Five. Here, I review the facts of the incident and their 
relationship to commemorative monuments. 
The attack on the railroad workshops was carried out Linder the combined 
command of the underground movements. Four individuals - Moshe Sneh and 
Yisrael Galili, representing the Hagana; Menachern Begin, representin- Etzel., and 
Nathan Yellin-Mor, representing Lehi - met regularly to co-ordinate plans for the 
three organizations at the Tel Aviv horne of Yan Yanovsky (a Hagana member who, 
as Yaakov Yanai, became Assistant Director General of the Ministry of Defiense). The 
operation were planned by Yanai, Lehi's operations officer, and endorsed by the other 
members of the forurn as part of the broader program to paralyze British movement in 
Palestine. Sabotage of bridges and airports was part of the plan. Lehi was given the 
task of blasting the workshops in order to halt rail transit, while the Hagana was 
assigned to sabotage various bridges, including the Achziv bridge. During the 
operation, Lehi broke into the workshops while under fire froin the sentries; it 
exploded engine pistons and the bridge leading to the engine repair shop. However, z: I 
while doing so, thousands of British soldiers and sentries gathered outside and I 
blocked the surrounding streets; a curfe\v was immediately called. The attackers tried 
to drive away in a car without headlights but ran into a British tank blocking its way. 
British soldiers converged upon them from the open ditches lining both sides of the Z-- 
street and opened fire, killing, 9 of the attackers. The others were captured and sent to 
the Acre fortress. The men in the group were sentenced to death and the Nvoincii to life 
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imprisonment. During the Acre break-in (1947), two of the participants in the I laifa 2-1 
raid were killed. 50 
From the perspective of this dissertation, the relevance of the raid Nvas not its 
intent or operational failure, but the fact that, like the Night of the Bri&es, it Nvas 
planned by the same unified command. Theoretically, both units could be considered 
equal within its paramilitary framework. That being so, the only explanation for the 
selective treatment of its fallen must be found in the political arena, in the power 
struggle between the camps that was formalized in the subsequent legislation. ZD 
What we can learn from these examples is that in order tojustify the erasing of 
anv hint of Etzel and Lehi actions against the British from the nation's collective t, 
memory, the illusion had to be created that the Flagana also suffered from legal 
stipulations. Hence the Council for National Monuments Nvas formally prevented from 
responding to the requests of the bereaved parents of Hagana dead. However, ni 
practice, as we have also seen, "an order was immediately given to deal with the 
issue .,, 
51 Every detail of the treatment of the Achziv Bricitge commemoration and of 
similar operations executed by units identified with the Labor Movement, indicate that 
this group of "Hagana" parents spoke NvIth a potent political voice. The State's z: 1 Z-- 
cornmernorative organs recognized that voice and responded to it by granting thern the II 
opportunity to participate in the formulation of Israel's commemoration policy. Thus, 
in a letter written in the fall of 1951 to the Commemoration Unit, a group of parents 
wrotc that: 
We have learned that you have finally received a directive from the higoher 
reaches of aovernment instructing ý"OLI to end the discrimination between these 
ý() A\ neri, U. Hoolam Ha: ch. 19 June 1952. (Hchre%N 
51 Shamir, p. 60. 
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13 young men and the War's dead who served In the regular army. It appears ZD 
that the time has come for a monument to be erected in the narne ofour dear 
ones... so that we will have at least one place where we can go and pay hornage 
to their memory. 52 
Respite from discrimination, so it seems, was evidenced only with respect to 
this group, a group that, according to Shamir, "dictated the transfer of policy to the 
ministerial levels. " 53 
The conduct of coin mern oration with respect to the underground movernent 
emphasizes the selectivity in the elite's treatment of fallen soldiers even when their 
operations were conducted within a shared and mutually agreed upon frarnework. To 
review. even before the pile of correspondence demanding commemoration of his 
colleagues had gathered, the government established a settlement named after 
Yechiarn Weitz, prior to which a state funeral was held, attended by the masses, "The 
Hagana urged large crowds into the streets so that they could pay their last respects to 
-4 the dead" wrote Yellin-Mor years later in a holiday supplement of Maariv. 'ý However, 
"[a] short time later, II Lehi fighters fell in the attack on the railroad workshops; their 
burial was arranged in secret, and no one called for the populace to accompany thern 
on their last Journey. The quorum required to conduct a funeral was assembled with 
-ftqCUlty.,, 55 great di I The workshop attack inspired no public interest and no dernands 
for their victims' commernoration by the State. In a letter published by Uri Avneri in 
HuOlam H(iZeh six years after the incident, he reproached the government for its lack 
of response: "This week marks the sixth anniversarv of the historic attack on the 
I hid. 
lbid. 
Yellin-Mor. N. 10 A pii I 1966ý Alaariv, Holidal Supplellical. ýII chrc\ý) 
I bi d, 
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workshops, it appears that the State and all its citizens have totally forgotten the 
operation and those who carried It oUt.,, 
56 HaOlam HaZeh was the only journal or 
other channel of the mass media to mention commemoration for these dead. No public 
figure attended other than Yellin-Mor, a former commander of Lehi. 
At the time, the political behavior of the families and survivors of the 
workshop operation dead did not resemble those of their peers in the other carnp. They 
addressed no clainis to the government, which was still at the height of its campaign 
of delegitimation and persecution. In effect, it appears, they never expected the Y*Ishuv 
to permit them to engage in any commemorative or related activity whatsoever, and 
certainly not to financially support any such acts. 57 For this reason, no correspondence 
regarding SLIch initiatives are to be found. As stated, similar to efforts to raise the 
Achziv monument. the survivors of the workshops operations began to commemorate 
their dead only in 1966,20 years after the event. On 8 November of that year, the 
Association for the Commemoration of Lehi fallen turned to the chairi-nan of the 
Kiryat Ata City Council - again, the local rather than the national level -- with a 
request to erect a memorial within the city limits. 58 Although a monument was raised, 
it still does not bear the IDF emblem, contrary to the monument at Achzpý,. 
Revisionist Movement dead, like the dead of other combined Etzel-Ilagana Z-- 
operations, were never to earn comparable markings, symbolic toLens of affiliation, 
on their gravestones. "Cemeteries do not recognize Trameworks. ' Etzel dead rest next 
to Hagana dead, but someone decided that even here, deceit was to enter. " So wrote C, 
Chaim Lazar-Litai in the foreword to a book in memory of the Jaffa campaign's dead 
was edited by him and published by Shelach. He continued: 
A\ ncri. U.. 19 June 1952. Haolom fluf eh. (I-Icbrew) 
57 Annoni, f lannah- 29 October 2000. personal inter\ ieýý. 
ý'S Kirý at Ata Conimcniorati\ e Monument File, \ arious ý ears, licit Yair Archi\ es. Tel A\ i\. (I lebrew) 
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On the top of the graves of Hagana soldiers who died protecting Jaffa hovers 
the phrase 'fell during the liberation of, faffa, ' whereas above the graves of Uzi 
and Yehoshua and all 40 who paid with their lives so that the campaign could 
succeed, only the words 'fell in Jaffa' are inscribed ... 
We therel'ore stood before 
their sacred graves and felt an inexpressible anger: 'Will lies be spread even in 
the next world ?, 59 
Even Yosef Weitz candidly objected to these practices, as evidenced by a diary 
entry dated II April 195 1: 
I met with ... 
from the Commemoration Unit to discuss the construction of a 
monument to the 14 who fell at the Achziv Bridge. He, that is, the Unit, is 
following routine, inasmuch as the Ministry of Defense is officially respond' I in 
only to cases of casualties who fell after 29 November 1947 [the date of the 
UN declaration announcing the partition of Palestine], and not prior to that 
date., so as to exclude Lehi and Etzel casualties. We are therefore continuing 
the ancient tradition of discrimination. 60 
The symbolic and political significance of efforts to exert control over the 
landscape were raised in several Knesset debates in relation to yet another state body: 
the Government Names Committee, then located within the Office of the Prime 
Minister. This committee had been established to assign names to tile settlements 
springing up throughout the country; the products of its activity were entrenched in the Z-- Zý t, 
normative conflict between the Right and Mapai, between liberalism and collectivisin. 
The confrontation between these values framed Mapai's program to appropriate and I 
nationalize the landscape as part of its public policy agenda, as it did Labor's attempts 
ýq Lazar-Litaiý C- 195 1, The Conquest Tel A% iv: Slichich. 
"" Weitz, Y., 1965. Meminiscences and Letters to (The Seillement Period, 1949-1956, )ý Raniat- 
Gan: Pi-i% ate printing. p. 1334. (Hebi-e\\) 
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to indicate its traditions and the symbolic politics within physical space during the 
Ylshuv. 
The narning of settlements, streets, and recreational areas encapSLdatcs this 
often-bitter strife. "People living in villages established on public land and desirous of' 
calling their settlernent after a person dear to them are denied this elementary option. 
Someone may appear who thinks that he has the right to intervene and tell them how 
to name their sons and daughters" argued Herut Knesset member Esther Raziel-Naor 
during a debate over the Names Committee's performance. Raziel-Naor went oil to 
label the Committee: 
... an independent 
kingdom ... I was educated within a movement where we 
were taught to respect heroes without asking about their politics or their party 
affiliation ... the government and the 
Prime Minister have yet to I-Ind the will to Z, 
properly honor those executed by the British and those belonaino to the t-- C, 
underground ... they 
have adopted reprehensible measures to prevent 
recognition. 
During this debate, Razlel-Naor cited instances ý, vhere the Names Committee 
had refused to let communities founded by Etzel and Lehi veterans to call themselves 
as they wished. For instance, residents of a village in the Jerusalem Corridor were 
denied the right to call themselves "Ramat Shimon" after Shimon Amram, killed in 
the attack on the Acre garrison. Instead, the Committee allotted thern the narne "Bar 
Giora. " after an early twentieth-century defensive organization. Another community zD 
was "Nachlat Shlorno. " a village in the Upper Galilee. fts residents wished to name 
themselves after Shlorno Bar Yosef, who was hanged by the British, but the Names 
Committee charged that tlicý call the village "Hosen" (stalwartness). Yet another case 
Nvas that of "Ramat Raziel, " a cornnlunltý resting in the Judean Hills, originally named 
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after Etzel's first commander, David Raziel. This name as well was denied approval- 
the name "Kasalon, " resembling the narne of the Arab village "Kasale" that once 
existed in the area, was given instead. "' 
Residents of these communities refused to accept the Committee's decisions. 
They continued to call themselves by the names of their choice (e. g., Ramat Raziel, 
Kfar Aviel, Nachlat Shlorno, Ramat Shlomo) and returned letters to the Postal Service 
that were addressed to the settlement names given by the Committee. In a number of' 
instances the Committee overturned its own decisions and allowed residents the 
freedom they wished. Herut Knesset members demanded that the authority to 
determine settlement names be removed from the Prime Minister's - that is, Ben 
Gurion's - office and transterred to the Knesset's Internal Affairs Committee. where 
they could participate in the debates. There, they believed, Ben Gurion's control over 
62 
their daily lives could be somewhat attenuated . 
In face of the State's success in perpetuating Mapai hegernony through the Zý 
messages transmitted by commemorative monuments and place names, Shelach began 
a similar set of projects. Amon-, these was construction of the David Razlel Museurn 
of the Jewish Underground, which would "present the underground's battle ill its 
entirety, and will be permanently open to the public. " These plans rankled the 
bureaucratic and Defense Ministry elites. For support, Shelach turned to the mayors of 
various cities and requested that they erect monuments and other municipal markers in 
remembrance of Etzel dead and operations. Thus, the Mayor of Jerusalem received a 
request in September 1957 to erect a nionurrient to the memory of "two of Jerusalem's 
(" Details ot'thc debate can he found in the Knesset Proiocols, the Net--er Sereni Lan'. First Readillu. 3 
Januar\ 1955. (1 lebre\N 
62 bid. 
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heroes, Moshe Barazani (Lehi) and Meir Feinstein (Etzel), " both of whom had died 
"for the sake of Israel's rebirth. They blew themselves up while captives in the 
Jerusalem prison rather than allow the hangman to do his work. " Shelach noted that 
these dead were buried on the Mount of Olives, a site inaccessible to Israelis at the 
time. In conclusion, Shelach declared that "the monument will bring glory to the 
capital and its residents, and be available as an educational attraction for the many 
young people, new immigrants, and tourists coming to Jerusalem. , 63 
Jerusalem, where many soldiers and civilians had been killed during the War 
of Independence, was one of the cities willing to take on the obligation to 
commemorate the underground's fallen. Because this was a local initiative, the 
municipality did not turn to the central government for guidance. This administrative 
discontinuity was the salient factor that permitted Shelach, like other organizations 
functioning in the city, to commemorate its "own" -martyrs. The first monument was 
erected in 1949; the second to the 18 Etzel fighters who fell in the liberation of Dir 
Yassin. 
This, like similar projects, troubled the elite. "From the moment they are 
placed in the landscape, these monuments acquire a life of their own" Shamir argues. 64 
Whether the product of state or private initiatives, an object's placement within the 
landscape or any other public space allows for its images, symbols and messages, as 
permanent objects, to be imprinted within collective memory. It is therefore quite 
understandable why these activities worried the political elite controlling the central 
government. Especially disturbed was the Commander of the Jerusalem District, who 
63 Katznellenbogen, B. Letter to Agron, Gershon, Mayor of Jerusalem, 4 September 1957, Jabotinsky 
Institute Archives, 17/5-10. (Hebrew) 
64 Shamir, 1996, Commemoration and Memory, Tel Aviv: Am Oved, p. 9. (Hebrew) 
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sent a secret and personal letter on 29 December 1949 to the Commander of the 
Central Region, in which he \vrote: 
Shelach, founded by Etzel, is placing rrionuments-in various places ... these 
monuments may, In the distant future, create the impression that the sites were 
conquered by the same group that placed them there... I believe that we should 
pass a law that will regulate permission to erect a monument, and the form it 
will take ... to prevent the 
historical distortion of the campaign to establish the 
State of Israel. Please bring this issue to the attention of the Ministry of 
65 Defense . 
The letter was transmitted to the head of the IDF's Personnel Division and passed on 
to Pinchas Sapir, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense. On 9 January 1950, 
Sapir wrote to Yosef Dekel of the Commemoration Unit. Fear of the same "historical 
distortion" continued to irk Mapai policy makers, who kept track of these so-called 
"biased" initiatives. Nevertheless, contrary to Ben Gurion's position, Sapir clearly 
instructed Dekel that he was "to be broad-minded regarding commemoration of Etzel 
and Lehi dead. ""6 
Arnong the monuments that Shelach vvas to erect (such as those to the 
Wedgwood and Mar-olin units at Nordia and to the 14 casualties at Kfar Aviel), the 
"Memorial to the Conquerors of Dir Yassin" was particularly important because the 
highly charged operation had been coordinated xvith State institutions and its status 
had been confirmed by the COUrts (see Chapter Five, below). The decision to allocate 
land for construction of an obelisk in memory of the 18 Etzel dead killed during the 
operation was made iii the Jerusalem Municipal Planning Subcommittee in response 
to Shelach's request. Tile Subcommittee's chairman. Attorney Arrildor, invited Chaim 
65 The IDF Archives. File 211-220'170. (Flebrew) 
66 , Fhe IDF Archi\ es, File 213-220\70. (I lebrew) 
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Corfu and Rahamim Mizrachi, members of Shelach's Jerusalem branch, to one of its 
meetings in order to hear their plans. They informed the Subcommittee that tile ZD 
monument would be raised on the main road to the village. 67 Although approval was Zý 
obtained in principle. the plans were never realized. 
Another pro, ject involved the renovation of the Acre Fortress. The break-in 
conducted by Etzel and Lehi forces that succeeded in freeing many of the captives 
held by the British was to becorne part of the heritage of the two underground 
organizations. In order to alter the site's function, more than municipal consent was 
required because to the astonishment and anger of the families of those hanged there 
and of Etzel and Lehi veterans, the State had converted the fortress into a mental 
hospital run by the Ministry of Health. As Shelach charged: 
It would have been more fitting to convert the Acre Fortress, whose walls had 
witnessed the unfolding of the epic of Jewish heroism ranging from the arrest 
of Zeev Jabotinsky to the armed entry of his disciples and their submission to 
the hangman's noose, Into a national museum. The government, stubbornly 
continuing its policy of distortion and concealment, did not see it appropriate 




Shelach's efforts did, hwvever, bear some fruit. As described in the next 
chapter, the execution chamber was eventually converted into a room for solitude and 
communion with the dead, a commemorative site for Etzel and Lehi rituals. "We 
managed to save only the most hallowed space in the fortress - the execution 
chamber - which was kept in its original state. Commemorative plaques dedicated to 
67 Hcrnlý 8 Julý 1954. (Ilebre\N) 
69 Hevia, 21 June 1949. (1 Icbre\\ 
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each of the executed dead were placed, including one in the roorn where the father of 
the Jewish insurrection - Zeev Jabotinskv - had been ailed. " 
69 
Nevertheless, the bitterness flowing firorn the State's disregard of the mythic 
site did not abate: 
... 
how will it be possible to enter a museum that is situated in a place 
surrounded by the mentally ill'?... We have to ... transform the entire 
fortress 
into a national museum. By the way, as far as I know, not one Israeli young 
person belonging to the circles identified with us has set foot in the execution 
chamber ... 
Here, no good word from the party is needed. Here, only the 
'undergrounds' have control. "'70 
Herut fully understood the State's disdain for the fortress's history: It was 
meant to scorn the undergyround's role in the national narrative. Shelach stated it ZD 
would: 
... spare no efforts to expand the shrine 
from this point forward. We believe 
that one day, a pantheon to Jewish bravery will be built in the Fortress, whose 
walls witnessed the daring battles of our generation's Jewish rebels. We 
strongly believe that the commemoration project will expand throughout the Z-1 Zý 
land-and commemorative plaques, monuments and statues will pay homage 
to the rebellion's heroes and actions ... 
before the people and the future 
generations as paragons of Israel's struggle for liberty. Our success is largely 
dependent on the public at large and its generosity, which we believe will fully 
materialize. Here we present to Israel's citizens the story of the 14 who were 
hanged, martyrs of the generation of rebellion, for the sake of our children's 
education ... 
[about] the daring exploits and noble sacrifices of those who 
71 symbolize a new race olJeNvish warriors . 
"" Ibid. 
70 Hcrzaý 21 June 1949. Editoriat pa(-, e. (Ilebic\\) 
71 KoLlm itz. R.. 14 October 1956. speech. Jahotinský Institute Archi\ cs, 24ý15-16" (Hebrc\\) 
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As part of the Etzel and Lehi counter-culture, the "Martyrs' Shrine" would 
became a maýjor site, a pantheon to their heroes' valor. These initiatives would parallel 
,, 72 the State's prograin to erect a "Heroes Shrine . 
Shelach organized a special 
ceremony for the opening "Mcmorial to the Executed in Acre" on 14 October 1954, 
which was attended by the deads' families, HerUt'S officials, the surviving members of 
Nili, as well as Etzel and Lehi veterans. 
The site was chosen to commemorate the dead beginning with those belonging 
to Nifi, which had been incorporated into Shelach's mythology as the underground's 
historical predecessors . 
73 "Anyone interested in erasing the most glorious act of 
heroism of our people., will fail in his schemes, " read R. Kotlovitch, Shelach's 
chairman, from a prepared teXt. 74 Rivka Aaronsohn, Sara Aaronsohn's sister, was 
escorted by Herut MK Haim Landau, who represented Etzel's cornmander, and 
Yaakov Banai, a member of the Lehi command; she was invited to light a memorial 
candle. After a moment of silence and prayer, a letter sent by Rabbi Arieh Levin 
Shalita, the rabbi of the imprisoned Russian Zionists (known as Asirei T-7iyj)on) was 
read. In his letter, Shalita cites the exploits of the executed as models for emulation. 
Also present was Zvi Dresner (his brother had been executed by the British), the 
spokesman for the bereaved families., ývho bemoaned the fact that so many in the 
country were ready to repudiate the deads' contributions. He used this occasion to 
depict daily acts that illustrated hoNv the group present had been prohibited from 
entering elite circles. This estranoement was enacted in ordinary events: he relayed 
how a passerby had torn down the signboard on Oley HaGardom Street [named for the 
12 Sccretary of Sliclach. coi-respondctice to Israel GillShUrl-1,16 JU11C 1957. kibotinský Institute 
Archi\ es. 17\5 - 16'-,. (ficbre\\) 
73 Herza, 15 October 1956. Hebrew 
74 Jabotinský Institute ArchiVes, 24\5 - 161. 
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Acre dead] in Tel Aviv. Dresner expressed hope that those commemorated at the site 
would find their place into Israel's collective memory not simply as heroes associated 
with a specific group but as "heroes of the entire nation, " that is, as part of officlai 
collective inerriorv. 75 Menachem Beoin spoke as \vc1l, noting that the Acre site was 
sacred, like others that had been sanctified in the narne of the new civil religion: 
"When coming hither, please remove your shoes because you are standing on 
hallowed ground. , 
76 
Thus, due to its paltry ability to influence national commemoration policy, 
Shelach chose to direct its efforts to the municipal level. But success was minimal 
even here because the majority of local governments were controlled by Mapai. Only 
in Gush Dan (Israel's central region), where the liberal camp controlled a number of 
local councils, were its achievements noteworthy. A salient example was Tel Aviv. As 
early as November 1948, Shelach had demanded that "Jaffa's streets to be narned after 
its hero- liberators" - declared the headline of an article, appearing in Herut. 
However, that same article goes on to relate that: "The blood of 35 Etzel fighters and 
infiltrators who fell in the [Arab] defense of Jaffa during Passover 1948 ... 
have been 
ignored by the authorities, Nvho chose to narrie the streets vvth insensitive, inarticulate 
numbers. , 
77 
Just prior to Independence Day, 1950, the Municipality of Tel Aviv announced 
plans to name or rename 22 streets and roundabouts in honor of the War of 
Independence. The list was compiled of the following names: Eilal, HaPalmach, 
Hagana, HaGibor HaAlmoni (The Unknown Soldier), Negba, Eivek Ayalon, Gush 




77 Herut. 9 No% ember 1948. (1 Icbre\%) 
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Nahariya, Lod, HaNitzahon, HaLamed-Hei (the 35 Palmach fighters killed on their 
way to Gush Etzion), Tet-Zion (for the 16 who fell at Ateret), the narnes of two fallen 
pilots, the Mahal Unit, HaPortzim, Davi(I Marcus and Kikar HaKovshim 
("Conquerors' Squarc. " referring to Etzel's occupation of Jaffa). "Kikar HaKovshim" Zý 
was special because it was the only name that referred to a local rather than a national 
event, and the only one involving Etzel. Use of the term "conqueror" in the square's 
narne was also unique because it implied adoption of Etzel's ideological lexicon: That 
is, some viewed the name as having rainifications going beyond a mere choice of 
words. To them it implied that the Tel Aviv Municipality, ruled by the liberal carnp, 
had adopted Etzel's version of the Jaffa campaign. In the end, the word "kovshim" - 
conquerors - was used, but for a street rather than for the area's main public square. 
This shift was meaningful. The street would be named after Jaffa's Etzel 
liberators, in their own tarninology. Therein ties the narne's uniqueness: Under 
Hagana influence, the rhetoric describing the War of Independence portrayed the 
campaign as a defensive , var. The subjects of this rhetoric had freed settlements and 
territories; "defenders" and "liberators " Nvere the dominant appellations circulating Z-- I 
Now a street was named using Etzel's more forthright and abrasive terminology. 
In the flurry of cornmemorative activity. Shelach turned to Tel Aviv's Mayor 
with the suggestion of erecting a monument to Jaffa's liberators opposite the local Z: I 
mosque, Hasun-Bek. Shelach even expressed vvillingness to finance the project. The 
proposal was denied by Rokach, who explained his refusal in terms belonging to Ben 
Gurion's statist lexicon: "Commemoration cannot be divided according to 
organizational affiliation, it must be universal in character. ,7 He had argued n 
78 Report to Afembers. the Department1bi, the l-, 'aderground's Cusualties, undated but apparently 
written in September 195 1. Jabotinský Institute Archives. T3 7-4D (Hebre\ý) 
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elsewhere that "such commemorative plaques will be manufactured but they must be 
placed throughout our city only in accordance with the wishes of the 
,, 79 MUllicipality. - .. 
Shelach had been forced to wait for Municipality initiatives while attempting 
to influence that policy. The first official proposal was formulated in April 195 1. The 
Mayor of Tel Aviv had decided to erect three monuments to the memory of fallen 
from the War of Independence. One monument was universal in nature. Dedicated to 
all the residents of Tel Aviv who had died during the War, it was to be constructed on 
Malchai Yisrael Square, the future site of the municipality's inain building; another at 
the former Tel Aviv-Jaffa city limits., in rnernory of the dead who had fallen in the 
Jaffa campaign; and the third in Independence Park on the Tel Aviv seashore, in 
homage to the pilots killed while defending the city. Rokach wrote to the Chief of the 
General Staff informing him about the competition to be held regarding construction 
of the three monuments. He also requested that a representative of the OF sit on the 
judges committee. 80 The winner of this competition was Michael Karo, whose 
proposed monument to the memory of the Jaffa dead would eventually be erected in 
what was then called "Liberators' Park. " The monument's facade would display the 
symbols of the Hagana and Etzel next to that of the Municipality of 'Eel Aviv. 81 It's 
cornerstone would be laid on Remembrance Day, 1957. 
Shelach rernained persistent in its goal of penetrating the message of Etzel's ZI 
responsibility for the success of the Jaffa carnpaign into the collective consciousness. 
In March 1963, on the eve of Israel's fifteenth Independence Day, a committee was 
71) 
Rokach. S. 13 August 1950, memorandum sent to the Department tor the Undet-round's Casualties. 
Rokach, S. 23 April 195 1. letter to Dori. Y.. Chief of the General Staft'. IDF Archi\ es, 1559\52 - 67. 
(I lebre\\) 
" A7aryahu. 1993 . 
Between Two Cities, Katedra. 68. p. 116. (1 lebrc,. N) 
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formed to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the liberation of Jaffa. The committee 
organized a string of observances for the sarne day, II April 1963, held in the Nachlat 
Yitzhak- Cemetery, the Alliance High School, and at the corner of HaKovshirn and L- 
Lotern Streets in Jaffa. "Immediately after the ceremony, we will unveil the 
commemorative plaques that were placed in proximity of the areas where the soldiers 
fell" was inscribed on the invitations sent to the victims' families. 82 Quite 
independently, Etzel veterans indeed placed a commemorative plaque on the Clock 
Tower in Jaffa. The plaque's text told their own version of the campaign and 
emphasized their responsibility for the city's surrender. Their place in the national 
narrative was thereby established within the physical environment of Tel Aviv: 
"Eternal glory to Etzel soldiers, the nation's heroes and liberators, who fell in the 
historic battle for the liberation of Jaffa. Victory was won with their blood.... " Six 
similar brass plaques were mounted at sites where Etzel fighters had been killed. As 
opposed to the monument in Liberators' Park, these plaques retained their strict 
association with the underground organization and remained devoid of any official 
municipal seal. 
A more prominent commemorative initiative, also promoted by Shelach, was 
rejected by the municipality. Shelach had requested the right to place a reproduction of 
the mortar used to shell Jaffa during the first four days of the operation at the head of 
Lutece Street in Jaffa 
. 
83 Another rejected request involved broadcasting the 
ceremonies dedicating the commemorative plaques over national radio, during which 
11 Letter ofin% itation sent from the Committee for the Celehration ofthc 15'1' Anni\ ersar\ of the 
Conquest of. latTa to the martýrs' fami ties, 13 March 1963. -1 he I abotinský I ristitute A rc I ii\ es. 5'4 - 1, -,. 
(Hebre%\ 
S, ' 'D irector of She I ach. Letter to Mordechai Namir, Maýor of-I eI A\ i\ - Jaffii, 13 M arch 1963, The 
Jabotinský Institute Archkcs, 5\4 - ], -,. (Ilebre\\) 
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eyewitness reports would be given. The official reason for the denial was that the 
broadcast schedule had already been finalized. 84 
Etzel's coin ni emoration efforts throughout 1963 can be understood against the 
Municipality's decision, confirmed by the City Council, to rename Jafla's Clock 
Square as "Hagana Square" during the Jaffa independence celebrations. Members of 
the Etzel Veterans Association convened a press conference and expressed the insult 
they felt as a result of the decision because, in their view, the initiative behind the 
Jaffa assault was strictly their own. Yitzhak Lim, Chairman of the Association and a 
former Etzcl operations officer, decried the decision: "An attempt to pervert history, 
and the public's views, especially among those who have not yet touched Israel's C, 
shores. " Shmuel 'Famir even sent a letter on behalf of the Herut faction of the City 
Council to Tel Aviv's mkyor, Mordechai Nainir, threatening to petition the High Court 
of Justice to nullify the decision. tn response to the threatened attempts by Etzel's 
bereaved families to disrupt the renaming ceremony, the municipality reversed its 
decision and postponed the celebrations. The renaming ceremony itself was 
cancelled. 
85 
In the end, Etzel activists succeeded in preventing the change in the Clock Z: ' 
Tower's name, and they also managed to place a commemorative plaque on the It, 
structure itself. A pamphlet issued by Shelach in connection with the plaque's 
dedication described Etzel's version of the events as follows: 
... and what would have 
happened had we waited, as the Hagana demanded, 
until 15 May, the date slated for the evacuation of British forces?. -The 
Hagaiia attempted to overtake Tel Arish but failed, to conquer Abu Kabir but 
failed ... A iiiiracle was about to visit our people once more. 
Our timely attack 
84 Kenner. T.. Assistant Director, the I srae I Broad casting AuthoritN .31M arch 
1963.1 ctter to Shertzer. 
A.. The Jabotinský Institute Archi\ es, 5\4 - 1-,, i. (Hebrew) 
85 HaBokei-, 24 June 1963. (1 Ichrew) 
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on Jaffa, at the last moment, not only saved Tel Aviv ... it saved the entire 
front ... But we paid a heavy price 
for the conquest of Jaffa, 38 officers and 
men ... the price might have been higher. Who can say whether the Altalena is 
part of the price we paid for Jaffa's independence, which raised the country's 
love for its rebels to new heights. 86 
On that sarne day in 1963, Shelach held its own official ceremony in Jaffa 
This ceremony would become a ritual among members of Herut. The announcement 
published in honor of the event stated: " 
The masses are only now beginning to appreciate the extent of the operation 
and its strategic importance in the general campaign. Appreciation will only 
, rovv over time. The units that participated 
in the assault on Jaffa will come to 
be called 'Tel Aviv's liberators, ' and all the city's residents will prostrate 
themselves on the graves of our con-irades who fell in this historic battle.... 97 
Etzel's experience in Rarnat Gan was different from that in Tel Aviv. There. 
attempts to plant a reminder of the underground's contribution to independence within 
the urban space went more smoothly. A case in point is the monument in memory of 
DoN,, Gruner and of the three Etzel members killed during the attack on the British 
police station located in Rarnat Gan. (The wounded Gruner Nvas arrested and 
eventually hanged. ) With the consent of the Ramat Gan municipality, the statue was 
erected in 1954 opposite the very same stationhouse attacked by Etzel forces in 1946, 
novv the home of the local police. The statue, sculpted by Hannah Orloff and cast in 
Paris in 1953, depicts an aged lion struggling with a cub. The lion motif was borrowed 1ý C, 
from tile statue of tile lion erected at Tel Hai. In the Gruner statue, the cub represents 
S(I I Inclatcd text. apparentlý a dr 
h 
aft of a pamphlet, meant to be distributed in March 1963 bý the 
Committee to Celebrate the 15' Anni\ ersarý ofthc Liberation ol-Jaffa. Jahotiiiský Institute Archives. 
5ý4 - 1. (1 lebi-c\N S-' ' , xii nouncenient/Order o fthe DaN , apparentlý 
dated 1963, The Jabotin ský In stitute Arch i% es, 5/4- In. 
jlcbrc\ý ) 
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the Lion of Judah who does battle against the aging British lion. The larger British 
lion likewise represents the power of the British police, attacked by the cub, Etzel, in 
1946. Shelach described the statue's connotations in the accompanying brochure: 
"The 11101IUMCIlt ... NVIII ViSUally dernonstrate the war of a minority against the majority. 
a war of the type waged by the underground against the foreign enslaver.... " Like Zý 
most local governments at the time, the Rarnat Gan municipality was controlled by the 
liberal camp, one of Labor's main competitors below the national level. Prior to the 
decision to allocate land for the monument, the Herut faction sitting on the city 
council successfully exerted pressure on its Mayor. Shelach then organized a 
campaign to raise donations for the moriument commemorating Gruner, one of the Zý 
individuals who had come to symbolise the underground and its rebellion. The 
inscription on the statue reads as follows: "A monument to the soldiers belonging to 
the National Military Organization: Dov Gruner, hanged by the British, and three 
others who fell in the attack on the British police station on 25 April 1946. " Another 
inscription, also incised on the statue's brick foundations, reads: "Nili, the glory of 
Israel , vill not lie or repent (First Sarnuel 15,29), the first national underground ZD 
resistance for independence. [sic]" This reference to Nilt confirmed that organization's 
place in the historical ethos of the underground. A similar message was associated 
with the monument to the Ten Martyrs (Nili, Etzel and Lehi). erected by the Rislion 
LeTziyyon municipality in 1955. Contrary to its official status, the latter project was, 
in effect. a private initiative: the town's Mayor, Eitan Belkind, was the brother of 
Naarnan Belkind, one of the Nill fallen. 
Compared to the scope of official commemoration oil the national level, these 
Successes ýNerc highly local and negligible. As could be c,,, pected, when central and 
local bodies approached the subject of commemoration, they naturally searched the 
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official records, for the names of those killed while serving with Etzel or Lehi, none 
were to be fOLInd. Shelach received nurnerous letters from parents who had found that 
the names of their sons were missing from the public monuments, even when they had 
participated in battles I*ought against the Arabs. 
The influence of these sources was likewise clearly visible in another type of 
commemoration project, the naming of Israel's streets. The process in Tel Aviv has 
already been described but from a different perspective. In Haifa, where the Hagana's 
victorious campaign involved Etzel's somewhat marginal participation, the city's new 
Mayor, Abba Hushi, immediately upon his election in 1951, convened a special 
committee on the subject of street names. His stated purpose was to Hebraize Haifa's 
street names. To this end, he turned to the Haifa branch of the Hagana Veterans Lý 
Association in April of that year, and requested that it prepare a list of names that 
would "c ornmern orate important sites in the campaign for the city's independence. " 
The list came to include 41 names, all of them "Hagana services, units and battles. " 88 
The process repeated itself throughout the country. In response, the director of 
Shelach, BenZion Katznc lien bogen, when writing to Herut officials, commented: z::, 
I would like to draw your attention to the paucity of our cities' streets that carrv 
the names of Etzel and Lehi operations or of the underground's heroes... It is 
needless to refer to the significant educational value of commemoration of the 
feats cornmitted by the underground's heroes for the younger generation and I Zý 
new immigrants... With the renaming of the streets in Tel Aviv's new 
neighborhoods, but especially of Jaffa's streets, which are numbered, this 
urgent problem has again arisen on the [public] agenda, and you are requested Z71 
to exercise all the influence at VOUr disposal and to do so Nvith alacrity.... 89 
SS %I emoranduni froni the II ail'a I lagan a Veterans Assoc iation to the Secretarý of II aifa's City Counci I. 
16 April 195 1.1 laifa Municipal Archk es. File 209. (1 Icbrew) 
Katznellcribopen, B., 8 Nlaý 1956, letter to the'lel Aviv branch of Herut, The Jabotinsk) Institute 
ArchiN es, 16/5 16-", (1 lcbi-c\\) 
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Others describe a different kind of discrimination: The graves of Etzel 
members Nvere neglected xhile the graves authorized by the Ministry ol'Defense were 
weil tended. )(' In Hadera, for instance, a commemorative plaque was installed "with 
the narnes of all the dead - Hadera's sons - who had fallen for the sake of the 
homeland. " Yet, despite declared intentions of listing the narnes "without reference to 
their organizational affiliation, " wrote Miriam Kellner, "my late son's name was not 
noted. " Kellner's son had died during the Altalena incident. "My son Dov served his 
country as part of Etzel and was martyred for its [i. e., Israel's] sake on the Altalena 
armaments vessel. I find no justification in discriminating against his memory. I am C, 
thoroughly shocked bNI unreasoning hatred, especially because the [Yad Labanim] has 
ascribed to this virulent discrimination between citizens ... 
I strongly request that the 
bias be corrected and that my son's name be added to the list of Hadera's heroes. 1191 
Another case is that of Ramle. In a letter dated 30 March 1950 addressed to the 
Mayor of Ramle, regarding the first request made by the underground to allocate a Z-- 
memorial in memory of their fallen in Ramle, Shelach's Department for the 
Underground's N/lartyrs wrote: "We respectfully turn to you once again in the matter of 
placing a commemorative plaque in honor of the Etzel dead and missing in action who 
fell ... The bereaved families 
frequently request answers from us about the status of 
the request yet there is nothing we can relay. "92 Their request was to be fulfilled 'in 
1992,22 years later, in the form of a State memorial to all Etzel dead. 
Q, j For the \Nca I th of correspondence. see the Jabot insky I ristitutc A rchk es. 5/17 - 16ý. (I I ebre\ý) 
Kellner, NI.. 9 June 1957. Letter to Yad Labanim. the Jabotinský Institute ArchiN cs, 5/17 - 16'-. 
]chrc%%) 
. I'hc Jabotinský ll)StitL]tC cs. Tý37 - 4: ). (1 lchre\N) 
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The State's institutions were far from pleased with the appearance of private 
and municipal initiatives., however marginal in number, because little control could be 
exerted over the rnessaoes transmitted or their form. As early as 1949, the Ministry of 
Defense announced that: "It k\ould be preferable to cease all activity and wait until the 
public institutions decide how and in what manner to commemorate these saints. "93 In 
effect, Shelach attempted to ftirther coin mern oration of its fallen at sites independent 
of the official mernory sites that embraced only Hagana and IDF fallen. Although the 
latter appear together in the Yizkor volumes (see Chapter Five) and lie side-by-side in 
military cemeteries, the sole place where Etzel and Lehi dead were commemorated 
and buried together was in a private institution, the Achditt Yisrael synagogue in Zý 
Jerusalem. 
In the absence of government sponsorship, the raising of commemorative 
projects faced many obstacles, financial and legal alike. Yonni Greenfeld, Chairman 
of Yad Labanim, relers to this issue ii-i a letter writteri to Ben Gurion, int61-ming hiin 
that bereaved families \vcre erecting cornmemorative obelisks independently: 
The deep spiritual need to commemorate the memory of their dear ones has 
unsettled them and becorne a life-or-death issue ... They nevertheless 
began the 
prQject and stopped only when their funds Nvere depleted, This is the source of 
their request that the Minister [of Defense] assist them so that they may 
conclude their mission. 9' 
Alternatively, public participatioii in commemoration rituals was far from 
spontaneous. This applied to everý, avenue in which commemoration might 
materialize. including, burial. For instance, until directives to the contrary were issued 
ý., Ij I, isti-\ )f I)cfciisc. 21J unc 1949. press rel ease. (t I 
1)4 Shamil. 1996ý p. SO. 
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from "the top, " cemeteries where soldiers might be buried retained their status as 
private sites, physically neglected and forsaken, visited only rarely by relatives of the 
deceased. Numberless complaints coiicerning maintenance were forwarded by 
bereaved parents to the responsible institutions. One complaint, made in April 1950, 
concerned the lamentable condition of the Beit Keshet cemetery, where the son of 
Yitzhak Ben Zvi, then President of Israel, was also buried. 95 In response, Shaul 
96 Avi, 0Urjoined their campaign and noted that the phenomenon "deeply worried" h IM. ZD I 
Yet, despite efforts to attract the public to the State's commemorative rituals staged at 
97 
the gravesites, attendance was poor and limited to bereaved families. Similar reports 
were delivered to a meeting of the 1955 Independence Day Planning Committee, L- 
noting that the PLIblic attended such events only in communities located in the 
periphery. 98 The Country's leadership was thus blatantly informed that they could not 
rely on the public's spontaneous participation. 
Their realization that this was in fact the case prodded officials to find ways to 
expand public attendance through institutional manipulations. Hence, the 
Commemoration Unit turned to the Ministry of the Interior with a request that it 
ensure that the local authorities under its jurisdiction close their offices and enjoin 
their staffs to "()o to the cemeteries aild participate in the commemorative rituals 
conducted there. "')9 Similarly, participation of schoolchildren was scheduled for the 
first time in 1955, during that year's Remembrance Day rituals. 100 One fact 
, )ý Interim Committee for the Families of'War ot'Indepenclence klartý rs 21 April 1950, letter to Avigur, 
S. (Flebre\N) 
Q(, A\ igur, S.. 24 April 1950, Ictter to Dekel, Y. (Ifcbre\\) 
97 Yad Labanim. I 'March 1954. Ilrotocol of meeting with Minister of Defense Pinchas Lavon. (Hebrew) 
'), S Ilrotocol, 16 JanuarN 1954, p. 6: Proiocols q1 Me Public Council. for Commemoratioti, 27 Ma3 1955. 
P. 1. 
99 Comnicinoration I nit. 13 April 1953ý letter to the Minister ofthe Interior. (I lebre\N) 
100 Indepciidence Dm Organizing Committee. 20.1une 1955. Protocol. Meeting No. 12, Concluding 
Meeting- 1). 2. (1 Ichl-c\N ) 
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contributing to the success of this move was that Remembrance Day is not treated as a 
holiday, meaning that school was in session; fience, the children could participate 
within the framework of their daily activities. 
Apathy to commemoration of' the ýA`ar of' Independence fiallen did not go 
entirely unnoticed. F. Israel, a columnist for Davar, the Labor Movement organ, wrote 
a series of articles on the subject under tile title "How the Nation Commemorates Its 
Martyrs": 
Despite all the sincere and protracted attempts made by individuals, 
institutions, households, and the Commemoration Unit, " he wrote, "these 
parties remain thoroughly bewildered by the question of why their voices 
remain unheard. To this very day, our three major cities have not erected a 
single monument in memory of their fallen sons. Hardly any streets have been 
narned after individual dead, groups, or even the main battles where they died, 
especially when compared with the commemorative activities conducted with 
respect to the more distant past. Think of how we cornmemorate World War 11 
dead, for instance. Yet today, not one major institution or place of work has 
done more than the bare minimum to cornmemorate its lost employees ... 
Nor 
have any high schools - excluding Bill-1. Gymnasia Herzliva, and Tichon 
Hadash - exerted any effort to even passively commemorate their Students 
within then- walls. 101 
The analytic response to this journalistic indictment is found by framing 
national commemoration in the context of synibolic politics. Monuments are 
recoonized instruincras for enhancement of national consciousness. As Mosse 
demonstrates in his study. monuments are iconographic as well as textual symbols that 
inculcate the myth of self-sacrifice and patriotisin into the public sphere as in physical 
space. An outstandim2 instance of this process can be found in Germany. In the wake 
lul Isract. L.. 16 April 19ý3, Davar. lt'cekýi SIII)I)IC177071. (Hebre%q 
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of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-187 1), numerous irionuments were constructed to 
give iconographic expression to the myth of the German people and its power to 
vanquish its enernies. The majority of monuments represented fallen soldiers as 
patriots who had sacriticed their lives on the altar of nationalism. ' 02 Military 
cemeteries were thereby transformed into secular religious sites, temples for the 
practice of nationalistic rites. 103 Moreover, these sites prepared the public for 
legitimization of liegemonic politics. When tile inasses come to pay their respects and 
to honor national institutions, the dead resting in the military cemeteries and the 
groups identified with them were perceived as those who had sacrificed themselves 
for the national project. Commemoration vested the dead with new life, but in the 
public rather than the private sphere. Those who took no part in this project, or were 
perceived as foreign to it, were deprived of any substance in the conceptual fabric of 
daily I ife. 104 
Ben Gurion's response to the public's apathy regarding commemoration was 
"cultural engineering, " manifested in legislation, he placed little trust in stygian 
emotions or mass-initiated acts. By fixing celebration of Remembrance Day in a series 
of commemorative rituals stipulated or supported by law, he hoped to induce the 
requisite political behavior: massive participation and social recognition of Labor's 
legitimacy, rooted in the immense price paid bý bereaved families. This motive was 
reflected in the statement made on 18 June 1958 by Shmuel Dayan (MK, Labor), 
himself a bereaved father, when he raised Proposal 609, Laýv. - Remembrance Day in 
Honoi- ofthe . 11artyrs ofthe War ýflndej)en(lence on his party's behalf- 
10, Shamir, 1996. p. 10. 
10', Mosse. 6. L.. 1975. Pic Aationah--alion (? I the Ilasses. Ntc\ý York: publ.. pp. 42-72. 
104 A related. interesting phenomcnon is the transformation of the gzravcs of Christian saints that %\ere 
I-ound it) the cemeteries ot'l ate I mperi a] Roman and the Býzantinc Flinpire. See Brown, P., 1981, The 
Cult of the Saints. Chicago: Un i%ersitý of Chicago P ress. 
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I propose, in the name of the Public Council for Commemoration, to legislate 
the law legalizing observance of Remembrance Day in honor of' War of Z: 1 
Independence dead. It is true that we already instituted a memorial day, but its 
observance is haphazard, pieceineal, and voluntary. In some villages, loved 
ones are honored by visits to the cemeteries where they are buried, but they are 
few in number. We Should note that thousands of fathers, mothers, and 
orphans do not wait for Remembrance Day to honor their dear ones, they do so 
nightly and daily. And they are very much aggrieved. But in the cities, where 
the majority lives, Remembrance Day is not observed, especially in the cafes 
and theatres, where life goes merrily on as if nothing had happened. For this 
reason, we propose a law requiring public places of entertainment to be closed 
on Remembrance Day eve, so that during at least one day a year, everyone will 
be able to pay their respects to their war heroes. Therefore, we propose 
that ... the law will be binding on the entire population. 
105 
L- 
Ben Gurion embraced the idea from a highly centralist- perspective; to him, 
only three military cemeteries were to be inaugurated., one each in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv 
and Haifa. 106 His opinion did not, however, prevail. In September 1949, it was 
decided to build eight military cemeteries: in Jerusalem, Nachlat Yitzhak (Tel Aviv), ZI 
Netanya, Kfar Warburg, I-laifa, Naliariya, Afula, and Rosh Pina. An additional 25 
"small, local burial plots" Nvould also be established. 'ý" Had the cemeteries been more 
rigidly centralized, performance of standardized commemorative rituals would have 
been easier to exact. In reality, the distribution of burial sites made it possible for the 
rituals conducted to deviate from official formats: In 1954, the prescribed 
Remembrance Day rituals were conducted in only 14 cemeteries. 
loý Daý an, S.. 19 June 1958. knes, %ct Prolocols. (Hcbi-e%\) 
IU6 The (-'017W7eM01-(lliO)? 1 1711. UtIdited, internal %mi-kingy paper: Ilivorj ýýilhc Disagrcements Regarding 
Commemortmon qfSoldwrs, p. S. (I lcht-e%\) 
10-1 Commemoration 1, nit. 1950. Prolmsed Bwýqef, pp. 5-6. (1 febi-c%N, ) 
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Still another route for centralized control over commemoration was utilized by 
the State: headstone inscriptions. Uniformity in the format of gravestone inscriptions 
is applied universally, and betrays more than form al -technical aspects. Headstone 
inscriptions make strongy statements about the role played by the dead in national tn 
tradition, in the collective space. Military cemeteries belong to the pUblic space; from 
this locus, myths, interpretations and the meaning of bereavement are constructed as 
military as well as civilian experiences. Unifori-nity in inscriptions was agreed to early 
on. According to this principle, cemeteries Nvould express the view that "each and 
every one dedicated his or her life to one shared goal ... uniformity must be achieved in 
a conspicuous and decisive way. "")8 
Gravestone inscriptions, as artilacts belonging to the cultural apparatus, 
therefore reveal attitudes toward those bUried in cemeteries and the function of the 
cemeteries themselves. The government statement published in Davar, reveals several 
aspects of its attitude: 
The fathers and mothers who bequeathed us their sons as warriors and 
defenders of the national lionor cau be assured that the Jewish people will not 
forget those who volunteered to Fight against the enemy... The War of 
Independence and establishment of the State have raised new problems that 
were previously unheeded. One of these problerns., related to the War in the 
most tangible way', is that of commemoratiori of our fallen and, closely related, 
the construction of military cemeteries. ' 09 
That is, until independence, every aspect of security and warfare was 
considered strategically, tactically and operationally. After independence, state 
108 Rosen. P., Mi 11 i StCl' 0 f. J Usti CC. 20 NI arch 11) ý 0, Sess ion 128, the Fi rst K nesscl, see Knesset 
Protocols. (I lebrc%N) 
101) The Commemoration Unit, Nlinistrý ofDclensc, 24 Julý 1949, Introduction, Public AnnOUncenlent: 
Competition: Design of IMilitary Cemeteries. (Flebrc%%) 
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institutions were required to regulate the relationship between the state and the 
bereaved for the first time. 
The debate over a durable solution to the issue of burial and the t-Ormat of the 
cemeteries themselves began immediately upon the War's close. Prior to statellood, 
military dead were buried in civil cerneterics, sometimes in temporary plots located in 
small communities. So, in March 1949, the committee mandated to devise an orderly 
policy sat for the first time. The solutions they discussed ranged from the construction 
of civil cemeteries containing sections with plots for soldiers, to that of military 
cemeteries. In the end, the Ministry of Defense decided to establish military 
cemeteries. "() The plans were all-inclusive, covering every detail, beginning from the 
location of the graves and their desigon. This task became tile first attended to by the 
Comi n ern oration Unit, which had begun preparing for its mission in October 1948: 
"The Unit will plan and implement the organizational, technical and aesthetic 
arrangements in accordance with Jewish tradition. These functions include: burial, 
setting a headstone at each dead soldier's grave, the placing of a general 
commernorative plaque, in each cemetery. "'" Hcnce, the Unit's mandate was to 
execute the detailed terms of the associated law, which would be passed in 1950 under 
the title Law: Military Cemeteries. 
The Minister of Justice, Pinchas Rosen 112 proposed the law, while stating that 
it represented the nation's obligation to its bereaved families. An additional aim of the 
law was "to concentrate ... the bodies in military cemeteries ... which would permit 
proper care [of the graves]. an honor due the fallen. and preservation of an agreeable 
Sunimarý oftlic Jud es of the Competition tor the Planning of Militan Cemeteries. conducted 
during 14 March 1949: sce Azarý ahU, I 9CA P. 17 1, ftri. 27. (1 lehrew) 
F,. /. Eshkoli, October 1948. working paper. (I Ichre\\ 
20 March 1950. 
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ati-nosphere. " Rosen also noted that these activities paralleled the efforts exerted to 
produce Yizkor (commemorative) volumes, another task assigned to the 
Corn in ern oration Unit. According to Rosen, the nanies to appear in these books would 
be those of the soldiers buried in the c1csigriated military cemeteries. 
The cemeteries' owner, its caretaker, and the master of ceremony of the rituals 
to take place there was, in effect, the State: "The proposed law contains an important 
provision ... the right of possession to the 
land dedicated to military rituals will rest 
with the State. The law proposes that all the military cemeteries cited will be 
transferred to state ownership. " National ization of bereavement vvould flourish with 
tirne, and become a major bone of contention between bereaved families and the 
responsible institutions. The ensuring debate would come to envelope the conflict 
between collectivist and liberal values regarding how loved ones should be buried and 
how they should be commemorated. ' 13 
Conceptually and practically, the main reason for warning to concentrate the ZD 
bodies of the dead in a limited number of cerneteries was that such a policy enabled 
appropriation of burial and commemoration from the arena of the family to that of the 
State. Private experiences could thereby become public experiences. 1 14 In order to 
nationalize bereavernent and use it to further political goals, tile state was to guarantee 
that the entire community of the dead be "in their hands. " A reading of various 
Knesset debates indicates that in private cerneteries. those not owned by the State, 
official rituals were not held, crowds did not arrive to celebrate the Remembrance 
Days as intended, and the practices enacted did not transmit the desired messages. 
I'- , Doron. G. and Lebel, U.. ? 000, '1 fie Detensi%c OrLnmization: The klinistrý ofDefense Against 
Bereaved Parents. Plilim. 9. pp. 285-369. (ficbru%% ) 
1 14 I-elicl, t 1.. 1998.1hc Political Behavior oj'Berea VC Me 111, U11pUbliSl1Cd NIA thesis. I cl A% i% 
Unk ersit\ . 
Department of Political Science. (Hcbt-c\\) 
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Contrary to expectations, nationalization of bereavement did not take place 
WithOLIt comment. Members of the left Nvho shared Ben Gurion's collectivist views 
with respect to other issues objected to placing bereavernent Under the statist-Labor 
umbrella. Thus, during the same session that Rosen had proposed the Alililaýv 
Cemetei-ies Law, members of Mapam nayed the pro. ject. Yitzhak Bar Yehuda (MK,, 
Mapai) commented tersely: 
I assume that everyone knows that we are not afraid of nationalization in 
several areas of the economy. But I am absolutely stunned to hear that the only 
objects, or at least the first objects that you propose to nationalize are the 
bodies of our dead soldiers ... According to this law., parents do not exist at all! 
If an individual serving in the army dies or falls in battle ... his body will be 
appropriated by the state's representatives. Parents aren't mentioned even once 
in any of the law's articles. Everyone else you might irnagme is mentioned: the 
Chief Medical Officer, and the Rabbinate, of course, but not bereaved- 
parents!... Is this the proper way deal with such a delicate subject; 
In reply to these allegations, Ben Gurion clanned that nationalization of 
bereavement and memory provided the sole mechanism for the State to repay, as 
much as it could, bereaved parents for their sacrifices and to institutionalize the rites 
held in the military cerneteries. rhese spaces were meant to recognize the parents' zn 
loss, as would the other rituals soon to become part of mass culture. Ben Gurion 
himself came to use these occasions to applaud parents for their contribution to the 
State's rebirth and its development. To illustrate, during the 1950 Remembrance Day 
rituals, after Yizkor, the praver for the dead, had been read, Ben Gurion stated: 
ues of the sweet boN, s and (), Irls olows the ima,, cs of their "... Above the ima,, Zý Z7) tý 
parej its. .. tlie \N ondrous 
II ons of Is rae L" 
11 ý Bar Ychuda, Y. 20 March 1950, Session 128, the First Knesset, see Knessel Protocols. (Hebrew) 
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Military cemeteries were thus treated as statist pro '. ects 
that, like the plethora 
of other projects initiated by Mapai, were intended to express the general will, the 
narrative of Israel's rebirth and survival. 'Their target audience was the entire public. In 
addition to the Yizkor volumes (see Chapter Five), military cemeteries would come to 
mirror the community of the dead, the contributors to the independence project. Those 
included were signified as members of the group to which the young state owed its 
resurrection. Burial in a military cemetery became one of the passkeys to social 
acceptance, status, and material rewards. Inclusion in or exclusion frorn this select 
community, again based on decisions regarding the right to a military burial, acquired 
political nuances almost from the start. 
The terms of admission into this community were elaborated during the 
parliamentary debates held surrouticling the Law: Families ýI'Soldiers Killed in the 
Tl, 'ctr (1950). In the pithy phrases of Minister of Justice Rosen: "The military 
cemeteries express the principle that all those who fell during the War were comrades zD 
with a single objective - this invites uniformity. " In this context, uniformity meant 
participation in an exclusive community. This principle was firmly put into practice. 
Headstones displaying the OF seal and their location in military cerneteries marked 
their subjects as participants in that community. Those buried outside the cernetery's 
perimeter, or close by but devoid of headstones hearing an official seal Nvere marked 
as non -part ic ipants. To complete the cycle of signification, the task of gathering the 
bodies, their interment, the placement of the headstones and their inscriptions, as well 
as maintenance of the grounds was assigned to state - not private - agencies. 
primarily the Commemoration Unit. 
A Journalist in the popular press fixed the neýý site's identity in the title of his 
article: "Military Cemeteries - Pantheons to Heroism. " In the article, the author 
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expresses hi's amazement at the State, which had "invested hundreds of thousands of 
[Israeli] pounds in the construction of the military cemeteries that at sorne future date 
will become national pantheons to Israeli bravery. "' 16 As pantheons, Israel's military 
cemeteries not only accelerated the transmission of ideological and political messages 
OLItward, firom the family of the bereaved to the rest of the nation, they also functioned 
as sites for socialization of the community it represented, the sarne family of the 
bereaved. 1 17 That is, these sites were converted into collective spaces, arenas used by 
the State for labeling members of the in-group, the elite, and for transmitting the 
pertinent social messages, reinforced through annual repetition of the state rituals 
enacted there. 
It was Izhar Harari, a Progressive Party (liberal cainp) member of tile Knesset 
who verbalized the spatial dimension attached to the symbolic markin- of' this I 
community: 
Perhaps we should allow the Ministry of Defense the opportunity to 
occasionally expand the law's boundaries ... I know of cases where soldiers 
died during training with the underground, under conditions reqUiring) that they 
be buried on the spot in order to prevent the British from discovering the 
incident. Even when the family requested that the body be moved, it was often 
necessary to leave the body where it was for fear of revealing other activities. 
Perhaps the time has come to collect the remains of these fallen, which are few 
in number, and to bury them in a military cemetery; after all, the cause of their 
deaths is not verv different from that which brought on the deaths of those who 
fell during the War of Independence. " 
To Harari, determination of burial criteria was in the State's purview, and 
should involve application of a uniform, Lin ]versa] istic policy. His remarks were 
I](, A. Falmi. Davar. 30 April 1952. (1 lcbre\ý) 
I1 -1 Na% eh, 1993ý pp. 159-160. 
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therel-ore seen to support Ben Gurion's demands to nationalize bereavement and to 
subordinate bereavement to laws that transfer discretion in these matters from the 
family to the state: 
We should install special cemeteries dedicated to all those who died during the 
War of Independence. The cemeteries should be standardized, whose special 
character would be maintained and cared for by the state... If' soldiers fought 
together, they should lie together in their final resting place. This should not 
prevent us frorn consulting the family ... [but] I believe that the final decision 
should rest with the Minister of Defense. 
Harari's approach even touched upon the design of these cemeteries and the 
graves themselves. A model was at hand, available for adoption or re. jection: 
Following World War 1, the British had established cemeteries in Palestine dedicated 
to the servicemen killed in the campaign to conquer the Turkish-held territory. The 
guilding principle was western in the basic equality attributed to the dead, expressed in ZD 
the uniformity of its graves and symbols. The ruling perspective was that "military 
cemeteries were to be rooted in the idea of homogeneity, that everyone had dedicated 
their lives to a common purpose ... 
The uniformity should be unmistakable and 
absolute. " For then- own reasons, representatives of the right joined I farari who, as a 
staunch liberal, had suogested expanding the boundaries ot-the coirirnunitý, entitled to 
rest in the military cemeteries. 
A good number of Mapai representatives sitting in the Knesset surprisingly Z- zn z: l 
agreed to the proposal to broaden eligibility for interment in the military ceincterics, 
althou,, , hts Nvere not set on Etzel or Lehi dead. They had others in mind, zh then- si, 
fighters kvho might be eXCIUded due to strict obedience to the law's Stipulations. 
Chalin Bcn Ashcr (MK, Mapai). declarcd that: 
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I feel I must focus on one specific point ... the matter of returning volunteers 
who fought in World War 11 for traditional Jewish burial on Israeli soil ... 
This 
entails the retroactive acknowledgement of these volunteers as members ofour 
country's army, which implies a gradual change in the definition of tile terni 
'soldier' for the law's purposes... We should work to obtain recognition of 
volunteers as participants in our pre-independence armed forces. " 
With creation of the Public Council for Coin mernoration, a Knesset 
subcommittee was also created, mandated to determine what would be engraved on 
the headstones. 118 Shortly before Remembrance Day in early April 1951, the 
subcommittee announced that a format had been devised. Its content included the 
soldier's name, rank, serial number, parents' names., date of birth and oi- death 
lI according to the Hebrew calendar, in addition to the IDF seal. The Pub ic Coune, had 
hoped to secure control over use of the IDF seal through a regulation entitling the 
Council alone to place headstones displaying the IDF seal. 119 In response, the Chief 
Counsel of the Ministry of Defense informed them that such a regulation could not be 
issued separately from new legislation. ' 20 
The IDF seal that appears on the headstones of recognized military casualties 
is more than decorative. It is a highly significant symbol that awards official and 
social status to its bearers. Such a symbolic process could be adopted because within 
the context of Israel's political culture, the IDF has corne to be perceived as a fitting 
reflection of the values dominating, the Israeli space. Israeli society, which has upheld 
collectivism as one of its constitutive ideologi cat -organizational concepts since the 
I'' Subcommittee to Determine the Inscriptions on the Parnanent Headstones of War of' Independence 
NlartN rs. 28 Fcbruarý 195 1. meeting protocol. IDF Archi\ es. unnumbered: Azarý ahu. 1 990ý p. 183 fLn. 
67. 
III, Dekel, Y., II March 195 1ý letter to the Chict'Counsel. the N linistrý oi- Defense, cited in Azýirý ahu. 
l 990, p. 184, l1n. 69. 
Knccht. M.. 12 April 19-5 1ý letter to Dekel. Y.. cited in Azaryalm. 1990, p. 184.11n. 69. 
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days ofthe Yishuv, 121 converted the military into an organ embodying these notions in 
all their rarnifications. 122 The IDF seal that appeared on the graves of those who had 
died, in whatever franiework, Nvhile defending the State represented an imprimatur of 
the successfully acquisition of Israeli citizenship. 
123 As a result, when groups other 
than those specified in the relevant laws, especially the Loit, ': Families qj', ýohliers 
Kille(I in the War (1950) dared to use the IDF seat in the design of headstones for their 
own dead, the authorities were infuriated. This was so despite the fact that the 
"outsiders" had been comrades in arms with the Hagana and the IDF on various Z, 
occasions. In a letter dated 233 June 1953, sent to the Legal Counsel of the Ministry of 
Defense, tile Director of the Commemoration Unit, Yosef Dekel, wrote the following 
under the heading "The IDF seal as it appears on commemorative statutes and 
monuments": 
As I have already explained to you, a rule is needed that will forbid the use of 
the IDF seal in the absence of special permission given by the responsible 
officer. During my recent tour of military cemeteries... I noticed nurnerous 
instances where the IDF seal was placed on civilian as well as on military 
headstones.... 124 
This preoccupation with the IDF seal illustrates the point. Nationalization of' 
bereavement had political as well as socio-cultural dimensions. Its aim went beyond 
construction of a national ethos and collective culture. Perin ission to use the IDF seal 
became a potent tool in the hands of policy makers as it enabled the political elite to 
III To bCtteF COMPI-Chend the Concept COIICcti\ ism. we can refer to Nleý er's definition: "A person fulfills 
his destiny on Iý \%hen lie scr\ es societ) ." 
See Meý er, A., 1965, The So viet Political Sysiem. N. c\\ York: 
Random House. 
122 
Lebel, U., 2001 The Politics of Commemoration. In D. Korn (ed. ), Public Policly and 
Administraiion in Israel. Baltimore: Lexington. 
1--ý 11o this verN daý. during, the conduct ofthe public and political debates about the imokement of 
Israel's ultra-Orthodox citizens in dailý life. the question is raised of\\ho N\ill he lain to rest in a nulitarý 
cemetcl-\. 
1'4 IFT Archk cs. 90', 7'- - 150. (11-lehrew) 
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signifý with the utmost efficiency who WOUld be included and who excluded from this 
select community. 
Construction of military cemeteries proceeded with alacrity and full support of 
the public administration. "I have read the report on the care of the graves ofIDF dead 
and totally support you" wrote Ben Gurion to Dekel. "The plans should be executed 
with all speed, until not one grave is left without appropriate markings or proper form, 
even ternporarily. We owe it not only to those who gave their lives for our freedom 
and to their parents, but also as a sign of respect for the Israel Defense Forces. " 
125 In 
practice, however, the graves belonging to the underground movernents' dead were left 
unattended, with no markings or appropriate arrangements. For instance, in the 
Nachlat Yitzhak cemetery, next to the graves of Hagana fallen, Shelach's Department 
for the Underground's Martyrs observed that the "graves of Altalena martyrs lying in 
the military portion received no military seal. They appear to find it difficult to place a 
military seal on the grave of Avraham Stavksy and the others who they murdered ... 
If 
they do not put headstones on the graves of the Altalena martyrs we will do so against 
their will. . .. 
" 126 
In January 1956, after the Ministry of Defense continued to refuse to place 
headstones at tile graves of the Altalena dead, Shelach's Director, B. Katzliellenbogen 
notified the Commemoration Unit that "due to the lack of response to our request 
regarding placement of headstones at the graves of the casualties from the Altalena 
munitions carrier, we wish to inform you that we have ordered 16 headstones, which 
Ben ( iurion, D- 229 
J unc 1 949ý I cuer to Deke I. Y., cited in Azaryahu. 1990, p. 104. (11 chrc\ý 
Sliclach. Report o/ 117c Dcparlmelll /61' the C'10CI-gl-07ind's Afarl., Vrs, undated, probablN Septelilhel 
195 1. The Jahotinský IIIStitLItC AI'Cili% CSý 337/7 - 4:. (Hebrew) 
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we will place in the military portion of the Nachlat Yitzhak cemetery. "1 
21 M. Orbach, 
Dekel's successor, hastened to warn Shelach that "no seat is to be incised oil the 
headstones, and that the place of their deaths is to be noted as 'died on the Altalena 
munitions carrier. `12ý These directions denied recognition of the headstones as 
legitimate features of military graves. This conclusion is supported by an internal 
memorandum dated May 1956 and classified as "top secret. " The memorandum 
contains a summary of a meeting held with the Minister of Defense, on 24 May 1956: 
"The Ministry of Defense will not provide headstones for the graves of Altalena dead 
and orders that they be interred outside the military portion of the Nachlat Yitzhak 
cemetery. " 129 
On 24 May 1956, the uiiveilin, (, of the headstones at tile graves of tile 16 
Altalena fallen took place at tile Nachlat Yitzhak cemetery. The date was auspicious: 
It represented the eighth anniversary of the attack on the vessel. No representatives of 
any State institutions attended. B. Katznellenbogen, Director of Shelach, wrote the 
following to one of the bereaved families: 
We are honored to send you a modest memento - two photographs taken at 
the unveiling ceremony of the headstone standing at the grave of your son ZD ZD 
our dear comrade - conducted on 24 May 1956. We firmly believe that the 
efforts and sacrifices of Etzel's soldiers - heroes of the Altalena incident 
will soon be recognized by the entire nation. " 
130 
Statist symbols did not appear solely in connection with military burial or IDF 
cemeteries. Ben Gurion sought a symbol that would more quickly and effectively link 
1'7 Kat7nellenbm-, en, B.. 26 Januai-N 1956. letter to Orbach, M., the Jabotinsb Institute Archi\es. 16", 
5/16. (Ilebrcý%) 
12S Orbach. NI.. 28 l-Cbl'UM'\ 1956, letter to Katziiellciihoi-mi. B.. the Jabotinskv Institute Archi%, es. l6t, 
5/16. ýHcb re %v) 
12q Unsigned. cited in A. Ben Yosel'. A. 27 MaN 1956, letter to Amir. Y.. Head, the Personnel Di\ ision. 
IDF, the IDF Archi\ es, 285-74/20. (1 lebre\ý) 
I ý() KatznellcnhoLcn, R.. 5 June 1956. Jahotinský Institute Archi\ cs, '--)/ 1 16 -1 6ý. (1-1 ebre\% ) 
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the national ethos with that community of the dead that he believed to have expressed 
the spirit of the times. In mid 1949, Dekel turned to the Jewish National Fund with a 
request to allocate "about 40-50 dunarns" of its holdings in the vicinity of Jerusalem 
for use as a military cernetery. After review of several alternatives, it Nvas decided that 
"the most appropriate area was the section of the hill rneant to be used for Ilerzl's 
Tomb 
... 
According to the caretakers, the area is sufficient for the planned tomb in 
addition to a military cemetery. " 131 Preparation of the site for its new function required 
laying of an access road half a kilometer in length, construction of terraces and 
placement of graves, at an estimated cost of fIL 15,000.132 From the size of the 
budget, one can readily conclude that the cemetery would have a special function: "In 
the near future, the cemctery in Jerusalem, located on Mount Herzi, will operate as the 
IDF's main burial grounds. It appears that the bodies of all those buried abroad, who 
comply with the stipulations of the special decisions reached, will be transferred to 
Israel. Headstones will be placed for each soldier missing in action, as well as for the 
paratroopers buried in foreign territory. " 13 3 
The image of Herzl, the prophet of the Zionist drearn, was therefore chosen as 
the official symbol of the community of the dead. Construction of the cernetery and 
the tomb began in 195 1, immediately following that year's Remembrance Day rituals, 
as stipulated in the associated law. HoN\; ever, due to the low level of spontaneous 
recognition of the symbol and its association with the dead, the political leadership 
requested that a grandiose public ceremony be held at the site, accompanied by the 
appropriate solemnity. NovN;, a year after the first Independence Day had been 
131 Dekel, Y., I Juh 1949. Letter to A. Peri. the Nlinistrý offlefense. the IDF Archives, unnumbered. 
(liebreM 
13' Proposed budoet I-or 1950 as prepared bý the Commemoration [ nit. 9 September 1949, transmitted 
to A. Peri. Director (icneral. the Nlinistrý ol-Defense. (I lcbrcNý 
13 1 Cited from the Proposed Budget t-or 19-50 prepared bý the Commemoration Unit, see Azarý Llhu, 
1 995ý p. 178. (1 lebrew) 
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celebrated, the site would be dedicated together with Herzl's tomb. So, in summer 
195 1, f lerzl's casket was interred in a state funeral conducted on the eastern heights of 
Jerusalem. The site was named "Mount Herzl" as an "expression of the respect and 
esteem felt toward Ben - jarnin 
Zeev HerzI by the Israeli people. " 134 
Mount HerzI was indeed intended to become Israel's national pantheon, where 
the nation's prophet and his disciples were to be buried in what eventually would be 
called the "Founding Fathers Plot" (Chelkat Gedolei Haouma). As Chaim Bar Asher 
(MK, Mapai) would note in a different context: "Not just anyone can enter the 
national pantheon. "' 35 According to Azaryahu, Mount Herzi was to replace the 
Temple in Jerusalem as the center of1srael's civil religion. ' 
36 
For the fallen, Mount Herzl would come to fill a role similar to that of the 
Yizkor volurnes, discussed in the next chapter, a corpus that identified "who's in" and 
"who's out" vis-ý-vis the national -stat i st ethos: "... on one hilltop we intend to locate 
the tomb of the originator of the Zionist dream and a cemetery for those who realized 
that dream, " wrote Dekel. 137 The synibolic relationship was established during 
Defense Forces Day, celebrated in 1949, on the anniversary of Herzl's death. On that 
occasion, Ben Gurion would assert that this relationship linked the dreamer to the 
implementer. The site therefore supported Ben Gurion's efforts to identity national 
symbols with Mapai, which he hoped to present as the very incarnation of statism. The 
statist project was thus linked to the name of IlerzI, the spiritual father of the nation. 
"Today marks the 45"' anniversary of the death of the prophet of the Jewish state, " 
declared Ben Gurion during his speech on that first Defense Forces Day: 
Taken from the spccifications ofthe sitc's arcliitcctural dcsign compctition. p. 2 (1 lclbrcýN ) 
Debate o\ cr the Xef--ci-Scrcm Laii, 3 Jamiarý 1955. first roll call \ ote. Knessel Prolocols. (Hchrew) 
Israel Staddis. cited in Azar) ahu. 
137 Dekel, Y. 
ý 
I Julý 1949, letter to Peri, A.. Director Gencral. the Nlinistrý of Defense. (11 lebreý\ 
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but this is no day for mourning or lamentation but of exaltation and 
thanksgiving, of victory and sel f-forti fi cation, for our vision has been realized. 
The mortal Herzl is no more, but replaced by an immortal soul. His spirit 
floats above a reborn state of Israel, above its builders and defenders. 
Henceforth, 30 Tainuz will be celebrated as the Prophet's holiday - lierzl's 
day - as well as the holiday of his instruments - Defense Forces Day. 
' 38 
Actually, war dead had been interred on Mount HerzI since the closing days of 
1949, specifically, the bodies of 300 Hagana and IDF soldiers and officers had been 
lain to rest in November of that year with impressive ceremony. During the mass 
funeral, work ceased in Jerusalem as 50,000 residents, including teachers and their 
pupils, awaited the funeral cortege along its route. 
139 Interment of another 600 dead zn zn 
was planned for 1950.140 It was also decided to place a monument to soldiers buried 
on foreign soil at the site. 
Eventually, Anda Pinkerfeld-Arnir, responsible for the Yizkor project 
suggested that a" Heroes Shrine" be constructed on Mount Herzl. She hoped that the 
shrine would "house all the rich material that has been gathered in memory of the 2-1 
, produced 
in an appropriate manner, so that each volume would be dedicated to a dead, 
single individual .,, 
141 Pinkerfeld-Ainir assigned a InUseurnized, historical meaning to ZD 
the space, \vIllch would preserve the menlory of those who had died so that the State 
could be reborn: 
We intend to bequeath a complete and comprehensive record of their 
lives ... They, who by their 
deaths, gave life to us and to our people. We have 
an obligation to them to inforin the coming generations about who they 
13 8 Ben Gurion. D., 1949, Defense Forces Daý 111c, Sde Bokcr: Ben Gurion Archi\ es. (Hebrc%%) 
13Q Da\ ar. 20 No\ ember 1950. 
140 Proposed Budget for 1950 prepared bý the Commemoration Unit. see Azarý ahu. 1995, p. 178. 
'4' Pinkerfeld-Amir, 23 March 1950. lettCl- tO LOttC FUld. the IDF Arclik, es. 758\ 19 13', 262. (Hebrc\ý 
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were... The shrine to be built will be a richly endowed monument, a place of 
study and communion with their memories. 142 
Pinkerfeld-Amir directed the proposal to the Prime Minister, Ben GUrion, who 
accepted it in principle. Upon receiving his decision, Pinkerfeld-Amir turned to 
architects and the Jewish Agency to advance her plan. 143 , Fhe proposal met the 
demands of those bereaved parents who had participated in the establishment of Yad 
Labanim the previous year. According to the proposal, a "Heroes Shrine" would be 
constructed in each of the three ma jor cities (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa). There, 
all the material that could be gathered on the lives and character ofthe fallen would be 
concentrated. After receiving Ben Gurion's approval in 1950, the intention to build the 
shrines was advertised in the daily press. Yosef Dekel suggested, in turn, that the 
Shrine be built as a national institution, in which documents pertaining to acts of 
Jewish bravery from the entire period of Jewish national renaissance, including the 
period of the Shomer and the Hagana would be concentrated. 144 In the end, the project 
was not undertaken due to the massive funds required. 
The special status of Mount Herzl rests in the symbolic function it fulfils as the 
national pantheon. For this reason, soldiers Nvlio fell before establishment of the State, 
such as the 25 Yordel HaSira, or those who fought in the Jewish Brigade during n Z, 
World War 11,155 were likewise honored. 145 In 1957, a "Commemoration Lane" was 
dedicated to the War of Independence dead Nvho Nvere buried on the Mount of Olives. 
A unique feature of the lane is that the commemorative plaques placed along its 
142 Pinkerfeld Amir, A., 12 March 1950, lettcr to Julis, E., a bereaved brother. the IDF Archives, 
758\1913\262. (Hebre\N). 
143 Pinkerfeld Amir, A.. 7 March 1950. letter to Dr. Lautcrbach ol the fe\\isli ALcncý . the 
I DF 
Archi\es. 758\1913', 262. (Ifebic\\) 
144 Dekel, Y., 12 Januarý 1954, Nlemoi-anclum to the Ministrý ol'Dctensc. IDF Archi\ es. (f1cbrc\v) 
14ý Davar. 30 April 1952. (Hcbre\ý) 
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perimeter list the names and identifying details of all the fallen in the very same 
format as these items appear on their headstones. 
146 
From the perspective of the State, Mount HerzI became the focal cemetery. A 
preponderance of resources and attention were channeled toward it, a fact that often 
irritated bereaved parents who were forced to wait until preparation of other military 
cemeteries could be concluded. 147 The proximity of the cemetery to the tomb of the 
founder of modern Zionism as well as to the graves of the Zionist Movement's and the 
nation's leaders endowed the site with a special aura. The process thus produced one 
of the main texts of Israel's founding myths, and fixed that text within the landscape. 
Mount Herzi thus expressed the national consensus with respect to the place of the 
War of Independence within the nation's heroic tradition. As a mirror of that 
consensus, any monument raised there, whether public or private, as will be shown in 
subsequent chapters, would reflect the attitudes prevailing at tile time. Although these 
attitudes would change with the ruling political constellation, in the 1950s, Etzel and 
Lehi dead were still denied a final resting place on Mount Herz]. 
Following internal Ministry of Defense consultations, which took place on 14 
March 1949 between Dekel and Anda Pirikerfeld-Arnir, it was determined that for the 
purpose of cornmemoration, "all those who fell while serving in the Hagana or on one 
of its missions as of 29 November 1947" would be included in the project. Later, ill a 
letter dated 23 May 1949 sent to Shaul Avigur, Dekel would request that the President 
or the Prime Minister declare that all those killed in action against the enemy "in 
operations that did not contradict the positions taken by the authorized institutions, 
146 Ballachanch, 55.4 September 1957, p. 8. (1 lebrcýý) 
147, See for e\ample minutes of the meeting between rePresentati\ cs ofthe Yad Labanim and the 
Minister of Det-ense Y. La% on, I March 1954, p. 1. cited in Azan ahu. 1995. p. 18 1. ftn. 59. (f lebrew) 
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starting from I December 1947, would be considered [IDF] servicemen. " He hoped 
that such a declaration would remove all doubt about the status of Etzel and Lehi dead 
who had acted in contradiction to the "position taken by the authorized institutions, " 
meaning Mapai-controlled organizations. Surprisingly, it was Ben Gurion who 
objected to a strict date, arguing that it was impractical. 148 
The issue was once more raised for discussion in connection with the 
condolence letters that Ben Gurion planned to send to the families of the fallen to be 
buried in military cemeteries. At the time, Ben Gurion explicitly stated that he would 
sign letters to Etzel and Lehi families "only in those cases that it becomes clear, after 
uncorn promising, painstaking investigation that they really died while on duty in the 
149 
war against the Arabs. " Several years later, Mordechai Orbach, as Director of the 
Commemoration Unit, would inforin Shelach that: 
... we have received numerous requests to transfer the remains of members of 
the Hagana and other organizations who were killed prior to 20 November, 
including cases such as yours. Please note that they do not comply with the Z: ' 
conditions allowing burial in military cemeteries... We [therefore] cannot 
transfer their bodies to the military cemeteries. ' 50 
The decision's intent is clear: Ben Gurion refused to allow the story of the 
rebellion against the British any place within Israel's collective memory, including a 
place arnong the military dead. In a later version of the decision appearing in the 
February 1951 edition of the Reshumol, the government gazette in which new ZD Zn 
regulations and laws are published, the binding definition of military service is given 
as "service in the Hagana or an-,,, other planned operation against the Arab bands and 
148 Ben Gurion, D. 29 Maý 1949ý letter to Aý igur. S.. IDI'Archk es. Mehre%\) 
141) Ben Gurion, D., cited in Ironi. Y.. 9 Januarý 1950, letter to Dekel. Y_ IDF Archk es. (Hcbre\\) 
1ý0 Orbach. N/l., 4 June 1955, letter to Shelach, the Jabotinsky lnstitute. -Iýrchivcs, 515 - 16',. (Flebrew) 
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invading armies from 30 November 1947 to 31 December 1948. " In effect, this 
definition states that only IDF and Hagana dead were eligible for the State's patronage. 
The graves of Etzel and Lehi dead were thus oft-icially lonored. Once again, Ll 
Shelach took upon itself performance of all tasks otherwise assigned to the Public 
Council for Commemoration with respect to the treatment of its fallen. Shelach's 
Department for the Underground's Martyrs, described itself as "tending the graves of 
Etzel fighters located in 18 cemeteries throughout Israel; it has placed headstones on 
their graves. " It is interesting to note that Shelach adopted the sarne rules legally 
required of the Public Council for Commemoration: concentration of graves in 
military cemeteries, uniformity in headstone inscriptions and headstone design, with 
the latter resembling the official version; and the Etzel seal, patterned after the IDF 
seal, place on the headstone. Other features were also copied, such as the preparation 
of special access roads leading to the graves and the regular performance of rituals for 
communing with the memories of the dead: 
The Etzel seal, smote in bronze, was placed on the uniformly designed 
headstones. Safed's ancient cemetery, Nvhere the hanged are buried, lies at the 
lower reaches of the hill. The approach to the graves was extremely difficult. A 
paved road, with steps permitting easy access to the graves, was completed on 
20 December 1953.1 51 
In addition to the transfer of their bodies from nurnerous plots throughout the 
Country and their burial in central locations, Shelach also took it upon itself to bring 
the bodies of dead who had died abroad for interment in Israel: 
During the previous year, the Department managed, after much effort, to 
retrieve from their graves in Italy the remains of Israel Fpstein, leader of the 
151 Shelach, 1950, S71111172ary Report, 15 April 1949 to 31 Oclober 1950. Jabotinský InstitUte Archi\ es, 
I\ 12 - 16. (1 lebrew) 
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Aviel squadron, who had died while trying to escape from prison in Rome. 
With the arrival of his bodv, an exhibition was dedicated to him at the 
Jabotinsky Institute; masses from the National Movement accompanied his 
ftmeral. The Department is also assisting in the transfer to Israel of the bodies 
of our Eritrean dead: Naftali Lubintchik, Shaul Galili, and Ellyahu Ezra, as 
well as in arranging for their funerals. The Department is also making every 
effort to return David Raziel's body from Iraq, but Fulfillment of this goal is 
dependent on other, external factors. 152 
Many of the fallen from the war against the Arabs were thus excluded from 
admission into the designated community of the dead, especially if they were 
associated with the underground. Even after lengthy legal battles (see Chapter Five) 
had confirmed that the underground's dead were entitled to be considered IDF dead - 
that is, they had died while fighting the Arabs in operations approved by the official 
Institutions the responsible agencies did little to amend the situation. "We were 
shocked to hear of their refusal to erect a monument to the Dir Yassin 
dead ... who ... were excluded 
from the Yizkor volume that has just be published. We do 
not want to believe that this was an act of malice, but a misunderstanding.... " wrote 
the head of Herut's Division for Rehabilitation of Members of the Underground to his 
peer in the Coin inemoration Unit. Only after the Courts had decided against the 
Ministry of Defense decision to prevent these fallen soldiers froin en - joying 
the same 
survivors' benefits given to their comrades in the Hagana were their bodies Z71 
transferred, in a military ceremony, from their temporary garaves to interment on 
Mount Herzl. 153 
ibid. 
Decision. 24 M a\ 1953, the Tel A\ i\ District Court, Case Nos. 56/51.96, /5 1.90/5 1ý and 92, ý5 1. 
(I cbrew) 
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The legal proceedings were not addressed against the policy per se, expressed 
in the definition of official war dead, but against what the Courts considered to be 
faulty iniplernentation of that policy. But again, even in the wake of the trial and the 
burial of the Etzel and Lehi dead on Mount Herzl, delay characterized official actions, 
such as the lethargic placing of headstones bearing the IDF seal at the respective 
graves. 154 In February 1956, in response to the ruling and Shelach's repeated demands, 
the Director of the Commemoration Unit wrote that: 
... the 
Ministry of Defense has agreed to place headstones at the graves of the 
five Dir Yassin dead located in the military cemetery on Mount Herzl. The 
headstones will follow the pattern of the other military headstones, and display 
identical Inscriptions but not the IDF seat. The IDF seal can be incised only on 
the headstones of fallen who had received a military serial number. " 
155 
The objective now before Herut was to retroactively construct the military 
status of its soldiers in order to qualify them for the official IDF seal. This meant 
retroactive enlistment in the IDF. In his letter of 26 January 1956 to Major Uri Vrum, 
the head of the IDF's Personnel Division, Katzriellenbogen wrote that: I 
The five Dir Yassin dead have not been [formally] enlisted by you to this very 
day. The problem arose when the Ministry of Defense Commemoration Unit 
informed us that they are unwilling to place the IDF seal on these 
graves ... because this seal can 
be incised only on the headstones displayingy a 
military serial number ... we therefore 
demand that you complete the enlistment 
procedure and inform the Ministry of Defense of that fact. 156 
'5' This attitude \\as extended to Shelach's request to reissue a YLkoi- volunic that \wuld incorporate the 
nannes of the underground's rnartýrs. See KatzricIlenbogen, B., 23 Januar\ 1956. letter to the 
Commemoration Unit. Jabotinský Institute Archkes, unnumbered. (Ifcbrc\ý 
Orbach. M.. 15 Fcbruarý 1956, letter to B. Katzriellenbo2en. pri% ate correspondence held bý H. 
Katzriellenbog-cn. (I Icbre\N ) 
I ýC, 
ý 
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To substantiate his demand, Katznellenbogen repeated the details of the 
Baranes case (1953), in which the court ruled that the Dir Yassin operation had been 
declared an operation approved by the Minister of Defense, which entitled the 
bcreaved families of the Etzel and Lehi soldiers to compensation. 
In the course of this parrying, copies of Katznellenbogen's request would be 
sent to Moshe Dayan, Chief of the General Staff, to Shimon Peres, Director General 
of the Ministry of Defense, and to Chaim Landau (MK, Herut), a member of the 
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. To Katznellenbogen's surprise, he 
received no response from any of the addressees, even after a month: 
sufficient time to compose a response ... your 
behavior in this matter is 
reprehensible... if I do not receive some comment as to your decision about 
this matter within the next few days, I will have no other recourse but to turn 
to the High Court of Justice, where the legitimacy of our demands will come to 
light 
... such a step ... will place 
the military institutions in a position in which 
the), will appear as negating the memory of the nation's heroes and liberators. 
Such an attitude is unbecoming to the IDF and its institutions, whose 
reputation we all are interested in upholding. 
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Peres eventually replied, advising Katznellenbogen that "the Minister of 
Defense has decided to enlist the Dir Yassin dead; hence, the IDF seal will be incised 
on their headstones. " 158 The political aspects of this tarrying was not, however, lost on 21 
Herut's members; they consequently protested against it: "... we view this 
procrastination ... as a 
deliberate slight to the memories of the nation's heroes, and an 
Institute Archi\ es, 5/16 - 16ý. (Heb, -ex\') 
, Peres. S.. 8 April 1956, Letter to Katznellenbogen. B.. Jabotinsky Institute Archi\ es. 5/16 - Wl. 
(1 lehrew) 
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affront to the feelings of their bereaved families and to all those who hold their 
memories dear. " 
159 
Ministry of Defense sources would not only resist the appearance of the IDF 
seal on Lehi and Etzel headstones, they would also not approve the appearance of the 
Etzel seal beside that of the IDF seal. 160 Thus, it fell upon Lehi, in addition to Herut, 
to attend to the issue of the headstones to be placed on their members' graves. 
Numerous letters from bereaved parents expressing their wonder that no headstones 
had been placed at their sons' graves were sent to Lehi offices as well. Many questions 
were raised in these letters: "We hope that the headstones will be ready by 
Remembrance Day. Will one of you attend the headstone's unveiling. It would be 
worthwhile advertising the date of the commemoration ritual so that his friends will 
be able to come. " 161 The parents of Lehi fallen, after observing the commemoration 
rituals for-Etzel and Hagana fallen, attended by a large audience, especially public 
figures, hoped that such participation would be repeated in their case. 
The case of the Dir Yassin dead and the efforts that had led to their ultimate 
inclusion in the community signified by the IDF seal indicates much about the 
meanings attributed to the attempt to deny them this distinction. First, these efforts 
were based on principle, which only judicial intervention could resolve. Second, from 
the standpoint of Herut, the effort to include Etzel dead in the official community of 
the dead was symbolic in character: Even after the bereaved families were recognized 
as eligible to enjoy the same rights as their Hagana counterparts, Shelach refused to 
desist in its attempt to arrange for headstones similar to those of Hagana dead. 
159 Katznellenbogen, B., 10 April 1056, letter to Shimon Peres, Jabotinsky Institute Archives, 5/16 - 10 
. (Hebrew) 160 Shelach, October 1956, Annual Report: Shelach, the OrganLation and its Activities, 1955-1956, p. 
6, Jabotinsky Institute Archives, 1/12 - 10. (Hebrew) 16 1 Dvir, B., letter, Beit Yair Archives, file nos. 37-38-39. (Hebrew) 
203 
Although the underground's dead were transferred to the military cemetery on Mount 
Herzl, their symbolic and political recognition - epitomized by the IDF sea] - was 
delayed, again until Judicial intervention put an end to Ministry of Defense policy. In 
closing this chapter of the confrontation hetween the two camps, Katzriellenbogen's 
comments, forwarded to the Commemoration Unit are highly revealing: ".. We are 
confident that you will recognize the injustice perpetrated to the bereaved families and 
to the memory of' their heroic sons for certain reasons that have no basis in the law 
that supposedly justified these action ." 
These events articulate how Mapai managed its campaign of symbolic politics. 
These did not involve econornic benefits or any of the other rights awarded to 
bereaved families per se. It did involve eligibility as a symbolic process conducted 
along channels of social communication. The official IDF seal incised on headstones zn 
was simply its tangible form. Contrary to a family's rights to benefits, such as tax 
deductions or financial assistance, issues that belong to the private sphere, a 
monument erected in full view at a public site - in this case, in military cemeteries 
qualified the dead soldier for mention in the commernorative literature published 
by the Ministry of Defense. Commemorative literature a highly effectively vehicle for 
transmitting social and political messages to the masses. This effectiveness was 
reinforced through the official rituals and commemorative services held at the burial 
sites. Accordingly, the battle of Etzel and Lehi veterans waged for recognition of their 2D ý t, tl 
dead was symbolic and political in the main. For this reason, even though the 
eligibility of the bereaved families of Dir Yassin dead and similar events for 
coil] PCII satiol I and bul-Kil III a llitlitarý ccnicterý ýNas cventuallý, recognized, the mo 
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sides continued a lengthy, often vituperative battle to realize their other respective 
symbolic demands. 
Summan, 
Israel's landscape was thus transformed into an arena for the play of political and 
social dynarnics, an arena for the distribution of' images and the marking of political 
understandings having long-term implications for the status of the governing elites zn 
and parliamentary movements. The organizations founded by the state for the purpose 
of constructing, Israel's landscape in all its manifestations - museums, memorials and 
military cerneteries - were utilized by Mapai to support its hegemonic status as the 
party responsible for Israel's independence project and, consequently, the sole party 
worthy of public trust. Contrary to Shamir's conclusion that "the network of 
relationships woven by parents, friends, the Ministry of Defense and the IDF during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s reflects attempts to consolidate a policy of non- 
intervention" 162 in all aspects of commemoration, I would argue that these 
relationships displayed tightly orchestrated intervention. Shamir's focus on the 
identities of the organizations involved in commemoration policy, "public" and state 
oroanizations that were not. formally, affiliated with any political movement or party, I 
has led her to deduce "non-intervention" by the State or, alternatively, the ruling party. 
An altered perspective, one focusing on the outcomes of that policy, indicates 
assiduous exclusion from the landscape of any trace of events or the dead not 
associated with the Labor Movement or N/lapai. 
In effect, appropriation ofstate commemoration allowed Mapai's leadership to 
place material symbols of its own, partial "story" about Israel's Nvar for national 
1" Slwmirý L. 1996. p. 73. 
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independence within the landscape; complementary narratives were left aside. 
Exclusion of Etzel and Lehi dead induced Herut to adopt a parallel strategy. Its 
resolute attempts to penetrate the landscape, accompanied by production ofa counter- 
Culture. pronio(cd the coninien-ioration of fallen soldiers belonging to their own 
political strain exclusively. Organizations closely resembling their state equivalents ZD 
managed the process. It so came to pass that each party's audience was exposed to a 
different narrative of the War's events, leading figures, and dead. 
Chapter Four 
The Language of Sovereignty 
Ben Gurion. The Champion qf Israeli Sovereignty 
Rivka Guber' 
One of the main instruments used in construction of the spirit of the time is language. 
Language, as a system of signs and symbols, produces and structures labels as it 
describes the constituents of reality, especially political real Ity. 2 It is thus an effective 
tool for distributing and inculcating political consciousness and collective memory. 
All citizens speak and write with language, they use language to define sites and 
processes. More than any of the institutions available for use as memory sites, 
language is the most intensively exploited. Through language we learn which regions 
have been conquered or liberated, and whether specific political actors are enermes, 
allies, or legitimate rivals. Hence, language is the basic medium for expression and Zn In 
construction of a collective worldview, for the penetration of values and dominant 
cultural givens. 
For its users. language is therel'ore a lens through which its speakers view and 
construct realitv. In order to comprehend the lens and its contours, students of 
language attempt to expose the interpretive package at its core. This package includes Z" 
assumptions and ideas that support one another and that, in tandem, construct 
interpretations of the past and present. In -general, fundamental staternents and, in our 
' Ri%k a Guber, R- 4 No% ember 1957.1 cttct- to Ren Gurion, D.. Sde Boker: Ben Gurion A rchives. 
2 Marcusc. 11- 1969. One-Dimcnsional I fan. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 85-101. 
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case, political statements about various sub_lects encapsulate all the names and 
descriptive phrases used by individuals in the process of social discourse. These 
statements produce while they reflect the conceptual frames anchored in social 
consensus. As tile frarnes adopted and cultivated by language disseminate social and I :n 
cultural narratives about reality, they become ingrained in individual consciousness. 
Among other things, frames are distributed as a result of their authors' 
demands for a plethora of devices, for symbols that succinctly and parsimoniously 
transmit the essence of a society's interpretive packages: its metaphors (images that 
reserrible the specific form of the perceived reality), representative events (stories that 
confirm the package's perspective), slogans (concise statements or sayings that express 
the frame), irnages and reiterated phrases (events frequently mentioned by key Z, 
figures). As Garrison and Modigliam argue, the dissemination of these frames through 
language is as vital a practice as is their construction. Penetration of the frames into 
the media, textbooks and state rituals is a condition for the transformation of these 
linguistic devices into daily speech, as such, the frannes transform political 
interpretations of reality into the social consensus. 3 
This chapter deals with one segment of Israel's cultural production, the 
language cýf sovereign(y, that is, the efforts of a political party - Mapai - to impose 
a dorninant systern of symbols and thereby identify itself with the national sovereignty 
project. This meant that political interpretive packages, dressed in the names of 
historical events, annual observances whose meanings were nested in the Hebrew 
calendar, defending warriors and fallen heroes Nvere incorporated into the dornmant 
culture. In the process, those dead who \\cre clearly associated with the ruling political 
3 Garnson. W. A. and Modialiani. A., 1989, N, lcdia Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A 
Constructionist A pproac I i. A merican Journal of Sociologi, 95( 1 ). 1 -37, 
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elite acquired a standing that awarded thein elevated social status and intensified 
societal recognition of their deeds. These ideas or themes may have been expressed in 
a concrete idiom, such as the monuments placed within the Israeli landscape or 
literature. For the most part, they remained on the level of language, in a system of 
phrases, disserninated and inculcated within the national consciousness through the 
premeditated choice of the dates with which they were associated. Events and rituals 
thereby acquired unequivocal political significance. This was accomplished while 
expressly ignoring or avoiding use of any reference to items such as dates or locations 
that might award recognition to competing political camps irrespective of their 
contribution to the national independence project at the heart of the political 
competition. 
The main practice explored in this chapter is that of political labeling. Labeling 
and its outcomes became part of daily life and the culture disseminated, Dissemination 
is a tool for the transformation of the subjective and equivocal to the objective and 
taken- for-granted. Regarding national politics, some scholars have argued that 
dissemination of labels is the requisite strategy for establishment of a civil religion as 
these labels encompass all the symbolic social behaviors initiated by the state in the 
creation of its doctrine. 4 The purpose ol' civil religion, as a competitor to church 
religion, is to disseminate rituals, symbols, and nationalist interpretations among the 
populace by means of secular rites, it thereby "acquires" an aura of holiness. In his 
research, Azaryahu, for example., delves into what he terms "state rituals", the 
5 
ceremonies and other practices involved Nvith observance of memorial days. The 
scope of this chapter is broader: it will illustrate how more subtle practices, such as 
Don Yehiýýl. E- 1989. smereigiltý and Judaism in Ben Gurion's Philosophý and Policý, HaZionzil, 
14, p. 70. (llebre\% ) 
Azai-%illLl. M. Staic Ritilals, Ben Gurion ýiiii%ei-sitý oftlie Nege\. Sde Bok-er: Ben Gurion Archies. 
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naming and labeling, the fruits of rational political manipulation, construct political 
perceptions of the past and the trarislatiou of those perceptions into present and future 
political behavior. 
As pointed out M the opening chapter, the nicanirig of political hegemony rests 
on the ability of the hegerrionic group to persuade the populace that only one story is 
true, that one narrative alone describes reality. This version is perceived as consensual, 
as indisputable. Here, I deal with the less obvious aspects of the attempt to construct 
that same irrefutable version. In doing so I will reveal the political structure beneath 
the linguistic and behavioral institutions just mentioned, the same institutions through 
which political hegemony is constructed. With the aid of individuals who assess 
events, images, and contexts, these institutions are themselves constructed. In order to 
expose these processes, an in-depth content analysis will be conducted. Such an 
analysis will reveal the conceptual frames with which Israel's hegemonic political elite 
modified society's vision so as to produce the desired political socialization. 
Specifically, the content analysis will reveal the political texts that underlie the 
labels, names, dates and national martyrs that became the substance of Israel's civil 
religion during the period in question. The challenge lies in exposing the interpretati ZD ZD III ive 
package etched within each text, including its mutually supporting assumptions and In 
concepts. To the degree to which the various elements of the frame are internalized, 
they acquire precise political sionatures. The frame, which is the vehicle for the covert 
dissemination of political ideologies, can be viewed as a narrative, in our case, the 
story of Israel's national sovereignty. This seemingly fortuitous narrative will employ 
metaphors, verbal labels. illustrative exarnples, and prominent figures. Taken 
together, these elements serve the political interpretations and elites in place. 
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The narrative deals with sovereignty: How it was achieved and by whom. The 
very use of the word sovereignty has political connotations that are still debated in the 
literature. Hence, this chapter will review several *junctures in the construction of a 
language that informs the description and comprehension of the past as it relates to 
Israel's national sovereignty. 
Naming the State's Banner Orl4anization 
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as an organization, was officially established on 25 
May 1948. At a government meeting held the previous day, Order No. 4: Israel 
Defense Forces (1948) was torniulated, based on Article 18 of the Lmv: Government 
and the Judiciaty; it was signed by David Ben Gurion, Prime Minister. 6 The IDF was Z-1 
meant to be the epitome of Israeli sovereignty, its banner organization. Over the years, 
it came to be a consensual institution, awarded broad public acceptance; for decades, 
criticism of the IDF was considered intolerable within Israel's cultural space. 7 Ben 
Gurion decided that the organization's narne, as noted in Article 2, was to incorporate 
the name of its predecessor, the Hagana ("defense" in Hebrew). In this way, the 
Hagana was awarded the symbolic significance it had aspired to: It became sacrosanct. 
In effect, inclusion of the Ilagana's name within the official title of the new nation's ZD 
armed forces "corroborates" the clami that the IDF was the Hagana's descendant. It 
"proved" that the Hagana had responded to statist burdens in the pre-State era; that it 2_ý 
had been the sole organization to staunchly express patriotic values and collective 
fealty. As part of the cited law. Ben Gurlon would write that "[w]ith the establishment 
of the State, the 11agana emerged from the underground to become a regular army. " 
6 OrderNo. 4. The Israel Defeiisc Forces (1948), 26 Maý 1948, Reshilmol. 
7 Lebel. U. 2002, Cracks in the Mirror otAlilitarý I lcgcmoný: The Courts and the Media as Agents of' 
Civil Socictý, in Koren. D. (I ed. ). Public Polio and, l(Iministration in Israel. Baltimore: Lexington. 
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He then went on to summarize Mapai's version of modern Jewish warfare in its 
various stages and organizational formats: 
The Yeshuv and the Jewish people are greatly indebted to the Hagana at each ZI - 
phase of its existence and development. from the isolated huds during the first 
days of its founding in Petach-'I'ikva,, Rishon LeTzlyyon, Gedera, Rosh Pina, 
Zikron Yaakov, and Metula, during the days of the Shomer, recruited amongst 
the pioneers of the Second Aliyah; the Jewish Battalions of World War 1; the 
Tel Hai defenders, and the steady growth of the national defense forces in the 
period between the two world wars; the creation of the Alotrim (Guardians) 
during the 1936-1938 riots; the founding of the Palmach and the infantry; the 
mass volunteering during World War 11 and the founding of the first Jewish 1ý 
Brigade, until the great struggle waged by the Hagana ... between 30 November Z. ý 
1947 until 31 December 1948. 
In Ben Gurion's version of the story, repeated in Ordci- No. 4. - Jsrael Dqfimse 
Forces (1948), a document that became a widely distributed primary text, Nili, Etzel 
and Lehi were conspicuously missing. Prior to the founding of the IDF, Hagana efforts 
alone had led to Israel's attainment of sovereignty. As he xvrote: 2-1 - 
Without the Hagana's experience, operational planning capacity and power of 
command, its loyalty and brave spirit, the Yishuv could not have met the test 
of the awful bloodshed that fell upon it during the first six months [following 
the UN resolution partitioning Palestine] nor could it have achieved statehood. 
In the history to be written of the Jewish people, the chapter on the Hagana 
will glow with an enduring splendor and glory. We are now about to open a 
new chapter - the regular armed 
forces of the State of Israel, the army of a ZD 
free and independent Israel, publicly announced in the order issued by the 
Interim Government, the Israel Defense Forces ... All those who served in the 
various Hagana divisions and branches until I June [1948] and who 
participated in the defense ofthe Ylsliuv and in the war for Israel's frecdorn, as 
well as all those who now re-enlisted according to the terms of the new law 
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will be members of the Israel Defense Forces. Every soldier, male and fcmale, 
serving in the armed forces is required to swear an oath ... the moral and 
physical might of each soldier and officer and their dedication in the 47, 
fulfillment of their duty - will enable 'the Israel Defense Forces to becorne 
the stalwart defender of the nation's peace. ý 
Ben Gurion would diligently stress the intense association between the IDF 
and the Hagana throughout his political life. 
Thus, due to the exclusion implied in the IDF's name, Etzel and Lehi veterans 
remained ambivalent for many years about the very use of the title "Israel Defense 
Forces". In the public staternent (May 1948) announcing Etzel's dismantling and 
incorporation within the IDF, Begin's attempt to avoid direct use of the name "IDF" 
was quite conspicuous. The phrase he preferred was "the unified army": "With the 
creation of the Jewish army, Etzel's fighting units are prepared to join the ranks of the 
unified army. Our battalions, its war-tested commanders and units, will be at the 
service of the general command in the fulfillment of their duty during the nation's 
struggle. "9 Etzel veterans tended to use the term "Israel's ariny, " as did their daily 
newspapers, Herut and Haboker, which represented the entire liberal camp and not 
exclusively Herut. 10 
In Begin's view, Etzel as well had been established as an army in the 
traditional sense; hence, its inclusion in the IDF was comparable to that of the 
Hagana: 
1jen ( Llriollý 1). -3) 
1 JLIIIC 1948,01'dcr No, 4.1w ad Peloisc Forccs (1948), citcd in 11ahoker. 2 Juk 
1948. (1 Icbrc\\). 
I HoBoker. 25 Nlaý 1948. (I-Icbre\\ 
10 See f-or example HaBoker. 2 hine 1948: "During )esterdaý's search conducted bý Israel's arrný in 
CaptUred Jaffa, a large arms store was discovered. " (Hcbrew) 
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My basic assumption is that Etzel was not mobilized solely for defensive 
purposes ... but as a [full-fledged] military force ... An army of liberation Is 
differentiated from a regular army primarily by the political function of tile 
battle ... an army of liberation cannot and must not abstain from creative 
political ideas nor from independent political operations whose purpose it is to 
obtain help, to intensify the fighting, and to hasten victory. '' 
For instance: "While the fighting in the Negev continues, Israel's anny opens a 
new front in the Hebron hills. " 12 Hagana members, on the other hand, viewed the 
narne "IDF" as recognition of the Hagana's superior contribution to the nation. Yaakov 
Rifkin (MK, Mapai), in a Knesset debate on the Casualiies Law, 1954, stated that: 
"The army was established on steadfast and sure foundations, it is no accident that the 
name 'Israel Defense Forces' [was chosen] ... nor that Herut has removed the word 
'defense' from the IDF's name. " 
13 Later, Zvi Shiloach (Mapai) would note the same. 
14 
Abba Eban, in contrast, would consistently refer to the "defending forces" ("hagana") 
whenever he mentioned the IDF. 
15 In this manner, the status of the Hagana as the Zý 
incubator of the 1DF was engraved within Israel's collective consciousness. tl 
Official Celebrations 
The Hagana was honored with more than inclusion of its name in the title of the 
branch of the state that was to be the anchor of national consensus. After 
independence, Tel Hai Day, II Adar (Hebrew calendar), was set as Defense Forces 
Day (Yom Hahaganci), an event xvith special significance on the Israeli calendar. This 
Begin, M., 20 October 1948, Herut. (lichrew) 
Ibid. 
13 Riflin, Y.. 6 April 1954, debate on the Lou ý Invali(ls (Pcnsions an(l Rehabilitalion) 
(. Imen(Imellf), 
1954. second and third reading. Meeting No. 411. the Second Knesset. Knessel Pi-otocols. (1-ichrew) 
14 )ecliot Aharonol, 8 June 1986. (1 lchre%ý) 
'ý Fban, A., 17 JUIN 1949. specch made during Del'ensc 1ýorces Daý. at the rnilitarý encampment in 
Icrusalern, cited in Davar. (I ic[)i-e\\ ) 
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region of collective memory, created prior to statehood, was transformed into a site for 
political bargaining with respect to its symbolic meaning. Despite each faction's 
attempts to appropriate the occasion, the national consensus continued to identik/ this 
date as symbolically meaningful. As the contest over its name "vas won bN the 
dominant party -Mapai - the date was appropriated and officially identified with 
the Labor Movement. By renaming the event, originally meant to celebrate Jewish 
pioneer heroism, it becarne identified primarily with the Hagana. Zýl 
Defense Forces Day and the Hagana 
Defense Forces Day was first observed in March 1949. A military parade was 
organized, with the Chief of the General Staff ISSI-Iing a special Order of the Day: ZD 
Today, we will review all the defense forces and units from the past to the 
present: the Mishmar, the Jewish regiments, the Field Command, the Palinach, 
the Notrim, the Jewish Brigade that fought with the British, the fighters behind Z' zn 
enemy lines, the soldiers and sailors who aided the illegal immigrants and the 
[weapons] smugglers -a huge assembly that paved the way for the Israel Zý11-1 
Defense Forces.... 
This rather inclusive list clearly differentiated between the Labor-associated 
pre-State fighting forces and Etzel Lehi, and Nili, which were excluded. From that day C-11 
forward, the pilgrimage to Tel Hai, which had always been organized and identified z: I I Z' 
III 
with the incipient state, became dominated by symbolic rituals whose participants 
were identified exclusively with the Hagana. At the 1951 ceremony, the Minister of 
Education and Culture and the representative of the Hagana Veterans Association 
each addressed the gathering. The iny1h of Tel Hal (_, radually lost its salience. to be 
superseded by Remembrance Daýl, the official nicniorial day, which marked the 
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bravery of the post- independence IDF. Tel Hai and its connotations were observed on 
a lower key due to their symbolic attachment to the Hagana and the left. In 1953, it 
was the Histadrut - and not the government - that financed tile site's 
refurbishment. 16 
Authorized celebrations were not the only events that became unequivocally 
linked with the Hagana. What could be considered private events organized by 
Hagana veterans also received state sanction and acquired the aura of "pseudo- 
official" events due to the patronage by mernbers of the political and military elite - 
ministers, generals and, of course, prime ministers - who became permanent fixtures 
as guests and as speakers. This custom began at the founding convention of the 
Ha-ana Veterans Association, held on the morning of a day infused with symbolic 
meaning - 15 May 1949 - the date Israel was accepted into the UN. The 
Association felt as if international recognition of the young state's existence was the 
fruit of only one group's labor - their own. Prime Minister David Bell Gurion 
referred to the event and its connection with Mapai in his address at the convention: 
We have been privileged in holding this meeting of the Hagana Veterans 
Association oil the very day that our nation's independence has been 
conclusively recognized by humanity's supreme authority, the United 
Nations ... I believe that we would not 
be exaggerating were we to say that it is 
to the honor of our defensive, fighting forces, which were born as the 
Hagana-and matured into the Israel Defense Forces. 17 Zn 
16 f-\cn-/oliai. S., 4 March 19ý3. lettcr to [101-()\Nitz. 1\;. 111(-i others. the State Archkes.. 5581/4460 , 
(I lebrc\ý ) 
17 Bell (ILII-iOll. D., 15 Nlaý 1949, the Yad Tahenkin Archkc. ý, 'Scction 15. the Oalili Archkes. 
Container 140. Box 2-7. (Iiehrcý\ ) 
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Ben Gurion continued in this vein and concluded by stating that the IDF was "the 
Hagana's legitimate offspring. " 
18 
t, 
The symbolic identification ofthe Hagana with the IDF materialized in the 
decorations placed on the rostrurn: Next to the national flag hung pictures of Herzt, 
TrUrnpeldor and Golomb. 19 Two organizations - Hashoiner (led by Trumpeldor) and 
the Hagana (led by Golomb) - were presented as pioneers in the efforts for rebirth as 
foreseen by the nation's prophet (Herzl). Ziporah Zayd, widow of one of the Shomer's 
founders, Alexander Zayd, placed the first revolver used by the group on the 
podium . 
2(ý The list of invitees also reflected the three groups; for instance, Yisrael 
Shochat and Rachel Yanait (Hashomer); Eliyahu Golomb's widow (the l1agana), and 
leaders of' the political, Zionist and military elite, such as Isidore Shalit. an elder 
statesman of the Zionist Movement, the Minister of Police Shitrit, the Minister of 
Education, the Director General of the Ministry of Police, representatives of local 
government, the Cominander-in-Chief Major General Yaakov Dori accompanied by 
top-ranking IDF officers, as well as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, David 
Ben Gurion. 
The ,,, oal the Ilagana Veterans Association set for itself ýNas to influence the 
country's cultural. educational and communications arenas so as to perpetuate the 
status of the Hagana as the foremost armed contingent to participate in the national 
independence project. The political leadership supported this goal and its wide reach, 
as reported by Lt. Colonel Yehoshua Eshel, a Hagana veteran and one of the 
Association's founders: "... Before convening this meeting ... we transmitted our 
intentions to the Minister offlefense and the Prime Minister ... we conferred with them 
Is Datur. 6 Januai, ý 1952. (Hebre%%) 
1c) Davcv% 16 Nlaý 1949. (1 lebre%N) 
10 Ibid. 
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and received their consent for our present and future activities. " At this first 
convention, educational and cultural programs were presented to the audience, all of 
whorn, as stated, had received political approval. As if to confirm the organization's 
aims, Nahum Ziv-Av, a Hagana district cominander, and an Association founder, 
noted that the organization was to operate "in cooperation with military institutions 
and the Ministry of Defense. 
Another participant, Yaakov Dori, the Chief of the General Staff, firmly stated 
that in his view, "the values at the core of the Hagana ... should represent the moral and zn 
spiritual foundations of the IDF. , 22 By saying so, Dori effecovely summoned the 
Hagana Veterans Association to act as an instrument of normative and ideological 
influence on IDF soldiers. The response to this invitation was a plethora of initiatives 
and intense Association involvement in the preparation of IDF educational programs 
to last many years. Even the Minister of Education, who had spoken before the 
convention on the subject "The Hagana as a Turning Point in the History of Israel, " 
gave his blessings to the transformation of this group into an instrument for 
influencing the historical perspective of the nation's youth. 
One of the messages that would later be distributed Nvidely was delivered by 
Shaul Avigur, one of Ben Gurion's most trusted friends and advisors, who had been 
responsible for the Hagaiia's procurement program. He stressed the Uniqueness of the 
organization. From his perspective, the Hagana was a body whose social significance 
lay in its contribution to unification of the YIshuv: "... prior to establishment of the 




into a whole. More than any other tie, and more than any other framework ... the 
,, 23 Hagana unified people from every class, party and individual loyalty. 
A precedent was set that night: Hagana ceremonies, like Palmach ceremonies, 
were made part of state ritual, with the heads of all major state institutions, from the 
Prime Minister to IDF senior officers, acting as their honor guard. 24 The Hagana 
Veterans Association thus became an accessible vehicle to ordinary soldiers for the 
dissemination of the Hagana/Mapai tradition and its version of the War's narrative 
and its protagonists. 
The Anniversary of Herzl's Death 
After Mapai had officially appropriated Trumpeldor's memory, the Revisionists 
sought to tie themselves to some other national figure in their efforts to achieve 
political legitimation. The figure they chose was that of Theodor (Benjamin Zeev) 
HerzI, the nation's prophet and founder of modern Zionism. Similar to the bargaining 
that had attended the appropriation of Trumpeldor and the Tel Hai site, attempts to 
attach HerzI to the Revisionist Movement began before independence. As early as 
1938, preparations were made to commemorate the anniversary of Herzl's death, 20 
,, 25 Tamuz (Hebrew calendar) in a "major display of Nationalist Movement strength . 
In 
opposition to the official attitude, which minimized the cultural space made available 
to others, the Revisionists openly tried to capture some of that space by identifying 
23 Ibid. 
24 For example, at the fifth annual convention of Palmach veterans in May 1957, in the course of which 
the monument to the ý": ) immigrants was dedicated on Mount Herzl, those attending included Israel's 
President Ben Zvi, the Chairman of the Knesset, Shprinzak, Knesset members and the Commander of 
the Navy. A Navy honor guard presented arms and the IDF cantor declaimed the prayer for the dead. 
Following the ceremony, Palmach veterans marched in a military parade along Jerusalem's streets. At 
the parade's head were Yigael Allon, Yisrael Galili, retired generals, and Lieutenant Colonel Michel 
Shacham, all in military dress. The parade's leaders were then received at the home of the President. See 
Haareti, 23 May 1957. (Hebrew) 
25 Jabotinsky Institute Archives, 5\1 - 27. (Hebrew) 
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thernselves with a universally accepted, politically uncontroversial figure - Herzt. 
This represented an opportunity to use the "national" lexicon as a tool in its 
competition with MapaFs language of sovereignty, which left no place for flerut. 
20 
On 20 Tarnuz, the following invitation was transmitted to Herut members. 
"All of Lis, every true student of Herzi and Jabotinsky, will ascend to the modest grave 
of B. Z. Herzi in recognition of the greatness of his vision and to commemorate his 
deeds.... " In 1954, the day was declared a holiday for members of the National 
Workers Federation, founded by Jabotinsky as an alternative to Mapai's Federation of 
Labor in Israel (the Histadrut). The day was described as "a demonstration dedicated 
to those who tolled to realize the Herzilan miracle. , 27 Herut organized the events to be ZI 
held at the 1954 observation with great care: agenda, transportation., placement 
national flags and Movement flags, registration of members, advertisements in Heria 
as well as the daily press. Review of the event's program reveals that it was planned to 
demonstrate the political power of the right. On II July 1954, a "national convention 
to finalize preparations for the 20 Tamuz demonstration" was held. Also planned was 
"a procession to Jerusalem by the Movement's membership, with vehicles carrying 
large signs displaying each branch's name. " Significant attention was also given to the I 
vehicles' decorations, which included the aforementioned sign, the national flag and a 
photograph of fferzl. The route within Jerusalem began at Jaffa Street, passed through 
King George Street, and culminated at the YMCA courtyard. The effect to be made by Z" 
a uniformly outfitted, densely populated column was very important to the organizers. 
,6 Ifl tillIC, I ICRIt \%OLIld call itself' "the Nationalist Camp. " 
'7 Preliminar) drall in pieparation of' 20 Tamuz celebrations Julý 1954), undated. lICI-Ut MOVellICIA 
Headquarters. Jabotinsk% Institute Arclikes. 8\8 - Imis. (Flebre\%) 
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A special order requested that "the drivers gas up on their way to Jerusalem. No firne 
would be made available to fill up with gas, water, or oii. i, 
28 
The ficrut Movement diligently worked to connect Herzl to Jabotinsky, 
argLIiIIg that the 1954 events would be dedicated to the two ideological -cousins" who 
had stubbornly adhered to political Zionism, as opposed to the practical version 
associated with Mapai: "This year, all mernbers of the Herut Movement will go up to 
Jerusalem in order to commune with the memory of the founder of ideological 
Zionism and to demonstrate the integrity of our philosophy. ... "29 The demonstration's 
effectiveness as a display of immense power by a huge number of participants was 
crucial to the organizers: "From the moment that the branch delegates reach the 
00 [YMCA] courtyard, no one will be allowed to leave.... 
The parade's participants were divided into six cohorts; they marched three 
abreast while carrying flags. All the marchers represented organizations and groups 
aligned with the Revisionist camp. The cohort carrying the national flag was 
accompanied by a unit holding pennants bearing either the Beitar or the National 
Workers Association emblern. The Association was represented by nurses, in uniform, 
employed by its National Workers Sick Fund. The parade's path extended fi-om the 
YMCA courtyard to King George Street, along the entire length of Ben Yehuda Street, 
passed through Zion Square, and concluded at the entrance to Romerna, one of the 
city's oldest neighborhoods. From there, buses carried them to Mount Herzl. A 
ceremony was then held in the plaza before the tomb. Beitar songs were heard, the 
movement's manifesto and Jabotinsky's eLIIOgy of Herzi were read, wreathes were laid, 
2S llrcparatorý dOCUMC11t, 8 Rllý 1954, Jabotinský Institutc Archi\ es. 8\8 -I ms. (Hebre\\ ,,, Ibid. 
3r) Ibid. 
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and the national anthein sung. The event concluded with the Herut leadership 
marching around the vault. 31 
At the gravesite, Herzl's image was equated with the motifs of sell'-sacrifice 
and bereavement. Herut used this connection to identify its own view with official 
positions on the subject in an attempt to topple the barricade of Mapai's pervasive 
statism and to inform the public that its movement was the proper representative of 
patriotism: 
The National Workers Association subscribes to Herzl's program in its 
entirety ... 
[its members] object to every forin of class struggle... [and] 
declare 
... 
20 Tarnuz a national holiday, a day for national pioneers to express 
then- loyalty to Herzl's ideas in their pristine form, the idea of national 
liberation. 02 
In its declaration of 20 Tamuz as a "general holiday in all employment 
sectors ... 
following an interval five years in length ... 
five years of violence that have ZD 
blurred the image [of 14erzlj and his simificance. , 33 Herut betrayed the political 0 
character of this act by the date it chose to celebrate labor because it differed from I 
May, the date declared as a workers holiday by its political competitor: 
The 20"' of May... is an alternative to the I" of May not only because it is the 
anniversary of Dr. Herzl's death, but because it is a day for dernonstrating the 
existence of a socialist model that completely contradicts that represented by 
the left 
... 
Our philosophy has yet to be realized and is awaiting its final 
t'ormulation 
... 
[it] rests on total belief in the individual. Beitar's leader 
31 Ibid. 
3 National W(li-kci-, A,, sociation placardý 14 Julý 19-338. Jabotinský Institute Archives, 1\8 - 2-1. 
(Flehre%% ) 
i" )cdiot 2, National Workers 
-Association 
inl'of-mation circular. 20 Taniu/ 1954. Jabotinský Institute 
A rchiN es, T, 5 -2 lý. 
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[Jabotinskyl constructed the fundamental precepts of this philosophy; it is our 
responsi . 
34 ibility to derrionstrate its validity through explicit acts 
More than expressing the substance of Revisionism, it was meant to negate tile 
ideological thernes that N/Japai celebrated in its own holidays: "The I" of May... the 
red [Labor Movement] holiday is not ours, the red flag is not our flag ... we will band 
05 together around our flag, the blue and white flag [Israel's national flag] . 
Herut's leadership had hoped that over the years, the cvent would be 
recognized as a general holidaN! and celebrated by the profusion of political streams 
active in the country: "... 20 May, the national workers holiday, will acquire the 
character of nationwide demoiistratloii ... we should expand its framework in order to 
transform it into... a tradition for everyone, a national-holiday lemphasis in 
original] . 
06 As a means of emphasizing their strength, Herut supporters were called to 
decorate their hornes and to display the national flag. They were also invited to: 
Blue and White Balls' that will take place throughout the country on the 
evening of 20 Tarnuz. The prograin will include, as customary, an address oil 
the Subject: 'Political Zionism to the Barricades! ', an artistic performance 
during which poerns by Jabotinsky and [Shaul] Tchernichovsky will be read in 
addition to excerpts from the writings of Flerz] and [Max] Nordau, a banner zn 
procession will be field, and the national anthem sung. In addition, a 
ceremonial formation [kvill take place] ... individuals who are not members of 
37 Beitar should also be invited... 
34 
Ibid. 
35 National 'ýVorkers Association placard, 20 -famuz, ý ear unspccified, probahlý 1970s. (Hehre\ý) 
I (, Thc Ccntral Plannim, Committee fbi the 20 FallILIZ Celebration. the Executi\ c Committee of' the 
National W'orkcrs Association in lsrJCIý DCpal"tIllellL 01' ('Ll]tLll'C alld hil'ormation, undated. apparciak 
193 8ýJabotinskýIiistitu te A rc Iii\ es -7 -5 -21ý,. (I i eb re 37 1 bid. 
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The Planning Committee for a sirrular event, held on 21 July 1954, the 50"' 
anniversary of Herzl's death. decided to present the nation's prophet as the spiritual 
father of Revisionism. Herzl, like Jabotinsky, believed in a political Zionism, and, 
again like his assurned disciple, Jabotinsky, Herzi had likc\vjse been called a "rebel": 
Two decades ago, under the shadows of exile, in the ghetto's gloom, Herzl had 
unfurled his banner. He was alone, forlorn, a rebel, yet far-reaching in his 
vision, bearing his mission on his solitary shoulders - an historical figure 
who by the force of his vision changed the world's direction... full realization 
of his vision has been blocked by those skeptical, puny leaders who have 
rejected him. The instrument Flerzl envisioned - the State of Israel - fought for 
by his adherents, chiefly his [spiritual] heir, Zeev Jabotinsky, who paved the 
way for his other spiritual and ideological followers - the soldiers of the 
Jewish undcrground. 's 
This was not the first time that Herzl had been presented as a dissident. As part 
of the defense delivered during, the Acre trial of the Oley HaGarclom, MatItiyahu Zý - 
Shmuelevitch, one of the defendants, declared that: "Herzi as well as Jabotinsky were 
rebels. "39 This attitude acquired a permanent place in Herut indoctrination and 
symbols. From the day that 20 Tamuz was declared as National Workers Day, the dais 
would be decorated with pictures of both Herzl and Jabotinsky. Pictures of the two, as 
a pan-, first appeared on the Tel Flai Fund lo-o. 40 After Herut's first national 
convention, which took place at the Ofiel Shern hall in Tel Aviv on 19 October 1948, 
large photos of Herzl, Jabotinsky and David Raziel Nvere to hang over the stage. 41 
38 Herut Headquarters, document prepared tor the 20 Famuz celebration. Julý 1954. Lllldatedý 
Jabotinsk) Institute Archives, 8\8 - I, i. (HehreýN) 
19 Heria, 24 Dcccrnhcr 1948. (1 febrew) 
40 Jabotinsky Institute Archives, 2- 7. (1 Ichre\N) 
41 Weitz. Y., 1993, The Revisionist Movement and the I. ahor Mmement. Studies in Israel's flehirth. 
Tel A\ i\: Am Oveclý 352-353. (Ilchrcýý) 
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The relative success with which flerut was able to appropriate the image of 
Herzl was made possible, arnong other things, by the fact that Mapai was not terribly t, 
eager to emphasize the place of the country's prophet in its own sovereignty project. 
While flerut's purpose in linking itself to the image of national consensus was to 
acquire political legitimacy, Ben Gurion, from his unassailable position of power, had 
no intention of allowing another figure to overshadow his owu in the coterie of those 
responsible for the rebirth of the State (also known as the "third temple"). This 
position was buttressed by the fact that Herzl had taken no part in the Labor 
Movement or socialistic activities. The exact opposite was in fact true: Herzl's 
movement, the General Zionists, upheld liberal and secular values and would 
eventually tie itself to Herut within a right-wing political bloc. Herzi had also been 
involved in diplornacy, the sarne "political Zionism" that Ben Gurion and his 
movement eschewed if not despised. Nevertheless, when confronted with Herut's 
intensive efforts with respect to Herzl's image, the Kriesset decided in 1948 that the 
anniversary of Herzl's death would be observed as "State Day. " An editorial in Dam. r 
commented that this occasion should be considered as "a memorial day to the 
,, 42 contemporary author of the idea of the State of Israel . 
Yet, State Day was observed 
only once. In its place, the date on which independence was declared 14 May, would 
come to be celebrated as the national holiday, institutionalized in a law passed on 27 
April 1949. This declaration relieved Ben Gurion of the need to share prestige for the 
achievement of independence with another fiLure, it thereby facilitated the 
transformation of Ben Gurion's version of sovereignty into a fundamental value in Z7, - 
Israeli society. 
Davarý 27 Julý 1948. (Ilchre%%) 
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Ben Gurion, though, did use Herzl's image on the first Defense Forces Day, 
celebrated in 1949: 
Although today is the 45t" anniversary of the death of the prophet ofthe Jewish Zn 
nation, it is not a day of mourning or lamentation but of exaltation and 
thanksgiving, victory and strength, because our drearn has been realized. The 
mortal Herzi is gone ... yet, the 
immortal Herzi [remains] 
... 
his spirit floats 
above the renewed State of Israel, its builders and defenders. From this day 
forward, 20 Tarnuz will also be an auspicious day - celebrating Herz] as well 
as those who realized [his drearril -Israel Defense Forces Day ... 
The IDF was 
not created without a cause ... the 
Yishuv and the Jewish people owe the 
Hagana an overwhelming debt... frorn its first isolated buds ... through the 
Shomer 
... the 
Jewish re,, iments... the defenders ofTel Hai ... the establishment b 
of the Notrun during the 1936-1938 riots, followed by the founding of the 
Palmach and the armored divisions, the mass volunteering during World War 
11 and the creation of the Jewish Brigade, concluding in the awesome struggle 
waged-during the second half of the first year of the war against us, from 30 
43 November 1947 until 31 May 1948. 
Independence Day and Remembrance Day 
On 14 May 1948, following the departure of the British Mandatory government, David 
Ben GUrion declared the rebirth ol'the Jewish State in the land of Israel. Armies of the 
surrounding Arab states immediately invaded, bent on destroying the newly born 
entity. During the struggle to consolidate the infant state, Ben GUrion Yearned to 
create a national holiday to symbolize and observe political and national sovereignty. 
44 
similar to those celebrated by other nation S. Two symbols already existed: the 
4 ', Haai-eiz-, 19 Julý 1949. (1 lchre%ý) 
. 14 Some scholars assign the term "ci\ il religion" to projects in %\hich holiday's arid 1esti\ als exalt the 
national being. See for example Leibman, S. and Don Ychiýa. E., 1983, Civil Religion in Iyrae[ 
Tiý(i(lilioiiaIJiidaisi? 7atidPolitic(ilCiiltiii-eii7tl7eJeii, ish, ýt(ite, Bcrkcle, %: 1)'tii\ei-sitN, of'C'alitof-iiii Press. 
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national flag and the national anthern. The debate surrounding the choice of the 
45 
specific dates was raised by the Ministry of Defense in late 1949 . 
The Hebrew calendar provided several options. Among them was 20 Tamuz, 
the anniversary of Herzl's death, a date shunned by Ben GUrion after I lerut's fairly 
successful appropriation of Herzl's image. Another date, II Adar, Tel Hat Day, the 
anniversary of the death of Trumpeldor and his comrades (1920), had become Defense 
Forces Day; although it suited Ben Gurion's purposes in that version, it nonetheless 
prevented broad segments of society from identifying with its substance and from 
participating in the ceremonies. Another option raised was 21 'Famuz, the date of the 
death of Chairn Nachman Bialik (1935), Israel's poet laureate. However, Bialik's life 
was devoid of any clear symbolic connections with Ben Gurion or the Labor 
Movernent. Two dates remained: 2 November, that date of the Balfour Declaration 
(1917) symbolizing external recognition of the Jewish national aspirations, and 29 
November (1947), the date the UN partition resolution passed and Jewish sovereignty 
in Israel was recognized internationally. The last two dates were perceived as fitting 
alternatives but the establishment of the State contributed an alternative that would 
focus on the image of Ben Gurion himself. The day the State was declared, viewed as 
an act of "procreation" at the hands of Ben Gurion, represented the transition from the 
nation's "absence" to its "presence, " an occasion that separated between "before" and 
"after, " the beginning of a new temporal sequence for Zionists and for Jews. 
Ben Gurion was intent upon stressing his role in the process. The day to be 
chosen would symbolize, in its name as in its date, a new perspective on the events, 
commencing from the date of the nation's rebirth. As the formal director of the 
project., fie was able to link the process mth his own self and his efforts, not the least 
4 A\ jgUr, S., 18 December 1949. letter to thc Dori, Y., Chiel'of the (iclicl-Lil Staff. (Ilebrew) 
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because in the imagined "future, " Ben Gurion and the Labor Movement were bound to 
be at the center of activity. Again, the date statehood was declared became identified 
with Ben Gurion personally for it was his decision to convene the Interim Government 
at the Tel Aviv Muscum in April 1949; it appeared to be the natural choice for 
celebrating Israel's rebirth. Knesset ratification of the holiday's date in April 1949 
thereby confirmed that Ben Gurion was indeed responsible for Israel's transition to a 
full-fledged state. Time was pressing and the alacrity with which the proposal was 
raised and voted upon prevented, as Azaryahu notes, a thorough discussion of the 
issue. The nation's leadership acted hastily, being interested in assigning the holiday's 
date as quickly as possible. It therefore sidestepped an opportunity that, "under other 
conditions, could have triggered an important public debate due to its relationship to 
,, 46 questions concerning the foundations of national existence. 
The choice of the date on which national independence was declared is not 
self-evident. Many countries have preferred to celebrate the occasion on the date of 
their release from colonial bonds, a pattern set by the United States. In Israel, some 
members of Herut rejected Mapai's choices. As Y. Rubin, editor of Herut wrote: "We 
consider our national holiday to be the day when the British were ousted and not 29 
November ... the Israeli public never accepted 29 Noveniber... [they] know that the 
true date that changed Israel's history is the withdraNval ofthe British. , 47 Thus, from 
the point of view of Herut, the British physical departure from Palestine was the 
relevant date and as such, common property. This Nvas the same project over which 
Begin saw himself as leader and advocate: 
On 14 May 1948, the British flag was lowered. The rebellion had succeeded, 
The British Governinerit announced that 80,000 soldiers, without cooperation 
Azar, alm. M. 1995ý p. 24. (Hebre\\) 
llerzaý 5 December 1948. (IlebreNN) 
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from the Yishuv, were inadequate to maintain order when the terrorists began 
their operations by means of units equipped with modern weapons. The State 
of Israel was declared, an interim government was established. We [the 
Rcvision1stsj made no request to be included in that -overnment. We t, 
continued to fight for our people. On 15 May, the Voice of the Zionist 
Resistance announced the following: 'Etzel has abandoned the underground as z' 
we approach an independent Jewish state. In the State of Israel we will be 
soldiers and builders, obedient to its laws, because they are our laws, and to its 
government, because it is our government. 49 
Debate over the date intensified when the subject of its name arose: The narne 
of the observance would in effect imply the official name of the War as well. 
Legislation proposed by the government stipulated "Sovereignty Day , 49 : "The Knesset 
hereby declares that the date 14 Iyar as 'Sovereignty Day' is to be celebrated annually 
as the national holiday. , 50 Etzel and Lehi veterans preferred the name "War of 
Liberation Day, " which recalled liberation frorn the British Mandate. Linguisticalk, 
the word "liberation" implies removal of the burden of colonial conquest, a concept 
which described the British rule rather than the Arab military threat. Flerut was 
interested in presenting the war as an anti-colonial war of liberation because. arriong 
, s, this interpretation stressed 
its members' role in the process. Ben GUrion, other thing 
in his attempts to ignore the conflict with the British, especially the part played by 
Herut, moved to prevent use of the word. Yet, as a narne, "liberation" was very 
popular. Within the frarnework of the Zionist discourse, it expressed the view that 
Zionism is a movement for the liberation of Jewry. Ben Gurlon preferred tile narne 
Reginý N4- 12 Januarý 1959. Proposal for a no-confidence %ote submitted b) Herutý Knesýwi 
I, rwoco[s. (I Ichl C\\ ,) 41) This term ýNas taken from "The So\ereiLmtý. " one of' the %esseks that comc\ccl illcL, ýil Jn%ish 
immigrants to Israel in earl) 1948. 
ýO 
ý 
Article 1. [cm, Independcnce DaY (1951). (1-febrew) 
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"Sovereignty Day" because it also stressed the institutional aspects of the war. For zn 
him, the word "liberation" raised associations with the past, a past in which the 
dissident organizations were actively involved. The concept "sovereignty, " however, 
alluded to the present, a present that Ben Gurion and his movement, as members of 
the ruling group, would steer on a daily basis. 
The right, on its part, continued to view the word "liberation" in its own 
political context. "Liberation" had already become ingrained in its rhetoric. As early as 
1941, the word appeared in the eulogy written by Joseph Vinitzky on the first 
anniversary of Jabotinsky's death: "Israel's liberation movement will remember his 
words and his vision. 01 After statehood was gained, the public was invited to attend 
"Etzel's exhibit on the subject of the War of Liberation, " mounted by Shelach in order 
52 
to publicize the underground's part in this achievement . 
The view of the War as a struggle for liberation was accepted and internalized 
by large segments of Israeli's population. During commemoration services held in zn Z, 
April 1949, it was stressed that the fighters fell "in a war for the liberation of the land 
- birth .,, 
53 Labor's ideological perspective, according, to which liberation" of oui I ZD 
referred to the systern of social relations maintained between individuals or classes 
that Nvas to guide construction of a just and egalitarian society, appears not to have 
been absorbed by the public at large. This fact disturbed Ben Gurion, who wished to 
" ý4 transform national rebirth into "one of the milestones in the history of Israel, on a 
par Nvith the exodus from Egypt, receipt of the Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai., 
Joshua Bin-Nun's conquest of ancient Israel, and other major events in the course of 
lla)ardm. 23 July 1941. (Hehre%ý) 
Shelach. Independence Daý 1950ý cite incomplete in original. (I lebie\ý) 
Davar- 13 April 1949. (Hehrcý\) 
54 ficii ( lut-ion. D., 1951 The Status of the Zionist Federation in Isracl. The i, ision and lhe fl4y. I cl 
A,, i\: N/lapai, p. 18. (Hehrcw) 
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Jewish history and national consolidation. " Significantly, he viewed himself as solely 
responsible for this modern feat, the credit for which he was not willing to share with 
others. Thus, the sarne series of events were perceived as two different projects, 
headed by two different leaders - Ben Gurion and Begin - each jealous of his place 
in the respective missions. 
Mapai soon began its campaign to inculcate "sovereignty" into the national 
consciousness. In February 1951, Yosef Dekel and Yitzhak Ben Zvi sent a letter to 
Ben Gurion in which they transmitted the decision reached by the Commemoration 
Unit's Public Council, according to which "IDF dead are to be officially called 
'Martyrs of the War for National Sovereignty. ,, 56 Similarly, the caption for the starnp 
to be issued for Israel's fourth anniversary was planned to read as: "In Honor of 
Independence Day and the Martyrs of the War for National Sovereignty. " 57 
Although a different model was eventually accepted, Article I of the 
respective law was revised (1949) by the Knesset Internal Affairs Comin ittee to read: 
"The Knesset declares that 5 Iyar will henceforth be known as Independence Day. , 5S 
This decision did not in any way prevent Mapai, with Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi at its 
head, from retaining the term "sovereignty" as if it were the official title. At the first 
meeting of the Commemoration Unit's Public Council, with Ben Zvi presiding, it was Z-- 
decided to suggest to the government that it "change 'independence' to 
'sovereignty'.... " The proposal was transmitted that very day in a letter sent to the 
Minister of Defense and signed by Ben Zvi himself. 59 In 1953, in response to Uri 
Don Yclulia. E- 1989. p. 70. 
Public Council t6r Commemoration, 21 Iýehruary 1951, Minutes, IDF Archi\csý unnumbered. 
(HebreM 
57 Dckel, Y.. 29 N, o\ ember 195 1. letter to the Director of'Postal Services. (I Icbrew) 
ss Legislati\e proposal including the amended article, ratified bý the Knesset on 12 April 1949. 
(Ulebre\\ ) 
59 Yad Ljbanirný 21 Fcbruary 195 1, meeting protocol. IDF Archives. (I ICbFC\\) 
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Avrieri, a publisher, publicist and former Lehi member who had argued in favor of the 
name "Independence Day" and who had complained about the use made of the phrase 
"Sovereignty Day, " Ben Gurion detailed why he favored "sovereignty": 
I pi-cler sovcreipity to independence for two reasons: Independence is an I, , 
artificial and contrived word, whereas sovereignty can be found in the 
Scriptures. Sovereignty 
... 
is a deeper and more daring expression for the status 
of free men. , 60 
The word "sovereignty" was incorporated into the texts of every event 
connected Nvith statehood that required official authorization. For instance, the history 
published by the Ministry of Defense in 1959 was entitled The -11i, vtory of the Warfor 
National Sovei-eignty. In every instance where a name for a settlement or site was to 
be assigned, the highest reaches of the Israeli government became involved, as in the 2-1 
case of the new settlement established in 1959 in the Lachish region, named 
Konnnemiyut (sovereignty). Letters sent to bereaved families on the eve of 
Remembrance Day. 1951 was addressed as follows: "To the family of martyrs of the 
War for National Sovereignty. The Israel Defense Forces has decided to distribute the 
Sovereignty Decoration to all the soldiers that participated in the War. 
It is appropriate here to return to the events surrounding passage of the 
legislatioii regarding what would becorne Independence Day. As stated, the alacrity 
with which the proposal was passed enabled Ben Gurion to install himself as the 
decisive force in the culture of state ritual. As the interim between the planning and 
celebration of Independence Day Nvas short, the Knessct subcommittee's decision to 
transfer all the relevant items to the government also transferred discretion lor how the 
Ben Gurioný D. 5 Nlaý 195-33. letter to Avineri. S.. Mapai Archi%es, 316\5376 -,,, '13. 
I-cttcl, s'ent to hel-ca\ ed tillililics. April 195 1. IDF Archi\ cs. (f lebre\\ ) 
2.33 2 
62 holiday would be realized throughout the country. The law assigns responsibility for 
crafting the ceremonies to the Prime Minister because it places control over national Zý 
holidays within the al-Ithority of the highest reaches of government. This power was 
expressed, among, other things, in the choice of organizations that joined the IDF z: l Z-- t: l 
the official focus of the celebration - during the holiday's observance over the years. 
The military parade held in Tel Aviv in 1948 included Palmach units, who marched 
with their banners. However, on the eve of Sovereignty Day in the following year, 
1949, special displays were prepared for a press conference. When Ben Gurion 
announced that the Haoana \vould not participate in that year's military parade, ZI 
somewhat of a ruckus arose at the conference. His decision rested on his desire to 
ascribe a distinctively statist character to the parade, meaning that the IDF alone 
61 
would participate . 
Ben Gurion's decision was not well greeted, and his explanation indicated that 
he sought, in effect, to exclude from popular recognition those heroes who were not 
members of the political coalition at whose head he stood. At the same time, lie 
wished to stress that statist values transcended the various political factions that had 
survived the period of the Yishuv. As a political actor, Ben Gurion was wont to 
altercate with Hagana veterans from the Knesset podium over historiographical issues; 
his targeted efforts were ineant to highlight the establishment of the State and of the 
IDF, both celebrated on Sovereignty Day, as the sole watershed in modern Jewish 
national revival. In the process, he Would dwarf the contribution of other parties, even 
members of his oýNn ideological camp, should they become his political rivals and 
certainly ifthey opposed his monolithic status. 
ol I Lrari, Y.. 12 April 1 949ý N/leetitiL, No. 23, the First Knessct. Kncsset Prolocoly. (Hchre%\ 
,,,, 
, 
I/ Hatnishmar. 27 April 1949. (Iic[)i-c\\) 
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The fourth ma jor symbol used to fix the identity of the war was Remembrance 
Day, Israel's Memorial Day. 
III SUIlliner 1950, Dekel had requested that Ben Gurion raise the iSSUe of 
permanent observance of a memorial day in the schools before the government. 64 The 
schools were to become the major mechanism for the inculcation of Labor Movement 
and Zionist values. Given the legal definition of the War's dead, the majority of Etzel 
and Lehi dead - unlike their colleagues from the Hagana - could not be officially 
recognized. The very narne assigned to this observance, as we shall see, emphasized L- ZI 
rather causticallý, the political advantage of one political camp over the other even in 
the area of death. This superiority was expressed, for example, in the Orders of the 
Day issued by senior officers. For instance, the Order of the Day regarding the 
Remembrance Dav observed in 1953, prepared by Major General Mordechaii 
Machleff, the Chief of the General Staff, made no reference to the underground's 
fallen: 
On this Remembrance Day we shall honor the memory of our comrades, the 
fDF soldiers who fell so that the our nation could be reborn ... [and] share their 
memory Nvith their parents and fain II ieS.,, 65 
The -eneral public also seems to have internalized the message that the 
occasion was a "Memorial Day for the IDF soldiers who had fallen in the war for 
national sovereignty. " 66 IDF war dead, we should recall, included the Hagana dead 
", lio had been officially reco-nized as belonging to the first group by virtue of special 
gislation. le- 
Dckc I. YA ugust 1950. summar\ of- meeting, \\ ith Bcn (Jurion, D. fDF Archk cs. (Flcbi-c%\) 
Machlufl'. 11) April 1951. Or(ler ofilic 1)(i. y. Renl, '127hrance Day, IDF Archives. 72\90 - 156. 
lcbrc\ý ) 
HaBoAcr. 10 April 1953. (1 Icbrc\\ ) 
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In 1958, the term sovereignty was entered into a legislative proposal ineant to 
institutionalize Remembrance Day observances . 
67 Knesset Member Shmuel Dayan 
(Mapai), himself a bereaved I'ather, acting in the namc ofthe Commemoration Unit's 
Public Council. proposcd a law: Remcnibronce Day in Honor (ýfihc Marlyrs (? I'Ihc 
W, urfior AlwionalSovereigw-v. The legislation was completed only on 28 March 1963, 
15 years after independence. Wlien passed, Law. - Remembrance Day in Honor of the 
Mar(yrs (ýI'Ihe U'arfi)r National Sovereignty (1963), which set 4 lyar as the official 
date of its observance, was received by a standing ovation. Yad Labanim, the leading 
civil organization active in commemoration, noted this achievernent that very year: 
This, the fifteenth year that Israel recognizes, with the greatest respect, the memories Z: ) 
of its sons, its heroes, the fallen in the War for National Sovereignty and the Israel 
Defense Forces. " 
The right's reservations about how the day would be called were raised in the 
debate that preceded the vote on the law. I will begin with its name, " lectured Esther 
Raziel-Naor (Herut) from the podium; she suggested that: Z-- 
... the 
]a\\, be called Rernembrance Day in the Honor of the Heroes of the War 
of Independence and the Israeli Defense Forces. ' In the body of the law, it 
should state that ... 
[this] represents an honorable commemorative observance 
dedicated to all the fighters for Israel's freedom and the IDF soldiers who fell 
in canipaigns for establishment of the State and its security, to share in their 
meniory, to ponder on their sacrifices and valiant deeds. 
Acknowledging the convoluted phrasing of her suggested title, Razlel 
explamcd that trom her perspective. it should refer to the many groups whose sons 
Motionjýn- the (Proposa/ No. 609). 18 June 1958, Knessel Prolocols, h 
(, 3 Yad Lahaniin 1-1 hine 1963. (Hebi-e\ý) 
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had fallen for the sake of national rebirth because she felt that the name originally 
suggested excluded them: ZZ, 
A nation's independence - when does it occur? ... From the moment that its 
sons do not fear to submit to the yoke of destiny ... Therefore, those who fell on 
the Night ol'the Bridges and on the barbed wire surrounding Sharona, in the 
battle for the conquest of Jafla and in the airport at Kastina, at the refineries 
and at railway workshops or, in simpler, more prosaic terms: the martyrs of the 
flagana, the Pali-nach, Lehl, Etzel and Maha 169 - all these are worthy of our 
respect... 
In response, the Ministry of Justice, D. Yosef, rejected Raziel Naor's 
suggestion to change the name of the proposed law, while noting that in his view, 
"there is no significant difference between the expression 'war of national sovereignty' 
and 'war of indepetidence'... It rctcrs to everyone, without exception, who fell for the 
sake of the revival of the Jewish nation and its security. " 70 Thus, the war's name 
becarne legally sanctioned as the War for National Sovereignty with respect to the 
nation's Remembrance Dav as Nvell. The terin "independence" remained excluded 
from the official rhetoric for the time being. 
In response to Razicl-Naor's demands, Mapai limited the law's referents to 
those xvho had been recognized as IDF war dead, meaning mainly Hagana troops who 
had been incorporated as soldiers in the IDIF and who had fallen after declaration of 
statehood. Nonetheless, the possibility of including the underground's members 
remained implicit, depending on the date Etzel was disbanded and their consequent 
behavior. 
Voluntcers from ahroad \ýIio lought in the War of' Independence. 
Rjzic I -Naor. F. R a/ ic I -Naor FiIe, ja hotinský I nstitutc A rchk es. (I I iehrc\ý) 
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As part of the 1957 ceremonies, wreathes donated by the following bodies 
were to be placed on the rostrum: the Ministry of Defense, the municipalities, tile 
Ministry of the Interior, the IDF, the Jewish Agency, Yad Labamm, the Hagana 
Veterans Association and the Association of Disabled Servicemen. No representative 
of the underground was invited . 
71 The symbolic identification of Remembrance Day 
with Mapai continued into the 1960s. During the 1963 Remembrance Day observance, 
an official ceremony was held at the military cemetery in Nachlat Yitzhak, Tel Aviv, 
where a number of Lehi and Etzel dead, the majority of whom had fallen during the 
Altalena incident, were also buried. Aniong those invited to witness the military honor 
guard were the Minister of Justice, Pinchas Rosen, the mayors of Givatay1m and Tel 
Aviv, members of the Hagana Veterans Association, and the parents of interred 
Hagana dead 
. 
72 By now, flagana veterans had become standard fixtures of 
Remembrance Day ceremonies throughout the country, whether as honored guests 
73 seated on the stage or as active participants in the proceedin gs. 
The Underaround's Attempts to Enter Collective Memory 
Despite the elimination of an,, refercrice to Etzel and Lehi dead from official 
Remembrance Day rituals, sorne did try to mention their comrades during these 
occasions. Thus, for instance, in 1953, a group of Flerut members initiated a ceremony Z, 
in Tel Aviv to coin mcin orate cornrades originally from that city. The event was called 
to observe the fifth anniversary of what they called "the rebellion's victory against the 
British oppressor and the capture of Jaffa. " The intent had been to introduce 
commemoration of Etzel and Lehi dead into the proceedings of an official ceremony 
YCSI I C\ III U, SA 1., 27 NI arch 1953. letter to A razL S-cited in A zaryahu. 19933. Between 1 wo ( 'ities, 
kalhe(ku. 68.1). 120.11n. 71). (1 1ch-c\\ ) 
An-ar, 7 Nlaý 1963. (1 IchrcN\ 
Ouvar, 2 Nlaý 1963. (1 Ich-c\\ 
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already packed with Hagana symbols and organized by Hagana veterans. However, Z!, Z-1 
the very fact that Herut "dared" to inention its contributions during the public 
observances riled Mapai officials. They viewed this action as a provocation: "We fear 
that the said gathering will disturb the festive aura ofthe public celebrations on the 
following Independence Day, " wrote a Ministry of the Interior official to a member of 
the event's Organizing, Committee. 74 , Fhe issue raised considerable indignation, which Z: I 
induced the Committee to express its serious objection to an event that they viewed as 
"political" in nature. Although the event was cancelled, Herut did make its mark on 
Tel Aviv's commemorative activities by means of a permanent commemorative plaque 
(see Chapter Three). Remembrance Day observances thus retained their general and 
official aUra, beret! of reference to the underground's dead. 
Public Exposure: David Raziel, 23 Ivar 
As stated, Etzel and Lehi attempts to inculcate public celebrations of Israel's dead 
failed during this period. The Labor elite stubbornly refused their entry. During the 
debates over passage of the law Renzembrance Day in Honor Qf the Martyry of the 
War for National Sovereign(v aml the Israel Deftmse Forces (1963), MK Esther 
Raziel-Naor (Herut) expressed her colleagues' feelings about Mapai's attitude thusly: 
... even if the desire to repay the debt of honor that the Knesset owes to those 
who sacrificed their lives., but l'or the tears of their bereaved rnothers and the 
choking pain of then- fathers - on this day, [their] graves in the military and 
civilian cemeteries rernam forsaken, no representatives of the Knesset or the 
CY government or ariý, of the important institutions listed here before us, 
honorable Minister of Justice, have visited these dead ... The graves of the 
martyrs of the Jaffa's conquest. of the Altalena, of' those who were hanL)ed 
74 Ycsheý aliu, S. 1 1- the %linistry of the Intei-ior. 27 March 1 953ý letter to AFazi, S., cited in Azarý ahu, 
1993, p. 120,11n. 79. 
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remain deserted even on the eve of Independence Day. It appears to me that the 
time has come to abolish this type of abysmal and strident discrimination . 
75 
Raziel-Naor's plea was to no avail. And so, Hcrut adopted an alternative 
strategy in 1953, that of' boycotting the ol-ficial Remembrance Day rituals while z: I Zý, 
observing an alternative Memorial Day 23 4, cv-1, the date that David Raziel, Etzel's 
first cornmander, was killed. The date had, in effect, been declared "the Memorial Day 
76 for David Razicl and Etzel martyrs" by Herut as early as 5 December 1948 . With the 
announcement of the official Remembrance Day, the underground's members had 
hoped that commemoratiori of their own dead would be included in the general 
frarnework. Labor's refusal to do so induced them to continue to observe the 
alternative date. As Shelach was to 
'justify 
this inove: "Being forsaken, without a 
relative or friend to remember them, other than their comrades -in arms and 
their 
, 77 ideology. 
... 
Considering Herut's goal of obtaining legitimation, it is understandable if still ZD tl 
surprising that the practices associated with 23 lyar would more and more come to 
resemble those initiated by the State: honor guards, the presence of former 
commanders oil the rostrum, sites chosen for their symbolic import, as well as 
commemorative services conducted throughout the day at the cemeteries where the 
dead were interred in addition to services conducted at sites Nvhere the dissident's had 
displayed exceptional bravery. Like the official models, Herut's rituals were repeated 
annually, until the practices could be treated as if they were elements of a unique 
subculture. The central event of-the day Nvas the ceremony conducted at Rarriat Raziel 
75 L at v, Remem I? r(m cc Daýi in Honor o, l'thc I MI'IýVTS 01'117C Hal-for A-at ional So i, creignty and ihe Israe I 
Dqýense Iýoi-ces (1903). 25 MaFC11 1963- first roll call ote. Knesset Protocols. (Hebrew) 
76 hlerwý 5 December 1948. tI lchrc\ý ) 
,7 Shclach, 19 April 1953. Ictter to bci-ca\ed I'amilies. Jabotinský Institute Archkes, 23\5 - 16 
(I lebl-c%\ ) 
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in honor of David Raziel, followed by similar ceremonies at the execution gallery in 
the Acre garrison, at the graves of' Its attackers In Shivei Tziyyon, at the graves of the 
hanged Lehi fighters located in Safed, with a parade ending at the courtyard before the 
Gruner memorial in Rainat Gan. A special committee was likewise charged with 
guaranteeing that the services held in the cemeteries were all identical and that a 
eulogy honoring the dead was written and properly declaimed. " Herut's 
Commemorations Committee would annually place an advertisement in the daily 
newspapers and Shelach would arrange transportation for the bereaved families to the 
79 s ites . 
Despite the counter-culture that evolved, participants at the ceremonies 
complained about Labor's indifference to the ceremonies ýoiveji the presence of 
in iI itary Zý personnel and government officials at the Ilagana ceremonies: "The 
involvement of IDF soldiers is permitted onlN, during commemorative ceremonies 
organized by the IDF itself' responded General Moshe Tzadok, head of the IDF's Zn 
Personnel Division, to the members of the Locharnim Party, then involved in 
preparing a ceremony honoring the Haifa railway workshops operation. "Henec, your 
request for the participation of an arined military lionor guard ... is demed. 
") The 
denial is illustrative: it represents a process that operated in all areas of 
coin mern oration. Because the ceremonies held by former underground members and 
their current political representatives were treated as "political" events - as opposed to 
the Mapai Government's "consensual" events - IDF participation could be formally 
denied. At the same tirne, this "political" quality prevented their transformation into 
"' Shelach Commemorations Committee. 1ýar 1954. letter to bereaved Camilics, Jabotinsb Institute 
Archiý es, 2-i%ý5 - 16. (1 lebre\\ ) 
SO 
Ad\ ertiscment. undated. Jahotin-ský I nstitutc Aichk cs. 23\5 - 16 . (11 ebrc%ý) Tzadok. (ien. Moshe, Head, the Personnel Di\ ision. I DF, undated, letter to the Lochamim Partv. the 
Lochamim PartN Archi\ cs. Beit Yait% f-iles 37-18-39. (11 leht-c\\ 
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official, statist ceremonies. To paraphrase, on the declarative level, Ben Gurion treated 
the ceremonies organized by the Labor elite and its supporters as national and thus an 
apolitical events, whereas the ceremonies held by rival parties excluded from power, 
were treated as sectoral and thLIS political. The struCtUral consequences were the 
further marginalization ol'Herut and its supporters. 
Herut's Commemorative Ceremonies: Labor's Rebuff 
Commemorative observances in honor of Etzel and Lehi fallen were, in effect, located 
beyond the pale of official recognition and certainly of public or political legitimacy. 
No Ministry of Defense or IDF personages ever attended. Herut's response is 
illustrated by the following exchange of letters, the first written to its organ, Herut: 
"Was the nation's President invited to participate in the commemorative service to 
Etzel's commander and his soldiers? If yes, what was his answer'? And if no, why? 
This is especially important today in light of the President's presence at a Zý, 
commemorative service and dedication of a monument to Paln-lach recruits. "st The 
letter's author received a personal reply from the Secretary of tile Herut Movement, C 
who also suffered the slight referred to: 
We have frequently invited the President to attend several of our 
ceremonies, including those held on 233 lyar-Each tu-ne, we received an 
evasive answer, and he never appeared. For this reason., we no longer extend 
any invitations. 82 
This practice continued throughout the first decade of the State, until 14 May 
1959, when a change in direction, hovvever partial, occurred. In 1959, Etzel and Lehi 
Ben Meir, Y., 22 Maý 1957. Letter to the Editor. 11cria. Jabotinsk-ý Institute Archives, 23\5 - 161,. 
lebi, e\N ) 
Secretan of'llerut. 2S Mm 1957. JahotinskN IIIStitUtC A rchi\ cs. . 13\5 - 16'"/. (1 lchre\ý 
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veterans decided to conduct commemorative ceremonies on Remembrance Day as 
well as to continue to hold ceremonial gatherings on 23 Iyar at the sites symbolizing 
the Revisionist heritage. 83 
Yizkor (Remember) 
The Labor Movement's imprint oD official symbols was expressed, aniong other 
things, by Yizkor, the liturgical portion of the canonical Remembrance Day ritual. This 
prayer would be periodically revised, according to the ideological and political powers 
in place. The first version was written in 1920 by Berl Katznclson, one of the 
Movement's founding fathers as a secular equivalent to the prayer lor the dead 
invoked during religious funerary services. Early in 1949, the Jewish Agency's 
Information Department raised the idea of preparing a commemorative prayer 
dedicated to War of Independence dead. 84 
Katznelson's early version of Yizkor was written in hornage to the eight Tel Z:, 
Hai defenders, especially Trumpeldor. It was printed 10 days after their deaths, on the 
front page of Conti-as, the Achdut FlaAvoda gazette. It began: "May god remember the 
valiant men and Nvornen who braved mortal danger in the days of struggle.... " The text ZD ID 
is replete with images reflecting the Labor Movement's soldier-farmer ideal, whose 
one hand held a gun and the other a plough. The eulogy became a national symbol, a Z: ' Z-11 
text to be read whenever someone fell by Arab hands. 
DUring the transition period between the pre-State YishLiv and statehood, many 
IDF officers turned to Alitivia Malchin, an editor of the Arn Oved publishing house 
ý3 Hall. G., 14 Nlaý 1959, In Memorium, lhiBokcr. (Hchre\ý 
84 Azan all u. I I)Q5. P. 15 1. 
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and a member of the IDF's Department for Cultural Aflairs, for guidance regarding the 
texts to be read during military funerals. Joseph Kariv (Karkovy), head of the 
Department of Cultural Affairs, set belOre Malchin and the poet Aharon Zeev, the 
future Chief Education Officer, the task of adapting Katzrielson's praycr to the IDF 
context. Moreover, it was decided that the authority to determine future versions of 
Yizkor would rest with the director of the Government Information Office, a body then 
headed by Yehuda Ilan, the Palmach's former Officer for Cultural Affairs. Although 
all the phrases directly identified with the Labor Movement were expunged from the 
revised versiofl, 85 the public was conscious of its source, a politically rooted eulogy. 
The eulogy was revised to focus on the IDF fallen that fell only during the War. As to 
the changes, Sharn ir was to write that: Z-1 I 
from then on, War of Independence dead, soldiers in the Israel Defense 
Forces., will be remembered for generations, They alone, not those others who 
had died for the sake of the Yishuv and the incipient nation in the days before 
30 November 1947, will be remembered. " 
In 1955, Yizkor was revised once more. The new version, whose references 
were expanded to include IDF dead frorn campaigns following), the War of Zý 
Independence, appeared at the opening of the first )"izk-or commemoration volurne, the ZD 
book that listed all those officially recognized as fallen during the War of 
87 Independence (see Chapter Five) . The present version retains the main body of the 
text, kvith the community of the dead enlarged to Include "the valiant men and wornen 
Shamir. 1,1999. The Changes 1)7(lergonc b, v Yi--kor. 1, ccturc. Confaence on the culturt ot- 
Com n) cmorat ion and Rellicilihi-ance, Nlinistrý of' Def'cnsc, Commemor2tion ( nitý AuiZust 1999. '1 cl 
I bid. 
81 The MinistrN of Delense, 1955, KifAor. (1-1chre\%) 
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who braved mortal danger in the days of struggle prior to the establishment of the 
,, 88 State of Israel and the soldiers who fell in the wars of Israel. 
Fulogles in the form ofcommernorative prayers had existed earlier, during the 
period of rebellion against the British. Both the Pah-nach8" and Etzel" had their own 
versions of Yizkor. These were printed in the commemorative volunics prepared for 
the fallen of each respective group. However, the Palmach volumes, like the later JDF- 
authorized Yizkor volumes, stressed the war against the Arabs-, hence Etzel and Lehi 
dead were again excluded. Shelach was forced to utilize its own version of the 
prayer9l in its struggle to draw the public's attention to two issues that Labor and 
Mapai wished to avoid - that the War of Independence had begun as a struggle 
against the British and that several members of the undergromid had been assassinated 
by the Hagana, as we shall see. 
The Production of National Heroes - Decorations and Citations 
The left excluded the right from rnany areas related to commemoration, not least of 
which was official recognition of its heroes. On the eve of Remembrance Day 195 L, a 
letter Nvas sent to bereaved families under the heading "To the Families of the Heroes 
of the War for National Sovereignty, " in which Ben Gurion announced that "the Israel 
Defense Forces has decided to award the Komemmývut [Sovereignty] Decoration to all 
the soldiers who had participated in the War of Independence. , 92 In November of that 
"See httr: '/\mN\Jsrac L org/rnia/go. aspNIFAHOON b Im- the I atest \ ersi oil ot'd Ic poern. 
81) Brenner. A., 1988,7he Palinach. Regular Soldicrs and Officers, Tcl A\ iv: The Palmach Association. 
(Hebi-c\N). 
Shelach. 1 949ý In Their LastingAllemmy. (Hchrew) 
"Israel. remember )OUr sons and daughters, the soldiers ofthc Nationjl Nfilitarý Organization and it. ý 
Ofl-ICCFS. thOSC COU1,1.11COUS and hold ý011-111teCrS NNho had sacrificed their lkcs lor the sake ofthe nation's 
libcrtN and the courim's liberation. Israel. rCn1C1nhCr \OUr heroes and \our marm-s Nýho ýýcre hamcd. 
who tell in the defense against the Arab horcics... " I rný translation]. 
,,, f3cn Gurion. D. April 1951, letter to berea\cd families. IDF Arclik es. (lIcbrc\N) 
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year, a public competition for the design of the decoration was announced. 93 The 
design chosen was a ribbon colored blue and white - representing the nation - and 
red, representing blood and sacrifice, the ultimate price paid by all those to whom the 
State owed its existence: "Every soldier who served in the ME betkNiecri I Februarý 
and 10 March 1949, " the period Israeli forces were active in the Hat area proximate 
to the official close of the War of Independence. 94 Given the announcement's wording, 
it was clear that fighters belonging to organizations not incorporated within the IDIF by 
that date were ineligible. All told, the Disabled Veterans Decoration was awarded to 
95 
more than 1,500 disabled ex-servicemen. 
Enthralled by the symbolic and political functions of decorations, Ben Gurion 
turned, in 1952, to the Golomb Committee, whose members - Ffivahu Golon1b, 
Yisrael Galili, Major General Yaakov Dori and Colonel Nahum Shadnil - were all 
veterans ofthe Hagana. Ben Gurion assigned it the task- of setting policy regarding the 
award of state decorations and citations to outstanding individuals who had made 
distinguished contributions to the defense effort in the period preceding the State's 
creation of a national military presence. His Instructions clearly reveal the tendency to 
ignore members of organizations from the rightist camp: 
You are requested to act as a committee that will propose decorations, such as 
the SovereiZoDnty Medal ... to all those who helped defend [the Yshuvj prior to 
the establishment of the State, that is to members of the Shorner, tile Jewish 
regiments during World War 1, the Hagana before the IDF, those who served 
in Jewish Brigade during World War 11, individuals who participated in the 
defense of our settlements during the War of Independence but were not Z' 
members of the IDE to settlements that, as units within re0ional divisions 
93 IX-jvar. '- 5 No\ cinim 195 1. (1 lcbrc%ý) 
94 11CII ( JLII-iOll, API-i 1 195 1A ettCl' tO disah, I ed \ eterans. Sdc Bokcr: Ben Guri(m A rchi\ es. (I I ebre\% 
9' Flic decoration \Nas c\entUalf) a%\arded during the Remcnibrance Day 1954 obser%ances. see 
Azarýahu. 1995. p. 112.1-tii. 2. 
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(Jerusalem, Negba, etc. ) had distinguished themselves in their fortitude during 
the War, as well as all those unaffiliated individuals who sacrificed their lives 
for their country .... 
96 
As can be readily seen, Etzel and Lehi were not included by narne in this rather 
comprehensive list. 
The Golornb Committee recommended four categories for commendat'01): 
three for individuals, and one for kibbutzlin and other settlements (inoshavim, villages 
and towns). The Committee's intentions are revealed in its report, presented to the 
Minister of Defense. They suggested that 26 decorations and citations be distributed, 
including "about 20 of whorn are to be chosen from among our comrades ... It WOUld It, 
be preferable for those selected to represent, as much as feasible, every type of [ma -. orl 
operation and event from the period. " 
The first decoration, intended for "our comrades" was the liagana Medal. The 
idea was not original: In February 1949, it had been announced that a special Z, 
decoration would soon be awarded to members of the Hagana, Including those alreadv Zý - 
released frorn service. 97 The Hagana Medal would mark: 
... the nation's gratitude to those of its sons who 
fulfilled their duty to protect 
the nation and to defend the Jewish settlements in Israel, from the period of the 
First Aliyah until the formation of the Israel Defense Forces ... 
Ori one side of 
the niedal the symbol of the State of Israel will be found, on the other side, the 
symbol of the Hagana, a sword encircled by an olive branch.... 
The second decoration recommended by the committee was the "National 
Volunteers Medal. " The mcclal resembled the Haiona Medal, but in different colors. 
13 en Gurion, D. -i 
J an uarv 1952, Letter to Galili. Y.. Yad 'Fahenkin A i-chj% es. Section 15 - the (ialiii 
Archi\ es, container 140. fife 5- 20. (1-lebreý\) 
97 10 Februar, ý 1949. 
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The third decoration proposed by the committee was the "Magen David 
Medal, " also known as the "Medal for Excellence. " This decoration was to be awarded 
to whoever could be considered "an example of his generation for risking his lite -- 
this medal will be awarded to 35 individuals only ... the Minister of Defense will 
appoint a committee authorized to recommend the 35 candidates. " In form, the medal 
would "resemble the Hagana Medal. " 
The "Jerusalem Medal" was the fourth decoration proposed. The committee 
suggested that it be awarded to the "settlement, village or town for its independent 
collective resistance during the enerny blockade and for its determined resistance. " 
To surninarize, other than the medal to be awarded to a settlement, three vvere 
to be awarded to individuals: the first only to Hagana personnel, the second to 
volunteers., and the third to those individually selected by the Minister of Defense 
according to his discretion. It would be awarded to those who had volunteered "to 
defend Jewish settlements ... 
from the period beginning with the First Allyah and 
ending with the establishment of the State of Israel. Etzel and Lehi veterans, were 
ineligible for the first decoration - an award based on political parameters - yet they 
vvere also disquallf-jed from receiving the second. The ploy used to exclude thein ', Nfas 
affiliation: bad they been defined or categorized as members of the Jewish Brigade, 
the Palmach, the Yishuv's Jewish police forces or Jewish units serving in the British 
Army, blockade-runners, Hagana servicemen involved in weapons production or 
pUrchase, in addition to anyone "who had served as a regular officer in the Hagana. " or 
"voluntarily served as an officer in the Hagana, " or had participated "in an emergency 
mission on behalf' of the Hagana, " or had been "any mari or woman, Jewish or 
othem Ise, I iving outside Israel, who had made a contribution to the liagana and to the 
Yishl-W'S SeCLII'ltý .... " theV Might have been, in theory. eligible. BLIt tl-)Cý \%ere not. The 
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committee also decided that Independence Day, 1952, would be "declared as the date 
for award ofthe decoration S. 
08 
Years later, in December 1954, State decoration policy was again debated and 
confirmed by the Knessct in the form of tile Laiv. - Israe/ Dcjýnse Forces Decoralions 
(1954). The original proposal had been raised by MK Baruch Kamin (Mapal): 
The proposed law is meant to fill a gap that has been felt since the 
establishment of tile State, one that pertains to the [public] recognition of' 
soldiers who sacrificed their lives in acts of exceptional bravery on the 
battlefield, or those who excelled in their courage or their service. 99 
Kamin stressed that the project provided a frarnework in which the State 
would identify its heroes, those individuals whose acts would be etched in the 
collective memory regarding the State's rebirth. Karnin also corni-riented that lie was 
referring to all those brave individuals who promoted emergence of the new state, and 
not exclusively to OF troops: 
Award of a decoration for these acts expresses the State's recognition of its 
soldiers ... the nation's appreciation ... 
in a way similar to that practiced in all the 
world's armies ... 
The decorations will be awarded to members of the Israel 
Defense Forces as a rule. However, the medal for military bravery can also be 
awarded to civilians who performed exceptionally courageous acts ... on the 
battlefield.... 
A further reading of Kamin's remarks indicates that the recipients of these 
decorations were to serve as Cultural, normative and educational instrUrnents, as 
models for emulation: 
')lý Galili. Y Dmi. Y., Jacobson. J.. and Sliadini- N- 20 Juh 1952, report to Bc[i f)., tile 
'Fahenkin Archiýcs. Section 15. the Galili Archnes, File No. 5-20. 
9') Nlectiii-L 20 December 1954. Klie, Yyet Protocols. (Hebi-e\\ ) 
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Decorations for bravery play an important part in the lives of the people and 
the nation ... 
The more a nation struggles, suffers, and sacrifices, the more it 
commits acts of bravery, the more important are the decorations it awards as 
patriotic, educational and normative tools. After all, the European nations 
conferred medals not only for their regular armies, but also for acts of 
patriotism, beginning with soldiers standing at the rear, where they were joined t, zn 
by civilians and youths who gradually became part of the regular army under 
military command ... the 
decorated must retell their stories to their companions. 
What has undermined and continues to undermine our youth in many areas 
appropriate to volunteering is ... 
[the cornment] 'Did you do it, did you act, and 
who knows about it, who appreciates iff ... 
As to the ancient adage 'the Moor 
has done his work, the Moor may go'... this law is meant to rectify-the 
distortion. 100 
Kainin concluded his ' fi 'on of the State's award of decorat*ons bv 
-justi 
icati I 
adding a few personal remarks intended to call attention to what he termed 
"oversights. " As he saw it, among the ranks of the eligible for commendation were ZD ZD 
those "citizens in the agricultural collectives who volunteered for missions during 
World War It ... at the height of self-sacrifice ... I refer to the parachutists, members of 
the Jewish Brigades and the Palinacli ... who left their families ... and volunteered to 
fight 
... the 
Nazi eneiny.... " These, lie argued, unlike Hagana members, "lack any IDF Z, It, - 
status, " a fact frequently overlooked. Zeev Shefer (Mapai) supported Kamin's 
position, and reminded the Knesset that: 
during the War of hidependence, those who fought did not come exclusively 
frorn the ranks of the arrn ... why not give them as well the right to wear the Y t, 
Sovereignty [Komeninzilvitt] Medal? Until now, we discriminated against 
them ... It troubles me to see these displays of lofty Jewish armed 
courage ... rent from the pages of history... 1 thcref'Orc ask: I IoN% 111LICII \\ OUld I 
100 Ibid. 
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this add to the nation, its youth, its citizens ... were we to 
decorate members of 
the Shorner, as well as those who fought at Tel Hai ... the defensive campaigns 
in Jerusalem, Petach 'Flkva, Jaffa.... 
Shel-er underscored his demands with the staternent that Jewish defense did not begin 
with the creation of the IDF, and that the: 
Knesset was obligated to pay homage to the leading members of this group 
from its outset ... If there is any value or symbolic importance to this 
commemorative medal, we should make sure that it is ... considered as a sign 
of universal, national commemoration. We will never regret it; the nation can 
only gain from it. '01 
Kainin's and Shefer's comments, as might be expected, ignited Herut MKs. 
They sorely felt the truth of Kamin's comments about those who lacked any IDF 
status. "We cannot educate such heroes, only worship them, " declared Yohanan Bader 
(Herut) during that debate. In addition to his general support of the suggestion to 
broaden eligibility for the medal, he voiced Etzel and Lehi fears that their members 
were to be barred frorn this group as well. 
We will not award these inedals to the Maccabees, nor will we award them to 
Bar Kochba, Trumpeldor, or Zeev Jabot, risk),... Who but the people can award 
a rnedal to Dov Gruner; can any decoration add to his value or to his 
personality? And who can augment the worth of those who lost all hope upon Z' 
the galloxvs? Who" -I believe., only history. I support this proposal ... no one 
would envy them, and certainlýý not those among the underground who 
survived, nor would the-y envy those who gave their lives for the nation as 
volunteers and as rebels.... 
101 Ibid. 
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In his closing statement, Bader stressed that because the policy regarding 
decorations was fixed by Mapai's political interests, this "law ... will not produce 
(, I olýy.,, 
102 herocs, nor add to heroism's 
Bader's words induced others to voice their bitterness over trends that thcý 
were beginning to observe. The decorations project, they realized, was another layer in 
the corn in em oration pro ject whose realization was just beginning to be felt in Israel's 
landscape and its historiography, all orchestrated by Ben Gurion. The'response was, 
surprisingly, non-partisan. "Ben Gurion wants independence to be identified only with 
the undertaking that he directed - the War of Independence" implored Shmuel 
Dayan, a member of Mapai. His colleagLie, Abraham Herzfeld, raised doubts about the Zý 
willingness or ability of fello\v politicians to influence history so substantially that 
they could determine its heroes. Herzfeld's remark accompanied his warning that the 
proposal to distribUte medals was threatening internal harmony: 
I have serious doubts about our objective capacity, divided as we are [as a 
nation], to single out these events and to place each In Its separate framework, 
as suggested by this leoislative proposal ... 
Friends, we should avoid the issue. 
We cannot foresee how much bloodshed it can incite ... 
just how many 
hotheads are amon- us ... 
A history rich [in such events] brought us to t, 
Statehood ... It may have begun even more than 80 years ago.... 
Herzfeld believed that politically motivated attempts to identiAý and dramatize 
national heroes would, by definition, slight a significant number of worthy individuals 
and goad many others: "It would be a mistake for our comrades and for those of us 
10, [bid. Also. note that in tialit of Bcn Gurion's refusal to award the medal to those of' Jabotinsk)'s 
follo%\ers \\ho acti\ct) imolit the British durirw the ýcars 1936-1940, Etzel and Lehi veterans \\ere 
surprised %\hen he offered to award the mcdal to Zee\ Jabotinský for his participation in the Je\Nish 
Brigades. 
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like myself who are aware of the current history of the YIshuv to demand award of 
these decorations.... " 
103 
Despite the outspoken objections and bitterness, Minister of Defense Lavon 
(1953-1955) stubbornly continued to maintain that the proposed decorations policy 
would not manufacture Israel's history but, rather, reflect it: 
Many of the speakers have confused two factors: history and law ... the reality 
of Jewish courage - did not begin with independence or with the Hagana ... it 
is a historic phenomenon replete with blood and glory ... but it is history. Laws 
do not make history ... laws cannot compete with eulogies in their influence on 
the fate of a nation. 
A reasoned and inclusive representation of the nation's fallen, thought Lavon, 
one that was objective and devoid of special interests, was characteristic of the 
project, a pr ject which nonetheless ignored those aligned with the underground: "It oJ Z, 
[the law] does not pretend to at all to accomplish what only a huge commemorative 
volume can achieve - if that Nvere at all possible. " 
104 
Yet, opposition to the law did have any effect. It was only in May, 1959 that a 
government decision was reached as to Its final version, which determined that "'in 
future, the Ministry of Dcfense vould award decorations only according to 
government decisions or a specially legislated IaNv. , 1115 That is, decorations policy 
would be determined by the Knesset. The debate had, in effect, been further 




W Goi, ernmew Decision No 421.10 Ma\ 1959. Olehre\\) 
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Medal durina the celebration of Israel's first decade (Hag Ha'asor) that Ben Gurion Zý, 
had decreed. 
And so, the medal was awarded to veteran Hagana officers in a ceremony 
involving the participation ofthe President of Israel, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, and tile IDF's n 
first Chief of the General Staff, Yaakov Dori. The President pinned the medal on the 
lapel of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's coat who, in turn, pinned medals on the 
uniforms of the members of the General Staff. The ceremony, conducted as a state 
cerernony attended by invited public figures, was held in the National Stadium in 
Jerusalem, and declared to be part of Defense Forces Day festivities. In addition to the 
President, Prime Minister and IDF generals, the current Chief of the General Staff 
Chaim Leskov and Minister Yisrael Galih were in attendance. The Israel Police Force 
Orchestra accompanied the event; on the rostrum sat senior officials from the Ministry 
of Defense and the Mayor of Jerusalem. 
In his address, Ben Zvi stated that from his perspective, being awarded the 
Hagana Medal was "the greatest honor a person in Israel can receive. " Ben Gurion, 
who followed, reviewed the history of Jewish defense of the YIshuv in a style 
reminiscent of an "order-of-the-day" announcement, 'while skipping over Nili, Etzel 
and Lehi. After mentioning the Shorner. the Jewish Brigade and the Hagana, he noted 
that the IDF is the "OffSpFing and disciple of the Hagana and that Hagana veterans 
know that the IDF is their descendant. "' 06 The Fla-gana Medal thus became an official 
decoration, part of the dress uniforin 107 worn bv IDF soldiers who had also served in 
Davar, 10 June 1958. (1 lebre%\) 
Palmach Veterans Association. undatcd, pljcýtrd: Annomicement lo Pulmach Members. 
im iting its members to a ccremom . 
detailing the arranucinclItS. KibbUl/ Hameuchad Archi% es. 9- 7\2m. 
(Flcbre%N 
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the Hagana, whereas regular servicemen and officers were required special permission 
to wear the medal during cerci-nonles. 108 
Also noteworthy with respect to the historical role of the Hagana during the 
Yishuv, was the award of the Disabled Ex-Serviceirien's Decoration on Independence 
Day., 5 May 1954. At this ceremony, conducted in the Rose Garden opposite the 
government compound in Jerusalem, cabinet ministers, Knesset members and 
numerous Hagana veterans stood beside Ben Gurion who, as Prime Minister, 
personally presented the decoration to each recipient. '09 
David Raziel - Reinterment 
One particularly significant commemoration pro -. 
eCt Undertaken by Etzel veterans was 
the attempt to install the organization's first commander, David Raziel, within the 
pantheon of Israel's heroes. The institutional resistance to their efforts was minor in 
comparison to Ben Gurion's attempts to sabotage the return of Jabotinsky's body to 
Israel (see below). Jabotinsky had been marked as the Labor Movement's ideological 
rival, the person who had chiseled rejection of its political, social and economic 
pro, (, ), ram on his seal. Within the framework of Labor policy, every sphere of civil life 
was nationalized: under the banner of statism, a political part), - Mapai - becarne 
the sole manager of that policy. Although Raziel was the commander of an alternative 
military organization and a renegade, his legacy did not include a worldview that 
threatened the party in power. Thus, his heirs were intent on preserving his military 
legacy which they believed a more reachable goal. 
"" Onlý in Mav 1959 was it decided that IDF soldiers are I-orbidden to \\ear the Ha2ana medal. " 
Decision No. 423,10 May 1959. IDF Archives. unnumbered. 
loq Duvor, 6 Nlaý 1954. (Hebrc\\) 
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In 1952, Esther Raziel-Naor (I lerut), while sitting in the Knesset, began her 
activities among influential figures and government officials in London for the 
purpose of returning Raziel's remains to Israel from his burial place in Iraq. Her 
activities led to contacts between the British Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi 
Minister of Health; together they convinced the Iraqi government to transfer the coffin 
to Cyprus with the aid of the British Royal Air Force. On 19 December 1955, the 
coffin was transported from Habniya, Iraq to Nicosia and then interred locally, in Ktar 
Margo, Cyprus. "() During the whole of 1956, British pressure on the Cypriot 
z::, intervention 
of government prevented the coffin's transfer to Israel. Only the 
Menachern Begin, who wrote to Archbishop Makarios, later President of Cyprus, as 
"one freedorn fighter to another, " persuaded the Cypriots to allow the coffin to reach 
Israel. ' '' 
Herut then turned to Prime Minister Ben Gurion and to the Deputy Minister of 
Defense with a request for permission to conduct a military funeral for Raziel in the 
national military cemetery on Mount Herzl. Agreement was reached thanks to the 
intervention of Shimon Peres, who was particularly active in obtaining the permission 
for such funerals, and a military ftmeral took place on 15 March 1961. Previously, an 
official delegation headed by Yaakov Meridor (Herut), including Shelach 
representatives and Israel's ambassador to Cyprus had been present when the coffin 
was disinterred in Cyprus before transport to Israel. A police cortege accompanied the 
coffin from the airport to Mctzudat Zeev, Herut headquarters in Tel Aviv. Thousands 
of Herut supporters awaited its arrival; during that evening. Herut leaders held a vigil 
dedicated to Raziel's memorý. 
''ON aor. A. 1991. DuvidRa--je1. TcI A \, i\: Maarachot. Ministrý ot'Defense, p. 282. (11 chrc\\) 
'''Begin, M. Letter to Arclihishop Makarios. Herut. 17 March 1961. (11 ebre\\) 
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The next day, the military cortege set out to Mount Herzl, again accompanied 
by thousands including Knesset members and local government officials associated 
with the right. Meridor delivered the farewell address: "... So many Israelis will 
accompany you as all Israeli armý honor guard salutes [you, ] the commander of 
Etzel, "1 12 words that imply that Meridor was ashamed to admit that the name of the 
Hagana - i. e., in its denotative sense, defense - had been incorporated 
into the name 
of the nation's armed forces. The procession continued to Tel Aviv's main synagogue 
(Beit Hak-nesset Hagadoo on Allenby Street, with the surrounding streets closed to 
traffic. Crowds gathered on the pavement along the route to pay their respects, and 
police officers marched in the procession, which wound its way to Jerusalem, 
accompanied by two military policemen on motorcycles. Those who gathered on the 
road were described by one J ournal ist as "a huge co I urn n ... thousands upon thousands 
packed the streets.... " 113 The spontaneous gathering of such numbers highlighted the 
institutional ambivalence regarding the funeral. Despite its official designation as a 
military funeral, the only signs of this status were the two military policernen on 
motorcycles, and the military vehicle that carried the coffin. Government 
representation was also low-keyed: at the ceremony held at the Russian Square in 
Jerusalem, neither Yitzhak Ben Zvi, the President of Israel, nor the Minister of 
Defense were present. In their place, there appeared the President's deplity and tile 
Minister's Military Secretary. At the interinent service, also conducted ill military 
fashion, no senior officers participated, as would be expected. Instead, the armed 
forces were represented by the IDF's Chief Rabbi and by a colonel. Hence, although 
Cited in Naor, 1991, p. 284. 
1 13 Heria, 17 March 196 1. (Hebrew) 
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official permission was granted to bury Raziel on Mount Herzl with military honors, 
the honors were more administrative than real. ' 14 
It appears that the conduct of Raziel's funeral only strengthened Ben Gurion's 
determination to object to the transfer of Jabotinsky's remains to Israel. The force of 
the street's identification with the event, and the multitudes that followed Raziel's 
cortege in Jerusalem' 15 as in Tel Aviv were interpreted as evidence of the opposition's 
strength. The event's organizers were well aware of the political significance of a 
procession years before it actually occurred: 
The funeral procession, which we believe will be grand, will display the 
obligatory honor and veneration to be shown to our great commander, the z: 1 
power and glory of our entire movement, precisel lernphasis in original] in a 
period of flagging spirits and little faith, at a time when the entire [Jewish] 
w orld is convening - at the Zionist Congress - and masses of Jews 
from the 
Diaspora as well as Israel can witness this great national event - [honoring] 
its warrior and liberator. 116 
Return of Jabotinsky's Remains 
Immediately following the establishment of the State, Herut began intensive efforts to 
convince the authorities to return Jabotinsky's remains for reburial in Israel. Their 
spiritual leader's will demanded that only a legitimate government in a Jewish state 
could order that his body be brought to Israel. For this reason, Herut's leaders as well 
as Jabotinsky's family refrained from doing so independently and focused on 
pressuring the government to initiate the project, in compliance with the will's terms. 
Katznc II enbogcn. B- 2 Nlaý 1961.1 etter to Minister ot' I )c I ense, J abotinský I nstitutc A rclik es, - 161 
23\5. (licbreN\) 
II. ý llciarh% 17 March 1961. (Hebrew) 
'"'She lach. Letter to the Herut k1mcment's Centra I Committee, 15 A pri 1 1956. (Hcbt-e\%) 
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The first public debate on the subject took place in December 195 1. At that 
tirne, Rabbi Norick (Mafdal), a Knessct member, presented a query to Prime Minister 
Ben Gurion, in the framework of which he referred to Jabotinskv issue. In his 
response, Ben Gurion stated that: 
... the obligation of the State of Israel 
is first and foremost to bring living Jews 
to the country, those who would build our country and the Jewish people; this 
is what the Government of Israel is striving to do. The memory of individuals 
worthy of [the transfer of their remains to Israel] will rest in the nation's heart, 
irrespective of where their remains are to be found. ' 17 
Public and private organizations made similar demands over the years - including 
the Zionist Federation based in the US. Some Mapai members ofthe government, in z: l 
cooperation with their coalition partners, likewise requested such an action. In 1954, 
Israel Rokach (Liberals), the Minister of the Interior, raised the issue before the 
government but nothing was done. Pinchas Rosen (Mapai), while Minister of Justice., ZD 
likewise attempted to acquire agreement to do so. ' 18 On 3 Au, --ust 1958, after Rosen 
had once more made such a proposal, it was again rejected due to Ben Gurion's 
personal opposition to implementation of the initiative. 
Mapai cabinet members did not adopt a uniform position., many disagreed with 
Ben Gurion. Numerous Jewish organizations were amazed at his vehement objections. 
Justice Dr. Joseph Lamm, a Bnei Brith official, stressed that despite its differences 
with Jabotinsky, "our order [i. e., Bnei Brith] has decided to do everything possible to 
return his remains. " Lamm argued that the act was necessary because Israeli society 
stood before "fragmentation on the basis of animosity and hatred. " Lamm also noted 
1 17 
ý Vaariv, 26 JuIN 1957. (1 lebrc\%, ) 
II 'S Ibid. 
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that he viewed the return of Jabotinsky's body as "a major factor capable of uniý/ing 
the populace. "' 19 
The pages of Davar became filled with articles and letters from Mapaii 
members and SLIpporters who objected not only to Ben Gurion's position, but more, 
they objected to his attempt to shape collective memory, an act that, in this case, was 
perceived as divorced from public opinion: 
It is doubtful if an objective historian will determine his rightful place ... 
In 
Soviet historiography, [such a position] is acceptable because the future is 
perceived as certainty and it is possible to change only the past. It is even 
possible to rewrite the history of the Bolshevik Revolution in a way that erases 
Trotsky, Bukharin, Zenoviev from its pages ... 
One can improve the Soviet 
encyclopedia by tearing, out the entry (even if it were a dubious entry) about 
Beria and replacing it with a full page on the Bering Sea. In a free country, in a 
nation that is not based on the dialectic approach toward absolute and relative 
truth, those who deviate from the party line will not rernain anonymous, for if 
they do not contribution directly to the progress of our enterprise, they do so 
indirectlv. 120 
In 1956, Ben Gurion wrote to Jabotinsky's assistant, Joseph Shectman: " 
would like to express my opinion ... 
[that] the remains of only two Jews are to be 
brought to Israel: those of Dr. HerzI and those of Baron Echnond de Rothschild. Israel 
needs living men, not dead corpses.... 121 The Prime Minister posted a similar response zn I 
to Israel's President, Yitzhak Ben Zvi: Even the formal head of the State was unable to 
shift Ben Gurion one iota, whether the source of this attitude was consuming political 
competition with the deceased Revisionist leader, or resulted from rational political 
i nterests. 
11cria. 22 Jul% 1963. (Hebrc\%) 
Yehuda. Y.. 10 November 1963. Davar. (, 11ehre\N) 
Ifoariv. 26 Julý 1956. (11chrew) 
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Bcn Gurion's olýjections remained personal and isolated. No other leading 
member of Mapai shared his position. In the face of such obduracy, YehUda Ben 
Moshe, a resident of Michinoret who was a member of the Zionist Federation and a 
veteran Mapai activist, chose to express his own opinion in one of the national 
newspapers: "My conscience dernands that I disagree with David Ben Gurion's 
attitude [even thoughl I continue to totally object in principle to the majority of 
Herut's political and social policies. " The author stressed that "like many other citizens 
of this country, " he: 
... respects and appreciates ... one of the greatest and most 
devoted leaders of 
the Zionist Movement in the pre-State era despite his incorrect and regrettable 
position with respect to the Zionist Labor Movement ... I believe that the 
, government of Israel is obliged to return the remains of Zeev Jabotinsky to his 
country with no further delay and to conduct a funeral appropriate to the man 
and to the public figure who faithfully served his people throughout his life. 
Moreover, the author continues, such an act would serve party and national 
interests because: 
... our party's status as the 
leading party [in Israel] ... makes many 
demands 
upon Lis to enter into all spheres of national life while it bans any expression of 
partiality or retribution for wrongful past events, certainly not those based on 
formalistic arguments about 'bringing living Jews and not corpses to the 
country. ' Our country will rise (or, heaven forbid, fall) ... according to the 
degree of our internal solidarity, which requires us to respect each other's ZD 
opinions (despite all the valid political contradictions), especially when it 
cornes to honoring the memory of a great Zionist leader who passed aNvay on 
alien so 1 1.122 
- Ben Nloslic, Y.. 9 Auaist 1957. Alauriv. Lclicr to the E'ditor. (licbre\\) 
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Ben Gurion's resolve regarding this issue appears similar to his objection to leave the 
Altalena on the Tel Aviv sandbar. It was clear that return of the remains of the lather 
of the Revisionist Movement would ensconce Jabotinsky within the national 
pantheon, an act that would entail state legitimation of his person, movement and 
followers. It was expected to result in a profusion of ceremonies held in his memory, 
pilgrimages to his grave, and demands by a wide audience that his tomb be 
transformed into an official site arnono, the tombs of the nation's other notables. Ben Zý 
Gurion's resolve to prevent the body's return expressed more than a simple objection 
to the act: It expressed the attempt to suppress access to the means of social 
cominunication and one of its major symbolic instruments, national rituals. Ben 
Gurion, as we shall see, preferred to monopolize determination of the nation's heroes., 
the leaders to be interred in the state cemetery on Mount Herzl, and the figures future 
generations would remember as major contributors to the Israel's independence 
project. 
Begin, as the leader of Flerut, was left with no choice but to raise the issue of 
Etzel and Lehi heroes on the public a(jenda in the form of references introduced into L- 
his Knessct speeches, yet he remained unable to obtain the desired formal state 
response: 
Let us ... raise this issue., which is sacred to our armed 
forces, If you will allow 
ine to first pay my respects to the national hero, who conferred his spirit on all 
the fiohtincy sons of our generation, I refer to Shlorno Ben Yosef, the first of 
our generation to be executed while under British rule, today being the 20th 
anniversary of his execution by hanging in the Acre FortresS. 123 
Begin. M. 11) June 1958. Proposed Item for the Remembrance Da) Agenda. No. 2. Regarding the 
Appearance of Rcgular Armý 01'ficers at Political Party Gatherings, Knessel Protocols. 
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Only after Herut had obtained some influence on state decorations policy 
would Ben Yosef be permitted to enter Israel's pantheon t-Or his deeds. 124 
Parallel Practices 
Herut realized that military parades and other events staged by the Hagana Veterans zn zn 
Association were all awarded official recognition whereas their own commernorative 
services Nvere denied such official recognition. They therefore turned to other options 
that they hoped would facilitate entry into the nation's collective memory. For 
instance, afier it was known that Ben Gurion had denied their members - excluding 
Jabotinsky - eligibility for the Sovereignty Medal, Shelach turned to the National 
Philatelic Services with the request that it issue a special postmark commemorating ZD 
the 20"' anniversary of Shlorno Ben Yosef s execution. The request was denied. 125 
Ben Gurion's decision to award the Hagana Medal and to establish the Center 
for the Hagana Medal within the Ministry of Defense likewise infuriated Begin. In 
response. Beoin decided to convene the "Under-round Generation, " survivors of 
Cy 
groups 
from Nili to Etzel and Lehi, the Revisionist parallel to the Ben Gurion's 
"Hagana Generation, " during the 10"' Independence Day celebrations, a move that 
resembled his decision to observe a "private" memorial day for the movement's dead. 
But to no avail: the right remained excluded. In a subsequent step ineant to force the 
issue onto the public agenda, Begin organized a parade of veterans from rightist 
organizations to march along the streets of Tel Aviv. "Following their habits, the 1 1-1 
rulers have ignored the historical role of the underground ... to battle against the 
perversion of llistor,,,, to reveal the whole truth ... 
Herut's Central Committee has 
], I Begin. Nl- 14 Jaiiuai-ý 1958. letter to Katmellenbogen, B.. Jabotinsky Institute Archives, 17\5 - 
(Ilebre\%) 
Director of the National Philatelic Services. 14 January 1958- letter to Shelach, Jahotinský Institute 
Archi ves- 1 7\5 - 16". (Hebre\\ ) 
262 
decided to hold a Convention of the Underground Generation during the 1958 
Passover observances to celebrate the conquest of Jaffa" wrote Uri Avneri in TfaOlam 
TlaZch. 
The event Nvas trail st"ormed into a dernonstration of the right's political poVver 
and opposition to Mapai's exclusionary practices. All those who had been denied 
access to government ot - fice, official position or inclusion within the official 
historiography describing the ten-year-old nation's efforts to achieve independence 
joined together in order to make public their contributions and demonstrate their 
strength as a distinctive group. "Everyone still living was there, " wrote Avneri, who 
covered the event as ajournalist. 1 26 
Resembling a meticulously planned military parade in form, thousands 
marched in carefully formed groups from Mograbi Square to the Tel Aviv seashore. 
Each unit carried signs bearing its name. Because the underground had been banned 
from the Yizkor commemorative volumes and official historiography, the public 
became exposed for the first time to its activities: "Sentenced to Death, " "Members of 
the Etzel's Fighting Units, "Jaffa's Conquerors, " "Imprisoned or Detained, " "the 
Bethlehem Prisoners" (the underpround's female members and wives of fighters 
imprisoned by the British), Wernbers of the Jewish Brigade, " surviving members of 
Nili, and others. References to Nili were reinforced by the presence of Rivka, the 
yourigger sister of Sarah and Aharon Aharonsohn. At the head of the parade marched 
Menachem Begin, surrounded by a hand-picked entourage: At his right, in addition to 
the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Chaim Levanon. marched Jacques Sustelle, a member of the 
French parliament NN, Iio Nvas then serving as Governor of Algeria. Sustelle blessed the 
-athering in the name of the French underground. The large crowd waved the flags of 
11,10l(1171 11a/Chý 10 Aplil 1958. 
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_3 
both countries while children threw flowers, with everyone shouting "Vive la 
France! , 127 
The presence of the Governor of Algeria was meant to bolster I icrut's position 
from which thev vievved the war against the British not only as a war of resistance but 
also a war of national independence. Begin and Sustelle addressed the audience on 
Israeli-French relations and stressed the identity between the underground's war 
against the British and France's war against Arab imperialism in Algeria. 
The parade continued along Allenby Street, then turned toward Jaffa. The 
choice of Jaffa as the terminating point was not accidental. For the underground as for 
Herut, Jaffa had become a memory site and locus of political confrontation. Although 
absent from the official historwraphy. for them, the conquest of Jaffa continued to tD 
signiN their role in the nation's liberation. Hence, the parade marched through streets 
where battles had been fought. "They gave something to the birth of the state; in 
response to the rising ývave of [intentional] forgetfulness, they wanted to openly say as 
much, " concluded Avnerl, 128 
The event's peak, at the parade's conclusion at the large open field in Jaffa, 
involved a ceremony for the award of i-nedals. These decorations were considered to 
be superfluous because the participants believed that they deserved the State's 
Sovereignty Medal. Like the preceding examples, this private ceremony closely 
resembled the State's version. The medal awarded Nvas entitled the Rishonim Medal 




Yermiyahu Halperin, Mrs. Jabotinsky Kopp, Aharon Props, and Joseph Klausner. 
David Raziel's father pinned the inedal on the Menachern Begin. " 129 
Appropriation of Bereavement 
Bereaved Parents 
The national sovereignty project did not bypass the family of the bereaved. Living 
heroes were not the only ones viewed as deserving of senior posts, social status, and 
political power: The community through which the State remained in touch with the 
dead - the bereaved, especially parents - likewise acquired a role in the formation 
of Israeli public opinion, production of a statist culture and preservation of Mapai 
hegemony. 
In effect, from the carliest days of the State, bereavement had been identified 
as an arena available for appropriation to the benefit of political goals. 130 Bereaved 
parents, particularly mothers, were quickly identified by Ben Gurion as a special 
group, which he entitled the ftimily Qfthe bereaved so as to signify their assigned role: 
reproduction of the socio-political order. Among other functions, this role guaranteed 
the social status of professional soldiers. stressed collectivist nationalist values, and 
sustained commitment to enlistment aniongy the younger generation. At the same time, ý1 2-1 
it supported and legitimated the military and political actions already initiated., 31 In 
addition, appropriation of the dead, as will be shown, vindicated Mapai's and Ben 
Gurion's assumption of exclusive responsibility for the success of the nation-building 
enterprise. 
Shelach, ulldntcd, ilacrilal report to its members. Jahotinský Institute Archives. 7\8 - 16 , ý. (I I ebrew) 
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Parallel to the sanctification of fallen soldiers and their transformation into 
role models for future gencrations, parents were also recruited. They were treated as 
agents assigned the task of encouraging their children toward self-sacrifice, the search 
for the common good, and dedication to the evolving State. This attitude Nvas so 
ingrained in the minds of several of the country's leaders at the time that it inspired 
some bizarre proposals. In 1949, the Knesset Corrunittee for National Emblems 
suggested awarding a "Bereaved Parents Medal" to parents of soldiers who had fallen 
between 30 November 1947 and 20 July 1949 (the date of the cease-fire agreement 
signed between Israel and Syria). The suggestion entailed awarding a bronze medal to Zý 
parents who had lost one child, a silver inedal to parents who had lost two children, 
and a gold inedal to those who had lost three or more children, accompanied by a 
certificate on behalf of the President of the country and personally signed by Ben 
Gurion. 132 General Moshe Zadok, head of the IDF personnel division, supported the 
idea. Although the certificate was issued, the medals were never produced or awarded. 
For their willingness to act as political agents, bereaved parents were rewarded C, 
by the State: official commemoration clevated their sons to the status of mythic 
heroes. "Their images Nvill stand before Lis and glow even after the last of our 
generation passes on" wrote a Ben GUriou touched after receiving Kinneret: Days of 
Defiance, 133 a book containing texts vvi-itten by fallen members of the Kinneret 
Settlement ývho had fought the Arabs during the War of Independence. 
134 The term 
I 
"hero" became attached to the narnes of the dead in popular speech. The phrase "How 
are the mighty fallen" ýII Samuel 1,25) linked the present to the past and carne to 
ýý\I 2 ist 1949ý 
lettei- to tlic Chief' of' the General Staff, IDV Archi\ es, 
unnuinheied. 
13 3 Hahasý 13. (cd. ). Kimlerei o1-1)ýfianceý 19-50. Tcl A, % iý : Kinneret Settleinent Publications and 
Da\ ar Press. ) 
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represent the epitome of public grief Dying in battle became viewed as the 
resurrection of ail ancient tradition. At one of its first meetings, the Public Council for 
Commemoration aorced to deniand of the Minister of Defense that IDF fallen 
officially be called 'lleroes of the War I-or National Sovereignty. "" 35 Such a step 
would symbolically eqtiate Hagana with OF dead. In response, the Ministry's Legal ZD 
Counsel stated that special legislation was not required because the government was 
authorized to make such decisions independently. Albeit government failure to issue 
the title, it did acquire in a semi-official status. In official correspondence regarding 
the annual award of medals to bereaved families, the Prime Minister referred to the 
recipients as "Heroes of National Iii dependence, " "Heroes of War for National 
Sovereignty, " or "Heroes of Israel". 
In this Nvay, the government awarded special recognition to bereaved parents in 
its official publications and state rituals. Parents, like their children, were declared to 
be unique and meaningful contributors to the sovereignty project: zD 
Today, Israel, trembling with pride and gratitude, recalls its sons and 
daughters, the nation's heroes, who exposed thernselves to mortal danger z: 1 
during battle, and who, in the glorious spring of their pure and courageous 
lives, obtained independence for their people. Israel will bless their memory 
while it is itself blessed by their valor, and loyally comforts their parents by 
acknovvied, im, their sacrifice. ' 36 
During construction of the family of the bereaved, it was Ben Gurion who, 
more than any other public figure. remained in personal touch with the families. He 
wrote the foreword Ior many of the commemorative volumes published by bereaved 
13ý ' Dekel, Y. and Ben Z% i. Y.. 21 Fcbruarý 1951,1 etter to Ben Gurion, D. containin-L, i-eport of decisions 
made dLIl'inL' the incetino ot'llublic Councit lor Cornincrnoration. IDI: ArchiVCS, Unnumbered. (liebrew) 
1 336 Pi-oclamation Rclardinlq the ., 
VatioWs First Independence Du. t . cited 
in Azaryalnl. 1995. 
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families, spoke at numerous commemorative services, and frequently responded, in 
his own handwriting, to the letters sent him by members of these families: 
... 
beyond the images of' the boys and oirls radiates the image of the parents. 
These wonderful young lions ol'Judah Nvere not born of- its granite and oaks. 
These lions and lionesses had parents, VH-tLIOLIS "vorricri and honorable 
men ... 
dear parents who bequeathed their children to the coming generations Z-1 
and to their people. 
137 
As stated, bereaved mothers were singled out. In an address whose subject was 
the role of parents in the education for sacrifice and patriotism, Ben Gurion stated: 
Perhaps fathers have a part [Hi the process] ... but I am convinced that a much 
larger part, perhaps the main part, belongs to mothers. We have been blessed 
with mothers who have given us boys and girls who are the pride of their 
generation. It is they who will educate the future generations; it is their image 
that will burn like a pillar of fire before those same generations. I am aware of 
my incapacity to console a rnothcr who has lost her precious child. However, it 
appears to me that the Jewish mother who educated her children in this spirit 
will not onI know grief over her loss; she will also feel pride, justifiable y ZD 
pride, for the gift she has given her people at Nvhat may be their greatest 
mornent in history ... She will feel not onlv pain and sorrow 
but also satisfaction 
because she gave such children to her people, children who have left us-but 
especially their mothers, their mothers. ' 38 
In translating this policy into a pro2ram, bereaved parents became regular 
invitees to state ceremonies, speakers at public gatherings, colleagues of national 
leaders on the reviewer's platform at military parades and state events. At the first 
Defense Forces Daý, celebration in 1949. w, hich inclUded the first military parade held 
Cited in Talmi. F. (ed. ), 1952. Israel (iuriiýg 117c Wur. Tcl A\, i\: Amichai. (Hebre\\) 
""'Ben GYLII'iOllý D. 28 Septembei 196 1. addrcss ý, iN en at the part\ cont'crence announcing publication of 
the third \o I unic of'G01ci E. ýh (Parchincias (jFire): cited in R. A\ inoam (I ed.. ), 1961. Memorial Pages 
Tel A\ i\: Am I laSeter. Olehrcýý ) 
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in the fledgling state, the central stage was planned to seat 1600 people. Each place 
was marked with the names ofthose invited. In the center, a special box was prepared 
for President Ben Zvi and his retinue, Ben Gurion and Chief ofthe Gencral Staff Dori. 
To the left, a section was assigned to the diplornatic corps. behind which would be 
seated cabinet ministers, members of the Kncsset, heads of local governments, the 
senior civil service and senior army officers. To the left, another platform was 
constructed to seat 800 disabled veterans, in front of the central stage and at both sides 
of the field where the parade would be held were other platforms, arranged in a 
horseshoe pattern, where bereaved parents would sit. Bereaved parents were also 
selected - for some, the absence of the parents of Etzel and Lehi dead was glaring. 
139 
In contrast, the parents of Hagana dead were not only invited, they arrived to find seats 
assigned to them on the specialty arranged platforms. 140 Zý n 
Ben Gurion was not content, however., to differentiate between "acceptable" 
and "unacceptable" or "Invisible, " excluded parents. He also selected parents who 
could symbolize the type of bereavement that served national purposes, who could 
represent and help construct the spirit of the time. These parents became, on occasion, 
partners in the practice of politics. figures acqUiring direct access to the Mapai 0 tD 
leadership. A prime example of this phenornenon was Rivka Guber. 
Rivka Guber was perhaps the tdeal woman to represent Labor Movement 
ideals and recruited bereaverricrit. After Gubcr's husband Mordechai was rejected by 
the British Army in 1942 on account of poor health, she became the first women 
inducted into the British Army's Auxiliary Training Service (ATS). Her decision to I 
13 9 Haarel--. 19 Julý 1949. (1 lcbre\\) 
140 Dresner. Y.. October 2001 . inter\ ie\ý. JabotinskN lnl; titLIte Archi\ es, I el A\ i\. (Ilebrew) 
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leave her two small sons at horne and _join 
the male war effort shattered all the nornis 
of protective Jewish motherhood and made her a controversial figure. Convinced that ýn 
her entire faintly should take part in the YiShUV'S contribUtIO11 to the War effort, she 
served for two years, until her son Efrairn reached the age of 16. She then helped forge 
documents verifying his age; Efraim then replaced her as the family's representative in 
the ariny. Efraim served as a Guardian (noter) in the Hagana for about six months, 
after which he joined the Jewish Brigade. "When I received your letter after the battle, 
I cried fi-orn happiness" responded Rivka to her son now stationed in Europe, "not 
only because you have survived but also because I have been blessed vvIth the type of 
son I drearnt about. My heart, like yours, betrays no tHniclity. " 141 
On 26 March 1948, while Efraim was commanding a Flagana convoy escort 
unit near Kfar Uriah, the Arabs attacked the isolated 'Firat Shatorn. While covering the 
settlement, he was caught by a bullet and killed. The sorrow that fell upon the couple 
did nothing to weaken their determiriatiori regarding the family's part in the Yishuv's 
collective effort against the Arabs. On 28 June 1948, Efraim's brother Zvi Joined the 
Palmach. Three weeks later, on 8 July, Zvi was killed in the battle at Hulikat in 
northern Israel. His body was found only some months after he died. 
In 1955, now past the age of 60, tile Gubers decided to leave their original 
home in Kfar Warburg and settle in the Lachish reigon. Lachish had becorne the site 
of concerted development efforts, concentrating on founding new communities and 
absorbing immigrants (aliyah), national projects that the government had signaled out 
as particularly urgent. The Gubers settled in Noga, the first settlement established in 
the area. The,,,, lived in a small wooden shack. Nvithout electricity or running water, and 
became active in the community's development. From there they moved to Nehura, 
141 HaDour, 30 hine 1972. (1 lebre\%) 
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the first rural regional center to be established in the Negev, following donation of 
their farm at Kfar Warburg to the National Fund. Mordechal Guber became head of 
the local council while Rivka became involved in early childhood educatioii and 
spurred establishment of libraries in the surrounding settlements. Their activity 
continued into 1967, when they moved once more, this time to Kfar Achim 
("brothers"), a settlernent nained after their sons, where they worked for the 
absorption of immigrants from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Zn 
Rivka Guber embodied the spirit of the Labor Movement as it was physically 
expressed in the monuments scattered throughout the country. ' 42 She would often 
verbalize the core values of the Hagana - national defense, pioneering, and settlement 
- which carne to represent the core values of Israel's collectivist ideology: 
Our unique situation demanded that we perceive life's meaning as a ZD 
mission ... there was no need 
for Lis to search for goals: The massive wave of 
immigration, which swelled and engulfed us, was like spring rain-this 
awareness and the circumstances provided [Mordechail with the opportunity to 
do what he did in order to establish dozens of immigrant settlements - and I 
was there to help him, as inuch as I could.... 143 
Given her activities and beliefs, she became an examplar in the campaign to 
recruit the masses to Mapai-directed national projects: 
Ingathering of the exiles [kibbutz galliyoll is the supreme goal of the State of 
Israel 
... 
including the kibbutzim ýý, 'herc the pioneering spirit was satisfied with 
attempts to absorb small groups of minorities but betrayed no concern for the 
masses of immigrants, nor for the immigrants who had settled on the land. The 
entire nation was thirsty for immigration and prayed for its arrival ... 
but 
outside state institutions ... only a smattering of citizens, such as the 
brothers 
For instance. the I lulda and Neaha inontiments: see Part it. Chaptel-T\\o. 
14 ', Guber. R.. 1970. Being Worth 
' v, 
address gken at the t\%entieth annkcrsar) celebration of the 
publication ofher book, The Brolhers Book. Beittlasol'er Archkcs, 'Fel , \\i\. 
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Yaakov and Zvi Maimon, and Rivka and Mordechai Guber, actively displayed 
any comradeship with the immigrants.... 144 
From Ben Gurion's the point of view, Rivka Gubcr Nvas the optimal 
Mapai/Labor Movement mother. At the cornerstone laying ceremony for the Soldiers' 
Commemoration Building at Kfar Vitkin (195 1), Ben Gurion mentioned The Brothers 
Book, written by Guber, and stated that 
among the special things about this book is ... the image of the mother who 
glows from its pages. The mother's words will stand as a symbol of the Jewish 
mother's courage and loyalty. She was able to speak for many of Israel's 
mothers. The nation will remember her sons ... and the parents who raised thern 
[to serve] the nation with love and respect. 145 
Ben Gurion's attitude toward The Broihers Book, 146 in which Guber recounts 
the history of her sons' short lives and their readiness to volunteer and to do battle, 
transformed the book into a canonical text, an inspirational tome of the first order. 
Immediately after reading the book, Ben Gurion asked to meet its author. 147 A long- 
lasting relationship followed. He described Rivka Guber as follows: "I arn acquainted 
with no other mother in Israel - either now or in any other generation - such as the 
mother of these two boys. Her work is an incomparable chapter in world literature. " 
The sobriquet "the boys' mother, " attached to Guber's name until her death, reflected 
her status as a paragon to be emulated especially by bereaved parents. "Frorn the 
144 Ben Gurion, D., 26 January 1964, Introduction to the Yi--kor \olume dedicated to Varda Friedman, a 
\oiuntecr \\orkitw in an immi-rant mosha\, killed bý Arabs. Scle Boker: Ben Ourion Archi\es. 
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moment I read your words in The Brotherý Book, I realized that a great mother had 
been born in Israel ... With mothers 
like you, we can confidently awalt the future. "' 48 
Guber accepted the role, fully conscious of the obligations involved Nvith beim, 
a living symbol: Zý I 
The biblical mother after whom I was named took upon herself a weighty 
responsibility for future generations ... 
Throughout our [people's] bitter exile, 
and until this very day, the Jewish mother was the symbol of horne and country 
for her sons. She guarded tradition so that her people's hopes would not 
die 
... suffering 
did not demean her, it only exalted her. I feel that this is the 
place and the time to remember a little-known Jewish mother, one of the many 
who died in the Warsaw Ghetto after all her sons had been killed before her 
very eyes. This mother, Esther Zacks, has become for many the mother of all 
Holocaust victims ... 
due to a letter she wrote to her children: 'After the 
pogrom, your father said to me: Don't worry, Hitler doesn't have the power to 
destroy us - we have a son in the Land of Israel. ' The greatcst Jewish mother 
of our times is Henrietta Szold"9; she has succored rnyriads of oppressed 
Jews, uprooted from their native soil and replanted in our homeland. Permit 
me to recall but another mother, a purely imaginary one ... a poet 
dedicated this C, 
unage to all the mothers whose sons fell in the campaign [against the z: 1 11: 1 11ý 
Arabs] 
... 
This youth had seen the best of the younger generation ... 
fall upon the 
homeland's fields 
... 
including his elder brother.. Tho u san ds of bereaved 
mothers were forced to dry their tears [in pridel for this is how we have 
educated our sons. 150 
For Labor supporters, Guber becarne the voice of the fallen soldiers' parents 
Whenever possible, Ben Gurion presented her as tile "State mother, " an honor she 
attempted to realize. In return, she came to call Ben Gurlon the Chainpion of'Araeli 
1" i3en Ourion, 1). 13 December 1953, letter to Ouber. R., Sdc Ilk) ker: Bcn Gurion Archk es. 1W I . ý. 
(licbrew) 
A leading educator. 
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Sovcrcýqnty. 151 She became a permanent fixture in commemorative ceremonies. 
During the 1951 Independence Day festivities, the Chief of the General Staffs address 
to bereaved parents was transmitted over the radio; Rivka Guber spoke next. At the 
end of the transmission, the leading actress of the day, I laiiiiah Rovina, read excerpts 
from the writings of fallen soldiers. 152 On these and other such occasions, the Gubers 
were invited to the rostrum as honorary guests and public figures. 
Gelbgisser 
The story of the Gelbglsser family, which paralleled that of the Guber family, could 
easily have become a national myth to be learnt by Israel's youth for generations. The 
plot involved the loss of their two sons - the twins Shlorno and Menachern - during 
the War of Independence, participation in settlement, belief in patriotic values and 
steadfast Zionist practice. The Gelbgissers had come to Israel frorn Eastern Europe 
and gone to Join other pioneering farmers in Mishmar Hayarden. In 1929, they turned 
to raising strawberries, then a new crop, in what was to become the city of Givatayim, 
in the proximity of Tel Aviv. Three of their children Joined the British Army in 1940. 
Shlorno and Menachern served in the Jewish Brigade., where they assisted in the 
rescue of refugee children in Europe. Volumes of letters, written by the two brothers 
to their siblings, remained with the farnily. The letters describe how the brothers 
visited orphanages and monasteries in Italy, Belgium and Holland, searching 
everywhere for Jewish children who had managed to survive. The rescued children 
occasionally wrote emotional letters to the family as , vell as newspaper articles 
describing their experiences. Gradually. the brothers' political vievvs came to approach 
(7mhei% R. letter to Ben Gurion, Sde Boker: Ben Gurion Archives. unnuInbered. (flebre\0 
Davai% 9 Nlaý 195 1. (1 lebre\\) 
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those of Etzel, which they eventually joined. Both participated in the conquest of 
Jaffa. Shlorno, who joined Etzel after completing his tour of duty with the Bri,,,, adc, 
participated in the Yehudia campaign and fell on 19 May 1948, five days after 
declaration of statehood. during the attack on Wilhelma. The attack, althow-di 
officially an Etzel operation, was conducted in coordination with IDF forces. 
Menachern had joined the IDF after its absorption of Etzel forces. 
As the father of three soldiers in the field, the elder Gelbgisser could have 
prevented Menachem's induction into the army and demanded that he not be put on 
active duty. He did in fact do so but rescinded his objection when Shlorno was killed: 
"I would like to cancel the appeal I presented regarding the release from mandatory 
induction of my fourth son [Menacheiril. After one of my three sons, alreadv serving Zý 
in the ari-nN,, was killed yesterday, my fourth son must take his place. " 153 Gelb-isser 
thus brought about a situation where his three remaining sons were all concurrently 
fighting against the invading Arab armies. During the Altalena incident, Menachem 
deserted his unit and returned home: He had found it difficult to fire upon his 
ideological brothers stationed on the ship. With the incident's conclusion, he returned 
to the IDF and was assigned to the 53rd Regiment, the Golani Brigade, and stationed 
at Kibbutz Geva. He was killed on 13 July 1948 while fending off the Egyptian attack 
on the kibbutz. According to a fellow soldier assigned to his position, Menachem's 
last words were: "My brother is calling me. " After his death, his mother expressed the 
hope that the death of her sons had contributed to the State"s rebirth, and that they 
"Nvere not needless victims. " 
In the absence of an,, official State mandate to corrim ern orate Etzel dead - as 
opposed to Hagana dead - commemoration becarne a personal and local goýernment 
1, ' Gelb2isser, Y. 1, etter to the IDF Appeals Committee, priý ate correspondence. (licbrc\%) 
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project. Six years after the deaths of the Gelbgisser brothers, several Etzel veterans 
decided to end the public silence surrounding their story and to erect a syna(41ope in 
their memory on a plot owned by their parents in Givatayim. The narne chosen for the 
synagogue was "The SM Tabernacle, " including the initials of the two brothers' 
names, S(hlomo) and M(enachem). In letters addressed to veterans of the dissident 
movements, pleas were made for financial contributions. 154 
On 7 July 1954, on the anniversary of Menachem's death, a groundbreaking 
ceremony was held at the plot. Herut advertised the event in its newspaper. The 
ceremony was staged as an Herut Movement gathering. None of the senior 
government officials invited to participate and address the audience arrived; invited 
representatives of the Ministry of Defense also failed to appear. Menachein Begin was zn 
the sole public figure present. Thus, despite the Gelbgissers' hopes that the ceremony 
would result in State recognition of their sons' deeds, they were awarded with official 
disregard. Comments made by the Rabbi of the Givat Rambam district of Givata-virn 
to Yaakov, the elder Gelb, -Isser - "Your sons'-dream will not be fulfilled until the 
Land of Israel extends over both banks of the Jordan River ... [I pray] that this 
liberation is soori completed" 155 _ irrevocably marked the ceremony as a political 
event irrespective of its original intent. Similar to Mapai's policy regarding such tý Z-- 
events, Herut had appropriated commemoration to its ideological needs and 
transformed the Gelbgisser ceremony into an instrument in it's withdrawal frorn any 
attempt to enter tile statist discourse. 
The Gclbgisser commemoration ceremony, irrespective of its scale. ý, vas zn 
therefore but one in a series of similar events exploited for political purposes. In the 
154 Sliclach- 28 1 une 1 954ý im itation tothe ccrenioný . (I 
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155 8 Lljý, c1 19 D4. (I I chre%\ 
276 
press report of the commemorative service for the dead from the Acre Fortress break- 
in, conducted at Moshav Shavei Tziyyoti, the article published in HaOlam HaZeh 
noted that: 
this is a private service for private heroes. While the martyrs' families weep l'or 
their sons, Menachern Begin and several leaders of the Herut Movement honor 
the dead who fell in the service of the organization that he [Begin] 
commanded. " The author then notes the fact that "the cemetery at Shavei 
Tziyyon 
... was established almost 
by chance-The original plan had been to 
bury them in Nahariya, but the Nahariya municipality feared all contact with 
the underground, even after death. Shavei Tziyyon eventually responded to 
their request to set aside space for their final resting place. Not one Israeli 
government official has yet visited this or other [Etzel and Lehi] cemetery. ' 56 
The bereaved families, bereft of any government support, were dependent 
exclusively on Shelach and private contributions in their efforts to commemorate their 
dead: 
They abandoned us. Parents. Brothers and sisters. Hurting and mourning. The 
State was born. Jewish policemen walk its streets. Jewish servicernen strut in 
parades on Indepeudence Day. And we, the parents of these freedom fighters, 
are left uninvited to the honorary rostrum to sit among other bereaved parents 
for the sake of those who, like them, were anonymous soldiers in their war 
against the British oppressor. Today, we are indeed invisible parents, unknown 
bereaved parents. But the State exists nonetheless. That is our sole consolation 
for the loss of our two precious sons. 157 
In the face of the public recognition awarded to Mapai's bereaved inothers and ZD 
its non-recognition of the bereaved mothers of those dead identified with the n 
1ý(, HaOlam HaZeh, 8 April 1958. (1-lebre\\) 
1ý7 1 rom ýiddress made hý the parents of the Rihenhach hrothers, killed ClUrin,,, the I lai Ia Railroad 
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underground, many Nvornen associated Nvith Etzel became embittered as they were týl 
repeatedly shunted into a corner of the public arena. They were thus obliged to 
construct a private culture of mourning and commemoration in order to state their 
claims in the nation-building project. For instance, the third verse of the Leh) anthem 
Unknown Soldiers, written by the organization's founder, Yair (Avraham) Stern, cites: 
the tears ofmothers bereaved of their young, 
sacred infants... 
We'll cement the bricks of our bodies for walls 
And our homeland will surely be built. 158 
The feelings of mothers belonging to the dissident camp were poignantly Zý 
expressed in the bequest of Ziporah Gurion, the mother of three daughters who had 
served in Etzel and the wife of Yitzhak Gurion, also an Etzel member. Her husband 
and daughters were arrested numerous times prior to independence. During her battle ZI 
against cancer, Gurion wrote a will that was entrusted to Esther Raziel-Naor (MK,, 
Herut). The will, opened after her death in 1957, read: 
... 
I remember the nights of turmoil and days of war and rebellion ... 
[what] I 
knew frorn my own experience and from the suffering faces of the mothers and 
wives of members of the underground ... 
I made a decision. I said to myself. 
only the body deteriorates and passes away, the spirit is eternal ... 
I would like a 
special fund to be established as part of the Museum of the Underground 
located in the Jabotinsky Institute for the collection of all the material on the 
roles played, operations conducted, the vision and execution of national 
liberation, the acts of defiance committed by women in the Diaspora and in 
Tziv%, on ... 
The fund \\, III provide all the means necessary for the collection of 
these documents, which will provide the foundations for an encyclopedia in 
N\hicli the mcinoric,, of all the wornen will be entrusted. [We AXIII tlierebý, 
158 See http: //\ý\\-\\. sa\cisi-acl. conilstei-tisoldici-s. htin. 
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learn] ... to appreciate their character and quality, their contributions and 
actions ... of those 
forgotten whether by choice or by accident.... 159 
After her death, her family began to implement her wishes. A public 
committee was formed ofthe underground's veterans and their wives, and collection z: 1 
of the material was began. This pr Ject paralleled the State's commemorative literature ZD 01 
project. Each had a similar political purpose - to impress the image of the bereaved 
mothers whose children were sacrificed on the altar of national rebirth into Israel's 
collective mernorv. 
However, in the face of the "counter-efforts" to commemorate these "private 
heroes, " as the press described them, Menachem Begin surprisingly presented a 
public-spirited approach in everything related to public commemoration of the nation's 
dead. At the opening of the inaugural meeting of Herut's National Convention, Begin 
outlined the difference between his approach and that of Ben Gurion: 
We will recall more than our sons this evening ... have no intention of 
discriminating between our undertaking and other Jewish undertakings... we 
will also remember those Ilagana dead ... who fought shoulder-to-shoulder with 
us against the British oppressor-who fell while defiending their country and zn 
their people at the hands of the British henchmen, the Arab bands. We will 
remember them all, whether they belonged to the Hagana, to Etzel or to Lehi, 
or to no one organization, who united as Israel's forces and who fought and 
fell ... they are all sacred, they are all 
heroes ... we will remember them all with 
love. In honor of them all, we will rise in a moment of silence. 160 
One vvonders vNFhat might have motivated Be-in's magnanimous attitude, considering tý t, tý 
I ive. the acrimony between the two sides regarding the historical narrati 
HaOlam IJaZ(, h. 20 February 1952. (licbre%%) 
Herutý 20 Octobcr 1948. (1 lebrem 
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Ben Gurion's War 
DUring the Knesset debate in which Begin had complained that Dayan, while a senior 
IDF officer, had taken part in a Mapai gathering and called upon the nation's young 
people to join the party's youth movement, Ben Gurion denied the legitimacy of 
criticizing "individuals who had participated in the war for national sovereignty by 
someone who had not participated in [that war]. " 161 
Begin's accusation prefaced a no-confidence vote against the government on 
24 June 1958. His argument was not against an act that had nullified the separation 
between the political and the military spheres but against what he contended was a 
contrary definition of historical truth and the character of the struggle that had 
culminated in establishment of the State. Was that conflict a sovereignty project as 
claimed by Ben Gurion and Mapai, or a war of liberation as claimed by himself and 
the underground, now under the Herut umbrella? 
Begin's Knesset remarks are revealing in the structure of the argument and the Zý t, 
personal antipathy betrayed: 
... 
From the dawn of their youth, individuals must of necessity dedicate their 
lives to their people and their country-they sacrifice their bodies in the 
concentration camps and on the scaffold, they endanger their souls by day and 
by night to leave their families, to conduct campaigns on more than one front Zýl 
a war of the few against the many ... and to remember - 
if not brought 2-1 
before the executioner - the land of their dreams. To hear such things [Ben 
Gurion's remarks] from the podium of a Jewish parliament, and from the 
mouth of one of its mernbers ... But there is no place for sadness or for 
argument. It is not beneath my dignity - although it was beneath the dignity of 
loi l3eLiii. IM. 19 J Line 19ý8, Proposal lhe A genda Proposal Ao 2 (fo II m\ing tl Ic proposa I lor a 
memorial daý Lm -117C 0/ I-egill0l' (71wi, i officers al political part. i gathcrings, Knessel 
Protocols. (Hebre\ý) 
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the youngest of my thousands of past subordinates in Israel's campaigns of 
resistance and liberation - to argue about the subject of the war of national 
sovereignty with a person who clairned ... before the Conscription Committee 
that Zionism never intended ... to create a Jewish state [a sovereign state in Ben 
Gurion's ternis]. -I le was willing to determine what Zionism entails - during 
those days when the best of Jewish youth stood in the midst of the life-or-death 
war against foreign rule, for the sake of national independence, and to declare: 
'If the British regime and gendarmes are interested in the elimination of terror, 
we will cooperate to that same degree'- and to abide by what he declared, to 
cooperate and to turn hundreds of freedom fighters over to the British, and to 
continue in that same shameful act against which our ancient forefathers would 
have uttered additional prayers ... There is no argument. History will judge who 
endangered his life for so many years, and who did not do so for even one day; 
who was hunted by multitudes of soldiers and police yet did not leave the 
country for even one day ... Who incited hate, malice, plots, civil war, the 
shedding of innocent blood - to the point of a vindictiveness that no human 
words can describe, vindictiveness beyond death - [as opposed to] who 
prevented civil war at all cost ... with so much love and understanding-who 
recognized every right and its possessor, every sacrifice and those who 
sacrificed. History will judge. You are too insignificant, Mr. Ben Gurion, to 
argue with us over the war of national sovereignty - too petty and too narrow- 
minded. There is no argument over the war of national sovereignty, but we can 
aroue over the status of the Jewish armed forces ... [of those who] tied their 21 
fates to Jabotinsky's movement in the last elections. Are you trying to identify 
the Israeli armed forces with Mapai? l 62 
Ih, Begin, M- 13 December 1954. Knessel Prolocols. (Hebre\\) 
Chapter Five 
The Politics of Historiography 
Little doubt exists as to the significance of Israel's War of Independence for the period 
covered by this research. The event, one and a half years in duration, provided the 
main content and symbolic thrust to Israeli culture. Poetry and literature were 
dedicated to the subject, commemorative sites provided major targets for artistic 
expression, school texts and educational activities focused on its narrative. As part of 
the program to convert the War into an educational value, a national essay competition 
was held for high school students in 1953 oil the subject the "War of Independence. "' 
The prizes were awarded at a special ceremony held in Jerusalem on Lag ba'Onier, the 
holiday celebrating the Jewish insurrection against Imperial Rorne. Rachel Yanait 
Ben-Zvi, the wife of Israel's President and a leading personality in her own right, 
handed the awards to the winners. 
Like the rest of the population, students' perceptions of the War and their 
attitudes toward it were not necessan Iv the products of spontaneous recollection. With 
the establishment of the State in 1948, the national leadership initiated a series of 
literary and historical pro. jects to document and recreate the story of Israel's rebirth. 
Historiography, authorized and unauthorized alike, whether written as war diaries, 1: ) 
historical works, literary collections, poetry. or letters froin the front, were loyal to the 
official interpretatl\c package decreed by Mapai. Although attempts ý, N/ere made to 
1 Peres. S., 30 April 1953. letter to y. f)ekeL Y- IDF Archi% es, 156-90/72. (liebi-e\%) 
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present alternative versions of the past so as to broaden public appreciation of the 
events and the contributions made by participants excluded from these texts, time, as 
Azaryahu reveals, worked in favor of the authorized version. 2 Tile examples to be 
described in this chapter illustrate how historiography reflected the hegemonic control 
of Mapat, the dominant party in power at the conclusion of the War but more 
particularly, Ben Gurion's desire to stamp his mark on the nation's collective memory. 
This was accomplished by means of selective remembrance of the "facts" realized 
through recruited historiography written about the events. The events cited here are 
limited to the military arena because of the political implications of the War of 
Independence and nation building. 
The guiding force behind the authorized historiography project Nvas David Ben C, L- ýl 
Gurion. He quickly grasped the political salience of writing and distributing his own 
version of the struggle for independence. By 1963, after retiring from government and 
secluding himself at Sde Boker, Ben Gurion turned to writing his memoirs. This man, 
who had served as General Secretary of the Histadrut., Chairman of the Jewish 
Agency, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, was acutely aware of his personal 
role in the State's rebirth and its maturation. He claimed at the time that writing his 
memoirs was more important than an-, vlhmgg he had yet done. 3 In effect, as Anita 
Shapira notes, "until establishment of the State, Ben Gurion had paid little attention to 
historical issues or to culture in general"; she concludes that these matters simply did 
not interest him .4 However, once national rebirth was achieved, Ben Gurion realized 
2 N1. Azarý ahu, 1995. State Rites, t Jnivcrsitý ofBeer She\ a, Ben Gurion Archives. (I lebrew) 
3 Erez., Y., quoted in Tzachor, Z.. 1996. Ben Gurion the Mvthrnaker, in D. Ohana and S. R. Weisreich 
(Eds. ). 1fi-th and Remembrance - The [, volution of Israel Consciozisness. Jerusalem: Hakibbutz 
Haineuchad and the Van Leer Institute, p. 138. (licbre\ý) 
4 Shapira, A., 1997, New Jeiis, Old, leivs, Tel-Aviv: Ain 0% edý pp. 225-226. Shapira also notes that the 
first inklintis of a chamie in \ ieý% arc noticeable in texts firom 195 1. See especially Ben GUrion, D.. 
195 1ý The Campaign, Tel-A\ i\: Mapai Publications. pp. 197-202. (Hebrc\ý) 
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the long-term political value attached to his version of the events. Ile subsequently 
invested considerable efforts in writing and distributing texts - in addition to his 
personal biography - that clearly informed their readers as to who was to receive 
credit for this achievement. 
Politically, historiography represented a direct extension oil' the legislation 
aimed at distancing Etzel and Lehi dead from the national pantheon. In 1950, Ben 
Gurion wrote: I refuse to grant Etzel any recognition ... Although I must avoid 
differentiating between the Hagana and the others who worked toward the same 
purpose, I will not rank Etzel alongside the Hagana.... " Ben Gurion identified the 
strategies required to inculcate his messages together with the force of culture, as 
resources capable of translation into political power. In 1950, he wrote the following: 
"The urgent tasks awaiting us include ... party publication of a 
large quantity of 
material in every area of literature ... organization of the Ministry of Defense, and 
recruitment of colleagues for the army's cultural education. 0 
The consummate expression of this view is Ben Gurion's decision to produce 
the Sefer Toldol HaHagana (The Hagana Chronicles), published by Israel's Ministry 
of Defense. The decision to do so provided the first opportunity to debate the 
developing historiography, as the right expressed its fury over an official institution's 
Willingness to publish a seemingly non-partisan history book that nonetheless ignored n 
the opposition's role in the War. The eighth volurne of Chronicles, entitled The 
Histoiy of the Hagana, was reteased in 1973, on the eve of the Jewish New Year. The 
idea of publishing such a book was born among a group of Hagana veterans with the 
creation of the IDF at the end of 1948. Their purpose, as stated by Shaul Avigur, one 
-ch 1950. t ýni\ ersit\ of Bcer Shcva. Ben Gurion Ben Gurion, D.. 1951. Dkirks, elltrý dated 26 Mat 
Archk es (originallý the Sde Boker Center). (I lebrc\ý) 
284 
of the idea's architects, was to recount the story of Jewish defense in Israel "from Tel 
Hai (March 1920) to the order announcing establishment of the IDF (31 May 1948), as 
well as from the earliest instances of self-defense in Palestine beginning with Jewish 
settlement at the close of the preceding century. " A further airn xvas to "faithfully tell 
the story as a gift to the IDF and its future generations, to all the nation's people and its 
youth. ,6A similar suggestion was made by a group of historians led by Prof. Ben-Zion 
Dinur. Both projects received the support of Ben Gurion, who created a framework to 
prepare the volume. It was also agreed that the book would be published jointly by the 
Ministry of Defense and the Zionist Federation. The project was officially announced 
on 17 July 1949; its editorial staff would include Shaul Avigur, Yltzchak Ben-Zvi, 
7 Ben-Zlon Dinur (DInburg), Eliezer Galili and Yisrael Galili . 
A review of the evolution of Jewish defense forces as described in the work 
discloses the total dearth of references to Etzel and Lehi from the volume dealing with 
the period of their operation. Only one organization - the Hagana - is mentioned. 
Avigur writes thusly: "Volume Three of the Hagana Chronicles unfolds the story of a 
period fraught with action and excitement from May 1939 ... until the end of 1948... At 
first we were convinced that our book would conclude on 29 November. However, in 
the course of its writing, it became clear that the Hagana continued to carry the main 
burden of the War of Independence until the establishment of the IDF in late May 
1948. 
Following the departure of Prof. Dinur (for reasons of health) and some of his ZD 
students from the project, the main responsibility for its cornpletion was transferred to 
Prof. Yehuda Slutzky, who had written the major portion of the text appearincy in Zý 
" Shadmot, 1953,50 (Winter). the Yad Tabenkin Archi% cs. Section 25, Contuiner 6, File 3. (1 febrc\\) 
7 Davar. 17 July 1949. (Ilebre\N) 
s Shadl? 70L 1953. 
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Volumes Two and Three. These describe the personal experiences of I-lagana 
members. The introduction, again written by Avigur, reveals the reality experienced 
by the Hagana veterans who initiated the pro j ect: "This is not a book of militarv 
history ... this is a personal historical account ... We tried as best we could to make sure 
that comrades who participated in or witnessed the various Hagana actions would 
review and comment upon tile text. "9 The text's intent was to position the Hagana as 
the forerunner of the Israel Defense Forces. As stated by Avigur: "We believe that 
whoever reads this or the previous volumes of the Hagana Chronicles will be 
convinced that the IDF is the Hagana's direct and legitimate offspring. Almost all IDF z: I Z: 71 
institutions were conceived in the Hagana. "10 
In the face of the contradictory evidence regarding the events that was brought 
forth by the underground's veterans, Avigur adamantly stressed Labor's version of the 
IDF's origins: "I believe it necessary to emphasize this point given the spreading view Zn 
claiming that the IDF and the Hagana are ostensibly two distinct and separate 
historical entities. We are convinced that our book refutes this idea ... In the years 
following the War of Independence, many works appeared authored by recruits of 
what we consider to be renegade organizations. Their aim NAlas, arnong others, to 
obscure the central role of the Hagana in the establishment of the State. The 
impression gained frorn their letters and publications is that three underground tý Zý 
movements were active in Palestine: the Hagana, Etzel and Lehi, each of which 
should be considered equal in its historical significance. I hope that our book will 
decisively refute this version of the circurnstances surrounding the State's rebirth. I 




organization that strode along the tracks of Jewish history in recent years. The other 
organizations were fleeting occurrences on the pages of history. " II 
Beyond the ruling elite's ability to produce authorized texts "recounting" the 
past was its power to distribute those texts and guarantee their maximal exposure. The 
editors of the Chronicles were eager to exploit this advantage: "We are diligently 
working on the maximal distribution of these volume ... Regarding the future, several 
options are available: one of these is an abridged version of our book... which will be 
inore accessible and readable for broad segments of the population including the 
young ... we will also 
begin translation of the book into other languages: English, 
Russian,... French, Spanish and Yiddish. 102 Eventually, as will be seen, the Ministry 
of Defense distributed this work widely, an act that renewed the controversy that 
surrounded its publication. 
Ben Gurion's version of the War of Independence was imposed not only on 
authorized historiographical texts, it also infiltrated other written works, whether 
produced by publishers directly connected with Mapai, such as Sifiriat Hapoalim, or by 
the Ministry of Defense and others. All betray reliance on authorized works and 
internalization of their messages. 13 As early as December 1948, Sifiriat Hapoalirn 
issued Be'lqvot HaChayalim (With Our Troops), a book containing "reports written by 
IDF observers and articles chronicling the War's progress. " These carefullv selected., 
edited personal recollections and correspondence were considered germane. 
"objective" accounts despite their chronological proxirnitý to the events. The volume 
Sha, lmot. 1953. 
Ibid. 
Shapiri. A.. 1985ý From Di. onissal (? fthe llagana'N Comman(ler to the Dismanding ofthe Pýlhllach 
Tel A\ i\ : Flakihbutz Haineuchad. (Hebre\N) 
Prime I linisterial Resignations, Tel A\ iv: Am O\ed. (H ebrc\ý) 
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represents, in effect, the first stage in the socio-cultural production of a fixed 
11 collective experience of the War, " presurnably shared by the entire populatiOn. 
Subsequent literary activity substantiates this conclusion regarding post-War zn 
historiography. The majority of writers who documented the conduct of tile War Z7, 
identified themselves with Ben Gurion. Their overwhelming reliance on his narrative 
prevented cross-references to texts free of Ben Gurion's direct involvement in their 
composition. This tendency incorporated an almost blind faith in the accuracy of the 
details reported by him, especially in his Israel at War" 14 a book that attained 
exclusivity as a historical record of the pre-War period and early stages of the War. 
Ben Gurion's personal diaries were extensively cited in the introduction to The History 
of1hc Wai- ofMclependence. 15 Although published in 1953 in response to The Hagana 
Chronicles and supposedly meant to compete with that authorized rendition of the 
events, the two-volume Palmach Yearbook'6 refrains from suggesting an alternative 
reading of the past. Shapira found that few of the details mentioned or contentions 
made in these volumes deviate from the authorized historiography. 17 I, ater works, 
although written in the 1970s after Ben Gurion's departure from public affairs, 
likewise strayed little from this path: consider the works by John and David Kii-nehl, 18 
Yehuda Slutzky, 19 and Michael Bar Zohar. 20 With the exclusion of Begin's The 
Revolt, it the story of Israel's War of Independence remained uniform and faithful to 
the interpretation proffered by Mapai's leadership. 
Ben Gurion. D.. 1963. Israel (it War, Tel A% iv: Sif'riat Hapoalim. 
C0111PICLe Cite 
Gitad, Z. (LdA 1953. The Palmuch Yearbook, Tel A\ iv: Hakibbutz Flameuchad. (Hebrc\ý). 
17 A. Shapira. 1985. 
IF, Kinichi. J. and Kimchiý D- I Q73. On Opposite Slopes of the Hilk Tel Aviv: Nfinistrý of Defense, 
Maarachot. jlcbrcýw) 
I') Slutzký. Y., 1971. A llisloiý, - qftht, flagana, Vol. 111. Part 2. p. 1587 ff. (flebre\%) 
Bar Zohar. M., 1977. Ben Gurion, Tel Aviv: Am 0% ed. (licbrew) 
Begin. NI.. 1950. The Revolt, Tel A%, i\: Achiassaf. (Hebi-e\\) 
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Ben Gurion was not content to mold the contours of the history recounted 'in 
"scholarly" texts. His incisive realization of the influence exerted by literature and the 
press on the public's perception of the past led him to diligently nurture fast ties with 
writers and intellectuals, kvhom he viewed as Mapai's ideological agents, to be 
22 
entrusted with creating the aesthetics of the party's political dominance . Ben 
Gurion 
unveiled his vision before this audience at a meeting held on 26 November 1948: 
"One hundred thousand Jews are fighting for their freedom. This, the foremost act of 
human creation undertaken in our time, will inspire literature and art for generations 
to come. This is an historical epic, written by 100,000 of the cream of our youth. All 
this effort is being concentrated now, and will remain targeted as long as the threat to 
our existence and independence eXiStS. "23 This was only one of the frequent meetings Z:, 
lie held with this community. During Israel's first decade as an independent nation- 
state, writers became part of what Shils terms the "charismatic locus, " one of the sites 
of spiritual, cultural and political influence, 24 or what Eisenstadt calls the "social 
core"2s They becarne Ben Gurion's companions and, as Zand has described it, they 
were engrossed by his personality. They helped Ben Gurion construct a national 
culture and ideological consensus while accepting the accompanying social and 
economic privileges, lacking the traditions of an authentic autonomous elite, they 
fought no intellectual battles. 26 
" Lebel, U., 2002. Cracks in the Mirror of Militarý, Hegemony: The Courts and the Media as Agents of 
Ci\iI Societý in Israel. in D. Korn (Ld. )ý Public Policy and Administi-alion in Isi-ael. Baltimore: 
Lexington. 
Cited in Peleg, A.. 1993. The War qf Independence in a Stocking Cap, Tel Aviv: IDII, Headquarters 
of the Chief Education Officer Command and the Gadna (Youth Battalions), p. 8. (Elebrew) 
14 E. Shils, 1973. Intellectuals, Tradition and the Tradition of Intellectuals: Some llrelimmarý 
Considcrat ions. in S. N. Eisenstadt and S. R. Graubard (Eds. ), Intellectuals and D-adition, Ne\\ York: 
I lunianities Press. p. 30. 
LiscnstadL S. N.. 1973. Intellectuals and Tradition. in ý. N. I-Jsenstadt and S. R. Grauhard (Lds. ), 
Iniellecizials and Iradition, Ne\\ York: Humanities Press, p. 4. 
1" Zand, S.. 2000. lntcllectuoN Trath and Powei-, Tel A% i\: Arn Ovcd. pp. 19-20. (Hebrew) 
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Ben Gurion did not hide his attitudes regarding the normative and political 
roles of another elite, the nation's reporters. During one of his speeches to senior 
editors and reporters. lie expressed his view of media personnel: "Like teachers., 
journalists are educators. Teachers educate only the young; journalists educate 
everyone who reads a newspaper. Journalists cannot work just to support 
them selves... Journal ism is a public service, not merely a private pursuit-The 
is public. " journalist is not employed by his publisher, he is employed by hi 1 27 
Government relations with the press were to remain within Ben Gurion's exclusive 
domain of influence for years. 
In the campaign for construction of collective memory, political elites and 
dominant parties obviously enjoy several structural advantages: They control the 
media, nourish the press, and have privileged access to documents. This facilitates the 
relatively effective flow and distribution of political messages throughout the channels 
of social Communication. The exclusionary outcomes of this structure can be 
illustrated thusly: In contrast to Davar, Mapai's journalistic outlet, distribution of 
Flerut newspapers through OF channels was prohibited. Practically speaking, this t) 
ineant that no IDF education officers openly identified with the right; moreover, these 
officers were explicitly ordered to screen newspapers and written material prior to 
their distribution to IDF soldiers . 
28 
The similarity between attitudes toward journalists and those toward teachers 
was far from coincidental. Unlike literature or the press, education, as a distinct arena 
of public service, is formally subject to policy formulated in the political sphere. 
Considering the , Neighty influence exerted by a teacher, such regulation will be more 
Ben (Jurion. D. 194 1. Speech before the Lcncial mectinQ of the Journalists I-ederation, I)avur. 21 
Aprilý (I lebrew) 
'ducation Officer, IDF. Anoný mous. 30 April 2002. Personal inter\ iew with former Chief E 
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strictly managed in fledgling nation-states where an autonomous, trenchant network of C, t, 
mass communication is missing. Furtheri-nore, in such situations, where teachers and 
educators act as "political knoNvIedge agents, " whether explicitly or implicitly; their 
impact on tile I-Ormation of political and normative attitudes 'is even more 
consequential. 29 Control over the teaching staff is, accordingly, the Inichpin of control 
over an evolving political culture. In the present case, this structure of control 
effectively prevented teachers identified with the underground's values from teaching 
in the public schools. Teachers who were former Etzel and Lehi supporters already 
employed in the system were discharged, and applicants with similar associations 
were barred fi-orn employment. This policy was soon brought before the courts. In 
1950, Dr. Israel Fldad, a former Lehi member and one of its foremost ideologues, 
appealed to Israel's High Court of Justice to revoke the Minister of Defense's decision 
30 
prohibiting him from teaching in a Tel Aviv high school (the Qvnmasia Herzlýya) . 
Although the decision, handed down on 8 February 195 1, declared that obstruction of 
Dr. Eldad's employment was illegal; Eldad was never to hold a teaching position in 
the Israeli public school system. 
But Etzel and Lehi veterans Nvere not the only ones to lock horns Nvith Ben 
Gurion on the subJect of national historiography. When challenges to the authorized J 1: 1 Zý 
narrative of the War of Independence and its actors arose, situations interpreted as 
threatening Mapai's hcgemonic status, Ben Gurion would launch into often-vitriolic 
tirades. His critics within the party and among its coalition partners were not 
exempted. For instance, as early as the First Knesset, a heated argument arose between 
11 On the milhoritýlti\e aspects of political kno\Nledge. sec Shapira, B., 1993, ]'he Devchpinew ol 
11ohitcal otaudes among Yowh. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Tcl A\i% Unkersitý, Thc 
Departnictit of Political Science. (I Ichrc\\) 
1Cj High Court qf, Justice -11)peal V() 144 50, Dr. Israel Sheib [F-Idad] v. 7'he Ahnistcr oll'DePi7se and 
Others. (Hcbre\ý) 
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Ben Gurion and Yisrael Galili (representing Mapam and the kibbutzim). During its 
course, Ben Gurion pointed toward Galill and asked: "What did the opposition do for 
the sake of national rebirth' . ),, 
3 1A tumult immediately arose. Moshe Sneh angrily tell 
the hall while Galili delivered his first Knesset speech, in which he detailed Hagana 
actions throughout the War. lie closed with this painful comment: "How can someone 
say such things about ine and my comrades? " 
Such episodes were often repeated. At a Mapai campaign rally held in Jaffa 
prior to elections to the Third Knesset, Ben Gurion again turned to Galili and his 
colleagues with the challenge: "Where were you? " In a Knesset speech delivered 
during Israel's tenth Independence Day celebrations, Ben Gurion listed those who had 
helped to shape the IDF but excluded the names of Hagana leaders such as Ellyahu 
Golomb, Shaul AvIgur, Yitzchak Sadeh, and Yisrael Galili. Such attacks and insults 
were not universally accepted. In an Open Letter to the Chief oj'the Geneml Slqff' 
addressed to Ben Gurion as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, the author, 
apparently a Hagana veteran. wrote: "How could you forget? Can someone who 
forgets that the Israel Defense Forces sprung from the roots of the Hagana planted 
before MLAN, 1948 fulfill his duty by creating a vacuum originally filled by the fighting 
masses" ... Who can forget that the Navy was 
built from the Palmach's maritime 
units9 ... 
You, apparently, have. They say that with age one tends to remember 
childhood experiences ... Have you yielded to senility? If so, you cannot stand the test 
of your military heritage. Are you capable of reviving your youth, dear commander? " 
32 
11 
Paradoxically, the conflict with Galill forced Ben Gurion to admit to some of 
the contributions made by the underground. In order to undermine Galili's claims 
31 Ben Gurion. D., 223 
June 1948, Kncyset Pr()locols (ijebt-e%\ 
il Zion. 1". 
- 
51 RUIC 1949. A/ HaMishmar (Hebm\) 
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regarding the Flagana's historical status, Ben GUrion granted Etzel and Lehi soine C, 
recognition, such as the award of the Hagana Medal. But this gesture did little to 
alleviate Begin's wrath and derision, expressed in Begin's comment that Ben Gurion 
was ready to give credit to the undero round's dead but not to its living. 33 
It thus transpired that the person who, by manipulation of institutions and 
symbols had invested so much to guarantee that the story of Israel's War of 
Independence would be his story, created a situation in which he was considered not 
only "the leader of the War of Independence" but, in the words of Mapai's authorized 
chronicler, Anita Shapira, "he verily wrote Its history. " 34 Shapira continues: "The 
question of what Ben Gurion chose to write down and what he preferred not to is itself 
worthy of sai&-When lie summarized a discussion after its conclusion, he would 
05 
record the events as he understood them or as he wished to understand them. She 
adds: "Very few ventured to state an opinion that contradicted those held by the 
Leninist prophet, legislator and commander ... as the years passed, they 
forgot his 
faults 
... and even painted 
his weaknesses as strengths, such as his taste for absolute 
government and vilification of rivals within the party, while labeling thern as 
06 troublemakers.... Hence, these tendencies were not limited to relationships with his 
political competitors: the management of the war and its military operations were 
similarly treated. W'hen investigating the historiography of Latrun (a mythic battle in ZD 
which Hagana ineptness led to a huge number of casualties), Shapira stated that "as 
long as Ben Gurion continued to serve as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, 
3 ', Cited amon., -, Ben Gurion's remarks madc dwing the 
decorations cercrnoný a\Narding the Hanna 
Medal. 
34 
Shapira. 1985 ý 1). 1) 35 
fbid- p. 23. 
36 
1 bid. 1). 9. 
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criticism of the Latrun incident was limited to rurnors and literary descriptions. 
Yisrael Barr's text was the only historical accOUnt written for many years. 07,38 
Ben Gurion's strategy was to appropriate history to political interests; along the Z-- 
way, lie Nvas able to portray his role within national mernory as perhaps the sole 
guiding spirit behind statehood and the general manager of the War of Independence. 
Shaul Avigur would summarize Ben Gurion's strategy as follows: "I, who saved you 
in the past, will also protect you in the future; you should defend and support my 
government. 09 
On 9 June 1959, a Knesset session was held on the subject of Jewish 
consciousness. During the session, Esther Raziel-Naor (MK, Herut), remonstrated 
that: 
A history book is being used that contains the sentence Dov Gruner, the 
terrorist, was hanaed'... This book was recommended by the Ministry of 
Education. "'... What place do the heroes and heroines who gave their lives for 
their nation have in the people's consciousness? Why do we ignore them? 
Don't such episodes provide guidance-for creating the image of the New Jew, 
free of the psychological chains that bound us in exile? What do we tell our Z: I 
children about this subject'? ... 
Flow can we discriminate between families, 
cripples, fallen or heroes? Is it possible to hide from our youth, that the Jewish 
State arose once more thanks to all those who fought, worked, produced, built, 
and died for its sake for ten full years? This fact has been forgotten by them 
41 [Mapai-backed authors of the text]. ... 
37 Ibid. 
Is Ibid. 
,9 Avigur, S.. undated. Sde Bokcr: Ren Gurion Archk es, 4896. (Hebre\v) 
'0 Raziel-Naor. 1'.. 9 June 1959. remarks made \%ith respect to the high school historý text written hý 
Dr. I-Iraim Shmueli. Knesset Prolocoh; JlchreNN) 
" Ibid. 
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Raziel-Naor had aptly expressed the underground's sorrow over non- 
recognition of their dead as well as their increasing sense of exclusion, the 
consequences ol-delegitirnization. 
The Historiol4raphy of Military Dead 
Beyond production of a general, historical account of the War of Independence, Ben 
Gurion also supported a project that rather explicitly communicated his message 
regarding the events and his role in them. At some point, Ben Gurion decided to 
produce a book in which the names of all those who had fallen during War would be 
inscribed. The book was meant to define for the reader, clearly and decisively, the 
boundaries separating those included from those excluded from Mapai's fellowship of 
self-sacrifice. Reference was also to be made, on a personal basis, to the families of 
those to whom the state was most indebted. In ellect, the project sprang from an idea 
raised by Anda Pinkerfeld-Ainir, a member of the editorial board of The Hagana 
Chronicles. A veteran of the Hagana, she joined the Ministry of Defense after it was 
established. [ter activities Nvere endorsed and supported by the Hagana high zD 
command; after the establishment of the State, she organized the IDF Archives within 
the framework of the Ministry of Defense. On 29 January 1950, it was decided to 
transfer the department in which she worked to the Commemoration Unit, 42 and 
convert it into what I term an authorized mcniory agent. Pinkerfeld-AmIr's task, begun 
in April 1948, was defined as the "exhaustive collection of personal material regarding 
the War's dead so as to carefully prepare these materials as inclusive testimony to their 
sacrifice. " The material would be deposited in a slinne. The work was to be done, at 
47 
' Sirkiný E. 29 Januarý 1950. letter to Shaul A\ islur, IDF Archives 26/60-13. (Iiebre\ý) 
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"her own initiative, " as these activities were not included in any overall plan. 43 After 
receiving Ben Gurion's blessings, her pro ject was officially launched. 
At a meeting held on 15 June 1950, Pinkerfeld-Amir and Ben Gurion decided 
what her activities were to entail: "The material to be collected will cover every phase 
of a man's life, biographical information, photos, comments and reminiscences, 
testimonials and articles as well as objects related to his spiritual legacy, such as 
letters, diaries, collected works of art, libraries, and so forth.... " At the same meeting 
it was decided that a Heroes' Shrine would be the place "to appropriately house the 
material, volume by volume, one volume per individual ... printed on the 
best paper to 
withstand the ravages of time. A reading room will be established next to the Shrine, 
where the volumes will be easily located, arranged by occupation, such as scientists or 
agricultural ists,... or by event ... The Prime Minister accepted the idea but stated that it 
would be advisable to include soldiers active prior to Israel's declaration of its 
independence. " Pinkerfeld-Amir adds that according to the original plan, the Shrine Z: ' 
would include all national war dead from the period of the Shomer, the Hagana, 
World War Two, the period of illegal immigration and the fla'apala [blockade- 
running], and the rebellion. 
44 
ZD 
Pinkerfeld-Amir was subsequently placed at the head of the Servicemen's 
Commemoration Section. I suggest that Pinkerfeld-AmIr's sense of the educational 
Z, I goals to be serve by her project motivated 
her request for an official appointment. Her 
staff diligently labored to collect all the personal effects available, from photographs 
to letters, but also eulogies and obituaries, coin rn ern orative pamphlets and books. Z71 
'3 Taken from a detailed list of PinkcrIeId-., \mir's acti\ itics as noted in a Icttcr sent to an official ofthe 
Information and Public Relations Department, the MinistrN of Defense, -') 
JuIN 1950ý IDF Archives, 
7581953,1133. (Hebrc\ý) 
44 Unsigncd. 19 June 19ý0. memorandUln retating, to the meeting) hctýýcen Pinkerfeld-Amir and Ben 
Curion, IDF Archkes. 758,1953/133. (Ilebre\N) 
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Questionnaires were distributed to the friends and family of the dead in order to 
collect as much information as possible. The concept informing this massive effort 
was not confined to that of a national "mernory bank"; rather, it was the assumption 
that the War's dead were characterized by "national personal values" whose 
"inculcation was" a vital asset for the entire nation. " To do so, the Section's staff 
requested any material that might "shed any light on the [fallen soldier's] views, 
,, 45 attitudes toward the country and its problems.... 
A summary review of the questionnaire quickly reveals exactly who displayed 
these "national personal values. " Under "Details of Military Service, " the following 
items are listed: service abroad, service locally, the Hagana, recruitment, training, 
active service, unit, battles. The possibility of serving in Etzel or Lehi was not raised. 
Because the only pre-State affiliation mentioned is the Haparia. 
46 the authors of the 
questionnaire imply that only Hagana members, whether living or dead, embody the 
national defense ethos. 
Had this project been confined to archival purposes, it would remain 
interesting but tangential to our argument. Instead, the long-term goal of the project 
was to convert the Archives into a national education ceriter, where schoolchildren 
would be exposed to and encouraged to write about the "martyrs' heritage, " as it was 
called, a source of lofty values. Pinkerfeld-Arnir's idea received additional support 
from Yad Labanim, the public association involved in commemoration whose 
members were primarily bereaved parents. In 1949, the latter suggested that the Z71 
collected material be concentrated and made available to the public in the Heroes' 
Shrines to be built in Israel's three niqjor cities. Ben Gurion actively supported the 
Leallet describing the acti%itics ofthe MY Archkcs. 1950, IDI'Archkes. 758/195Y8. (llebrew) 
Questionnaire distributed to the Families offIdlen soldiers that \Nas sent to Kibbutz Manara (specilic 
example found) and all the aEricultural settlements aligned \\ith the Labor Nlo\errrent. IDF Archiýes, 
758/1953/8. (Hebre\\) 
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idea. Y. Dekel, Head of the Ministry of Defense Commemoration Unit offered a 
counterproposal, that of constructing a single, national shrine on Mount Herzl to also 
contain documentation about the Shomer and Hagana. 47 L- 
Pinkerfeld-Amir turned to all the families officially recognized as bereaved; in 
addition to documents she requested correspondence and other written material, asked 
parents to record their mernories of their son's military service, with ail emphasis on 
relationships with siblings, spouses, and those comrades in his army unit with whom 
he was particularly close. Pinkerfeld-Amir admits that this personal initiative "was 
begun with a sense of anxiety concerning the substantial value of the historical, 
sociological, and human material that would be lost as inernories of their lost sons 
receded. " 
The first in the Yizh)r series, the title chosen by Pinkerfeld-Amir, was 
published in 1955; it was based on a collection of about 5,000 files. 48 The editors note 
that, like the legislation that assigned official "war dead" status on the basis of the date 
of the incident during which the soldier died, the volume 
... 
includes the names of all those fallen in Israel's War of Independence., 
during the period beginning with the UN declaration of 29 November 1947 
until 10 March 1949 ... 
The book's direct aim is to commemorate our soldiers 
who sacrificed their lives to achieve independence and national redemption. 
We should note, however, that this collection ... is to 
be used as an accurate 
source for those scholars who would devote themselves to describing the 
sociological background and psychological motives of this new generation of 
Hashnionaim. 49 
Memorandum sent to the Di rector ( iencra I ofthe NI in istrN o I'Defcnse. 1 22 Januar\ 195 4. (1 febrc%N) 
Edna Pinkcrfeld-Amir, A., 26 December 1950. letter jointlý addi-csscd to the Prime IvIinister and to 
the Minister ofEducation. WE Archives, 220-70-39. (Hebre%\) 
4ý) A major Biblical dN nastý. 
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Pinkerfeld-Amir's efforts, heartily supported by Ben Gurion, created an 
institutionalized, smoothly run systern within the Ministry of Defense that labored on 
behalf of the construction of national memory sites. The generous ftinding, large and 
dedicated staff, together \vIth support from the political leadership facilitated the 
painstaking collection of items. Drafts of the written biographies were reviewed by 
parents who filled in the missing particulars. When basic personal details were 
missing, the names were sent to the Ministry of Immigration, local government offices 
and employers, and families residing overseas. The narnes of the fallen were published 
in the daily press and regularly transmitted over national radio, together with requests 
for additional information. 50 
The evolution of the Heroes' Shrine deserves some further attention. After the 
51 
idea of creating a shrine housing the original documents was accepted, the issue of 
its location arose. It was Pinkerfeld-Amir who, as early as 1949, dernanded that the 
shrine be erected on Mount Herzi, near the entrance to the military cemetery. Ben 
Gurion objected to its proximity to the cemetery but pledged to locate the building 
within Jerusalem. He even confirmed the project's proposed budget and requested that 
a sketch of the structure be prepared. Both were prepared by her brother, the architect 
Yaakov Pinkerfeld. 52 Yad Labanim later accepted her proposal in principle yet made a 
similar but independent request. Pinkerfeld-Amir vie,, ved the role of the shrine as 
separate from that of military cemeteries and monuments. The need for such an 
institution Nvas based on the "fear for the documents whose collection was at the verge 
of completion ... 
They will be neglected if someone is not found to tend them. " Her 
5L) 'Eli ese efforts \N ere described in the \oI urne's forc\wrd. 
ibid. 
Unsiý-, lled. 18 Julie 1950. protocol of meeting [)ct%\ecii Ili nkerfeld-Arni r and Ren Gurion, D.. IDF 
Archives, 758/1953/133. (1 Icbi-e\\ ) 
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anxiety regarding the material she had collected drove her decision "not to rest until I 
know that the collection will be protected. 1153 
To Pinkerfeld-Ainir, the individual cornincinorative volumes to be placed in 
the library and personally managed by her as part of the Heroes' Shrine would be z: l 
uniform in style and format, parallel to the uniformity characterizing the gravestones 
found in military cemeteries. The texts would be "typewritten, without a [carbon] 
copy, " because "the volurnes in the shrine would follow the principle of uniqueness - 
,, 54 each one individual, and under the nation's protection. It appears that Pinkerfeld 
Amir viewed the preparation of these books as a sacred act, similar to the preparation 
of arcane, well-guarded religious manuscripts. Consonant with this attitude, the 
volumes would be placed in a circular format, its "gallery empt), but for the stacks I 
housin the nearly 500 books placed around its ý, valls: in the center, an eternal flame 9 
would burn. " 
55 
Notwithstanding their historical importance, the items collected by Pinkerfeld- 
Amir were consecrated to those living in the present: 
We also owe you [the bereaved] preservation of the complete and exhaustive 
testirriony ... regarding those who 
bequeathed their lives to Lis and to the nation. 
We promise you that future generations will know who travailed to bring this 
about. We have therefore collected everything we could obtain about their 
actions. These objects will be placed in a special shrine to be built as a 
monument rich in meaning, a place of study and communion with their 
56 inernory. 
53 See Footnote 44. 
54 Pinkerfeld-Amir, A. October 1950, Letter to the Director General of the Ministry of Defense. IDF 
Archives 7581/19ý11/133. (HebrcNO 
Pinkerfeld-Amir. A. 20 March 1950. letter to the Chairman of the Commiace of Judues ibr the 
Planning ol-Mount lierzI, IDF Archkcs 758,1953'131. (Hebre\ý) 
,,, Pinkerfeld-Amir. A., 12 March 1950. lettcr to E7. ra Yuhs, ýi hercaNed brother. IDF Archivcs 
758/1953/262. (I-Ichrc\N) 
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Because her personal objectives suited Ben Gurion's prograin of control over 
the War's historiography, he supported the project. 
A similar project begun at about the sarne tirne was preparation of the book 
entitled Gvilei Esh (Parchmenis of Fire). The project was rooted in Ben Gurion's vlm 
that the community of the dead, as a symbolic entity, was of unique educational worth 
for inculcation of the values - such as voluntary extension of tours of duty - that 
supported the nation-building enterprise. Thus, on 7 December 1949, the first 
announcements of the intention to produce an "anthology of the creative works written 
by fallen soldiers" appeared in the press and on the radio. This request was directed to 
"parents and relatives, friends and acquaintances of those fallen during the War of 
Independence. " Specifically, they were asked to forward creative works - letters, 
diaries, poems, stories, travelogues, theoretical and scientific texts, paintings, 
sculptures, musical works and so forth -to the Commemoration Unit at their earliest 
convenience. 07 
The task of editing the anthology was entrusted to the poet Reuben Avinoam. 
Once again, "entry" into the confines of a cultural-educational project was limited to 
those who had fallen in the course of the conflict with the Arabs. As two of the 
members of the editorial staff., Yitzchak Ben-Zvi and Reuben Avinoam, Nvrote to Ben 
Gurion: "The essence of the suggested project is to collect creative materials 
produced by every soldier who fell after 28 November. 08 Taking into account the 
project's aim - to inform the public about thinkers and teachers who had provided the 
fallen with ideological and spiritual guidance - Ben Gurion made clear his 
preference for citations from A. D. Gordon and even his ov,, n works rather than the 
Letter to the State Press Office Crom the Public Relations Department, December 1949, IDF Archi\ es 
7581953/2 1. (Hebi-c\\) 
ý I's Ben Zviý Y. and R. Avinoam. -', 
Maý 1949, letter to 1). Bcn Gurion. IDF Arclikes. 758/1953/21. 
(Flcbrc\ý) 
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writings of Jabotinsky or Uri Zvi Greenberg. 59 His stance was rooted in the belief he 
wished to propagate that the War's dead were exceptional beings, unlike the average 
man in the street. To him, they were members of a spiritual elite who, by their deaths. 
had 
'joined a select group, 
the carriers of ideologically edifying qualities of the first 
order. Therefore, one of the nation's moral obligations was to assemble their literary 
works. Even serninar papers were to be collected; their authors' martyr status endowed 
these prosaic academic exercises with special value: "These items will help complete 
the image of an entire generation of fighters for their country" continued Ben Zvi and 
Avinoam. 6( ' This statement was made in complete sincerity because both editors 
viewed their task as a mission: to reveal and explore the souls and personalities of 
morally superior beings, "the Israeli soldier[s]"' I who had built the new nation while 
envisioning its future. 
The project began thusly. Ben Gurion first received a letter from one Avinoarn 
Grossman with the suggestion to publish the writings of his deceased son. Grossman 
was then requested to expand the book to include the works of others killed. In August 
1952, Grossman was appointed "the literary editor of the [Commemoration] Unit. , "2 
The foreword to GOlei Esh was written by Mordechai Guber. 
At the literary event held to celebrate the publication of Gvilei Esh, Ben 
Gurion made a speech directed at the nation's youth in which he described the models 
who displayed these virtues and, perhaps more importantly, those who did not: 
You've all probably heard about young people apprehended in the process of 
committing a robbery or a rape, about bands of political hoollgans like those 
"' The leading Rcvisionist poet and intellectual. 
See fbotnorc 58. 
Cited from the transcripts of' a radio intervic\ý gi\en bý R. A\ inoam, 30 June 1949ý IDF Archi\es. 
7811953,21. (Ilebre\\) 
"' Unsigoncd. 28 Maý 1952, memorandum summarizing mecting bct\%ccn Dek-el. Y. and Peres, S_ 
Director Gcneral of the lvlinistrý ot'Defense, IDF Archk es, unnumbercd (I Icbrc\\ ) 
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who try to bomb the homes of government ministers or stone the 
Knesset ... [yet] you have also heard about 
how other young people withstood 
the Arab bands before the State was established, and how they fought the Arab 
armies after independence. 63 
The "political hooligans" he referred to were the Etzel and Lehi sympathizers 
who had instigated a violent public confrontation a few days earlier in protest against 
the government's intention to renew diplomatic ties with Germany. That clash. 
organized by Herut, had ended with the participants stoning the Knesset. Ben Gurion's 
speech - by mentioning, only opposition to current issues - dernonstrated his ZD 
implacable evasion of any recognition of the underground's contributioii to the War. 
The Knesset session, which had been devoted to national memory and 
corninemoration, was exploited by Ben Gurion to verbally scuffle with his opponents. 
This tactic, all too common among politicians, nonetheless had serious impacts on the 
nation's collective memory of the past. 
The first real test of the place to be awarded to Etzel and Lehi dead in the 
statist commemoration literature arose during the treatment of the Refineries (Balei 
Hazikuk in Hebrew) incident. 64 Yosef Dekel mirrored the operative exclusionary 
regulations in his statement that "casualties from the 30 December 1947 raid on the 
Haifa Oil Refineries are not listed in any military records as war dead, nor do the), 
appear in our files as IDF dead. " According to Nehernia Argov, Ben Gurion's Military 
Secretary, they were not to be included in the Yizkor volumes given that "insufficient 
evidence has been found to submit their narnes to the Soldiers' Compensation 
Davar. 25 Nlaý 1952. (1 lebre\ý) 
(, 4 Ilauana action. conductcd on 30 December 1947 meant to blmý up the Ifail'a Rcl-incrics. \%hich 
supplied the British armN \\ith gasoline. As a result of' this operation. the Arabs initiated a massacre 
against fe\\ish Rclinerý \\orkers. 
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65 -f mI Hence, they were also ineligible for mention in tile ot icial 
commemorative literature soon to be written. 
The contents of a letter written by Yigael Yadin to Anda Pinkerfeld-Amir in 
the wake of the Refineries incident indicates that prior to that event, policy covering 
inclusion of soldiers killed in action within the commemorative literature suffered 
from a lack of implementative guidelines: 
The editorial criteria applied to the Yizkor project are far from explicit ... 
If, for 
instance, all the dead from every kibbutz and Old Jerusalem, to narne a few, 
are included in the book - then those who died at the Refineries should also 
be included. If not - then they, too, should be excluded-The final decision 
has to be made by the Minister of Defense who most certainly set the book's 
editorial principles. 
Some criterion, even if unwritten, must have guided those made these ZD 
decisions. One condition that was perceived by the relevant institutions as mandatory 
for inclusion of a candidate among the dead was the following: "We released them 
from compulsory conscription but did not demand [emphasis in original] that they go 
,, 66 to the site. 
Anda Pinkerfeld-Amir stubbornly fought for inclusion of those who had died 
in the attack, as she expressed in a letter under the headin "the Refineries' victims are 9 
to be counted as recruits in all its aspects. " She wrote: "Many of the participants (i. e., 
Refinery workers) who were undoubtedly Hagana members and working under cover, 
confined to the site as an important first line position, have the right to be remembered 
just like those N,, 7ho fell during any other operation. , 67 Pinkerfeld-Arnir, it appears, had 
assumed that information stating that the dead were Hagana members would bolster 
Artw% 
. 
NI., 14 Dccurribu 1950. letter to Pinkerfeld-Amir. A.. IDF Archives, 758/1953/72. (Hebrew) 
"'ý Yadin, Y. 1-5 Junc 1950, lettcr to Pinkerfeld-Aniii-, A.. 11)1ý Arclik es, 758,11953/7-2. (HebreM 
67 Ihid. 
)04 
her campai,,, n to persuade the government of their right to state commemoration. A 
memorandum written by the commander of Haifa Suburbs and Eastern Galilee 
Region, later killed in action. and verified by Moshe Carmel, the Regional 
Commander, was attached to Pinkerfeld-Amir's letter. The contents of the 
memorandurn reveal that as of 7 May 1948, it had been decided "not to conscript these 
people [Haifa Oil Refineries staft] for either full or partial duty. Their employers 
consider thein to be enlisted servicemen ... due to the [strategic] importance of the 
site .,, 
68 Pinkerfeld-Arrur also inade it clear that her purpose was not substantive, a ploy 
meant to help the families acquire compensation or other concrete benefits, but 
symbolic, as a means to accept them within the official family of the bereaved: "These 
families are not requesting any compensation, which they have already received frorn 
the Refineries. " 
By treating the Refineries' workers as "unofficial" members of the Hagana, 
Pinkerfeld-Ainir hoped to incorporate thern into the community identified as the 
wellspring of national heroes. "9 She went so far as to request that the said workers be 
70 
conscripted retroactively so as to be eligible for inclusion in her book . 
While 
acknowledging that such a decision was a military rather than political prerogative, 
she nonetheless wrote the following to Ben Gurion as Minister of Defense: "If they 
are ... to be considered as soldiers, this 
decision should be made by the General 
Staff ... Please resolve this issue without 
delay because we are in the final stages of the 
book's preparati 0 11.,, 71 It should be understood, however, that Pinkerfeld-Arnir's efforts 
were in large part determined by the demands of standin- legislation, which stipulated 
68 ]hid. 
61) Ilinkei-l-eld-Amir. A. 19 December 1950. letter to Argym . N., IDF Archives, 758/1953/72. (Ilcbre\\) 70 Ilinkerfeld-Amir. A., 19 December 1950, lettel- to Ben Ourion, D.. Nlnlistrý of Defenw, IDF 
Archkes, 7ý8 195,, 72. (Ilchicý\) 
Pinkerfeld-Amir, A. undated. Letter to Prime Minister 1). Ben Gurion, IDI- Archi\cs. 758/1953ý72. 
cbrc\0 
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that retrospective conscription of the deceased enabled their inclusion in the official 
register of those "killed in action, " a status that would have entitled thern to State 
cornmemoration and their families to state support, At the sarne time, the Director of 
the IDF Archives, requested that the Refineries gather "as quickly as ... possible all ZD 
available information about the casualties, such as dates, biographical details, 
photographs, personal milestones, recollections, and so forth... " while noting that t, 
"the Refineries tragedy is an incident deserving special mention" within the 
framework of the Archives' commemorative activities. It appears that Pinkerfeld-Amir 
personally initiated inclusion of the victims within the commemorative literature, 
presumably without anticipating intervention from other authorized Sources or Z:, 
political-legislative actions. 
Cases of such acts of policy delineation by those responsible for its 
implementation - as opposed to its formulation - is commonly found in the scholarly 
literature. Administrators frequently deviate from the bureaucrat 1 cat Iv determined 
confines of their authority iii order to promote policy appropriate to their 
organizational affiliations and professional values. Thus, questionnaires were sent to 
the dead soldiers' families from the office of the Director of the IDF Archives by way 
of the Refineries' management. On 22 December 1948, the Director also sent a letter 
to the Refineries' Commemoration Con-unittee informing them that actions were being Zý 4-D 
taken to "preserve the memory of our fallen soldiers; we intend to prepare an inclusive 
,, 72 Yizkor book containing their names as well . Although his response denied the Z7, 
Refineries' request to publish a special commemorative volurne devoted to the 
72 Director, the IDIF Archi\cs, 22 December 1948, letter to the Committee I'Or Commemoration oFthe 
Haifa Refineries Marms, IDFA rchi\es, 758/1953/72. (11 ebrew) 
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incident's victims, he assured them that their names would be included in a future 
comprehensive volume prepared by his office. 
The attitude of the IDF Archives toward inclusion of the Refineries' dead 
within the commemorative literature reveals that the procedures applied by the 
Commemorative Unit, as transmitted to Pinkerfeld-Amir, were to becorne official 
policy. It's announcement that "if any of the fallen were members of the Flagana at the 
time of their deaths, whether or not they were completing a tour of duty, they will be 
counted among those who sacrificed themselves during the War , 73 essentially 
broadened state recognition of the dead beyond what Ben Gurion had intended. 
This humanitarian expansiveness. which ignored attempts to maintain central 
political control over the nation's memory sites, was not, however, extended to the 
underaround's dead. Families of' those Etzel and Lehi members who had lost their 4: ý 
lives during Hagana-led operations were categorically denied entry into the official 2-1 
family of the bereaved. This exclusion is pithily illustrated by the experience of the 
Gelbgisser family whose twin sons, Shlomo and Menachem, were killed in action. 
The names of the brothers. as relatives - the only set of twins who fell during the 
War of Independence - do not appear in any state publication honoring the dead. Nor 
was one line dedicated to thern by the period's "court poets. " Although "they left no 
literary heritage to speak of, the editors of th[e] polished and valuable commemorative 
book [i. e., Gvilci Esh] did not bother or feel it necessary to request any material about 
them. " 74 This point becomes clearer when we consider that one of the twins, 
Menachem, is included in a volume commemorating IDF dead: He was killed in May 
73 Pink-erfeld-Amir. A., 26 Aprit 1950. Ictter to Bcn-Florin, Y., IDF Archi\ es, 758/11953/'262. (1 Icbre\\) 
Ibid. 
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1949, after his unit, originally part of Etzel, had joined the IDF; the thus 
reorganization qualified him as an IDF conscript. Shlomo, Menachem's twin, had died 
earlier, as a member of Etzel, lie was therelbre autornatically excluded from mention. 
Under the caption "Discriminatim - Even in Condolence, " the twins' father, 
Yaakov, wrote the following in a letter dated 5 May 1949 to Ben Gurion: 
I notified you in the sarne letter that I had lost both my beloved sons during the 
War of Independence. Honoring the memory of one son while ostracizing the 
memory of the other reveals how insincere are your condolences regarding the 
grief felt by bereaved parents. It shows a lack of understanding of their pain, 
and even adds to their grief. 75 
Together with his letter, GelbgIsser returned the condolence card he had 
received following Menachein's death, which had been sent from the Prime Minister's 
office. In a later letter, Gelbzoisser continued: "The PrIme MInister and MInister of 
Defense has to be aware that even if Etzel was not to his liking, its members 
nevertheless gave their lives to their country, not less than did the Hagana. If a family 
lost two of its children, onK one of , vhorn did not belong, to the Hagana, there is no 
need to discriminate to the point of intensifying the pain felt by the bereaved Z:, 
parents. , 
76 
7ý Quoted in a letter from Gclhgis. ser, Y- to the F. ditors, Heral. undated, personal correspondence. 




Entry iPto the Family of the Bereaved 
Parallel to the production of statist commemorative literature, Ben Gurion endowed 
privately published volumes with his imprimatur. His sanction was meant to convert 
the commemoration literature initiated by families or organizations into widely Zn 
distributed and socially meaningful documents. He scrupulously collected these 
- he drafted emotional letters to books, read thern and wrote comments in the margins, 
the families, often adding a personal foreword to the separate volumes. An excellent 
example of this process of transformation of private texts into wide ly-d i stri buted 
public property are The Brothers'Book 7' and Toward the Lights of*Lachish, 78 written 
by Rivka Guber, a teacher by training, which became "best sellers, " texts representing 
Israel's emerging statist culture. Introductions to the texts were written by the Mapal 
leadership - Golda Meir and David Ben Gurion. The books' official aura gradually 
increased owing to a series of actions taken over the years by official bodies. After Z, 
publication of Toward the Lights qj' Lachish, Rivka Guber was named "Israel's 
Mother" by Hed Hachinuch (The Voice of Education), the widely circulated gazette 
published by the Federation of Teachers . 
79 Her books were defined as "instructional, " 
"required reading" for schoolchildren. S() " Here is a book to enlighten us, our children, ZD 
and future generations of Inim [grants, " wrote a Davar colunnust. 81 In the process, 
Guber was transformed from a bereaved mother into an author, a leading intellectual 
and shaper of public opinion. Her being Ben Gurion's political ally would ease her 
way into all Mapai institutions Ben Gurion would establish, facilitated his presenting 
her as an exemplary filgUre worth) of emulation. 
77 (iLiber, R., 1950ý The Brothers Book. Fel A\ i\ : Ain O\ ed. (Hebre\N ) 
7X Gubcr. R.. 1903.1 oitardihe Lýhts ol I, achish, 5'h Ld- Tc I A\ i\: Am (-)\cd. I ict)rc\%. 
79 Tied HaChinuch, Fall. 1952. (Ilebre\N 
8'ý Davar, 23 June 196 1. (Hcbrc\\) 
81 Davar, I Julý 1979. (1 lebreNO 
1 )09 
The relationship between Guber and Ben Gurion began after the War of 
Independence, with publication of Guber's The Brothers Book, a collection of the 
. 
journals, poems, and letters. It's format inspired Ben Gurion to initiate the brothers' 
Gvilei Esh project. Upon reading the book, Ben Gurion wrote: "The fact that two 
brothers [should be willing to sacrifice themselves] is in itself a worthy example for 
this and coming generations. However, the book reveals something even loftier... our 
generation is blessed with the presence of such mothers among us. Perhaps this is the 
real, buried secret of the 'miracle' that has occurred to us. " His closing comments 
indicate his decision to transform the book and its format into a model for cultural- 
political indoctrination: 
I would view it a great honor IfYOU would allow the Ministry of Defense to 
publish this book (I will retain its title, The Brothers Book, although it could 
also be entitled The Mothcr'S Book), and will allocate lLfIOOO for this 
purpose. 82 
And so, the Ministry of Defense published and distributed Guber's book for 
several editions; followed by its translation into various languages, all financed by the 
Ministry. "We felt that the book ývould glorify the countr for the Diaspora as well" 
wrote the Gubers to Ben Gurion upon receipt of Funds to cover the cost of translating 
the book into English. 83 Used as a statement of the evolving society's values during its 
battle for national survival, the translation was distributed abroad as part of the 
campaign to secure foreign support. 
Locally, as could be expected, RIvka Guber became a prominent public figure, 
and earned the nickname "the boys' mother, " as the quintessential symbol of bereaved 
Ben Ourion, D. 24 Au(-, ust 19ý0. I etter to (I uhcr. R.. Ben (jurion Archk es , 
1-i IeI 10/ý. (Hebre%%) 
F. and R. Guber, 17. and R., 3 April 1951, letter to to Ben GUrioll. For the Full correspondence and 
details regarding the project's financinu. see Ben (Turion Archivcs, File I 101/ý. (Hebre%ý) 
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Israeli motherhood. Many of the public events held in Guber's honor, including the 
tenth and twentieth celebrations of her books' publication, were attended by 
government officials and Mapai leaders, Guber herself being a member of the Labor 
Party. At the twentieth anniversary of The Brothers Book, In a speech entitled Being 
Worthy, Guber recounted the story of her sons' sacrifice. 
The Gubers were not the only ones to enjoy Ben Gurion's politically motivated 
assistance upon their entry into the official family of the bereaved. In March 1963, the 
parents of Varda Friedman, killed in 1956, wrote the following to Ben Gurion: 
At the ... seventh anniversary of our tragedy, we turn to you ... 
Until now, the 
name of our cherished Varda has not appeared among the lists of revered 
victims that fell while oil duty ... 
for us, heartbroken parents, the only thing left 
is her sacred memory ... 
For the sake of future gerierations, we think it 
appropriate to guarantee that her dear name be enshrined in a Yizkor volume. 84 zn 
Although Varda Friedman was not a soldier in the strict sense - she was a 
volunteer working in a moshav for resettled new immigrants (olim in Hebrew) - she 
did participate in a project, immigrant absorption, having political as well as social 
significance, one that was strongly supported by Ben Gurion. Thus, its was Ben 
Gurion himself who suggested that a cornmemorative volume be published in the 
memory of Varda Friedman, whose parents were from Kfar Vitkin, a moshav closely 
associated -vvith Mapai. Such a volume, which functioned as a means to appropriate 
her memory, was used as a lever to equate the immigrant absorption project with 
service in the IDF: 
To me, the act of [rnoshav youthl ineeting directly with olim and extending 
them human comfort and assistance is no less important than serving in the 





Such a book... will be her monument... [as well as] enormously 
educational ... A committee should be established to plan and write the book. I 
will gladly participate in such a committee. I also suggest that Moshe Dayan be 
appointed as one of its members.... 85 
After the Friedmans expressed their douhts that moshav members would 
readily participate in the book project, 86 Ben Gurion replied: "I will contact a number 
of young people and together with Moshe Dayan, who was among the major sponsors 
of the program to visit the olim, I hope to persuade them to cooperate. As you know, I 
am prepared to turn to those IDF soldiers who have something to tell about Varda I 
would like the volume to be dedicated to both Varda and the program. " 87 
From his offices at the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion 
subsequently organized the book's steering committee. Included among its members 
were Ben Gurion himself, Bracha Hebbs, Uzi Feincrillan, Shalorn Zohar, and 
Avraham Green Wozki. Under his leadership, the tearn's work was extensive: They 
visited villages where Varda had worked, gathered material, interviewed the young 
people she had worked with, and screened stories about her. Ben Gurion "appointed" 
himself as editor-in-chief, protocols of tile corninittee's meetings indicated his intense 
involvement in decisions about the book's content, its structure and chapter titles: 88 
"To me, this book has two aims, first, it is dedicated to the memory of Varda and 
those others who survived: but mainly, its airn is to inform the young about what it 
means to be in favor of immigration .... to be interested in [the immigrants] fate ... It 
85 Friedman, F. and Y. 2 April 1963ý letter to Ben Gurion, Sde Boker. Ben Gurion Archiýes. (Ilebrew) 
Especiall) significant for the purposes of my argument is the suggested inclusion of Moshe Dayan. one 
of the charismatic leaders of' the liagana and future Minister of Defense. in the book's steering 
committee. 
" Friedman, Y. 23 April 1963. letter to Ben ( jut-ion. Ben Ourion Archi\ es. (Hehrc%%) 
ý" Ben Gurion, D. 27 April 1963. letter to Y. Friedman. Ben Gurion Archi\ cs. (1-lebre\N 
Protocol: Meetingo regarding publication of the book in mentor) of Varda Friedman. Offices of the 
Minister of Defense, HaKirý a. 24 May 1963, Sde Boker, Ben Ourion Archives. (Hchrew) 
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should serve as an example to [the youngl. "89 Thus, it is easily discerned that in the 
case of Varda Friedman, like that of the Guber brothers, Ben Gurion felt little 
COMPLinction in bridling the recollection and coin in em oration of the dead to his 
chosen political goals. 
Q I' ýl ý A, 
"Among its other tasks, Shelach, as an organization, battles against the distortion of Zn 
history and the obfuscation ofthe truth. One of its airns is to construct a shrine to our 
heroes so that their memory will live forever in the nation's history. "90 So wrote 
Shelach's leaders about the goals they had set for themselves during the nation's first 
decade. In terms of the conceptual frarnework applied in this dissertation, Shelach's 
leadership saw itself as agents of collective memory, the guardians of its memory 
sites, avowed to present their version of the "true" story of Israel's rebellion against the 
British. Their address to the readers of the leaflet advertising Shelach's activities, 
distributed on the eve of Independence Day 1958 - "To all lovers of the truth" 
expresses this, their main objective. Especially important to note is that in addition to 
the ernotional and financial support given to bereaved families and disabled veterans, 
Menachern Begin, as the leader of what remained of the Revisionist movement, saw 
"presentation of the truth" to be Shelach's paramount political role. 
Shelach's Commemoration Department was established in order to "perpetuate 
the underground and its activities within the nation's soul. Their acts of bravery, 
unparalleled in the history of mankind and the feats of those executed [by the British] 
would have become, had they occurred elsewhere, inspirational chapters taught in 
Ihid- 
Leaflet send from Shelach to members of the Herut mo% einent on the eý en of Remembrance Daý, 
1958. Thc Jabotinský In stitute Archives, 1 7/5-16L. 
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schools, parables told by mothers to their sons. Here, these acts were maliciously 
ignored or distorted. In such circumstances, the activities of the Department in the 
preservation of historical truth and the education of Israel's younger generation and of 
those in the Diaspora who are unaware of what transpired in the homeland are 
exceptionally important. "91 
Shelach undertook a series of projects that paralleled those initiated by the 
state. As opposed to the Yizkor volumes, which excluded Etzel and Lehi dead form 
their pages, the organization published a volume entitled HaI)orshot (The Re"egades), 
dedicated to the underground's dead. In effect, the project had begun much earlier, 
endowed with a broader, more-inclusive historical vision. On 5 December 1948, the 
Jabotinsky Institute and the Herut Office for Servicemen on Active Duty announced 
plans to produce a "book to commemorate those who had fought in the rebellion. 02 It 
would be dedicated to the "memory of the heroes of the Jewish rebellion against 
British rule... irrespective of their ideological orientation or organizational affiliation. " 
That is, the book would also include the names of all Hagana members who fell in the 
cause of independence. Its intent was not to personalize the project - that is, not to 
consecrate the memory of individual Etzel members - but to recount a chapter in the 
nation's history that the authorized historiography had neglected by focusing 
exclusively on the military conflict with the invading Arab arinies. 
Preparations for the book were exceedingly complicated, especially in the 
absence of government financial and organizational support. Another obstacle was the 
lack of aii orderly and detailed list of dead and their addresses, the result of' the 




was eventually gathered, including photographs of the majority of the dead, and 
transferred to the Jabotinsky Institute. Material relating to those killed after 29 
November 1949 was transferred to the Commemoration Unit at the Ministry of 
Defense, which had guaranteed to include the narnes of Etzel and Lehi members 
within a Yizkor volume dedicated to all those who had surrendered their lives in the 
war against the Arabs. 
In the end, the book published by the Jabotinsky Institute and Herut in 1956 
contained names of the underground's dead only. This outcome, contrary to the 
proliect's original ainis, was a direct response to Ben Gurion's policy. Those who had 
served in the Hagana while fighting against the British were recognized as 
"legitimate" dead by Ben Gurion and entered the aUthorized commemorative texts, 
irrespective of the dates or official confirmation of the circurnstances of their deaths. 
Organizational - meaning political - affiliation was openly declared as the 
determining factor. 
In protest, the editors of Shelach wrote the following in the introduction to 
their commemorative volume. entitled To Their Eternal Memorlv: 
in the heat of the rebellion preceding the United Nations' decision and during 
the war auainst the invading Arab armies, many died. Their perseverance in Z: I 
the face of the enerny ... astounded the entire world. Among these heroes were 
those who willingly sacrificed themselves to the British executioner so that our 
nation could be reborn. However, after the establishment of the State, which 
was achieved at the cost of their blood, government leaders and ministers were 
averse to honoring their memory. Moreover, the government actually tried to 
dismiss and ignore them and their deeds. In order to pay hornage to the 
underground, Its heroes and their acts of heroism ... Shelach has gathered 
hcrein the biographies of all the heroes belonging to Etzel [and Lehi] ... 
from 
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the 1936 pogrom to the years of rebellion against alien rule and concluding 
with the War of Independence against the ... Arab 
invaders. , 93 
In light of its ideological and historical purpose, the book is divided into six 
94 
sections-, each dedicated to a watershed in the campaign for independence . 
Perhaps tile most politically and symbolically meaningftil section was the fifth 
section, devoted to the victims of Hagana operations, especially during the period of 
the Season and the assault on the Altalena. Moreover, the internal organization of the 
book parallels that of the Yizkor series: It begins with "Remember! " a secular-statist 
"prayer" written by Menachern Begin, eulogizing the fallen. But contrary to the 
authorized texts, the eulogy specifically mentions the underground and the injIustice 
committed to their memory by Ben Gurion and his Mapai government. 95 
Shelach projects were, in effect, analogues to their Mapai predecessors. So, in 
addition to the analogous texts, it was decided to establish "Shelach Publications" that, 
together with the Herut publishing house, would publish books to retell the 
underground's story as a counter-measure to the authorized texts. The list of published 
works was quite respectable. It included a book recounting the conquest of Jaffa, 96 an 
alburn on the history of the War of Independence-, To the Gallms, which 
commemorated the memory of the Etzel and Lehi members hanged by the British, and 
the autobiographical The Story of the Altalena's Capain, by Eliyahu Lankin. 
Ben Gurion's focus on educational texts likewise prompted a response. For 
example, in September 1951 it was decided to publish a work to commemorate the 
91 Taken from Begin, NT, 1949 Introduction. To Their Lasting Xfemory, Tel A\ i% : Shelach. (Hebrew) 
-4, Fhcse sections were: (1) Victims of British executions, (2) Casualties of the 1929 riots, (3) Lehi 
mcinhers who died durim2 World War 11. (4) Casualties durinp- the rebellion auaiwst the British 
I 'i-ts I a\ cr. (5) B\ Cjin's Hand. (6) Etze I mal-tý I-S \010 fe II in the \\; at- a(-, a inst the Arab hat ids and it iN ad im, 
, 
in, Nl- 1949. To Their Lasting Mcmory, Tel A\ iv: Shelach. (I lebrew). Bep 
96 Lazar-Litai. C'.. 195 1. The Conquest of Jaffiajel Aviv: Shelach. (flebrew) 
316 
operations conducted by the Jewish underground and balance the impression created 
by The Hi. ýtory of'the Rebellion, published by the Ministry of Defense, which was to 
becorne the leading public school text on the War of Independence. Shelach's version 
of the War, entitled The National Revolution, was meant to describe Ftzel's efforts and 
"preserve the historical truth for the coming generations, to prevent falsification of the Z=I 
facts. " This, like the other works published, was intended to lend historical credence 
to the political prcýject Begin would call "the revolt, " the opposition to Mapai's official 
policy of cooperation with the British and the subsequent attempt to rid Palestine of 
foreign rule. Significantly, the book's opening chapter deals with Hagana qualms over 
the elite's position vis-ý-vis the British Mandate and De Haan's murder, 97 whereas its 
closing chapter recounts the sinking of the Altalena and the absorption of Etzel and 
Lehi into the IDF. The identity of the book's editors is also revealing: Abba Achimeir, 
commander of the so-called "band of thugs, "98 (Brit HaBiriyo"h") and M. Segal, 
commander of Etzel's Jerusalem (Wailing Wall) contincyent. 
99 
The emphasis placed in these works on the "national" rather than "statist" 
character of the events reflects the differences in the respective attitudes toward the 
War and 'its outcomes. In contrast to the statist approach that glorified individual 
actors, Shelach's definition of independence as a "national" pro , ject opened 
the door to 
the participation of groups of all political colors. This approach was emphasized in all 
the works published by Shelach that recounted the story of the underground 
movements. These accounts made public the Hagana's persecutions of Etzel and Lehi 
97 Yaakov Yisrael De Haan, a Protestant from the Netherlands, arrived in Palestine in the 1920s. I le 
con\ crted and c% entuallN became a member of an cxtremist ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionist faction, Nefurei 
K(11'10. RCC9Use of his intensk c activity against the Zionist institutions. lie was "executed'' bý the head 
ofthe Hagana in 1934. 
Band ol'ThuLs: the label assip-ned to a terrorist group \\hose ideology support Lehi. 
Commemoration (ýf the War by the Jewish Lnderground and Its Opei-mions. Report to Shelach. 13 
September 195 1. ]'he Jabotinský Institute Archi% es, 3\4-37: ). (Hebrcw) 
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together with their implications for contemporary politics. In the introduction to the 
pamphlet The Background of1srael's War of Independence -- Factors Regarding the 
Rclationship belit, cen the National Military Organization and the Hagana, the author 
\N, rote: "We would have seen no cause to publish this report... if not Ior the campaign 
of vilification and polemics currently conducted by the Hagana leadership against 
Etzel. " loo 
Shelach's activities likewise highlighted discontinuities in structural 
identification with Revisionist ideology. Contrary to those educational and literary- 
historiographical activities launched by Ben GUrion, every aspect of Shelach's projects 
points to a clear separation between private initiatives and commemoration on the 
Municipal level on the one hand and Herut's ability to influence state and national 
policies on tile same subjects on the other. To illustrate, in September 1957, Oved 
Ben-Aml, Netanya's mayor and a veteran of the underground, turned to Shelach with 
the request to provide updated material for the purpose of "preparing a pamphlet to 
inform the public about Netanya's participation in the War of Independence. " The 
mayor requested "details ... publishable testimony and 
documents, " while stressing that 
he was interested in this material "for the sake of historical truth. "101 That is, the 
responsibility for doing so was seen to be local and unrelated to national programs. 
Returning to Mapai, the same hegemonic control that Ben Gurion attempted to 
exercise over the cultural production of pre-state historiography penetrated the 
individual sphere. As opposed to the writers and intellectuals Surrounding Ben Gurion, 
authors who professed rightist inclinations found the road blocked to influential 
positions in the new state's literary establishment. Nevertheless, they, like the 
""' 1 lassor, 1948 l, 111ý)tiiiský Insti tute A rchi\ es. -iý4-12D. (1 
lebre\\ ) 
llýI Ben-Amiý 0.. Ma\ or of' Netaný a. letter to Shelach, 12 September 1957. The labotinský Institute 
, ý, ýi-ciii\ es. 17,5-1,16. ( 
Hebi-eý\ ) 
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historians who prepared Shelach's published works, replicated the activities of the 
Commemoration Unit in their own meagerly funded efforts and therefore continued to 
isolate themselves froin the mainstream. Figures such as Dr. Israel Eldad, Dr. Ben- 
Zion Netanyahu, and Prof. Joseph Klausner, who were otherwise denied access to 
major public platt'orms, openly supported Shelach and its attempts to supplement the 
authorized statist versions of the past. As Prof Klausner wrote: 
Many things can incite anger and bitterness in individuals of a moral 
strain ... 
One such act is being witnessed before our eyes in the State of Israel: 
During a period of four years (1944-1948), several hundred members of Etzel 
and Lehi dedicated their lives to the liberation of Palestine ... 
Yet, the 
government of Israel is unwilling to provide these warriors with any comfort 
or Support ... 
The injured and disabled, their widows and orphans ... receive 
nothing ... 
Only Shelach provides them with any care ... 
At the same time, the 
organization makes sure that the history to be written about the War of 
Independence-will be free... of error. I believe that not a further word is 
required to prove how much everyone in Israel is required to support 
Shelach. 102 
The Politics of Alternative Memory Sites 
Over the years, Menachem Begin unceasingly demanded that an historical inquiry into 
the War's management be conducted. Ills hope was that such a public investigation 
would reveal that the official narrative of the War was partial, subjective, and 
politically biased. He chose a commission of inquiry because this instrument's 
mandate was not limited to revelation of the truth. rather, recommendations were 
inherently political in terms of their potential impacts. To the degree that a 
commission refuted, as he was convinced it would, the authorized versions of the 
10, Joseph Klauzncr. Prot'. Joseph. JanuarN 1951 , 
letter publicly distributed bv Shelach. (14chre\\) 
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incidents, the seeds of doubt would be spread regarding those narratives and their 
authors. 
Yet, appeals for commissions of inquiry were marginal in their effect. Due to 
their barred access to public outlets such as the educational system, mainstream 
publishers and the state-controlled mass media, the right sought alternative forums 
free of censorship, whether overt or covert. Hence, it turned to political forums such 
as the Knesset and to legal forums such as the courts as well as to commemorative 
sites, academic forums, or any other venue that could propel their version of the War 
onto the public agenda. The parliamentary arena was particularly amenable for this 
purpose. As elected representatives, Begin and his colleagues had free access to the 
press. They took advantage of coverage of parliamentary debates to repeatedly restate 
their case: "You can't chain history, "' 03 declared Eliezer Shostak (MK, Herut) with 
respect to Begin's attempts to counter Ben Gurion's obdurate position regarding the 
character of the War. Yet, although Begin's major platform was the Knesset, his power 
as a member of the opposition was inadequate to his goals. His demands for 
parliamentary review were regularly rejected. This state of affairs forced the right to 
adopt a different strategy and shift its efforts to an alternative public sphere: It turned 
to the courts, ostensibly to clarify the rights of fallen soldiers' dependents. 
It is interesting to observe how this strategy was employed by Begin and his 
colleagues against Ben Gurion and Mapai in parliament. While the latter applied the 
class politics in their budgetary proposals, the former utilized status politics to further 
their public and historical image. As the following shows, Begin no less than Ben 
Gurion attempted to delegitimate rival interpretations of the events and texts that had 
come to construct collective memory. What is especially interesting - and supports 
103 Shostak, E., Knesset Protocols. (Hebrew) 
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the validity of the argument presented here - is the marginal difference of opinion 
over the facts; what varied was the status of the interpreter, his access to the means of 
distribution of his message, his control over those means, and the meaning attributed 
to the events. 
A fine example of such a skirmish was the vote of no confidence proposed by 
Herut on 12 January 1959. "If Ben Gurion wants to argue over history" announced 
Begin at the opening of the debate 
... he will be given the opportunity. Quite incidentally, this week marks the 15 th 
anniversary of the day that Etzel, infused with the immortal spirit of our 
teacher Zeev Jabotinsky, marched to war against the foreign ruler in our 
land ... While we abandoned ourselves to the task, what was Mapai's leader 
doing? ... He did not go into battle; he did not endanger his life, freedom, or 
occupation ... [instead, ] he cooperated with the British police in attempting to 
destroy the Jewish fighters for liberty. In November 1944, the head of Mapai 
called upon the Yishuv to expel Etzel soldiers from their schools and places of 
work ... to deliver them into the hands of the British ... In respect for the 
Knesset I will not list the names of those who cooperated with their people's 
tormentors during that terrible period in Europe [the Holocaust] ... their 
ignominious acts disgrace the history of their land. Your cooperation [with the 
British] will earn you, Mr. David Ben Gurion, a similar judgment.... " 104 
Over the years, Begin would continue in this vein, portraying Ben Gurion as 
motivated by personal interests rather than the national good. 
In closing, Begin attempted to show that he himself, the underground leader, 
like his fellow militants, had displayed the greater sense of public-spirited loyalty: 
"During that same bleak November, we declared that under no circumstances would 





that of our rivals, we look to history, not to factional ism.... " Moreover, he argued, 
was Etzel's position regarding the War that would prove to be correct and eventually Z-1 -- 
adopted: 
tri the fall of 1945, that shameful period came to a close... 'I'lle Jewish Agencý, 
which had hoped for salvation from the [British] Labor government, was 
bitterly disappointed and forced to order the Hagana to commence with a 
military campaign against British rule. Our tormentors suggested that we join ZD 
in battle... [and] ail agreement was reached between the Hagana, Etzel and 
Lehi ... 
[but] at the close of summer 1946, the head of Mapai decided ... to 
withdraw the Hagana from the crusade for liberty. How could we have been 
able to oust the foreign rule if Etzel as well as Lehi had lain down their 
arms? 10-5 
The Altalena 
Portions of another Knesset speech delivered by Begin, this time on the subject Z-1 
of the Altalena (the speech was to becorne famous, especially due to the epithets that 
would be repeated during public polemics) is worth quoting: 
I accuse you of endangering the lives of thousands of Tel Aviv's residents bv 
borribing and arson, of a vessel full of ammunition and explosives along the 
city's shores. I accuse you of a third attempt to ignite the fires of civil war in 
Israel Just when the enemy is standing at the gates. I accuse you of the murder 
of dozens of innocent, saintly volunteers ... 
during meetings of the National 
Council you were far fi-oni modest ... you were 
boastful, exuberant, and cruel 
while the dead were still draped before you, and said that the cannon you had 
ordered - without any warning whatsoever - to bombard the vessel 
surrounded on all sides is a sacred cannon, which should be placed in a 
specially constructed temple. 106 
Ibid. 
106 Begoiný f%L 23 June 1948ý Kne. sscl Protocols. (Hebre%\) 
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Irrespective of the opposition's public statements, Ben Gurion and Mapai 
would continue to portray their actions against the Altalena as a moral act, committed 
within the framework of a nation-state against those who would incite civil war and 
unden-nine national sovereignty. The bitter debate surrounding the bombardment of 
the Altalena would ebb and flow but not retreat from the parliamentary arena for 
years. "The entire nation has to eradicate the evil among us" was how Ben Gurion 
would refer to the underground during one debate. 107 He bitterly castigated any 
attempt to legitimate their Knesset representatives. 
As was his wont, Begin suggested that the matter be subjected to a 
commission of inquiry. Ben Gurion, predictably, objected to any criticism of his views 
and of the statism he diligently attempted to construct. The ensuing dialogue, 
rhetorically and psychologically fascinating, encapsulates the attitudes of each with 
respect to their respective positions. I quote the most relevant parts: 
Begin: I propose that you compile your accusations and that I compile mine 
and that the two of us present ourselves to a commission of inquiry 
composed of three judges, to be chosen by the High Court of 
Justice ... The judges will decide between us, and the truth, the whole 
truth, and only the truth will be declared before all. 108 
Ben Gurion: [I have no intention ofl contesting the past. The protocols of the 
Interim Government are open to all 
Begin: No, my dear sir, I will not join you anywhere outside the Knesset's 
walls. Here I am subject to the law, I respect the law, to which I must 
obligate you and every member of the Knesset as well. Here, we are all 
equal in our rights and obligations.... 
Ben Gurion tenaciously presented Begin's demands as a benighted attempt to 





parliament should revise history - this is truly a novelty worthy of broadcasting ... the 
attempt to introduce politics to areas where it does not belong .... that political parties 
should appoint commissions ofinquiry for the purpose of writing history! "'()9 
During his entire defense of his version of the War of Independence, and no 
less his antagonism to commissions of inquiry, Ben Gurion painted Begin as a minor 
player on the political stage of history, lacking in moral fiber and impudently daring to 
cast doubt on the war and its narrative: "... What does he [Begin] want to say .... that a 
murderer is walking about - and not an ordinary murderer but a murderer who also 
happens to be the prime minister, the nation's representative before the Jewish people 
and the world, the person who directed the War of Independence and the Sinai 
Campaign? "' 10 Importantly, when it came to disparaging the right as parliamentary 
bloc and Begin in particular, leftist ranks were closed during this period and Ben 
Gurion found support for his position arriong opposition members within the left 
even the far left. For instance, see the defense of Beii Gurion's position presented by 
Shmuel Mikonis (MK, Mapain) and Maki, Israel's communist party: "... Begin ... 
is 
presenting-a distorted as ý, Nrell as petulant historical picture, drawn to prove that the Zýl 
Military operations conducted by Etzel and Lehi were those that, supposedly, 
determined the fate of the repressive British government". III 
Ben Gurion's arguments throughout this debate were intended to present him I I:, 
as aloof to historiographical issues and his public image. According to this scenario, 
Ben Gurion was exclusively involved with the mundane daily running of the 
government. It is from this position that Ben Gurion responded to the proposal to 
appoint a part iamentarv committee to investigate the history of the War presented by 
21) N, Ii\ 1958. (1-1cht cý% 
Bcn Ourion, 23 June 1948, Knc. vsel Prolocolý. (I febi-c%%) 
11 [ Nlikonisý S- 23 JLII)C 1948. Knesscl Protocols. (Hehi-c\% ) 
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Begin's Knesset colleague, Arieh Ben Eliezer (Herut), on 28 May 1958. When making 
his proposal, Ben Eliezer stated that "the underground requires no special 
recognition, " to which he added that I lerut was motivated by educational and civic 
goals: "to educate our youth as to the truth. " 112 In response, Ben Gurion noted that 
from his perspective, attempts to politically influence the nation's recollections of its 
past were out of place. In order to demonstrate his unconcern for the construction of 
collective memory, Ben Gurion announced that he had rejected a highly lucrative offer 
from a major American publisher to write his rnemolrs: "I am uninterested in writing 
my memoirs because I am uninterested in the past. I look only toward the future. " 113 
But the debate did not end there. Turning to Herut seats, Ben Gurion directed 
the next comment to Beu Eliczcr. "Who is interfering with your writing about or L- C, 
describing the heroism you and your cornrades displayed when expelling the 
British? ... I've heard [this complaint] dozens of times and expect to hear it a hundred 
times more. " 114 He rationalized his refusal to iriention the underground's efforts 
within any authorized texts by referring to his historical vision: "This country has a 
long history; manly foreign rulers were driven out but the state did not rise, It rose only 
ten years ago. "' 15 Ben Eliczcr's proposal fell dLie to the votes cast by Mapai, the 
National Religious Party, and tile Pro-ressives. The General Zionists, a right-of-center Zý, - ZD 
party., abstained. Ben Gurion's hegemonic control over national inernory was I 
sustained, with Begin and his movement abandoned, left to continue their 
involvement with this issue in political isolation. 






Thus, in the absence of other available institutional forurns, Menachern Begin 
and his followers turned to aily avenue that offered sorne possibility of opening a 
public debate on their status in Israel's lnstorý. Throughout this period, Herut's 
Knesset members would repeatedly demand review of those past events that Mapaj 
had exploited in its attempts to besmirch the underground's reputation and deny its 
members political legitimacy and access to government posts and political power. In Z7, 
their preoccupation with the status politics, sites meant to facilitate smooth 
management of the state's public administration, such as the courts and parliament, 
were identified by Herut as the appropriate inernory sites to battle over the 
underground's historical rehabilitation. '"' This strategy had a somewhat curious 
precedent: Upon transfer of the State administration to Jerusalem, dozens of Christian 
clergymen turned to the Court's president, Zamora xvith the request that the Court, as 
the contemporary heir of the Greater Sanhedrin, conduct a retrial of Christ's case in 
t 17 order to correct the original perversion of jLIs, Ice. ' Z, 
Decades later, after coming to power, Herut would again dernand that three 
incidents, the cornerstones of Mapai's campaign of delegitirnization, be subjected to 
historical review by commissions of inquiry: the Arlozorov murder, the Altalena 
incident, and the Dir Yassin incident. Within the frarnework of this study, Herut's 
application to the courts is interpreted as a political act, an invitation to a political 
trial, a tactic adopted by a politically Nveak rival in the face of the structural advantages 
116 For a discussion of the politics of'class aud the politics of status, see Chapter I. 
117 MU07. A., 1999.1 listorical ProccedinL,, s -- The Kastner Yrial and the Commission of hiquirý into 
the . -, 
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Shazar Centel- t-or lc\% ish I listoi 
' %, p. 
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accruing to ruling groups. In constitutional democracies, the judicial sphere, contrary 
to other spheres, appears to be open to all. 1 "ý 
The first incident brought to court was the sinking of the Altalena by the 
Hagana (1948). On the ship's decks were crowded 940 men and women, mainly 
Holocaust survivors; in its hold were arms and munitions meant for delivery to Etzel 
units then fighting Arab contingents in the battle for Jerusalem. Herut's efforts to 
initiate a judicial inquiry into the incident were preceded by a similar endeavor, 
undertaken immediately after the event. In a special meeting of the Interim 
Government on 23 June 1948, Y. Greenboini proposed that the investigative justice be 
appointed to question those arrested and decide on whether to continue to detain them 
or to order their release. In addition, he proposed appointing a ministerial committee 
to soothe passions and arrange for clemency. In contrast, Herut hoped that the 
proposed committee would function as a full-fledged commission of Inquiry Nxith a 
mandate to conduct an in-depth investigation, interrogate participants, and publicize 
its findings. This proposal was later combined with one offered by Ben Gurion: The 
investigative justice to be appointed would be authorized to free the new immigrants 
among the detainees as well as those apprehended who had not borne weapons and 
who had not committed any crime. The proposal regarding an exhaustive investigation V, Z-1 
was rejected. In response, Rabbi Y. L. Fishman and Moshe Shapira (both of Hapoal 
Hamlzrahi, an Orthodox Zionist party) resigned froin the government. 119 
Herut and Shelach demanded that the victims of the Altalena operation be 
recognized as ýN,, ar dead and that their families be considered bereaved families (based 
Kirshhch-ncr. 0.. 196 1. Poliiical Astice, Princeton: Princeton Unk crsitý Press. 
Text of the decision. taken durim, a reoular mcctinL, of the tnterim Go% ernment, 23 June 1949. 
Documents transmitted to the I el A\ iv District Attorncý bý Yosef Kokiý a, Director General. Ministr) 
of Justice. 23 Julý 1953. Ministr) of Justice Archi\ es. File 10 15, No. 10288. 
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on the incident's classification as a military action), entitled to government support 
and official commemoration of their dead. Specifically, they Justified their claims by 
the fact that the incident took place after the formation of the IDF and that several of 
the Etzel dead had been incorporated into the I lagana, with military serial numbers to 
prove their status. The sweeping rejection of their demands was formulated by C. 
Krishtem, Acting Head of the Department for Housing and Rehabilitation, the 
Ministry of Defense. However, in his letter of 4 May 1951 to the Herut leadership, 
Krishtein transmitted what was essentially Ben Gurion's decision: 
In response to your letter I have been instructed to inforin you that the claim 
for compensation made in the name of the bereaved families listed in you letter 
has been rejected on account of the fact that all the dead perished during the 
Altalena incident. 
After noting that sorne way would be sought to assist the families, he 
comments: "Nevertheless, I have requested that the Minister of Detcnse express his 
opinion as to the possibility of providing these families with a beneficence similar to 
that provided in a different case. I will inform you of his response when it is 
received. , 120 The letter's phrasing reflects Ben Gurion's policy, which was strictly Z, -I 
kept: His ob - jection was not 
to case-by-case support of families but to the global 
inclusion of Etzel and Lehi dead under the canopy of national martyrdom. This 
attitude Nvas poignantly if not cruelly expressed in the Ministry's decision not to 
financially support the erection of headstones at the graves of the Altalena dead and to 
prohibit their bUrial within the military portion of the Nachlat Yltzchak Cemetery. 
1'0' Ile JabotinskN Institute Archi%es, 2()-204: ) 
121 Outconic of meeting %%ith the Nlinistrý of Defense, 24 Nlaý 1956, cited in Ben Yoset', A.. letter to 1. 
Pinkcrt'cld-Amir. I lead, Personnel Di% ision, 27 Mn 1956. IDF -, %t-clii\ es. 285-74'20. 
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According to Ben Gurion and Mapai, the public lessons to be learned from the 
Altalena incident were that Herut could not be considered a legitimate partner in the 
sharing of power because its members had rebuffed official orders and betrayed the 
IDF by fighting against fellow soldiers. For Mapai, the Altalena incident encapsulated 
its belief that the underground's adherents were traitors and about to incite a civil war. 
This may explain why, of all Herut's demands, Mapai was to object most strenuously 
to the inclusion of the Altalena dead within the category of IDF dead. 
In the face of their inability to convene a commission of inquiry and to obtain 
positive decisions regarding the Altalena dead, Begin and his associates attempted to 
initiate an historical investigation in diverse formats and within different public 
arenas. Consider the case of those families of Altalena lallen xvho turned to the courts 
in order to sue for then- rights as bereaved families. These private petitions, which may 
well have been served solely for economic reasons, transformed the courts into an 
arena for historiographical combat, a memory site for all extents and purposes. 
Shrnuel Tamir, the attorney who represented the majority of families, was a 
Revisionist, a current member of Herut, and a future Minister of Justice in the Begin 
government. The overt purpose of the case presented to the Court was to clarifN, the 
rights of these families to state assistance, an objective that it achieved. However, its 
covert aim was to create a staoe for a public revie\ý of the past. The following V, 
examples illustrate how this was accomplished. 
The first petition was presented by the mother of Zvi Reifer. Reiter was killed 
at the age of 21, in Beit Da-an, during an enCOUnter between his unit and a unit of the Z-- Z7, 
IDF. A member of Etzel., lie was assigned to the 57t" Battalion of the Givati Brigade 
following Etzel's incorporation into the IDF. At the time of his death, the hattallon had 
vet to be fully integrated. On 21 June 1948, a good part of the battalion left their 
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encampment and headed toward Tel Aviv after learning that the Altalena was bcin, (, 
bombarded; their purpose was to help their comrades who were under attack. ]'he 
IDF's General Staff warned battalion officers that the group's departure was illegal 
and that they were to be prevented from reaching Tel Aviv, where the Altalena \NLis 
moored offshore, even if it required the use of force. Upon their arrival at Belt Dagan, 
in the outskirts of Tel Aviv, the group was confronted by an IDF roadblock erected to 
stop them. When their vehicle tried to avoid the roadblock, IDF soldiers opened fire 
and Reifer was killed. 
The Reiter case was, in sorne ways, a product of chance: his name had been 
included in the expanding list of IDF dead. Because Reifer had been killed after Etzel 
had been officially absorbed by the IDF, he was considered, as stated previously, a 
soldier in the regular army. In December 1950, his mother, Miriam, was declared a 
bereaved mother and entitled to compensation. "owever, in 1951 she was informed 
that her rights had been terminated and that her status as an IDF bereaved mother was 
null and void. The source of the decision was a group death notice appearing in the z:: I 
party's newspaper Herut in June of that year, on the third anniversary of the Altaleua 
incident. The notice included the names of all Etzel casualties who had been 
recognized as IDF fallen. The Ministry of Defense carefully inspected the list and 
followed up on all the names, which included that of Zvi Reifer. 
In light of this new information, the IDF's Comperisation Officer, acting, 
according to Ministry of Defense directives, decided on 9 September 1951 that 
Reifer's status as an IDF martyr was to be voided: 
Whereas this notice serves as proof that the deceased fell during the Altalena Z:, 
. *dent, NNh*lc a member of Etzel, and not during or as a result of an order inci I z: l 
. ()IN,, en to an IDF soldier, and inasmuch as such an Individual ... cannot 
be 
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considered an IDF martyr ... by law, I have no choice but to cancel the decision 
of 5 December 1950 and order termination of the compensation awarded to 
Mrs. Miriarn Reifer. " 122 
This decision escalated the conflict between the tkvo camps. The said incident 
was not connected with the expulsion of the British, it had taken place after the IDF 
had been formed, that is, the victim was technically an IDF soldier. The criterion 
applied to change his status and end compensation to his family was not normative or 
universalistic but administrative - it pertained to membership in a state body -- and 
particularistic or circumstantial - the Altalena operation. With respect to the 
newspaper notice, the Compensation Officer argued that it provided "new evidence 
that was unavailable to the Compensation Officer at the tirne that he made his original 
decision of 5 December and proves that the said decision was based on his mistaken 
belief that the deceased had died as a solder in the service of the IDF. " 123, 
To better understand the evolution of the case, some background information ZD 
is required. On 27 November 1950, Miriam Reifer presented a claim for compensation 
according to the law Families of Soldiers Who Had Died in the ff'or (ý/ Independence 
(1950), based on the fact that her son had died in June 1948 and was buried in the 
military portion of the Nachlat Yltzchak cemetery. For six months she appealed her 
case before the Compensation Appeals Commission headed by Justice 1. Mainion, 
chair of Haifa's Yad Labanim and Director of Carmel Hospital. Her aroruments Nverc 
primarily procedural. Her attorney, Zvi Hadasi, argued that the Altalena's mission had 
yet to be proven illegal, that Reifer's death had occurred while the ship Nvas in transit, 
and that Reifer had not violated any military law. In opposition. the Ministry of 
'I hc Jahotinský I nstitute Archk es, Iý1 6-5, ý 15. 
Decisioll of 1/7(' Compensalion Officer Wgarding ihe ILriniiialion o/ Compen. ýalion Awarded to 
lliriam Rcýlcr. 23 Nmember 1953, The Jabotinský Institute Archi\es. 1,16-5/15. 
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Defense contended that Reifer had deserted his battalion and joined the Altalena 
forces. 124 Hence, in addition to his conscription status, a procedural matter, Reifer's 
asSUrned political loyalties in effect determined the government's response. 
Another case that resulted from the difficulties faced by the Ministry of 
Defense when examining the cause of death of those buried in military cemeteries was 
the claim presented by Haya Lifshitz. Lifshitz was the widow of Itaniar Lifshitz, who 
had also been killed during the Altalena operation; she had also received 
compensation. Her status was likewise annulled in June 195 1, this time based on the 
contention that her husband had not died within the framework of an official military 
operation against the invading Arab armies or during an Arab incursion. Etched on his 
gravestone in the Nachlat Yitzchak cemetery was Lifshitz's IDF military rank: 
sergeant. The attorney who presented her appeal, Shmuel Tamir, was not content to 
base his case on procedural matters, as in the case of Reifer, but to convert the appeal 
into a debate over history. In the process, he requested that the court allow him to 
present witnesses from among the political leadership who, he argued, Nvould help him z: I t' 
prove that the Altalena incident represented a planned, legal, military operation and 
not, as Mapai claimed, an attempt to ignite a civil war. Among his proposed witnesses 
were Menachein Begin, Y. Meridor, A. Lankin, E. Palgin, Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defense David Ben Gurion, 1. Galili, Rabbi Mairrion, Minister of the 
Interior M. Shapira, and Major General Y. Dori. On 21 November 195 1, the 
Commission permitted Tamir to present the witnesses' written sworn staternents, but 
onk to the Magistrate's Court in Tel Aviv. 125 After receiving the statements, the Court 
decided to allow cross-examination and redirect in the courtroom. 
124 
, lfaarh% 30 June 195 1. (Hebrew) 
I's llaoret--ý 25 No\ ember 195 1. (, Hebi-c%\ 
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The Lifshitz case was not the first brought to civil courts by families ol- 
Altalena victims or defended by Tamir. Contrary to the previous cases., which Nvere 
denied a full hearing, that of Lifshitz was accepted. The reason for this chaiigyc iii Cn 
policy was that the court had decided that the case could serve as a precedent ýNhose 
outcome would detcrmine decisions in the other cases. The presidingi judges were: tD zD 
Justice Shiloh, with Dr. Shechter and Mr. Grinfeld (representing the Association of 
Bereaved Families), the latter two representing the public. In response to Tamir's 
argument that the Altalena operation was legal and planned against the Arab threat, 
the Ministry of Defense counter-argued that although a number of families, including Z_7 
that of Lifshitz, had received compensation, these were awarded prior to passage of 
the law Families (ýf Soldiers Who Had Died in the War of Independence (1950), 
Following the law's passage., the Ministry refused to continue to recognize these ZD 
casualties as War of Independence dead. 126 In response to Justice Shiloh's question as 
to whether the families would be willing to receive compensation in the form of a 
Minister of Defense beneficence grant. Tamir replied in the negative. 
As the hearing progressed, Tarnir read the law that stated that any service 
would be recognized as military service if so declared by the Minister of Defense, as 
Nvell as the Minister's announcement stating that any action planned against the 
invading Arab armies or bands would likewise be recognized as military service. This 
announcement, as discussed in Chapter One, was meant to bend the law in order to 
cover pre-IDF Haoana dead. According to Tamir., the Altalena carried weapons to be 
used in the battle against the invading Arab armies. "[D]espite the fact that the law I 
Heria, 10 Jul ý 195 1. (11 chre\% 
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have cited is unfair and highly discriminatory, it does include the Altalena operation 
wlthin... [its] confines... " 127 
Justice Shiloh, agreeing with Tarnlr about the operation's purpose, stated that 
the issue at hand was what the Attorney General's position would have been had an 
accident occurred during unloading of the weapons. The Attorney General's 
representative sidestepped the question and argued that he [the Attorney General] 
differentiated between treason in its historical sense and treason in its Judicial and 
legal definition. As he saw it, despite the fact that the vessel's cargo was supposedly 
meant to support the battle against the Arabs, its true mission had converted it into an 
instrument of revolution and betrayal. The government's position was, in effect, that 
the Altalena's victims Nvere not to be denied the status of xvar dead on the basis of 
procedural criteria - the legal definition of the military service covered the Altalena 
dead - but for moral and political reasons. 
On the morning of 10 June 1953, the Magistrate's Court in Haifa voided the 
Compensation Officer's decision to terminate Reifer's compensation. 12 8 rhe Appeals 
Commission's chair, Tel Aviv District Court Judge, A. Mani, Maimon's replacement, 
claimed that Ministry of Defense arguments had not provided adequate cause for its 
act. The Commission's current position was considered binding, with respect to similar 
appeals. including that of Lifshitz. 
The Mapai government policy toward the under round was not expressed Z:, 9 
solely toward the dead. In July 1953, another appeal was brought for judgment, but 
this time with respect to disability. Joseph Hadad, a former Etzel member, demanded 
that lie be categorized as a disabled veteran following injuries received during the 
'Famir. cited in Pleria, 10 Julý 195 1. (flebre%\) 
llat--ofe, I Julý 1953. jlebre\ý 
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attack on the Altalena. The Ministry of Defense refused to do so and declined to 
provide him with assistance. Hadad's personal reasons for making the claim were 
financial. He was now supporting his mother and three brothers. He required repeated 
surgery, his income was limited, and the support that Shelach could provide him was 
circumscribed. Hadad had initially been recognized as a disabled veteran, he was 
allowed to purchase a tax] tax free with a special loan jointly repaid with his father. 
Receipt of this benefit was based on the fact that one brother, also an Etzel member, 
had been killed in an automobile accident while serving in the IDF. After Hadad's 
father passed away, Ministry of Defense institutions ceased to recognize him as 
disabled. They claimed that he was not an IDF disabled veteran because his "injury 
was not caused as a result of serving in the IDF, " although he did have the right to 
129 
appeal . 
Hadad, who had been shot while swimming from the Altalena to the shore, had 
spent over a year in hospital. His injuries, which had been treated in a military hospital 
and were the basis for his release from the IDF, qualified him for 60% disability. He 
had even been awarded a commendation due to his participation, as an IDF soldier, in 
the War of Independence. Despite this, his request to be personally recognized as 
disabled and to realize his rights was denied. Shmuel Tamir represented Hadad as well 
before the Appeals Commission for Disabled Veterans at the Magistrate's Court in Tel 
Aviv. His arournent was simillar to that regarding the deceased: The Altalena operation I C, 
v, Tas intended to assist in the Nvar against the Arab invaders, as stipulated in the legal 
definition of IDF Nvar dead and disabled veterans. 130 
121), l'ainir. S.. undated. recording ofpersonal reininiscences. Tamir Familý archiý es. (1 Ichre\ý 
t `0 HaBoken 15 Maý 1952. (Helýrc%ý) 
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A high official of the Ministry of Justice, Attorney A. Gorney, represented the 
State at fladad's hearing. Gorney requested that the Commission not review the case at 
all and re'lect the appeal; his request was denied. Significantly, the Corn m Iss ion's chan, 
decided that the hearing would be closed to the public. Tamir, who was interested in 
public review of the case objected, arguing that secrecy was unnecessary. Although he 
would eventually claim that he had asked to court "to consider the case from the 
perspective of human kindness and not to overload it with politics and the settling of 
accounts between Ben Gurion and Etzel, " 131 it was obvious that he was desirous of the 
public exposure that might induce an improvement in Hadad's condition as well as 
tend political weight to his camp's position. In voicing his objection to closing the 
hearing to the public, Tamir stated: "My client ... has done nothing to be ashamed of. It 
is the Court's obligation not only to do right but also to show the public that it is 
interested in Justice, especially since the case in question is of the greatest general 
concern. " 132 The Court responded positively and the hearing remained open to the 
public. 
Tamir had attempted to compel the Commission, whose task it was to 
deliberate disabilitv, issues, into acting as a forum for historical and public review of' 
the Altalena incident. By complying with his request for openness, the Court was 
snared into doing so. From the start. Tainir claimed that he could provide evidence 
that the Altalena was supporting the war effort. 133 His arguments were meant to place 
all the military units that had operated along the Tel Aviv shore into a single context I 
and award them historical sýnunctry: "My argument is that we should vie, ý\, the 




Altalena incident as a confrontation between two IDF units, the result of an error, and 
that the State should treat the injured of both units. "' 34 For this reason, Tainir 
demanded that the Commission rule that Hadad was eligible to receive compensation 
"like any other disabled veteran because lie was injured in an operation planned for the 
purpose of unloading armaments intended for the war against the Arab forces, "' 35 
compliance with the compensation law. In his reply, Gorney wrote: 
Sailing the Altalena [to Israel] was an open violation of a clear commitment, 
signed by Etzel's head. The Etzel leadership had attempted to ship arms to 
Israel without government approval and in gross disregard for its 
sovereignty ... 
Etzel's commanders had been informed of the government's 
decision that the weapons were to be transmitted to the IDF, but they refused 
to comply to their orders ... the actions taken by Etzel forces, with whom the 
plaintiff is identified, were illegal and acts of insurrection. 136 
In the course of the hearing of Hadad's case, Tainir requested that the hearings 
be interrupted in order to transfer the proceedings to the District Court. He claimed 
that "[a]fter receiving a verdict in principle that will determine the degree to which the 
Altalena operation was legal, it will be possible to continue to argue the appeal before 
the Commission dealing with levels of disability. "' 37 He believed that the present 
Commission, composed of a judg-e and two physicians, was not the appropriate body 
to decide in matters of historical principle. Tamir hoped to acquire a verdict that 
would mend the historical imprint of the Altalena incident within the public mind and 






weight, will determine the eligibility of those injured ... for qualification as soldiers 
during Israel's War of Independence. "' 38 
Gorney opposed ending the hearings for the purpose of a declarative verdict-, 
the Court agreed and the discussions continued on the fornial aspects of the case, 
limited to Hadad's rights to receive financial compensation. This complied with the 
State's wish to linlit the discussion to procedural matters and thereby avoid a decision 
in principle on the status of the original incident. Nonetheless, the Commission did 
permit Tamir to present verbal testimony that he believed would prove that the 
Altalena operation was part of the war effort. ' 39 
As a result of the argurnents presented in association with the various pleas for 
compensation, and the maneuvers planned to change the disability hearing's venue, the 
Commission hearings were converted into forums for the determination of historical Zý 
truth and public morality. The Commissions and the decision therefore contained the 
potential to influence the evolving political culture of the infant nation. In effect, 
Tamir had hoped to convert the Appeals Commission for Disabled Veterans into a 
forurn to adjudicate between two contradictory versions of the historical past, its 
recognition of Hadad's disability Nvas actually a subordinate outcome of this unofficial 
mandate. 
The events should also be seen frorn the perspective of Herut as the 
underground's political representative Nvith respect to its attitude to the plaintiffs as 
well as to the larger role of the various hearings. Hadad's hearing in particular spurred 
a heated debate among party mernbers. According to Tarnir's diaries, the Movement 
was supposed to decide whether to place responsibility for its representation "on 
138 Ihid. 
139, ýj Hamj'ýh, 71ý11.. 18 IUIý 1952. (1 
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Hadad's shoulders" and his personal battle for compensation and his attempt to place 
the responsibility fior continuing the struggle over the historic status of the Altalena 
incident on Tarmr. 140 One of the main points of argument was moral: Was it fair to 
impose such historic burdens on the families of the dead and disabled. After 
consultations with Begin, it was decided that Tamir would continue to act according 
to his discretion and that the Movement would cooperate as needed. Tamir began to 
prepare a detailed plan of action. Senior Herut leaders were interviewed. Their 
testimony helped him to detail the reasons for the purchase of the vessel, explain its 
goals as well as describe the negotiations concluding in the agreement over unloading 
the weapons that had been finalized between Etzel and Ben Gurion, GaIlli and Eshkol. 
Tamir then set about collecting evidence supporting the testimony, which he later 
presented to the Commission. These proved, he would claim, that the incident resulted 
from the government's deceitful violation of its agreement. 141 
After presentation of the documents and testimony, Tamir decided to call 
witnesses before the Appeals Commission. These witnesses were members of Herut 
who had taken part in the vessel's purchase and preparing its orders, in addition to 
members of the government elite. I intend to spread before you a wide tapestry and 
reveal before the Court the complete story of the Altaleria" 142 proclaimed Tamir before 
the Commission. However, after announcing his intentions, he began to receive 
11 signals that the Ministry of Defense preferred to avoid exposing all the details... and 
was seeking a way out that would not darriage its reputation while solving the practical I 
problerns raised. " 143 It so came about that the Ministry of Defense decided to grant the 
plaintiffs their demands and thereby neutralize a political threat to its agenda, a Z: ý 
140 Tamir. S.. undated. recordim, of personal reminiscences. Tamir Family archk es. (I lcbrc\ý) 
"'Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
1 43ý 1 bid. 
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strategy that avoided formal recognition of the plaintiffs as bereaved families or 
disabled IDF veterans. 
It was the Shnnon Peres, then Director General of Ministry of Defense. who 
inforined Arieh Ben Efiezer, the Herut MK, ofthe Ministry's (reluctant) Nvillingpicss to 
award the plaintiffs "recognition of their legal rights. "' 44 Ben Eliezer informed Tamir tý 
of this decision. Although Tamir had, from the beginning, deferred such an offer, he 
was faced with fulfilling his obligations toward his direct clients. Given his formal 
standing as the plaintiffs attorney in a hearing over compensation, Tamir was forced 
to bring the Ministry of Defense offer before Hadad. Driven by economic need and the 
worn out by the hearing and its twists and turns, Hadad ordered Tarnir to accept the 
o ffe r. 
Interested in further removing the potential political threat inherent in the plea, 
the Ministry of Defense, in the name of the Compensation Officer, wrote a letter to 
Hadad informing him that the funds he so urgently needed would be transmitted only 
after he withdrew his appeal from the District Court and transferred it to the Ministry's 
Medical Commission. The same solution would apply to others injured in the incident, 
with the Hadad decision serving as a precedent. tn reply, Hadad wrote that Inasmuch 
as the Ministry had withdrawn its objections to his plea and was ready to recognize 
him as a disabled veteran, and considering his severe disability as a result of the 
incident, he was "unable to personally conduct, independently, an investigation into 
the essence of the incident, as demanded. Accordingly, based on your commitment 
fully believe that the day will soon arrive when the whole true with come to 
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light ... Please permit me to note that 
I will never see myself as a person enjoying 
charity but as someone deserving compensation from the State. "' 45 
The last event to be discussed within the framework of Herut's campaign to 
shift the political discussion of Israel's pre-Independencc history to the courts is that of 
Dir Yassin. In August 1952, the attorneys who had represented the underground's 
bereaved families and disabled met once agaiii in the foyer of Tel Aviv's District 
Court. Although the structural and procedural issues were similar, the incident being 
discussed was of a different order. The Appeals Commission was now composed of 
Judge Y. Gabizon, Dr. Ziv and Dr. Feller. 146 The families involved were now 
represented by Attorney Yaakov Meridor, a former Etzel member (and future Knesset 
member). Whereas the Altalena incident was exploited by Mapai to show just how 
much Etzel and Lehi veterans were unworthy of reaching positions of power for 
political reasons, the Dir Yassin incident was used by Mapai to prove the same point, 
but this tirne on moral and normative grounds. Mapai made potent use of the episode 
to attempt to prove that the outcomes of the underground's attitudes towards War 
the mass murder of residents of an Arab village - reflected a clear dearth of military 
ethics. 
Once more, the plaintiffs was required to raise historical issues, partially 
disguised as claims for compensation for injuries or deaths reSUIting from military 
actions, this being the only arena still open to debate during the formative stages of zn 
national development. In his opening speech., Gorney declared: "Our main argurnent zI 
against the plaintiffs' plea is that the Dir Yassin opcratiOn was not a opcration planned 
14S 
Ibid. 
"'Appeal No. 89/51, Halperin US. The Compensation OfIlicer. [Hebrc%Nj 
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against the Arab gangs or invading armies because it was totally unnecessary in 
military terms; its only purpose was to enhance the political reputation of' the 
underground ... During the testiniony for the defense, I will call witnesses representing 
the IDF who will prove the facts as stated ... on the one hand, that no military 
significance was attached to the capture of Dir Yassin, and on the other, that the Etzel 
and Lehi units had refused to participate in operations having greater strategic value. It 
is clear to all sides that this is a political trial, I therefore attach special importance to 
the presentation of clear and conclusive evidence by the state.... " 147 As in the cases of 
the bereaved and the disabled, Mapai would utilize the trial to delegitimate an 
alternative version of the nation's modern history. Tamir took an analogous position. 
The controversy over Dir Yassin revolved around whether the operation had 
been undertaken with Hagana knowledge and consent. Etzel commanders held 
documents proving that this was indeed the case. On 7 April 1948, the Hagana's 
commander of the Jerusalem District wrote a letter to the commander of Etzel's 
Jerusalem units that the I'lagana had learned of Etzel's intentions to invade the village. 
He stated that although his organization had also planned an attack, he had no 
olýjection to Etzel executing the mission. The sole intervention (if'kNie may call it that) 
into Etzel's program was a list of suggested actions and the recommendation that if 
Etzel could not hold the village, it should avoid acts such as demolition of buildings, 
which would cause the residents to flee in panic and invite the entry of armed Arab 
bands. Prior to the battle, coordination bet,, veen Etzel and the Ha-ana was reviewed, 
during which Etzel officers transmitted their plans to the Fla-ana., including their 
147 Go rncý . 
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operational timetable. It was also decided that the Hagana would support Etzel in case 
the latter was forced to retreat. 148 
On 9 April 1948, a force of 150,90 of whom belonged to Ftzel and 60 to Lehi, 
assaulted Dir Yassin. According to Begin, Etzel had warned village residents to 
evacuate women and children in a conscious surrender of the advantage of surprise. 149 
During the operation, Arab forces began to fire on the attackers. At this stage, Hagana 2: 1 
forces intervened; its attack on the Arab forces prevented their entry into the village. 
Palmach forces also participated in this defensive action. 150 The capture was 
completed by nightfall, at a cost of four Etzel and Lehi dead, seven seriously injured, 
and 28 slightly injured. According to contemporary accounts, Arab losses totaled 240, 
including women and children. 15 1 After conclusion of the battle, Etzel promised to 
hand the village over to the Hagana within 24 hours. On 12 April, two physicians, Dr. 
Avigdor and Dr. Druyan, visited the village upon the Jewish Agency's request. They 
reported finding numerous corpses of men, women and children, none bearing signs of 
mistreatinent, and piles of burnt bodies. 112 
In the wake of the operation, the Hagana printed a "yellow banner, " similar to 
the yellow Star of David that the Nazis had reqUired Jews to wear, condemning what it 
called the unnecessary killings and slaughter of women and children. It did so through zn ZD 
persistent denials of its role in the incident and of its knowledge of the attack. In 
response, Lehi issued a public statement in mid April 1948, Notice. - About the Dir 
Yassin Incident, in which it broupht "to the public's attention the letter written by the 1ý 
Hagana's Commander of the Jerusalem District, no further explanations being 
l; s The Dii- Yassin Incident, Con fidential Report, I DF Arch kes, 922\75-343. (I I cbre\N) 
II C'i I I. M.. ý cal. //I I/Ic I 'ndcrgroun(l. %o I. IV. pp. 274-6,2821-, ý. (I I chrcN\ 
I bid. 
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required"; the reference was to the very same letter of 7 April, cited above. "We 
gana headquarters, " the placard went on, "and suggested that the Hagana turned to Ha- 
enter Dir Yassin ... we 
did what we could. We captured the site and systeniatically 
transfierred it, position after position, to the district's Hagana forces. " 
The placard's authors indicated their immense surprise at the Yishuv's 
perception of the operation because: "On [that] evening ... 
Hagana officers made the 
request that we coordinate the start of our attack with the attack on the Kastel ... which 
they were about to undertake, and the two operations were indeed initiated 
simultaneously. " We see, then, that an operation that Lehi had thought would 
iin prove its public image and political standing - just because it was conducted with 
flagana cooperation - brought about the opposite. Moreover, upon their return, they 
learned that the flagana and their political backers had used the Arab version of the 
events to further disparage the underground as an oroanization and to portray its I. n t, 
participants as war criminals to further their own political interests. As expected, this 
anti-underground version of the events captured the public. Z!, 
Despite the attempts made by Etzel and Lehi to present their version of the 
events to the public by the paltry means available to them, primarily placards pasted 
on public notice boards, little could alter the image created of an Etzel and Lehi- 
instigated slaughter. Lehi even went so far as to print a placard bearing the opinion of 
a physician sent by the Israel Medical Society, who had examined all the bodies and 
determined that with the exclusion of those who had died by gunfire and explosives., 
there were no signs of atrocities committed to the bodies. Furthermore, " the same 
report stated, "upon entry of the Hagana forces, Solel Boneh [Illstadrut-ovvned 
coristruction compan. y] personnel had Joined them in order to plurider the machinery 
and quarrý stories located in the village, Lehi soldiers had not participated in the 
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tooting. , 153 The outcome of this campaign was marginal. Therel-Ore, it appears that the 
purpose of the Dir Yassin compensation hearing was to provide the underground an 
opportunity to discredit the official versions of the events and the images disserninated 
by Mapai after the operation. 
During the hearings, the plaintiffs' attorney requested that all appeals for 
compensation be combined 154 because the problems afflicting the families were 
identical; this was done. "All the plaintiffs' requests for compensation have been 
denied based on the fact that they had been injured in the Dir Yassin attack, an 
operation that, in the opinion of the Compensation Officer, was not planned against 
the Arab bands or invading armies; this was the purpose of the evidence I will bring 
before this Commission. " Gorney himself noted that he believed that the true goal of 
the hearing was not compensation: "Disability is not the issue at hand because onlY 
one reason was given for their rejection, and I quote: 'The circumstances under which zD 
you were injured cannot be considered to have occurred within the trarnework of 
ilitary service according to the Disability Law as defined in the statement made by mi IIZ, 
the Minister of Defense as publicized in Legal Dige-vt No. 54, that is, the operation is 
gainst the Arab bands and invading armles. "' Once not considered a planned action a,, 
more, the reason for rejection of the plaintiffs' clairns was worded thusly: "... not to be 
considered as an action planned against the Arab bands and/or invading armles. " As in 
the other cases, the veracity of the injuries was not under question. 
The documents and evidence brought forth convinced the Commission that the 
Dir Yassin operation was indeed a certifiable military operation conducted within the 
Placard, April 1948. \olice. 
. 
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framework of the liagana's campaign against the Arabs. In their concluding staternent., 
the Commission members wrote that: 
... after hearing the witnesses, we 
have decided that the circumstances under 
which the plaintiff was injured in the present case meet the conditions [for 
compensation] detailed in the statement publicized by the Minister of Defense. 
Accordingly, we accept the plaintifrs plea and nullify Con-1pensation Officer's 
decision dated 24 May 1953.155 
The Arlozorov Murder 
Arlozorov's murder in 1933 is included in this discussion for one main reason: 
Begin continued to demand that commissions of inquiry be appointed to fully Z-1 
investigate the case and "correct" the historical record as late as the 1980s. The bare 
facts of this incident, like the others reviewed here, were publicly known. This did not 
prevent Mapai's transformation of the incident into an asset for its political 
delegitimization of the right. After the murder, the darn of hatred dividing the two 
camps swelled with Mapai's efforts to blame the Revisionists for the act, while the 
latter rebuffed the attack with claims that they were being libeled. Several even 
claimed that the murder had been committed by the Hagana in cooperation with 
British secret police as a provocation in their campaign to slander the Revision' II ýý I ist 
political camp. 15' Abraham Stavsky and Zvi Rosenblatt, t, ývo Revisionist 
sympathizers, stood trial for the murder in Criminal Court, Jerusalem, with Abba 
Achirneir, the right's leading spokesman and organizer of the "hand of thugs, " accused 
of masterminding the act. Although the three were acquitted by the Mandaton, 
tribunal, Mapai ignored the verdict and continued its campaign of defamation. t, 
Flic Jabotinský Institute Archivcs. 4\10 - 4: ý. (I lebrew). 
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'rhe lives of the defendants were henceforth carried on more or less in 
response to Mapai's allegations and to the public's fixed image of the three as guilty. 2-1 
Stavsky was later killed while on board the Altalena but Rosenblatt, who was publicly 
identified as directly responsible for the murder, continued to struggle to repair his 
reputation. This involved two libel trials following renewed attempts to portray him as 
the murderer, the first brought against Shaul Avigur, the second against Edwin tý 
Samuel, both Labor officials. 157 
With respect to Arlozorov, the public debate and call for an official 
investigation of the incident exhibits a paradox that summarizes one of the major 
aspects of the politics of domination that characterized the post-war period: Begin was 
not interested in convening a commission of inquiry that would reveal a "historical 
truth" different from the "judicial truth" embodied in the court's decision to acquit the 
defendants. With respect to its public image and standing, identification of the right 
with the murder was so sweeping and effectively internalized (as Ariel Sharon would 
contend in 1995) that Begin felt obligated to confirm a verdict made five decades 
earlier as an instrument of legitimation. Correction of the record was aimed elsewhere. 
On 6 June 1956, in the course of the Third Knesset (the original proposal had 
been made toward the end of the Second Knesset) Begin suggested that a commission 
ofinquiry composed of three judges be convened to investigate the Arlozorov murder: I 
"I took to my left, and plainly see the degree to which the honor of the State of Israel 
and its leaders are involved in this incident. We know who signed the placard 
1ý7 
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[rejecting the Court's verdict, see the following] and who is morally responsible for it. 
A whole generation has been indoctrinated according to its contents. "' 58 
In order to illustrate the labeling and agitation provoked by the authorities, 
Be-ln declaimcd, with his characteristic combination of pathos and irony, the entire 
contents of the placard distributed by Mapai after Stavsky's acquittal as part of his 
opening statement: 
Rosenblatt and Stavsky ... were 
both recognized by the High Court as 
Arlozorov's murderers ... the 
[Court] decision releasing the murderers from 
[forinal] punishment reaffirms the dire charges against them. We are not 
interested in retaliation, we know that Arlozorov's murderers were victims of 
terrorist agitation and evangelical Revisionist indoctrination. Our struggle to 
reveal the truth will not cease ... 
[our mission] is to purity our [civic] way of 
life, we wIII fight against the murderers' collaborators in order to protect 
Arlozorov's n-iemory. We will especially combat the Revisionist movement 
and their associates who are transforming those who bear the mark of Cain 
into 'heroes' and 'saints'... and to purity the Zionist camp. " 159 
Be-in WOUld continue: "A few nionths prior [to the verdict]. in August 19333 
Dctvar published the folloýýJng statement: 'Irrespective of who the murderers Aere, 
they Nvere agents of the Revislonist Party. ' This appeared on 28 August 1933, at the 
height of the trial . 
"16(' His recitation of Mapai's blasphemy, he believed, would be 
sufficient to will support for his demand. 
Nonetheless, Begin's efforts to convene a commission of inquiry failed 
throughout Ben GUrion's stay in office. The left's sweeping and obstinate objections to Z: ý 
an investigation suited its prograrn of political manipulation of the case, with its civic 
Begin- M. 6 Juric 1956, ill the Course of the Third Knesset (the original proposal had beeii made 
to\%ard the cild ofthc 'Scomid Knesset) BeLin suugested that a cominksion ofinquiv\ composed of three 




as well as political implications. Begin would be successful only years later, after 
changes in the distribLItIOll of power had made him prime minister. Z-1 
The Final illustration of attempts to alter Mapai's program of deligitimization 
is the case of Yedidia Segal. During a trial that had begun as a libel suit against the 
Revisionist newspaper Herul (1949), the defense counsel decided to call several 
witnesses, including senior government officials, in order to expose to the public the C, 
acts of torture and abduction committed by the Hagana against Etzel members, The 
event that instigated the trial was Herut's publication of an article claiming that Paul 
Kollick, a former Hagoana member, was involved, even if indirectly, in the murder of 
Yedidia Segal. 161 Segal, a member of Etzel, had been abducted by the Ilagana during 
the campaign against the underground. His body was found several days later, in the I : _ý 
vicinity of Tira, an Arab village near Haifa. Rumors and different versions of the 
events surrounding his death traveled quickly. Etzel was convinced that Segal had 
been murdered by the Hagana who, in turn, claimed that the murder had been 
committed by Arabs. Etzel believed that Kollick's trial would present an excellent 
opportunitý to educate the public about flagana violence against them during the 
Season. This motive was alluded to by Segal's mother, who declared at the trial: "You 
can't return my son to me, but... it would be unforgivable if you blurred the 
circumstances of his murder. " 162 
It was Shinuel Tarnir who once more took up the banner of historical redress. 
During the trial., Tainir questioned numerous agents as to the role of Hagana 
I()' llcrzaý 8 August 1949. (Hebre%N) 
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commanders in Segal's murder. In doing so, he raised additional issues, pleading that 
they, vvould support his charge that "the Hagana murdered Yedidia Segal. , 163 
The trial revealed that the Ilaifa Situation Committee (a para-civil defense 
organization), like the NahariNa Municipality following the Acre Prison break-, ii, had 
abstained from publishing a death notice after discovery of the body. It appears that 
the "Committee was wont to publish such notices only if the victim was 'one of their 
own, ' meaning that he had died in action or was murdered by Arabs. " 164 No public 
figure attended Segal's funeral. In order to support his argument that the Hagana was 
responsible for Segal's death, Tamir introduced much testimony that revealed Mapai's 
policy during the Season as well as actions previously unknown to the public. 
Tamir also called numerous witnesses from among the contemporary Hagana 
leadership. Amono thern Nvere Issar Be'en, head of Shai, the intelligence branch of the 
Hagana whose main activity involved stalking Etzel members, as well as the head of 
Shai's Haifa office. Also called were Rabbi Mairrion, Yitzchak Grinbolm, and Moshe 
Shapira, the Minister of the Interior, all of whom were members of the commission of 
inquiry called by the Jewish Agency to investigate the murder but whose conclusions ZD 
were never made public. Their testimony revealed that Segal's autopsy report had 
disappeared, and that the death certificate had never reached Segal's family. 
, at's 
family is interested in correcting the injustice it has understand that Sep 
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r suffered and is seeking a way to place matters in their proper light, " _01-nmented the 
presiding judge to Tamir, who straightaway responded that "we will dernonstrate the z: I 
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Hagana's methods of torture. " 166 Through questioning, Tamir was able to prove that 
Shai had openly persecuted the underground activists, had brutally tortured them, 
especially by detaining thein in solitary confinement, inflicting pain to genitals, tooth 
extraction, and sin-eing, feet. Knowing full well that the details would not be ZD - 
broadcast in the government-control led media or published in Davar, the Labor- 
aligned newspaper, Shelach produced a pamphlet documenting the trial, I Will Not Be 
Silenced, in the forin of a commemorative volume. 167 Tamir's closing statement took 
four hours to complete, and "became a dramatic 'I accuse' directed toward Shai, the 
Flagana leadership, and the regime.... [It] made the damages trial brought by Mr. 
Kollick against Herut an instrument for revelation of the truth. " 168 Herut clearly 
supported Tannir's ag-cricla with respect to the trial. 
169 
L- 
From a purely legal standpoint, the 'udoes declared (19 February 1951) that 
although Kollick's charges against the newspaper had not been fully substantiated, 
11 sufficient [new] evidence has been brought before the court to initiate criminal 
proceedings auainst several Ha-ana members, and to charge them with first degree 
murder. " 17" During the session held oil 20 February 1951, Justice Zussrnan 
nevertheless proposed a compromise: "I believe we can agree that Defense Counsel 
has revealed items and events that Nvere it not for this trial, would never have come to 
light. However. the prosecution is 'interested only in what personally concerns the 
plaintiff. " 171 Within the framework of the compromise transacted, it was agreed that 
although Herul would formally apologize to Kollick for its allegations regarding his 
connection with the murder, it would be allowed to emphasize that: 
16c, Ibid.. p. 339. 
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... this apology is purely personal and in no way 
detracts from the fiacts 
revealed in court about Yedidia Segal's murder-and about the other C, 
reprehensible acts committed or on the character of the brutality exercised in 
the nation toward members of Etzel and the Herut Movement as well as 
toward other citizens. The prosecutor is ordered to cancel the plea and the 
defendants are ordered to cover the costs of the trial. 172 
Thus, although the suit was lost, the trial itself represented an effective means 
for Shelach and Herut to continue their campaign to distribute their version of the past 
and the facts that the dominant party had so assiduously attempted to extricate from 
national memory. 
After the trial had closed, Herut distributed a placard carrying the caption The 
Truth is Revealed. Under a photograph of Justice Zussman, who had suggested the 
compromise agreement, was written the following: L- ltý 
Attorney Tamir transformed the formal trial for darnages against Herut into a 
moral and historical crusade nainst the reign of terror and for the revelation of 
the truth regarding the murder of Yedidia Segal, may the Lord avenge him, and 
the other atrocities committed by the Hagana. The truth was further endorsed 1 Z7 
by the support the honorable justice expressed during the summation. 
Although the truth came to light. justice has yet to be served. Yedidia Segal's 
soul will not be appeased until ... the 
freedom for which he fought and fell is 
achieved. 17 3, 
Summan- 
A few xveeks prior to the tenth anniversary of Israel's independence, HaOlani Ha7. eh 
dedicated its cover and lead feature to: "The Tenth Anniversary of the Underground's 
17' Shelach and Segal Camil), 196 1. Compromise Agreement. Civil Case File No. 503 49. (1 lcbi-c\N, ) 
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War. " 174 The article, written by the journal's charismatic editor, Uri Avneri, began 
thusly: "On 15 May 1948, tile blue and white flag raised in parts of Israel became the 
fla- of the State of Israel. '['his would ilever have occurred had not the British flao 
been lowered on the previous day, 14 Maý 1948. '['his is a simple historical fact, so 
very simple that many tend to forget it. Whoever listens to the statements of the 
nation's present leaders may receive the impression that the lowering of the British 
flag was an ordinary, more-or-less obvious inatter... Witnesses to the struggle against 
the British are a minority in today's Israel. The million new immigrants who arrived 
after establishment of the State are ignorant of what had taken place ... A gap is liable 
to develop in our national consciousness that will spread in due tirne as a result of the 
official indoctrination that cultivates this amnesia. We therefore felt the need to 
review the facts.... " According to Avneri, "if there had not been a small group of 
individuals who had organized themselves beforehand and who were psychologically 
prepared to charge the explosion, " the British would never have been ousted. He 
maintained that "history's verdict [on the events] will be passed only when personal 
feelings and party interest cease to blur these simple facts. 1,175 
Avneri's insights N-vere not voiced in the official historiography. Mapai, as the Z:, Zý, 
dominant rulin, (-T, party, totally controlled access to the production of textbooks, history 
and national memory. With their works published by houses linked in one way or 
another to the State or to the Party, Israeli authors active during that first decade 
supported the endorsed narrative. As Zand argues, history had become nationalized in 
practice. The rational bLireaucracy in place, headed by an enlightened ruler who 
marked the period as an object of veneration, operated unhindered by any critique 
174 HaOlam HaZch, 8April 1958. 
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originating among the intellectual elite. This benign atmosphere supported Ben 
Gurion's production of a monolithic political culture that silenced radical criticism 
firom the let! as from the right. Intellectuals who dared to challenge the product or its 
producers were ostracized and intimidated. perhaps more than they had been during 
the 1930s. 176 
In opposition to this trend, veterans of the Revisionist Movement stubbornly 
refused to accepted Ben Gurion's version of the War's history. The right therefore 
searched for and found an alternative arena that could operate as a site for their own 
historiography. Commissions of inquiry and the courts vvere transformed into 
platforms for policy review, forums for the determination of their rights, and sites for 
the production of collective memory. Decades would pass before textbooks and other 
sites containing Israel's heritage would incorporate details about the roles played by 
Etzel and Lehi in the achievement of statehood. 
176 Zand, S. 2000. IntelIccotals, Triah and Power, Tcl Avi%: Am Ovedý p. 157. (licbreN%) 
Conclusions 
Private versus Public Heroes 
This study examined the political dynamics underlying the formation of Israel's Z, 
collective memory in the period 1949-1963, specifically, the commemoration of the 
Jewish underground dead. Beyond the description of the strategy adopted by the 
Labor Movement and then Mapai to install themselves at the nation's dominant 
parties, the study entailed a review and analysis of the responses of the excluded 
underground parties. Its point of departure is the assumption that the construction and 
adaptation of collective memory represents a crucial asset for the attainment of 
political dominance and the exclusion of competitors from access to power. The 
construction of collective memory as described herein was far from spontaneous. It 
was a highly rational process, carefully executed by a party and its leader for the 
purpose of concealing from the public any information, symbols and myths that did 
not serve its political interests. The spirit of the tirne was thus constructed with a view 
toward supporting the ruling political actors and their ability to reproduce and sustain 
their political power for decades. 
From the perspective of history, the study describes, in detail, the awesome 
influence of leadership and, in this case. of the charismatic leader on the dynamics 
governing the formation of collective memory. In June 1963, David Ben Gurion 
resigned froin the office of Prime Minister; Levi Eshkol was appointed in his stead. 
Nine months after his appointinei-it. on 15 March 1964, following consultation Nvith 
the party leadership, Eshkol presented f-or govcrm-nent approval the final draft of a Z: ý) 
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decision unanimously approved by his Cabinet. This decision was made HI response to 
Menachem Begin's demands that the stipulations of Zeev Jabotinsky's will be 
executed and his remains be brought to rest in Jerusalem. In the eyes of the public as 
well as of Flerut, the decision rested solely on one factor: the Prime Minister's 
personality. Ben Gurion had peremptorily denied the request despite the inclination of 
his party colleagues and other members of the government to fulfill its terms. As 
Begin wrote in Herut: "The battle has been drawn out for 16 years, yet only with Ben 
Gurion's resignation could Jabotinsky's loyal disciples receive full satisfaction. ", 
Herut Movement supporters saw Ben Gurion's lengthy opposition to their request as a 
sign of personal callousness, an act of capriciousness 2 rather than a decision reflecting 
his party's wishes. 
Many had hoped that after Ben Gurion's departure frorn the political scene the 
nation's policy toward the commern oration of EtzcI and Lehi dead would change: 
"Mr. Eshkol who, unlike Mapai's former leader, has not been consLimed by hatred will 
certainly repair the iniquities committed by the party leader who imbibed so much 
from the cup of enmity. " 3 Arnong those sarne iniquities was the refusal to inter 
Jabotinsky in Israel. This perception was not exclusive to Flerut. The politically 
neutral media also reported that government readiness to change its policy was t, zn 
dependent upon the change in personalities seated at the head of Mapai: "For more 
than 15 years, Mr. Ben Gurion, during all the governments he headed, consistently 
and tenaciously refused to make the decision that would permit execution of Zeev 
Jabotinsky's will" reported Maariv. The newspaper Nvent on to describe the numerous 
occasions the issue was raised before the -overninent, in addition to the endless 
formal and informal requests made by a myriad of Israeli and foreign organizations: 
Begin. NI., 8 Juk, 1964, Heria. (I IebreN\) 
Tagg, E.. 12 AUQUSt 1963. Herut. (Hebre\%) 
'Ibid. 
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it was impossible to find anyone among Mapai's top leaders, excluding Ben 
Gurion, who was willing to publicly state that he objected [to this act]... As 
soon as the obstacle of this one individual's personal aversion was removed, 
the government unanimously voted as it did-The very fact of this common 
consent from a government whose composition had not changed since Ben 
Gurion appears to confirin that one person alone was averse to returning 
Jabotinsky's remains to his Country and that it was he alone who had coerced 
his party, his colleagues, his rivals and the entire public. 4 
Herut's hopes that Eshkol would behave differently with respect to the place 
allocated to their fallen in the nation's collective memory were also fulfilled in several 
ways. Consider, for example, the character and naine of the national memorial day. 
After the occasion's name was changed in 1957 from "Remembrance Day for the 
Fighters for Sovereignty" to "Remembrance Day for IDF Martyrs, "' both of which 
intlinated exclusion of Etzel and Lehi dead. it was again changed in 1963 to a inore 
universal version: "Remembrance Day for the Martyrs of1srael's Campaigns. " 
In addition to new nomenclature and laws, other symbolic gestures confirmed 
this modification in policy. During the 1963 observations Y12al Allon, then Minister ID 
of Labor, participated in the ceremony conducted at the graves of the Ole. y HaGardoin 
(the seven hanged in the Acre prison) in Safed's cemetery. He laid a wreath on Dov 
Gruner's grave and eulogized the dead. This was the first time in history that an Israeli 
government official participated in a mernorial service for the underground's dead, Z-1 
and represented the first sign of their recognition as official war dead. The newspaper 
TIaBoker reported this precedent thUSly: "Until now, Israel's ministers were not wont 
to do so ... Fifteen years after establishment of 
the State, it would be a national 
4,11aariv, 17 April 1964. (Hebre\\ 
.) I-lie Commemoration Unit, undated. 1'17c Histon, qf1he Commemoration Unit, I cl A\ i\ : \Ministi-N of' 
Defense, p. 13. (liebre\\) 
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disgrace to ignore soldiers because of differences in their beliefs. Mr. Allon has 
understood th I S.,, 6 
In 1967, on the eve of the Six Day War, Meriachein Begin was invited to 
participate in Eshkol's coalition government. Eshkol was desirous of creating a broad- 
based coalition so as to reinforce Israel's stance toward the war about to erupt. Begin's 
participation expedited the taking of some additional steps toward inclusion of the 
underground's dead within official remernbrance. For instance, HI 1968, Eshkol's 
government announced "a decoration to the soldiers in the battle for the rebirth of the 
State of Israel, " to be awarded "to all those who were members in one of the armed 
organizations or those organizations having a military character that fought for the 
rebirth of the State of Israel from the period of the Shorrier until 15 May 1948. " 
7 The 
decoration was given to members of the Shomer, Nih, the Hagana, Etzel, Lehi, 
soldiers participating in the Jewish Brigades during World War 1, soldiers who served 
in the British army during World War 11, as well as those who were partisans and tý 
resistance fighters during the Holocaust. The awards ceremony, conducted at the 
official residence of the President of Israel, was the first occasion on which Etzel and 
Lehi fighters and the kin of their fallen had received public recognition of their 
contribution to the nation-building effort. 8 n 
When confronted with these developments, members of the Histadrut's 
Ideology Committee met in spring 1974 to discuss the Issue Linder the heading: "How 
to Preserve the Labor Movement's Hegemony. " Their conclusions were publicized in 
the collection edited by Yehuda Gotthelf and Bezalel Shahar. entitled: Labor 
HaBokcr, 30 April 1963. (IlchreN\ )- 
(Hchi c\\ (joN ernment ofIsracl. 25 March 1968, Decision No. 30, 
'Chairman of the Ftzcl Veterans Association, II Julý 1968. letter to Begin. M.. Jabotinský Institute 
Archives. 4\i - x20D. (I lebrew) 
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Movement Hegemony - What Does the Future Hold? 
9 During the original meeting, 
Gotthelf, Davar's former editor, warned that: "The danger to the Labor camp in Israel 
is escalating. "' 0 Others contended that "The motto coined by Ben Gurion -'No Herut 
and no Maki' - was verv effective inasmuch as it referred to much more than the 
plans to expand any single coalition [government]. It identified the [nation's] 
productive forces, with Mapai at their center. "' I From their point of view, Herut's 
participation in the coalition had distorted the natural order of governance and had, in 
essence, forced the Labor Movement to move "from a situation of relative monopoly 
to a situation of coin petition. " 12 
In 1977, Menachem Begin, as head of the Likud, rose to power. Mapai 
members and supporters., the hegernonic group lodged within Israel's political culture, 
reftised to recognize this event as legitimate within the context of democratic 
government. Their feelings were expressed by the author Yoram Kanluk, vho 
declared that "they have robbed us of the country. " 13 Kaniuk's "us" was the same 
group that after decades of political 
dominance and cultural hegemony, Dan Horwitz 
would characterize as "secular, Ashkenazi, personally successful and connected to 
Labor Movement institutions. " 14 
1978 was the first year that a government headed by Menachem Begin Nvas to 
celebrate Remembrance Day and Independence Day. It appears that Begin took 
advantage of this occasion to close an historical circle. Recalling that Ben Gurion had 
forbidden rnembers, of the underground to march in the nation's first military parade 
1) Cotthe I f. Y. and Shahar, B., 1974, Parshiot, p. 35ý Te I A% i% : Histadrut. (liebrc%% ) 
if) Gotthel t, , 
Y.. remarks made at the Ideolog) Committee meeting. spring, 1974, cited in Gotthelf. Y. and 
Shahar, B., 1974, Labor Alovemew llcgemoiýv -- What Does the Future flohl" internal memorandum. 
Tel A\ iN : Histadrut. (Iiebre\ý) 
'' Peres. Y.. cited in Gotthell, and Shahar, B., 1974ý L01101' I f0l', '117CIII 11Cý, -CM017_1' What Mes the 
Flaw-c 11ohl" internal memorandum. Tel A\ k: flistadrut, p. 5. (Flebi-c%\ 
fbid- p. 7. 
Kaniuk, Y., cited in Hor\ýitz, D.. 1993). Se f-Portrail. Tel A\ i\ : Ketcrý p. 148. ([Icbl-e\\ 
lbid- p. 147. 
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(1949), Begin used the State's thirtieth anniversary to hold another parade, this time 
including the underground. Members of the Hagana, Etzel and Lehi were to march,, 
side-by-side, through tile streets of Jerusalem. Not everyone was pleased with the 
symbolic meaning of the event. From the Knesset's floor, the Ma'arach (a bloc of 
leftist parties built around Mapai) complained about the implied comparison between 
Hagana and underground contributions to the War of Independence and warned about 
"attempts to revise the history of the Yishuv. " 15 Hagana and Palmach veterans 
organized themselves into an informal lobby and called for kibbutz members to 
boycott the march. 16 The government nevertheless decided to hold the military parade 
as planned. 17 
The political behavior revealed by the study indicates the parallelism of the 
strategies adopted by the two contending parties, as dell neated bv Gusfield and his 
colleagues. Their approach differentiates between class politics - the formal political Z: I 
framework in which groups attempt to fulfill the material interests of their supporters 
by attending to budgets, political appointments, and economic, security or social ZýI 
policy - and status politics, the symbolic struggle for legitimacy, status, and image 1ý Z-- 
within the public space. 19 Mapai, as could be expected from a ruling party, 
immediately began highly diversified parliamentary and coal ition-bu i Idi fig activity in ZD . ZD 
tandem with assiduous efforts to construct the nation's collective memory, including 
its historiographical and educational elements. Alternatively, Herut channeled all its Z71 
political and partiamentarv eneroies to historical rehabilitation of the role it had 
i I)avarý 18 October 1977. (1 lebi-e\\ ) 
Davai% 20 Octoher 1977. (1 lebrew) 
Gmernment of Israel. 17 October 1977. Minutes of Meetim, No. 28. Jerusalem: The Gmernment 
Arclikes. ( ficbi-c\N ) 
13 CiLisficld, 1.. 1963. SYmbolic Crusade. I jrbana: Unk ersit\ oflthnois Press. 
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played in the War of Independence. This airn guided Herut policy even after it 4ý 
achieved power. 
In the first elections held in Israel, Herut a very respectable 15 seats In tile 
Knesset, which transformed it into Israel's second largest party and tile chief 
opposition party. Nonetheless, it made no effort to be included into the goverm-ricrit or 
to offer an alternative to Mapai's policies. In the face of Mapai's efforts at 
delegitimation, aimed at excluding Herut from the centers of power and national 
decision making, Herut's vision remained turned toward the past more than the 
present, toward its image rather than its policy. It presented itself as the sole bastion of 
national morality and declared that it would never join a coalition led by David Ben 
Gurion, even if invited to do so. 19 Such behavior contributed to its ii-nage as an actor 
neither pragmatic nor interested in playing the game of class politics. After the Z-1 
General Zionists (Liberal camp) withdrew from the ruling coalition in 1955, which 
left open the possibility of Herut joining Ben Gurion's government, it was Begin who 
rejected the initiative on the basis of impractical and general arguments, a move 
contrary to those required of political garne players. "The crumbling foundations of 
Mapai's regime contradict the principles held by the Herut Movement, " he argued, 
adding: "We do not barter over principles ... We will resist Mapai's regime until it n 
fa I IS. "N' Another opportunity missed to join a Mapai-led government arose in 196 1.21 
It appears that the substance of these actions concurs with Yonathan Shapiro's 
argument that "Herut acted on the symbolic and rnythic plain, and not on the 
pragmatic plain as did other parties.... " 22 Flerut was to maintain this pattern even after 
it attained control of the government in 1977, that is, it did not function as the rulm- 
llairu 1-. 27 Juk 195 1ýI luarei-- 14 Au2ust 195 LO I cbl'c\\ 
20 11critt, 19 August 195 5. (Hebrc\N 
Medina. 1992. The Hel'Ut Deleuitination Theorý - Political and Acadcrnic Mýth or Rcalitý'. ) State, 
Regime 017d 117WI-17otiOl7al RchltiOl7s 36. (1 lehre\\ 
Shapiro. Y.. 1989, Choscii to Command. Tel Aýiv: Siftiat Hapoalim. p. 128. (lIcbrc\\) 
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power but as an opposition movement still trying to obtain political legitimac'y for its 
success. This was expressed, among other things, in its appointment of Moshe Dayan, 
the Mapai leader and former general, to the post of Foreign Minister, to the preference Zn 
for David Levi, the Moroccan populist rather than Shinuel Katz, the Etzel veteran who 
seemed the natural choice to fill cabinet post; and to the appointment of former 
officers rather than Revisionist Movement members to other government posts. 
23 
It should be stressed, following Bar On, that irrespective of the interpretive 
stratagems of historians, objective numerical, class and economic variables, the 
factors that support the level of input to the narrative, have driven groups to the 
margins of history. Stated simply, some groups were never at center stage nor 
subsequently driven aside. The historiography of dominant groups, which indeed 
often prefiers to minimize the contributions of other groups, was able to ignore thern 
because of the centrality of the dominant group within the public space. 24 In terms of 
the number of fighters, like the number of fallen, the scope of the battles and total war 
effort, the organizational framework and size of its political support, the Hagana was 
the major force that waged the War of Independence and provided the foundations for 
the IDF. Ho,, vever, alonaside the Hagana were groups smaller in number and narrower 
in scope. These were excluded from the historical texts written during the Ben Gurion 
era despite the fact that, according to Aharonson, their actions followed the same 
models constructed by their mutual spiritual fathers. After all, it was Zeev Jabotinsky 
who, together with Joseph Trurnpeldor, envisioned and in fact created the first Jewish 
military force in the form of the Jewish regiments that served in the British army 
durm- World War 1. By doing so, they. too, were forerunners of the independent 
State's armed forces as well as of the active Jewish resistance to the Arab challenge in 
11 Katz. S.. 1981.13ci-cli ofl'oiier, Bereft of Glorv, Tel Aý i\ : D% ir. (Hebrew) 
Bar On. N 1- 1996. The Unrecorded tor YahaAi 71? 7ane, vnu, 10, pp... (lJebrc\\ 
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Israel. Moreover, as Aharonson continues, Jabotinsky was the father of the idea of an 
independent Jewish state at a very early stage, a stage at which the leaders of Zionist n 
institutions such as Chaim Weitzinann, and heads of the Labor Movement such as 
David Ben GLirion, did not dare to even imagine such a prospect. 25 
Irrespective of these facts, Ben Gurion preferred to appropriate the statist 
project for himself, to identify it totally with his own person even more than with his 
movernent. As the figure responsible for the national resurrection project, he created, 
as Shapiro argues, "the identification of 'sovereignty' with 'Mapai-ism, ' what would 
lead to a situation where Mapai's form of 'factionalism' would be perceived as less 
party-oriented than that of its competitors. , 
26 Ben Gurion and the Ministry of Defense, 
during his term as its Minister, progressively operated as an Orwcllian "ministry of 
.,, 
27 - Israel's citizens to become free i-ncn from the point of view of truth While assistint, 
Rousseau, it persuaded them to internalize thought patterns conceived by its leader 
and to view competing attitudes as unfeasible and antagonist to national sovereignty. 
28 
In this respect, Ben Gurion himself declared that: 
What cannot be accomplished by means of law and government, can [be 
accomplished] ... by the force of 
ideas., and examples will be provided by the 
party'. " This position supported his positive attitude toward "party education 
[indoctrination], that is, political education within tile State ... as it should 
be. 21) 
The purpose of the associated steps was to preserve the power relations 
enjoyed during the period of the Yishuv but within a democratic framework. Only 
I- "Aharorlson, S. 1999. Dovid Ben Gurion, Decline qfthe Renaissance's Leadci-, Scle Boker: I . 1ni\ersit) 
of Beer a press. pp. 209-210. ýflcbrew) 
2"Shapira. A.. 1985, [1-0117 DiSInissal (? / the Hagands Conunundor to the Dismontlu, ýg ol the Palln(Ich, 
Tel A\ iý : liakibbutz I lametichad, p. 60. (1-lehre\\) 
()i \\cII. (j- 1971. llv, ý4ý 1 ci A\ i\ ý Am O\ cd. (Ilehic\\ edition) 
28 Rousscauý JJ.. On the Social Contract. cited in B. Susser and D. Tzur (eds. ). 1990. Polnicýd Fheoi-V, 
Selected Rmdinýgs, I ct A\ i\ : Shocken, pp. 273-3 12. (Hebre\\ ) 
2')Beri (411*iOll, D., 8 April 1949. Remarks made at a meeting of' Mapai members in the offices of' tile 
Prime Minister. cited in Shapira. A.. 1985ý p. 62. (1-lebrew) 
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now, "the focus of education and inspiration had shifted frorn the pioneering 
movements to the party. "'O Ben Gurion continued: Although intellectuals and opinion 
makers supported Mapai's leadership in the pre-State era of the Yishuv, "this is 
inadequate [now] ... We need to channel all our intellectuals toward a specific political 
path ... and gird that path with examples taken 
from the party. " 31 Shapira's statement 
that "whoever does not directly link what was good for Ben Gurion's and what was 
good for the State can readily conceive of a different course of development for the 
defense system" 32 was not made in vain. 
Ben Gurion's target audience was comprised of those who had not personally 
experienced the War of Independence. The first generation of Israel's citizens had 
formed their opinions and acquired information directly from the events; some had 
even participated in the fighting. Instead, Ben Gurion's sights were set on the second 
generation of citizens, especially the waves of new immigrants who arrived in the 
1950s. This audience would vote in future elections and determine the political 
leadership. Ben Gurion was far from being glib when he stated: "The ingathering of 
the exiles [kibbutz galtiyot] is the State of Israel's primary concern. " He then called 
upon the populace to take an example from "those few citizens, such as the Yaakov 
and Zvi Maimon brothers, and Rikva and Mordechai Guber" who had assisted in 
absorbing and educating immigrants. 33 While these activities were motivated by the 
desire to assimilate the masses of newcomers, they also presented opportunities to 
transmit political messages to these fresh audiences in the form of commemorative ZD 
-, (' Shapira, A.. 198-5. p. 022. 
31 See footnote 29. 
32 Shapira. A.. 1985, p. 64. 
3 ', Ben Gurion. D. 1963. IntrodUCtiOll. YL-kor \olume in memorN of- Varda Friedman, killed \ýhilc 
\\orkinp to absorb innniprants: see Chnptcr Fi%e. 
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ceremonies, such as the military parades. 34 Official monuments were likewise 
employed: They became points on "the patriotic map of Israe I' 1,35 as Azaryahu calls 
them, major stopovers on ficIdtrips organized for schoolchildren and immigrants. 36 
In general, the approach termed the "as if' methodolo y allows the scholar to 19 
equate organizations with their leaders 3' despite the fact that the organizations 
themselves often display differences of opinion and attitudes polar to those finally 
chosen and molded by the leadership into the organization's policy. Ben Gurion more 
than decided policy, he also dictated the policy of governing the elite's attitude to the 
construction of collective inemory, as he did for every other arena of public life. 
Acceptance of authority - or obedience to that authority - avowed by him as a 
fundamental principle at the beginnings of his career in the Yishuv, continued to be 
central to his personality and style of governance. 
It followed that anyone who differed with Ben Gurion was seen as unworthy 
of taking part in any ruling coalition that he might construct. His determination to 
exclude Herut from every position of political power expressed this attitude. A 
breach in the acceptance of his authority by Herut's leaders in the pre-State period was 
never forgotten. Mapai's attempts at coalition building were carefully and consciously 
directed toward creating a system of alliances that would prevent Herut from 
attaching itself to other parties, a process that guaranteed its isolation .38 But more: 
Throughout his (jovernment career, Ben Gurion refused to call Herut's leader, 
Menachem Begin, by name. In Knesset debates he would refer to Begin as "the person zn I:, 
34 For example. on Independence Day 195 1, the military parade held in Jerusalem included a column of' 
children from Ein Kerein immiorant transit camps. See Davar. 10 May 195 1. (Hebrew) 
-AzarNahu. NJ., 1995. Statc Ranul, ý. Sde Bokcr: Hen (Jurion Arclikc,,, 1). 210. (Hcbtc\N) 
36 lhid. ý pp. 210-211ý ,7 Doron, G. and Sencdý L 22000. Political Bargaining. London: Saý, e, p. 21. 
_ (,., 1992ý 1ý1 1,0/i 
3S(i Idter, lc/, 0)IýtN lical 
Partic. ý FI-0177 11ass Parties to P-7ectoral Parties. rcl A\ i\ 
Rarnot. p. 34. (lichrc\\) 
365 
sitting beside Knesset Member Bader. " As he would explain it, this habit was similar 
to that of individuals who avoid calling a inonster by its name. 39 
Only after Ben GLirion was replaced as Mapai's head did the Situation change. 
Mapai, while it remained in power, began to display readiness to expose Israel's 
collective memory to the historical contributions made by its rivals in the effort to 
establish the State. We may even conclude that this attitude accelerated the transition 
to a period termed by students of the Israeli regime as "the period of the disintegration 
of Mapai dominance. " 40 These factors, together with Herut's initial participation in 
government led to public legitimation of Begin as a political leader and, a decade 
later, to Herut's success in the 1977 elections. 
In November 1952, Uri Avneri, the editor of the leading radical left weekly 
HaOlam 11aZeh, wrote an article in the form of an open letter to Prime Minister David 
Ben Gurion; its heading read "Subject: Private Heroes. ,41 At the time, it appeared that 
Ben Gurion was about to end his tenure as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. 
Avneri's request was for Ben Gurion to perform "a great act of justice": "My appeal is 
that in your capacity as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, you demolish all the 
sorry barriers that separate between men and between graves., and introduce unity and 
equality amorig my friends, members of my (Terieration who, under different flags and - -1 t-n 
mottoes fell for the sake of Israel's rebirth. " Avneri's letter was the result of his 
understanding that official commemoration policy, as formulated by Mapai, reflected 
the decisions of one man only; hence, responsibility for that policy was personal: 
The courage to adinit their mistakes is required by all the sides. Surrcnderiug 
Je,, N ish fi-hters to the British Secret Police, who tortured thern in cellars and 
19 Arian. A.. 1990. Politics and Goi, crinnew in Lyrael. Tcl A \, i\: /inora Bitan, p. 19. (Hebre\v) 
%oldbergo. 1992. p. 37. 
4 lAvneri. U. 26 No\ ember 19ý2. HaOlam HaZeh. (I iebrew) 
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drove them into exile, is a painful episode. Yet, charitable gestures, admitting 
one's errors and abandoning one's pride are the qualities demanded of a 
national leader. A leader such as you, who was directly responsible for 
glorious chapters of the War offildependence, can allow himself these traits. 
42 
Avneri goes on to explain that denial and exclusion of the underground's 
members and fallen frorn Israel's the pantheon of bereavement and heroism is not only 
immoral, but it provokes social ills and schisms, the evolution of a dominant, statist 
political culture together with a private and insulated counter-culture. Ben Gurion, 
Avneri believed, had helped many bereaved families to feel that they were partners in 
the nation-building project although, at the same time, "he had prevented a significant 
portion of Jewish youth from feeling that they themselves were also real partners in 
the state to which they had contributed so much. " Avneri concludes his analysis of the 
political implications of Ben Gurion's policies thusly: 
At one end of the altar of youth the independent tradition of the Palmach was 
practically born-that [now] views itself as persecuted and discriminated 
against. At the other extreme, Beitar holds private memorial services to the 
Oley HaGardoin, the Nili episode, the defense of Tel Hai, the ghetto uprisings, 
Hannah Senesh and her comrades, the various underground organizations and 
their programs, illegal immigration and the 'War of Independence, all these are 2ý ZI 
found in private correspondence filled with mutual accusations, in nurturing ZD 
private rituals, honoring private heroes and writing private histories. This is a 
43 
worrisome and morbid phenomenon. 
The politics of the production of collective memory did not end with the 
decline of Mapai dominance. Indeed, the groups that paid the greatest price for that 
political dominance penetrated the social consensus. the map of commemorative 





However, an incident that transpired recently attests to Israel's continued 
preoccupation with the subject. In May 2001, I-Imor Livnat, the Minister of 
Education, notified the public of her disqualification for use in the public schools of a 
history text dealing with the twentieth century. 44 Tile book, she contended, minimizes 
the value of the Revisionist heritage and distorts Zionist history while adopting a 
critical perspective regarding Israel's struggle for independence. 45 
Livnat, the daughter of important Lehi activists and members of the 
Revisionist Movement (the "national family" as they are frequently referred to), 
serves as a minister representing the ruling party, the Likud, and is identified with its 
hawkish wing. Her steps against the trend that the history text represents are Zý 
surprising frorn an historical perspective because they relate to the exclusion of 
educational texts "darnaging" to the image presented of the infant State of Israel, led Z, -I 
by Mapai with Ben Gurion at its head, as just and responsible. Although the textbook 
portrays the underground's contributions during the per-State period as marginal, it 
does provide some details about their struggle. Yet, in objecting to the book, Livnat z1_ 
was paradoxically continuing Mapai's cainpaign to further its own public and political 
standing. Consider the irony: The daughter of Lehi members who had experienced 
discreditation as well as political delegitimation of their efforts in the nation-building 
project, a process that had excluded them from positions of influence and power, was 
to counter any attempt to darnage the positive image of those who had executed that 
exclusionary policy once she herself had achieved government office! Livnat did not 
target the book's rehabilitation of Etzel and Lehi as the desirable political project; 
instead, she chose to preserve the image of her party's historical rivals. 
'44 Jacobi. D. (Fd. )ý 1999, .1 World in Change. . 1crusn1cm: 
Nlinistr\ of Iducation. (Ifebrc\ý) 
45, rhe Minister decision reflected the conclusions reached bý a spcciallý comened commission, as 
recommended by the Kncsset Education Committee, for the purpose of' examining the text. See Special 
Commission for Review of ,, I [Vorld in Change, Final Re1wrt, 4 March 2001 (Flebrew). 
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The case of Livnat and the history text is interesting because it illuminates a 
larger issue, that of tile political trans form ation that Israeli society has undergone after 
the period discussed in the study (1949-1963)). The historical rivalry between the two 
political carrips who were "partners" in the struggle for establishment of the State, the 
Labor Movement and the Revisionist Movement, has been reconstructed into 
cooperation. Within this cooperative framework, the two camps are together 
contending with a new trend, ternfled "post-Zionisi-n" in the literature and the press. 
This trend is threatening the legitimacy of their common challenge - sustaining a 
Jewish democratic state in Israel - as experienced by each camp in its own way. 
Side-by-side. Limor Livnat and the leftist Meir Pa'11 waged a political and public 
battle against a textbook's entry into the education curriculum. Significantly, Pa'il, a 
veteran of the Hagana, had participated in the fighting against underground activists Z, zD 
and, as a military historian, had spearheaded the campaign to exclude Etzel and Leh] ZD 
from any mention in the historical literature. The two are jointly braving the attack 
launched by what some have argued is the new elite, the dominant group among 
Israel's academics and intellectuals. 46 This trend in historical revisionism is 
challenging more than just the approach adopted by each political and ideological 
camp in the nation-building project, it is also questioning the moral legitimacy of the 
project's very goal. 
40K arsh. L., 1999, Fahricaling Isrueli Hislor. i. Tel A\ i% :I lakibf)LItZ I lanicuchad, p. 11. (1 lebreýN) 
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